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**RISE OF THE
CHRISTIAN POWER IN INDIA**

**BY
MAJOR B. D. BASU, I.M.S. (Retired)**

VOL. IV

**R. CHATTERJEE
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PREFACE

Some of the chapters of this volume originally appeared as serial articles in *The Modern Review*, from which they are reprinted by the kind permission of its editor.

This volume contains many facts gleaned from the records of Britishers to account for the rise of the Christian Power in India—facts not referred to in any work on Indian History of the British period written by foreigners or Indians.

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ERRATA

- p. 53, line 1, for "*on*" read "an".
- p. 74, line 17, for "this" „ "his".
- p. 163, „ 10, for "Malcom's" read "Malcolm's".
- p. 178, last line, for "when *the* was" read "when *he* was".
- p. 231, line 7, add "to" before "be".
- „ , „ 9, for "Gangadbar" read "Gangadhar".
- p. 245, „ 4, for "remakable" „ "remarkable".
- p. 256, „ 8 from bottom, for "1924" read "1824".
- p. 282, „ 6, „ , for "preporties" read
"properties".
- p. 345, line 15, for "his" read "its".
- „ , „ 19, for "rudenes" read "rudeness".
- p. 417, „ 15, for "appointments" read "appurtenances".
- p. 427, „ 13, from bottom, for "stategy" read
"strategy".
- p. 437, line 3, for "This" read "The".
- p. 467, line 5 from bottom, for "all" read "further".
- p. 469, line 14, for "doctrine" read "doctrine".
- p. 477, line 13, omit "and".
- p. 479, line 25, for "teaties" read "treaties".
- After line 22, page 482, read paragraphs 2, 3 and 4
of page 487.

RISE OF THE Christian Power in India

CHAPTER XLII

The First Lord Minto's Administration

(1807-1813 A. D.)

The unjust and aggressive war on the Maratha princes commenced by the Marquess Wellesley had been brought to a close in a manner not reflecting much credit either on the valour or on the diplomatic skill of the European Christian soldiers or administrators then in India. The retreat of the troops under the command of General Monson before Holkar ; Lord Lake's repeated failures in reducing the fort of Bharatpur ; the restoration of the fortress of Gwalior and the province of Gohud to the Maharaja Sindhia ; and finally, the restoration of his territories and possessions to Jeswant Rao Holkar, did not certainly raise the prestige of the European Christian generals and administrators in India. The Marquess Wellesley had also pressed the Maratha princes to accept his nefarious scheme

of Subsidiary Alliance. But excepting the Peishwa, no other Maratha prince,—neither Sindhia nor Holkar nor even the Raja of Berar, was willing to place this yoke on his own neck. *

The sum total, then, of the second Maratha war was this ; that the Raja of Berar and Sindhia were made to part with some of their fertile provinces, but they did not lose their independence and were not reduced to the position of feudatory princes, like the Nizam or the Peishwa, under the protection of the British Government of India. Holkar also was very fortunate, since he neither lost his independence nor any portion of his territory.

The British were then having a very critical time in India. The charm of their military supremacy was a thing of the past. They were the laughing stock of all the independent states of India. † Then

* British prestige in India had indeed fallen to a very low ebb, and it is necessary to go back to the expedition against the Marathas undertaken in the regime of Warren Hastings to find a parallel to the heavy blow which had been struck at British dominion in India. The ambitious designs of the Europeans had been frustrated.

† Lord Minto, in his secret and separate general letter dated May 16, 1808, to the Directors of the East India Company, concerning the disposition of the native states, wrote :—

“We have every reason to believe that all the states of India are satisfied of our disinclination to extend our

their throwing overboard the princes of Rajputana, especially the Rana of Gohud, who had rendered them assistance in their hour of need and without whose help they would have, in all probability, been swept out of the country, not only amounted to base ingratitude but bad faith of a diabolical character. Of course their designs regarding the native states, given expression to by Sir George Barlow already referred to in Chapter XL, were not known to the ruling princes of India.

dominions or to invade their rights, and of our solicitude to maintain peace. But those states of which the power and dominion have been abridged, or of which the influence has been circumscribed and against which the field of ambition and enterprise has been closed by the political position of the British power and ascendancy in India, cannot reasonably be supposed to entertain that sense of common interest with the British Government which should induce them to prefer the security of their actual condition to the alluring prospect of restored possessions, consequence, and authority. And demonstrations of the dangers to which their authority and independence would be exposed by the ambition of France would have little weight when opposed to the assurance of restoration to the dominion they have lost.

"With states of another description, engagements of co-operation might no doubt be formed, provided these engagements should involve obligations of defensive alliance against all enemies. Of such alliances there is too much reason to doubt the efficiency and policy."

The inhabitants of the territories then under the administration of the British Company were groaning under the pressure of taxation imposed on them. It should be remembered that England never spent a single farthing for the acquisition of India. The empire which the British have built for themselves in India was brought into existence wholly and solely at the expense of the treasure of the natives of India and mainly of their blood, too.

But not only did India pay for all these wars which enabled the British to establish their empire, but all the surplus revenue of India was drained out of the country to pay dividends to the Christian merchants constituting the East India Company. Even a writer of such liberal sentiments as James Mill, the well-known author of an Indian History, did not feel ashamed to say :

"The financial results of the operations of Government from the close of the first administration of the Marquis Cornwallis, till the present remarkable era, (i. e., 1806), should now be adduced. As regards the British nation, it is in these results that the good or evil of its operations in India is wholly to be found. *If India affords a surplus revenue which can be sent to England, thus far is India beneficial to England.*" (Vol. VI. p. 471)

But the wars which the Marquess Wellesley carried on, did not afford a surplus revenue which could be sent to England. It was on that account that the Directors of the East India Company in England ordered their Governor-General in India to

cease from war, and on his persisting in it, they were obliged to order his recall from India.

When Lord Minto arrived in India, the finances of the Government were tottering under the burden, imposed upon them by the Maratha war.*

* Lord Minto left England for India in December 1806 and assumed the reins of Government at Calcutta on July 3, 1807. He was a friend of Burke. Lady Minto in her work on Lord Minto in India writes:—

“Lord Minto’s early and intimate connection with Burke was the keynote of his political career. For that great man he formed an enthusiastic affection which was returned with so much tenderness and confidence that, when indulging after long years in a retrospect of their old friendship, he was able to say, ‘I believe I was among those whom Burke loved best, and most trusted.’

“It was no doubt due to Sir Gilbert’s ardent sympathy with the views and the labours of his friend that in 1782 he was designated as one of the seven Parliamentary Directors (the seven kings, as they were called) to be appointed under the provisions of Mr. Fox’s India Bill.

“The measure was lost, and as with it collapsed the ministry and the reign of the Whig party, the honour was a barren one; but his first appearance on the political stage in a leading part was nevertheless destined to be connected with the interests of India. Two sessions had passed since he and Mirabeau stood together at the Bar of the House of Commons to listen to the great tribune of England, when Sir Gilbert himself made his first important effort in that formidable assembly, and moved the impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey in a speech which elicited the warm admiration of its most illustrious members.

Such was the critical situation of the British during the latter half of the first decade of the nineteenth century. Their prestige as a military nation was at its lowest ebb; their treasuries were empty and their public credit was shaken.

"In the following year he became one of the managers in the trial of Warren Hastings. 'His earnest desire,' he said in his opening speech on that occasion, 'to befriend the natives of India had decided him to undertake a business in many respects most uncongenial to his nature.' But another determining cause was the urgency with which Burke besought him to throw off his modesty, 'his only fault', and the warmth of encouragement which hailed his opening effort. A note written in December 1787 and sent to Sir Gilbert with a book intended to be of use to him while engaged in the preparation of his charge against Sir Elijah Impey, ends thus :

'God bless you and forward your good undertaking. Stick to it. You have years before you, and if I were of your age, and had your talents and your manners, I should not despair of seeing India a happy country in a few years.

Yours Ever,

E. BURKE.' "

To understand his Indian policy, it is necessary to know something of his antecedents before his assumption of the office of Governor-General of India. Happily, the details of his pre-Indian career are supplied by the three volumes of his *Life and Letters* from 1752 to 1806 by his great niece, the Countess of Minto, published in 1874.

Although Lord Minto was a great friend of Burke, that friendship came to an end on the outbreak of the French Revolution. Henceforth he paid homage to Pitt, into whose

Lord Minto had to devise means for the defence of India. It should be remembered that at the time of which we are taking note, there was the possibility of rebellion of the inhabitants in the territories under the administration of the Europeans as well as of invasion of those territories by the independent powers of India, and possibly also by the sovereign of Afghanistan. Lord Minto fully understood the position and took measures to avert the dangers which stared the Europeans in the face.

It is necessary to describe the measures adopted by him, which saved the expulsion of his co-religionists and compatriots from India.

First of all, there was the possibility, as said before, of the inhabitants of those territories which were then under the administration of the British, rising in arms against the alien usurers of their

confidence he wormed himself. He had been offered the Governorship of Madras, but declined it. But Pitt rewarded his adhesion to him by appointing him Viceroy of Corsica, a post which he held till 1796. Afterwards he was appointed minister at Vienna and held the post until the end of 1801.

Pitt was no Little Englander. He was desirous of founding a British Empire in India to compensate for the loss of America. As a confidential friend and protege of Pitt, in all human probability, he was thoroughly acquainted with Pitt's views and so during his administration he tried to give effect to those views. This explains his vigorous foreign policy while ruling India.

rights and independence, and driving them out of the country. To prevent this contingency arising the Europeans acted on the maxim of *divide et impera* ; and also generally excluded Indians from offices of trust and posts of responsibility. But there was something worse. The state of disorder then existing in Bengal was such that it could not have been worse if Lord Minto and his predecessors had deliberately devised means to prevent the people from uniting, on the assumption that in the miseries of the natives of India lay the strength of their European rulers and that it was therefore necessary to create distractions, disorder and confusion among them. There is, of course, no proof to show that dacoits were let loose among them, or that dacoities were encouraged. But there are also no records to show that any effective steps were taken to prevent dacoities. Lord Dufferin, in his famous speech at St. Andrew's Dinner, Calcutta, on the 30th of November, 1888, said :—

“Indeed, it was only the other day that I was reading a life of Lord Minto, who mentions incidentally that in his time whole districts within twenty miles of Calcutta were at the mercy of dacoits, and this after the English had been more than fifty years in the occupation of Bengal.”

But Lord Dufferin did not offer any explanation for the existence of dacoits and the perpetration of dacoities in Bengal. It should be remembered that the natives of England had been ruling in Bengal

ever since their gaining the battle of Plassey in 1757. They had established their supremacy there for above half a century, and yet it is a significant fact that dacoits thrived and flourished there when Lord Minto was the Governor-General.*

Regarding the dacoits and their offences, James Mill writes :—

“This class of offences did not diminish under the English Government and its legislative provisions. It increased, to a degree highly disgraceful to the legislation of a civilized people. *It increased under the English Government, not only to a degree of which there seems to have been no example under the native Governments of India, but to a degree surpassing what was ever witnessed in any country in which law and government could with any degree of propriety be said to exist.*” (V. 387).

From the sentences we have put in italics, it might be possible for a historian to suggest that the

* To be fair to Lord Minto, it is necessary to say that the dacoits were not brought into existence by him ; but the dacoits and the dacoities were the results of the so-called judicial reforms of the Marquess Cornwallis. There can be no doubt that the Marquess Cornwallis introduced these so-called reforms with the object of creating distractions in India. Lord Minto took advantage of the state of affairs then prevailing in the territories under his administration, and it does not appear that he ever took such effective steps to either bring the dacoits to book or to prevent the dacoities from taking place as were undertaken by his successor, the Marquess of Hastings, to ostensibly crush the Pindarees.

British Government of India of that period had a hand in encouraging dacoits for the purposes already mentioned above. But in the absence of positive proof, we would not go so far. We would only say that effective steps were not taken to put down or even to discourage dacoities.

Sir Henry Strachey, one of the British judges in India in the beginning of the nineteenth century, also wrote :—

“The crime of dacoity has, I believe, increased greatly, since the British administration of justice.”

In 1808, the judge of circuit in the Rajeshahye division also wrote :—

“That dacoity is very prevalent in Rajeshahye has been often stated. But if its vast extent were known ; if the scenes of horror, the murders, the burnings, the excessive cruelties, which are continually perpetrated here, were properly represented to Government, I am confident that some measures would be adopted, to remedy the evil Yet the situation of the people is not sufficiently attended to. It cannot be denied, that, in point of fact, there is no protection for persons or property.”

Mr. Dowdeswell, the Secretary to Government, reported in 1809, that :—

“To the people of India there is no protection, either of persons or of property.”

Regarding the operations of the dacoits, James Mill truly observed :—

“Such is the military strength of the British Government in Bengal, that it could exterminate all the in-

habitants with the utmost ease ; such at the same time is its *civil* weakness, that it is unable to save the community from running into that extreme disorder where the villain is more powerful to intimidate than the Government to protect." (V. p ; 410).

Would it be very unfair to infer from the above extracts that it was not the policy of the Government of those days to protect the people against the dacoits, for the prosperity and welfare, and consequent strength of the people meant danger to the alien, unsympathetic and selfish rulers of the land during that period ? This was the state of affairs in India after over half-a-century's administration of the country by the servants of the East India Company. *

* It is necessary to give Lord Minto's explanation of the existence of dacoits and the perpetration of dacoities. In a letter to Lady Minto, extracts from which are given in "Lord Minto in India" (page 185), Lord Minto wrote:—

"They (the dacoits) have of late come within thirty miles of Barrackpore. The crime of gang robbery has at all times, though in different degrees, obtained a footing in Bengal. The prevalence of the offence, occasioned by its success and impunity, has been much greater in this civilised and flourishing part of India, than in the wilder territories adjoining, which have not enjoyed so long the advantages of a regular and legal government ; and it appears at first sight mortifying to the English administration of these provinces, that our oldest possessions should be the worst protected against the evils of lawless violence.

A passing allusion must be made here to the tone adopted by all British writers on Indian history while speaking of the benefits conferred by their rule on the people of India. These writers are never tired of describing, by mainly indenting on their imagination, the so-called anarchy alleged to have prevailed in India on the break-up of the Moghul Empire. But so far they have not adduced

"It has been said that the prosperity and undisturbed tranquillity of these lower provinces, which have never seen war within their limits during the present generation of their inhabitants, that is to say, for half a century, have afforded two inducements to the desperate associations which have so constantly harassed them under the name of dacoits. First, the riches of the country have presented the temptation of good plunder. Second, the long security which the country has enjoyed from foreign enemies, and the consequent loss of martial habits and character, have made the people of Bengal so timid and enervated, that no resistance is to be apprehended in the act, nor punishments afterwards. There have, however, certainly been other more specific causes for the extraordinary prevalence of the crime at particular quarters. Among these has been the nature of our judicial and police establishments. The judge and magistrate is an English gentleman ; but all his subordinate officers and instruments are necessarily *native*. The probity and good intention of the English magistrate may in general be relied upon ; but his vigilance, personal activity, intelligence, or talents, are not equal in all cases to his integrity. The consequence often is, that the practical and efficient part of the police is cast upon the black subaltern officers, amongst whom, it is hardly too much to

any evidence to prove that anarchy existed in India previous to the assumption of the Government of Bengal by the British. During the last days of the Moghul Empire, while that empire was *in extremis*, military adventurers and also the servants of the Moghul Emperors tried to dismember the empire and succeeded in setting up independent kingdoms in several provinces of India.

say, although it sounds like an uncharitable partiality to my own fair complexion, that there is scarcely an exception to universal venality and corruption."

There is a proverb current in India that whosoever goes to Lanka (Ceylon) turns a cannibal. So it was no wonder that Lord Minto, who, as Sir Gilbert Elliot, was a friend of Burke, had moved the impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey and been one of the managers of the trial of Warren Hastings, should, after breathing the atmosphere of the Anglo-Indian society of India, have nourished uncharitable feelings towards the people of India, and libelled and abused them to his heart's content. It is natural for Anglo-Indians to credit their countymen with whatever good traits they discover in the administration of India, and impute the faults to the native Indian officers or natives of the country whenever anything goes wrong in the government of this country. Yes, Indians are made scapegoats for all crimes of omission and commission in Indian affairs ! The British officers—those who constituted the class whom Lord Minto's deceased friend Burke described as 'birds of prey and passage in India', who came out to India to shake the pagoda tree and grow rich and on their return to their native country to play "Nabobs", were all immaculate beings and therefore "the probity and good intentions of the

It was in this manner that Asaf Jah at Haidarabad and Saadat Khan in Oude established their independent principalities. But there was no anarchy or internal disorder anywhere. There was no doubt some bloodshed, for no independent principality could have been brought into existence without waging wars and fighting battles. But it can be proved from historical facts that there were more wars and battles in Europe during the 18th, and the beginning of the 19th century—in fact till the defeat and capture of Napoleon at Waterloo—than in India at the time when the Moghul Empire was tottering to pieces, or independent principalities

English magistrate may in general be relied upon." Lord Minto was a believer in the myth that the co-religionists and compatriots of Clive and Warren Hastings were, like Cæsar's wife, above all suspicion.

In some of the extracts made above, it is admitted that in the territories ruled by Native princes there was not such anarchy as in the adjoining British territory. Yet these Native territories had subordinate officers derived from the same class of Indians as that from which the corresponding class of the Indian servants of the East India Company were drawn. Had the Company then the misfortune of attracting to its service a very much larger proportion of rascals than were drawn to the service of the Native princes? In Lord Minto's opinion, British territory was richer than the adjoining native territory, and that was one cause of the dacoities in the British territory. But where are the proofs of this superior wealth? That British subjects were emasculated is a damaging admission.

and states were being raised by the disloyal servants of the Moghul Emperors or by the Marathas or Rajputs. But the rulers of all these newly established states made it a principal object of their administration to be acquainted with the wants and desires of their subjects and to afford protection to their persons and properties. It cannot be said that anarchy or internal disorder existed in any form or shape in these newly raised independent states. But this cannot be said of the British rulers of that age and the territories under their administration. It seems that they never cared for the welfare or prosperity of their subjects whose persons and properties they never took any step to protect.

It is also a singular fact that distractions and disorders commenced to appear in the different states of India not very long after the British established themselves as a political power in Bengal. It may hence be presumed that the Europeans sent emissaries to the states and principalities of Indian India to create distraction and confusion and disorder in them in order that they might be able to extend their power. It was the Europeans who helped the Nawab Vizir of Oude to murder in cold blood the brave inhabitants of Rohilkhand.

So then, though it may not have been a matter of political expediency during the administration of

Lord Minto not to give peace or afford security to the persons and properties of the inhabitants of the territories then under the rule of the East India Company, such peace and security were not enjoyed by them.

But the rising in arms of Indians of their own territories against their tyrannical rule was not the only danger which the British had to apprehend. The Marathas had been defeated but not altogether crushed. It was quite possible for them to combine again and take revenge on their British persecutors and aggressors. The persecutions to which Holkar had been subjected for so many years, the disappointments which he had met with, told on his health and he went out of his mind and became insane in 1808. Holkar was an ambitious prince and his becoming insane was very fortunate for the British at this critical period of their existence in India. So Lord Minto had no fear from Holkar. The character of Jeswant Rao Holkar has been thus described by Captain Grant Duff. He writes :—

“The chief feature of Jeswant Rao Holkar’s character was that hardy spirit of energy and enterprise which, though, like that of his countrymen, boundless in success, was also not to be discouraged by trying reverses. He was likewise better educated than Marathas in general, and could write both the Persian language and his own: his manner was frank, and could be courteous . . . In person his stature was low, but he was of a very active

strong make ; though his complexion was dark, and he had lost an eye by the accidental bursting of a match lock, the expression of his countenance was not disagreeable, and bespoke something of droll humor, as well as of manly boldness." (P. 606)

The derangement of the intellect of such a prince was not a small gain to the British, who were further fortunate when it was settled that the government of Holkar's dominions should be administered by a regency controlled by Ameer Khan, but under the nominal authority of Tulsibai, the favourite mistress of Jeswant Rao. On the death of Jeswant Rao, she adopted Mulhar Rao Holkar, a boy of four years of age, and in his name, continued to govern.

Ameer Khan was a Pathan soldier of fortune, and a leader of those men who were known in Indian history as Pindaries. The position which Ameer Khan came to occupy in the government of Holkar's dominion was an event highly favourable to the cause of the British. Captain Drant Duff writes :

"Ameer Khan was soon recalled to Rajputana in the prosecution of his own views, which were solely bent upon the extention of predatory power for the interest of himself and his ferocious band of Pathans.....When it suited his views of plunder, Ameer Khan sometimes advanced claims in Holkar's name but *those claims were not pressed where the consequences might involve the state of Holkar with the British Government.*" (P. 607).

The words put in italics in the above extract

clearly show how anxious Ameer Khan was to be in the good graces of the Christian Government of India. He further served as its cat'spaw by not bringing about order and good government in the state of which he was the virtual dictator. Grant Duff writes :—

"The Government, if such it may be designated, of Holkar was alternately swayed by two factions, the Marathas and the Pathans, who were constantly intriguing against each other, and nothing could exceed the state of anarchy which prevailed 'throughout the country'."

This was exactly what suited the purpose of the British rulers. For the same historian writes, that

"It was expected that their (the Maratha Chiefs') domestic wars, the plunder of their neighbours, and the fear of losing what they possessed, would deter them from hostile proceedings against the British Government."

So then it would not require much exercise of one's intelligence to infer that all the distractions and anarchy in the Holkar's Government, may have been created through the instrumentality of Ameer Khan and served the selfish ends of the British. From the Government of Holkar there was no danger to the Company; nay, on the contrary, from the fact that Ameer Khan was the virtual dictator of that state, they expected help and assistance from him to keep their position secure in India.

But from the other Maratha princes, especially

Sindhia, there was the danger of invasion of their territories. The frontiers of British India were at this time contiguous to those of the Maratha princes, *viz.*, the Raja of Berar and the Maharaja Sindhia. Both these princes had been defeated by the British Government and made to part with a large portion of their dominions. It was not impossible that these princes would take revenge on the Britishers, since vengeance sleeps long but never dies. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, that steps should be taken to prevent Sindhia, known to have been an ambitious prince, as well as the Raja of Berar from committing any mischief in British India. The finances of the Company were not such as to have allowed them to maintain a large army to guard their frontiers against the inroads of any of the Maratha princes. It seems to us that the British effected their own safety by creating distractions and disorders in the states of the Maratha Princes, not only by sending their own emissaries into those states, but keeping in their pay, as well as encouraging the Pindaries. We have arrived at this opinion by taking into consideration the facts and circumstances described below.

The Marquess Wellesley never concealed the fact that he desired to create distractions in the dominions of Dowlut Rao Sindhia when he was going to war with Tippu and trying to impose his scheme of subsidiary alliance on the neck of the

Peishwa. At that time Dowlut Rao Sindhia was in the Deccan and it was considered necessary by the Governor-General that that Prince should return to Hindustan. To effect this, he did not scruple to instruct his subordinates to devise means and send emissaries to that prince's dominion to stir up distractions. Again, when he wanted to go to war with the Maratha confederates, he instructed General Lake, then in the Upper Provinces, to send emissaries to Sindhia's territories for the sole purpose of creating disorder. It is evident from the Marquess Wellesley's published despatches that, that Governor-General indulged in conspiracies and intrigues against Dowlut Rao Sindhia. It is therefore not unreasonable to presume that at this critical period of their history in India, the British rulers should have also adopted the very same means which the Marquess Wellesley had done with such marked success not very long ago. In this connection, Sir George Barlow's policy—"a policy, which declaredly looks to the disputes and wars of its neighbours, as one of the chief sources of its (British Government's) security"—should not be lost sight of.

Moreover, an embassy had been despatched to Persia under Sir John Malcolm with the avowed object of instigating the Mohamedan sovereign of that country to invade the territory of a friendly, and besides a Mohamedan prince, that is, of Afghanistan, to prevent the latter from ever giving

trouble to the Europeans in India. We shall have occasion to refer to this Persian embassy later on. What we want here to emphasize is this, that while steps had been taken to prevent an independent power several thousands of miles away from the frontiers of British India from giving any trouble to the British Government, was it probable that precautionary measures should have been neglected against the inroads of the Maratha princes, especially when we remember the fact that they had been wronged and injured and were therefore expected to take revenge on the Government of India? The frontiers of British India and of the territories under the administration of the Maratha princes were contiguous and therefore it was much easier for the latter to always harass and give endless trouble to the British than for the Afghan sovereign to cross rocky passes and march through deserts before he could reach the British territories in India. The very existence of distractions and disorders in the dominions of the Maratha princes should lead us to suspect that these were mostly the work of the emissaries of the British Government.

It was not only by means of emissaries that the Europeans created all these distractions, but it is also most probable that the services of the Pindaries were also utilised for bringing about this miserable state of affairs in the Maratha states. It is not

necessary here to devote much space to tracing the origin of the Pindaries. Regarding them Professor H. H. Wilson writes :—

"The Pindaries, as a body of irregular horse, serving without pay, and receiving in lieu of it, license to plunder, appear to have originated in the South of India, constituting an element in the composition of the armies of the last Muhammadan dynasties of the Deccan. After their downfall, the services of the Pindaries were transferred to the Marathas with whom they served against Aurangzeb, and at a still later date, after that event, their leaders settled chiefly in Malwa, and attaching themselves respectively to Sindhia and Holkar, became distinguished as Sindhia Shahi, and Holkar Shahi Pindaries, receiving grants of land chiefly in the vicinity of the Nerbudda, for the maintenance of themselves and their followers in time of peace, on the condition of gratuitous co-operation in time of war."

The Pindaries thus appear to have been a sort of unpaid militia whose services were required only in time of war ; at other times they used to lead the lives of peaceful cultivators. Lest these Pindaries should give trouble to the Europeans, it would seem that they were subsidised by them not only to keep them out of their territories, but also to create distractions in the dominions of the Maratha princes. That at one time at least the Pindaries were subsidised by the Company appears very clearly from the despatches of the Duke of Wellington. Dating his letter from camp, twelve miles north of the Gutpurba, 29th March, 1803, the Duke of Wellington

(at that time Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley) wrote to Lieut. General Stuart :—

"I enclose the translation of a paper, which, with the concurrence and advice of Major Malcolm, I have given to Appah Saheb's Vakeel.

"He has had three thousand Pindaries in his service, to whom he gave no pay and who subsisted by plundering the Raja of Kolapoor. In order that all these chiefs may come forward in the service of the Peishwa at the present crisis, I have prevailed upon them to cease hostilities and, of course, Appa Saheb's Pindaries can no longer subsist upon the plunder they might require in the territory of the Raja of Kolapoor * * * *If he (the Peishwa) should not approve of retaining them, they may either be discharged, or may be employed in the plunder of the enemy without pay, according to circumstances; and at all events, supposing that his Highness should refuse to pay their expenses. . . . the charge to the Company will be trifling in comparison with the benefit which this detachment must derive from keeping this body of Pindaries out of Holkar's services, and from cutting off our communications with the army.*" *

From the words put in italics in the above extracts, the motive which prompted the future Iron Duke to subsidize the Pindaries is quite evident. The reasons which the Hon. Arthur Wellesley urged for bribing the Pindaries applied with equal force to the critical situation in which the Government of India found itself during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Minto. It is not therefore

* Duke of Wellington's despatches, Vol. I., pp. 120-121.

improbable that the same means should have also been adopted in Lord Minto's time which the Hon. Arthur Wellesley had advocated years previously to have the Pindaries "employed in the plunder of the enemy without pay". That these Pindaries were in the pay of the Company seems highly probable from an incidental circumstance mentioned in a foot-note by Captain Grant Duff in his history of the Marathas. That Christian author writes :

"For a long time they (*Pindaries*) respected the persons of the British subjects, to which the author (Captain Grant Duff) can bear testimony, having accidentally passed through a body of *Pindaries* in the middle of a night when they had committed excesses ; and to him, though unarmed and unattended, they offered neither molestation nor insult."

The only explanation for the Pindaries refraining from molesting or insulting British subjects would lie in the hypothesis that the Pindaries were in the pay of the Company and therefore were bound not to molest or insult them. But those who sow the wind, reap the whirl-wind. The Pindaries after all commenced raids in the provinces of British India. Captain Grant Duff writes :--

"For some time, until the districts in Malwa, Marwar, Mewar, and the whole of Rajputana were exhausted, and the *Pindaries* were excited to venture on more fertile fields, their ravages were chiefly confined to those countries and Berar ;But even had no other causes arisen to excite the *Pindaries* to extend their depredations, it was impossible, in the state in which India was left, by the

half measures and *selfish policy* adopted by the British Government, that any part of it could long remain exempt from predatory inroad. The Rajput states were overrun by Amir Khan, Sindhia, Holkar and the *Pindaries*; and the territories of Sindhia and Holkar, intermixed as they were in Malwa, at the hands of a powerful and lawless soldiery, soon became like Rajputana, common prey." (P. 611.)

The "*selfish policy*," as shown in the words of Sir George Barlow quoted on a previous page, was the policy adopted by the British to maintain their "security" in India. It has also been hinted at before, that this "selfish policy" must have dictated the British to pay and instigate the *Pindaries* to create distractions in the states of the non-Christian princes of India. Of course, all the *Pindaries* and their leaders were not bribed and subsidized. The policy was to play off one against the other, and so acting on this policy, they would have only favored a few in order to excite the jealousies of the others and succeed in inducing them to cut each other's throats. It seems almost certain that Ameer Khan was one of those whom the British subsidized, since he was an intelligent and powerful freebooter and had also a large following. To this circumstance, perhaps, is to be attributed the fact of his never committing raids in the adjacent territories of British India.

The provinces then under the administration of the Company in India, were after all, not free from

the ravages of the Pindaries. It was towards the close of Lord Minto's rule, that is, about the year 1812, that the Pindaries first made their appearance in British India. The real reasons for their raids in the British territories cannot be very definitely and with certainty stated. It may be, as Captain Grant Duff writes, that the Pindaries, after having exhausted the districts of the native states, "were encouraged and excited to venture on more fertile fields." But we suspect that it was the withdrawal of the subsidy of certain Pindari leaders which might have prompted them to commit ravages in the British territories. It is also not impossible that the Pindaries were secretly encouraged by the independent native princes to make raids on the British provinces, as a retaliatory measure against what they had suffered at the hands of the Christian Government of India.

The fact being remembered that the Pindaries were a sort of irregular militia, who, in time of peace, cultivated their fields or followed their own professions, and that their services were only requisitioned as camp followers in time of war to plunder and annoy the enemy's country and army, the question naturally arises why after the termination of the second Maratha war, the Pindaries, instead of leading their peaceful avocations, were always in a state of perpetual warfare and created distractions, disorder, confusion and anarchy in

the dominions of the principal native princes, with whom not very long ago the Europeans had been at war? Does not this very fact suggest the answer that the Pindaries were encouraged and bribed by the Europeans to create distractions in the native states, in order that the Europeans might enjoy security in the territories then under their administration?

Ameer Khan, as has been already said before, was in the pay of the Europeans. He never crossed swords with, or gave trouble to, the latter.* Nevertheless, they at one time were desirous to crush him, when he invaded the dominion of the Raja of Berar. It was not out of any love for the Raja that the Europeans came to his rescue, but it was political expediency which prompted them to adopt the course which they did. Ameer Khan's reasons for invading the Raja of Berar's territory are thus set forth by Professor H. H. Wilson in his edition of Mill's History of India, Vol. VII, p. 216:—

“Left without control by the insanity of Holkar, keeping together a numerous body of troops, for the payment of which he possessed no means of his own, Amir Khan, after exhausting the resources of the Rajput princes, was compelled to look abroad for plunder, and enlarge the

* This, of course, does not refer to the period when Jeswant Rao Holkar was at war with the British. Even then, Ameer Khan seems to have been in secret understanding with them.

field of his depredations. The Raja of Berar was selected as the victim of his necessities.

"In the commencement of his political career, Jeswant Rao Holkar had been detained for some time as a prisoner at Nagpur, and according to his own assertion, was pillaged by the Raja of jewels of very great value. Ameer Khan now demanded, in the name of Holkar, the restitution of the jewels or their price; and, as the demand was not complied with, he moved, in January 1809, to the frontiers of Berar with all his force. No serious opposition was offered to Ameer Khan's advance.

* * * *

"Although not bound by the terms of the existing treaty to give military aid to the Raja of Nagpur against his enemies, yet the aggression of Amir Khan was considered by the Bengal Government to mean its vigorous interposition. There were grounds for suspecting that his movements were not unconnected with the discontent of the Subahdar of Hyderabad: and although the assertions of his envoys at Nagpur, that their masters had been induced to invade the country by the invitation of the Nizam, who had offered to defray the cost of a still more formidable armament, might not be deserving of implicit credit, yet the known sympathies of the parties rendered such a league between them far from improbable. The interests of the British power were, therefore, implicated with those of the Raja of Berar."

The Nizam, it should be remembered, was merely a puppet in the hands of the Company. That he should have ventured to have taken such a step as that attributed to him in the above passage, without the knowledge or connivance of the British Resident at his court, seems very highly improbable.

It appears to us that the Nizam had been inspired by the Europeans at his court to intrigue with, and invite Ameer Khan to invade the Raja of Berar's territory, in order first to ruin that Pathan soldier of fortune and secondly to inveigle the Raja of Berar in the scheme of subsidiary alliance. Ameer Khan, although in the pay of the British, was an able and intelligent man. He was a tall poppy, and as such, although he had proved of great service to the Europeans, the latter would have been only too delighted to see his downfall and death.

On the other hand, the Raja of Berar, although not a strong prince, was a Maratha and smarting under the insults and injuries he had been subjected to by the British, and thus it was not an impossible or improbable thing for the Raja to conspire against them, since vengeance sleeps long, but never dies. At the time when the war was going to be declared against Holkar, it is alleged that the Raja of Berar was intriguing with Holkar against the British. At that time the Government of India pressed the Raja to enter into the scheme of subsidiary alliance with them. In the despatch of the Governor-General in Council to the Honorable the Secret Committee of the Honorable the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, March 24th, 1805, it is stated:—

On the following day the Resident desired the atten-

dance of one of the Raja's principal ministers for the purpose of conversing with him on the several topics connected with the Governor-General's recent instructions.

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"The Resident proceeded to state to him the advantages which the Raja might be expected to derive from his admission to the benefits of the general defensive alliance.

"The arguments employed by the Resident to convince the minister of the advantages of the proposed arrangements were founded principally on the dangers to which the government and the dominions of the Raja would be exposed under the circumstances in which the several states of India might be expected to be placed by the successful issue of the contest with Jeswant Rao Holkar, observing that the hordes of freebooters, whom our success would deprive of immediate employment, would direct their depredations against the territories of those states which possessed the least efficient means of defence: that the principal states of India being connected by terms of the most intimate alliance with the British Government, which was bound to protect them, these freebooters would probably seek subsistence by plundering the territories of the Raja of Berar, and that His Highness must be sensible of the inadequacy of his own military resources to protect his country against the ravages to which it would thus be exposed.

"The Resident concluded by contrasting the danger and embarrassment of the Raja's future situation with the security and prosperity of those states which were connected with the British Government by the relations of a defensive alliance, and the Resident having desired

to communicate to the Raja the substance of the conversation, the minister withdrew.

* * * *

"The Resident, therefore, deemed it proper to obtain an audience of the Raja for the purpose of conversing personally with his Highness and of endeavouring by a just representation of the advantages of the arrangement to induce the Raja to propose its adoption.

"At this conference the Resident repeated the arguments which he had employed in his conference with the minister. The Raja acknowledged his sense of the danger to which his country would be exposed on the conclusion of the war, but expressed a confidence in the adequacy of his resources for the defence of his dominions against common attacks, and stated his conviction that in a case of imminent danger he might depend upon the support of the British Government.

* * * *

"The Raja, however, continuing to manifest his reluctance to the adoption of the proposed arrangement, the Resident deemed it inconsistent with the spirit of his instructions to pursue the subject with additional urgency.

* * * *

*"It appeared to be more advisable to leave the Raja to the operation of future events on his mind, and to trust exclusively to the object of obtaining the consent of the Raja to the alliance; with this view, the Resident was directed to refrain from any further agitation of the question. * * **

Reading the above, and especially the passages put in italics, it is evident that the Europeans must have earnestly prayed for some imminent danger befalling the Raja of Berar which would

oblige him to seek their protection. Regarding the anxiety of the Europeans for obtaining the accession of the Raja of Berar to the alliance, it will not be straining one's imagination too much to predict that they must have taken means to bring about such a state of affairs as would threaten the very existence of the Raja of Berar. It was not impossible then for them to have indirectly induced Ameer Khan through their puppet the Nizam, to have attacked the Raja of Berar and then to show their disinterestedness to have come to the rescue of the latter so as to make him believe that they were his true friends. It was no doubt double-dealing, or, to quote the proverb, 'hunting with the hound and running with the hare.' But without double-dealing, without acting on the maxims and suggestions of Machiavelli, it was impossible for the Europeans to obtain power and establish their supremacy in India.

Ameer Khan protested against the Company rendering aid to the Raja of Berar. Prof. H. H. Wilson writes that Ameer Khan,

"appealed with unanswerable justice, although with no avail, to the stipulation of the existing treaty with Holkar on whose behalf he pretended to act, which engaged that the British Government would not in any manner whatever interfere in his affairs : and.....he argued that the conduct of the Government was a manifest infraction of the treaty, and a breach of the solemn promises made to Jeswant Rao, that it would not meddle with his claims upon the Raja of Berar..

These representations were no longer likely to be of any weight." (VII. 218)

The British assembled an army to punish Ameer Khan. That Pathan soldier of fortune had no heart or perhaps it did not suit his policy, as he had been in secret understanding with them, to fight. On the approach of the army led by the British officers Ameer Khan precipitately retreated from the Raja of Berar's territory. The British also did not pursue him ; for,

"Although for a season," writes Professor Wilson, vii. 220, "it was in contemplation to continue military operations until the complete destruction of Amir Khan's power should have been effected, yet the probability that the prosecution of this policy might lead to a protracted and expensive series of hostilities induced the Governor-General to depart from his original design, and content himself with the accomplishment of the main object of the armament. Their troops were therefore recalled to their several stations in the Company's territories and of those of their allies."*

* Lord Minto felt "that an enterprising and ambitious Musalman chief, at the head of a numerous army, irresistible by any power except that of the Company, should not be permitted to establish his authority, on the ruins of the Raja's dominions, over territories contiguous to those of the Nizam, with whom community of religion, combined with local power and resource, might lead to the formation of projects probably not uncongenial to the mind of the Nizam himself, and certainly consistent with the views and hopes of a powerful party in his court for the subversion of the British alliance." (Minto in India, p. 192).

There were expeditions against some of the petty chiefs of Bundelkhand and also a little war in Travancore.

Thus, although Lord Minto considered the Indian Empire safe either from the rebellion of the inhabitants of the territories then under the administration of his countrymen, or from the aggression of the Maratha princes, there was still apprehension of invasion of India by some foreign power or powers. For the first time in the history of British India, the North-western Frontier assumed an importance which it has ever since maintained in its administration.

Lord Minto's administration of India is noted for its foreign policy and hence more than a passing allusion should be made to it. But none of the measures of his foreign policy originated with him. He merely carried out and gave effect to what had already been initiated by the Marquess Wellesley.

The king of Afghanistan had, during the administration of Lord Minto, a grand opportunity of invading India. But Marquess Wellesley had taken steps which had the effect of paralysing the energies and attempts on the part of that Afghan sovereign to invade India with any certainty of success. It was no longer now Zeman Shah who ruled the turbulent Afghans ; it is certain that had that prince been ruling in Afghanistan during the administration of India by Lord Minto, he would have

made some attempts to take advantage of the critical position of the British in India and invaded it.

The measures which the Marquess Wellesley had initiated in preventing the Afghan sovereign from ever invading India were also given full effect to by Lord Minto. It was the Marquess Wellesley who, to disable Zeman Shah from invading India, sent an embassy to Persia and opened intrigues with the inhabitants of Sindh and the Punjab provinces, which were at that time, nominally at least, subject to the King of Cabul. Not very long after his arrival in India, the Marquess Wellesley directed his attention to checking the movements towards India of the Afghan sovereign. With this object in view he wrote to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan, at that time Governor of Bombay, a letter dated Fort William, 8th October, 1798. In this letter, he wrote:—

“I concur with you in thinking that the services of the native agent whom you have appointed to reside at Bushire may be usefully employed for the purpose mentioned in that letter; and as the probability of the invasion of Hindustan by Zeman Shah seems to increase, I am of opinion that Mehdi Ali Khan cannot too soon commence his operations at the court of Baba Khan,.....*It would certainly be a very desirable object to excite such an alarm in that quarter as may either induce the Shah to relinquish his projected expedition, or may recall him should he have actually embarked on it.*”

The words put in italics show how anxious the Governor-General was to prevent Zaman Shah from

invading India. He was not content with what the Governor of Bombay had done by sending an agent to Bushire. He sent an embassy to Persia under a British officer. It is an English saying that ambassadors are sent abroad to lie for their countries. So lying was the principal mission of the British ambassador despatched to the court of Persia. The name of this ambassador was Captain (afterwards the well-known Sir John) Malcolm. He was sent to Persia towards the end of the year 1799. In his letter of instructions dated William, 10th October, 1799, Colonel Kirkpatrick, military secretary to the Marquess Wellesley, wrote to Malcolm :—

“At Bombay you will be furnished by the Governor-in-Council with copies of all the correspondence which has passed between him and Mehdi Alli Khan, a native agent employed for some time past by Mr. Duncan, under the instructions of the Governor-General, in opening and conducting a negotiation at the court of Persia with a view to preventing Zemaun Shah from executing his frequently renewed projects against Hindustan.”

* * * * *

“You will apprize the court of Persia of your deputation as soon as possible after your arrival, either at Busso-rah or at Bagdad, intimating in general terms, that the object of it is to revive the good understanding and friendship which anciently subsisted between the Persian and the British Governments. It is not desirable that you should be more particular with any person who may be sent to meet you, or to ascertain the design of your mission; but if much pressed on the subject you may signify, that among other things, you have been instructed

to endeavour to extend and improve the commercial intercourse between Persia and the British positions in India."

Of course, this was a pure and simple lie, for such was not the real object of the mission. The real object is disclosed in the letter; for, continued Colonel Kirkpatrick :--

"The primary purpose of your mission is to prevent Zemaun Shah from invading Hindustan; or should he actually invade it, to oblige him, by alarming him for the safety of his own dominions, to relinquish the expedition. The next object of his lordship is to engage the court of Persia to act vigorously and heartily against the French in the event of their attempting at any time to penetrate to India by any route in which it may be practicable for the king of Persia to oppose their progress.

Such was the mission of Malcolm to Persia. He was authorized to conclude a treaty with the king of Persia,

"To engage to prevent Zemaun Shah, by such means as shall be concerted between his Majesty," and Captain Malcolm, "from invading any part of Hindustan, and in the event of his crossing the Attock, or of the actual invasion of Hindustan by that prince, the king of Persia to pledge himself to the adoption of such measures as shall be necessary for the purpose of compelling Zemaun Shah to return immediately to the defence of his own dominions."

To play the part of Judas, to betray a prince of his creed and faith, the king of Persia was tempted with a huge bribe.

"The Company (so ran the article of the treaty) to engage to pay to the King of Persia for this service, either an annual fixed subsidy of three lacs of rupees during the period that this treaty shall continue in force, or a proportion, not exceeding one-third, of such extraordinary expense as his majesty shall at any time actually and *bona fide* incur for the specific purposes stated in the foregoing article."

It was necessary to create distractions in the dominions of the Afghan sovereign. With this object in view, Malcolm was written to :—

"In considering the different means by which Zemaun Khan may be kept in check during the period required, you will naturally pay due attention to those which may be derived from the exiled brothers of that prince, now resident in Persia under the protection of Baba Khan. If occasion should offer, you will cultivate a good understanding with those princes, but you are not to contract any positive engagements with them without the specific authority of the Governor-General."

Another instruction to Malcolm ran as follows :—

"You will endeavour during your residence at the court of Baba Khan to obtain an accurate account of the strength and resources of Zemaun Shah, and of his political relations with his different neighbours, and to establish some means of obtaining hereafter the most correct and speedy information on the subject of his future intentions and movements."

Thus it is clear that the secret object of Malcolm's mission to Persia was to intrigue and conspire against Zemaun Shah. It must be added that all these intrigues and conspiracies were

successful, for these brought about within a short time the downfall of Zemaun Shah. In 1801, that is, within less than two years after Malcolm's departure from India for Persia, Afghanistan was the scene of bloodshed and murders and of political revolutions. Zemaun Shah, whose name used to inspire terror in the breasts of the English, was no longer the sovereign of the Afghans. He was deposed by his half-brother Mahmud, who put out his eyes and placed him in close confinement in the Bala Hissar at Kabul. He was released by his whole brother Shah Suja, who dethroned Mahmud.

These political revolutions in Afghanistan happening so soon after the embassy of Malcolm to Persia bear a significance which no one possessing the least insight into Occidental statecraft will fail to take proper notice of. It is not straining one's imagination too much to say that the British very dexterously manipulated the affairs of Afghanistan through Persia in a manner which turned out very beneficial to them.

Besides instigating the king of Persia to create distractions in Afghanistan, Malcolm's mission also had in view the engaging of the court of Persia to act in concert with the English against the French. In the letter of instructions to Malcolm from which extracts have been already given above, Colonel Kirkpatrick wrote :—

"With respect to the second object of your mission or the engaging of the court of Persia to act eventually against the French, his Lordship deems it unnecessary to furnish you with any detailed instructions. The papers with which you will be furnished, and your own knowledge and reflection will suggest to you all the arguments proper to be used for the purpose of convincing the court of Persia of the deep interest it has in opposing the projects of that nation, and of inducing it to take an active and decisive part against them."

At the time of Marquess Wellesley, there was no likelihood of the French intriguing with Persia and of their invading India. But with that Frankophobia which was so characteristic of the Irish Governor-General, he negotiated with the king of Persia to oppose the projects of the French which only existed in his imagination. But in the time of Lord Minto, that the possibility was not so much of French as of Russian designs on India, was fully believed in by the politicians and statesmen of England. From this period, commences that era of Russophobia which has proved a curse to the British rule in India. This has stood in the way of Indian prosperity and good government of the country.

At the time when Lord Minto was the Governor-General of India, the British were afraid of the invasion of India by the combined forces of Russia and France through Persia. Previous to Lord Minto's arrival in India Russia was the friend and ally of England. But, writes Sir

John Kaye (*Lives of Indian Officers*, vol. I. p. 169) :—

“Russia had ceased to be our friend and ally. She had been fighting for dear life against the growing power of Napoleon, and we had hoped that she would aid us in our efforts to checkmate France in the East. But the peace of Tilsit, as if by magic, changed all this. After the bloody fights of Eylau and Friedland the two armies had fraternised, and the two emperors had embraced each other on a raft floating on the surface of the river Niemen. Among the vast projects of conquest which they then formed was a conjoint campaign ‘contre les possessions de la compagnie des Indes.’ The territories of the East India Company were to be divided between these two great continental potentates. It was believed that the attack would be made by land rather than by sea, and that Persia would become a basis of operations against the North-Western Province of India. The danger was not an imaginary one. It was the harvest time of great events, and the invasion of India by a mighty European force did not seem to rise above the ordinary level of the current history of the day.”

But this invasion of India by the combined forces of France and Russia never became an accomplished fact. When however it suited the political expediency of Napoleon, he did not scruple to forge the so-called will of Peter the Great and spread Russophobia among the inhabitants of Great Britain.

The invasion of India by France and Russia was seriously believed in by the ministers of England and

so they contemplated despatching an embassy to Persia.* Lord Minto on his arrival in India was

* Countess Minto, in her work on *Lord Minto in India*, (pp. 98—101) writes :—

“At the beginning of 1806, Persia, being engaged in hostilities with Russia, sent an ambassador to Paris to desire the assistance of France. A cordial reception was given him, and it was announced that a splendid mission, having authority to make a treaty of alliance between France and Persia, would be despatched from Paris to Teheran.

“In order to counteract the effect of these proceedings a similar course was adopted by England. An envoy was appointed to Persia, and, with the object of lending greater dignity and importance to his credentials, it was suggested by the Court of Directors that, while remaining their own paid agent, he should be invested with the character of representative of the Crown. The proposal was acceded to by the ministry of Lord Grenville. There could be little question that Persia was only important to France as a weapon of offence against Great Britain..... Sir Harford Jones was appointed to the Persian Mission, to represent the Crown while receiving instructions from the Company.....”

“..... Sir Harford Jones was directed to proceed in the first instance to St. Petersburg to offer to the Czar the mediation of Great Britain between Russia and Persia.

“The peace and alliance between France and Russia had rendered the failure of this preliminary mission a certainty ;.....”

“In the meanwhile the aspect of affairs was becoming daily graver, as the co-operation of France and Russia in the East grew more probable.”

thinking of sending an ambassador to Persia. It is foreign to our purpose to refer to the friction that arose between the authorities in England and India regarding the choice of the proper person as ambassador to Persia. Lord Minto thought it proper to send an Indian officer as representing the

"In January 1808, rumours reached India of the march of a French army under General Menon towards Persia on the way to India while it became known that a great military embassy attended by four-and-twenty French officers and three hundred French soldiers had actually arrived there, giving it out that they were the advanced guard of an army. The first project is believed to be to take possession of a port on the coast of the Persian Gulf, by which they may communicate with the Mauritius, and receive supplies by sea, and from whence they may attempt an invasion of the Western coast of India, and unsettle the minds of the native princes by promises, menaces and intrigue.' "

No one knew better than Lord Minto himself that these rumours were quite baseless. In a secret letter dated Feb. 2, 1808, he wrote :—

"As long as France might be engaged in continental wars in Europe, the project of directing her arms towards this quarter must be considered impracticable ; but if her armies have been liberated by a pacification with Russia and by the continued submission of the Powers of Europe, the advance of a considerable force of French troops into Persia under the acquiescence of the Turkish, Russian and Persian powers, cannot be deemed an undertaking beyond the scope of that energy and perseverance which distinguish the present ruler of France." (*Ibid*, p. 101)

East India Company at the head of the Embassy to Persia.* The officer so selected was Sir John

* But Lord Minto seemed to believe in the possibility of French invasion of India through Persia. In continuing the letter from which an extract has been given above, he wrote :—

“If one body of troops should succeed in penetrating as far as the Persian dominions, others may be expected to follow ; and it may then be no longer at the option of the Government of Persia to prevent the complete establishment of the French power and ascendancy in Persia.

“The ascendancy of France being once established in the territories of Persia in the manner described, it may justly be expected that, from that centre of local power, they may be enabled gradually to extend their influence by conciliation or by conquest towards the region of Hindustan, and ultimately open a passage for their troops into the dominion of the Company.”

“Arduous as such an undertaking must necessarily be, we are not warranted in deeming it in the present situation of affairs to be altogether chimerical and impracticable under the guidance of a man whose energy and success appear almost commensurate with his ambition. We deem it our duty to act under a supposition of its practicability, and to adopt whatever measures are in our judgment calculated to counteract it, even at the hazard of injury to some local and immediate interests.”

Again in a private letter he wrote :—

“What would have seemed impossible has become scarcely improbable, since we have seen one state after another in Europe, among them those we deemed most stable and secure, fall like a house of cards before the genius of one man.”

Malcolm who had once before been sent to Persia by the Marquess Wellesley. Malcolm was a past master in the art of lying, duplicity and intrigues. He returned from Persia towards the end of the year 1810. In his journal he entered the manner in which, with "deceit, falsehood, and intrigue", his mission to Persia was crowned with success. He wrote in his journal :—

"What a happy man I am ! It is impossible to look back without congratulating myself on my good fortune

Lord Minto was a victim of Frankophobia and Russophobia. He was desirous of fighting France and Russia in Persia. So in a letter to Sir George Barlow, he wrote :—

"I am strongly of opinion that if this great conflict is to be maintained, we ought to meet it as early and as far beyond our own frontiers as possible. We ought to contest Persia itself with the enemy and to dispute every step of their progress. The force which we can oppose to them in that stage of the contest is indeed much smaller than they would find assembled against them in our own territories ; but in Persia we should have much less to contend with also, and we should meet an enemy much less prepared than he will be if we wait at home till he is ready to face us."

"This system, however, depends on the disposition of Persia herself to neutrality—that is, to let the French and us fight it out fairly between us. For if Persia is determined to support the French with all her power, I acknowledge that we cannot possibly *detach* such a force from our Indian Army as that state of things would

at every stage of my late vexatious and unpromising mission. I have now turned my back, and I hope for ever, on deceit, falsehood and intrigue ; and I am bending my willing steps and still more willing heart towards rectitude, truth and sincerity." (*Ibid*, p. 186)

This mission to Persia of Malcolm was ostensibly undertaken to make the King of Persia an ally of England against the French and Russians.*

require. *At least we could not do so without finding some means to divide Persia and to have allies on our side as well as the French,*" (*Ibid*, pp. 107-108)

The last sentence in the above extract has been put in italics to show the Machiavellian policy which the noble Lord was anxious to adopt in his dealings with Persia. He stood in need of a man who could play on the diplomatic stage of Persia to his satisfaction. In Malcolm he found such a man. To Right Hon. R. Dundas, President of the Board of Control, Lord Minto wrote :—

"By Colonel Malcolm, if by any man living, we may hope to detach her from hostile alliance with our enemy, and, if that benefit is no longer attainable, we shall receive from Colonel Malcolm authentic information and judicious advice. If Sir H. Jones should have arrived in Persia, Colonel Malcolm will of course withhold his own credentials and diplomatic powers in Persia, . . .", *Ibid*, p. 108.

* To Malcolm Lord Minto wrote a confidential letter of instructions. He wrote :—

"Of these transactions our opposition to France in Persia is the anchor on which our hopes must rest ; for if we permit that country to be the depot of her preparations against us and wait at home till the enemy thinks himself that he is equal to the undertaking, we

The people of Afghanistan can never entertain love and affection for the natives of England, who have always heaped disasters, miseries and ruin on them. Ever since the days of the Marquess

shall give him a great, and, as it appears to me, a most manifest advantage. * * *

The letter ends with the confession that "Sir H. Jones is rather a *marplot* (I am writing confidentially) in our play."

Malcolm's instructions were :—

"First, to detach the court of Persia from the French alliance : and to prevail on that Court to refuse the passage of French troops through the territories subject to Persia, or the admission of French troops into the country. If that cannot be obtained, to admit English troops with a view of opposing the French Army in its progress to India, to prevent the cession of any maritime port, and the establishment of French factories on the coast of Persia."

"Second, to obtain authentic intelligence on all points interesting to the Government. It is scarcely necessary to particularise those points, which will necessarily suggest themselves to the mind of Colonel Malcolm. The principal of them are the real nature and extent of the engagements entered into by France and Persia, and the real disposition of Persia respecting the execution of them. Colonel Malcolm's opinion and advice would also be required by the Government as to the policy to be adopted in either of two contingencies supposed—the active hostility of Persia, or her neutrality."

But Malcolm by his high-handed proceedings in Persia disappointed Lord Minto. In a letter dated July 30th,

Wellesley, the solution of the problem of maintaining the supremacy and security of the British people in India seemed to have consisted in keeping Afghanistan divided and making it the hot bed of

1808, Minto wrote to Lieutenant-General Hewitt, the Commander-in-Chief, as follows : -

"I am sorry to say in strict confidence that Malcolm has disappointed me exceedingly at the beginning of his mission. * *

"* * * You will be, I daresay, as much surprised as we have been to learn that the first condition required by Malcolm was the immediate expulsion from Persia of the French embassy with every man of that nation * * But I am compelled to say that my confidence is entirely shaken by the injudicious course he has pursued, and the disadvantageous ground he has taken. Persia is in the hands of France, and was only to be weaned from that connection by good and convincing reasons urged in a conciliatory form. * *"

In a letter to Mr. Edmonstone, Lord Minto wrote :—

"Malcolm's proceedings at Muscat has been affected with the original sin of his whole system."

In a Minute dated 21st July, 1808, Lord Minto, referring to Malcolm's peremptory demand for the expulsion of the French mission from Persia, wrote :—

"The demand cannot be supported on any ground of justice. Persia, as an independent Government, has a right to receive accredited ministers from any other court, and to enter into any negotiation she may think advisable. * * Persia was and continued to be exposed to an invasion from Russia, which is to her a subject of great and reasonable alarm. She first applied to us for

intrigues and disturbances. At that time, nominally at least, subject to the ruler of Cabul were the provinces of Sind and the Punjab. Lord Wellesley was not content only with sending the embassy to Persia to stir up disturbances in Afghanistan, but also intrigued with the inhabitants of Sind and the

assistance. It was impossible for us, consistently with the relations in which we stood to Russia, to afford the aid she asked. She therefore gave us fair notice that, although she would have preferred our co-operation to every other, she was constrained to provide for her safety by looking elsewhere for the aid which she could not obtain from us."

"Upon this ground her connection with France has been formed. * *"

So the mission to Persia was a failure and Malcolm was recalled to India. Countess Minto in her work on Lord Minto in India writes :—

"The mission from which so much had been expected had failed. It is possible, even probable, that a more conciliatory course might have enabled him to remain in Persia until a change of circumstances produced a change of sentiments on the part of the Persian Government, when his personal popularity and his conspicuous talents might have restored the prestige of the British name, and enabled him to conduct his negotiations with better effect than Sir Harford Jones ; but the neglect with which the India Government had treated Persia during the years that had elapsed since Malcolm's first mission, had perhaps a greater share in producing the present disappointment than his somewhat ill-timed arrogance" (pp. 120-121.)

After Malcolm returned to India, he had an interview

Punjab with the object of their shaking off the rule of the king of Cabul.

When Lord Minto was the Governor-General of India, he sent a mission to Sindh, ostensibly to contract an alliance with the Amirs of that province against the French but in reality against the Afghan sovereign. Prof. H. H. Wilson (VII. p. 156) writes :—

“Alarmed by the menaced interference of Shah Suja (the Afghan king) on behalf of the expelled prince, Abd-

with Lord Minto and was thus able to remove from the mind of the Governor-General much of the misunderstanding regarding the failure of his diplomatic mission to Persia. In a letter to General Hewitt, Commander-in-Chief, Lord Minto wrote :—

“I confess I have not seen reason to recall the sentiments I entertained concerning the general policy adopted by him in Persia, but I note with satisfaction that what appears to have been the least prudent and judicious course has proved, as often happens in human affairs, the most useful and advantageous.

“Since success was impossible, it is satisfactory to have arrived at the knowledge of the fact as early as possible, and since moderation and forbearance could have made no difference in the result, it is well that his line of conduct has asserted the power of our country and made manifest our knowledge of the influence under which Persia had adopted so hostile a course.”

Sir H. Jones remained in Persia, and he succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Shah and prevailed on him to send an ambassador to England.

un-nabi, the Amirs of Sindh had applied to Persia for succour, and a Persian army had been directed to march to their assistance. The death of Abd-un-nabi, and the embarrassments which Shah Suja experienced at home,

After the conclusion of this treaty, Lord Minto, in a spirit of bravado and to discredit Sir H. Jones and show his own importance as Governor-General of India, sent Malcolm a second time to Persia.

Regarding this affair Countess Minto writes :—

“To despise is to weaken. Reputation is power.”—said an English writer well versed in the knowledge of courts and men. So thinking, Lord Minto asked Colonel Malcolm once more to undertake a mission to Persia. * * * Malcolm and Sir Harford Jones met at last in Persia. To Malcolm were given the honors of the situation by the King, who had a personal regard for him, and created for his special behoof a new order of knighthood, entitled that of the ‘Lion and the Sun’.”

By the treaty which Sir H. Jones concluded with the Shah, Persia was detached from the sphere of the East India Company's operations ; referring to this, Countess Minto writes :—

“One of the disadvantages which could not but accrue to the diplomacy of the Company's Government by the withdrawal of Persia from the sphere of its operations, was seen when it appeared that, by an article of the treaty negotiated at Teheran by Sir Harford Jones, it was stipulated that, in case of war between Persia and Afghanistan, ‘His Majesty the King of Great Britain should not take any part therein, unless at the desire of both parties ;’ while, in ignorance of the existence of any such agreement, Mr. Elphinstone had been authorised to form a defensive alliance with Afghanistan against an

removed all ground of fear from Afghanistan, and the Amirs then became most apprehensive of peril from their allies. They thought it prudent, therefore, to oppose one powerful friend to another,—British India to Persia : they therefore began to conciliate the British Government and sent an agent to Bombay to propose the renewal of the commercial intercourse that had formerly existed. The proposal was favorably entertained, and Captain Seton was sent as envoy to Hyderabad. A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was concluded by the envoy with the Amirs ; but, as the stipulations pledged the British Government to a reciprocity that was deemed inexpedient, the ratification of the treaty was withheld, and Mr. Nicholas Hankey Smith, a Bombay Civil Servant, was deputed to explain the cause, and to contract a less comprehensive engagement. * * * * Mr. Smith reached Hyderabad on the 8th of August (1809) ; and on the 23rd of that month a treaty was signed, which engaged that there should be eternal friendship between the two Governments ; that vakeels or agents should be mutually appointed ; and that the French should not be permitted to form an establishment in Sindh."

But as there was no possibility of the French invasion of India ever taking place, the real object of the mission to Sindh, as shown in the above

attack from Persia, as was stated in the treaty signed at Calcutta on June 17 of the same year 1809. Yet Persia and Cabul were both necessary members of the Confederacy with which the India Government had proposed to resist an invasion of India."

extract, was to conclude on alliance with the Amirs against Afghanistan. *

* In her work, *Lord Minto in India*, Countess Minto writes :—

"The State of Scinde had come within the scope of the defensive arrangements proposed by the British Government, but the indiscretion of their agent, Captain Seton, led to the annulling of the treaty concluded by him with the Ameer of Scinde.

"It was found that Persian agents were negotiating with the Government of Scinde at the same time as the Envoy of the India Government ; that they had authority to act for both France and Persia, and that the bait held out to the Government of Scinde was military aid to throw off the yoke of the King of Kabul to whom they owed a nominal allegiance, and the possession of the Afghan fortress of Candahar. 'The chief ruler of Scinde informed Captain Seton distinctly that, despairing of the good will of the British Government, he had intended to close with the offer of the French and Persians, but preferred the British alliance on the same terms.' These terms, agreed to by Captain Seton, were not consistent with the endeavours making to secure the friendship of the king of Cabul ; hence the India Government repudiated the engagements made by Captain Seton, and sent another Envoy (Mr. H. Smith) to Scinde, to renew the negotiations with that Government on the footing on which alone Captain Seton had been empowered to treat—namely, the admission, as a preliminary step to all further transactions, of a resident agent of the British Government (the commercial resident having been expelled in 1802).

Lord Minto also sent envoys to the Punjab and Afghanistan.

The condition of the Punjab had attracted the attention of the Marquess Wellesley. His brother Henry Wellesley, as Resident of Oude, had brought to his notice the distracted condition of that province. Dating his letter, Bareilly, August 5, 1802, Mr. Henry Wellesley wrote to the Governor-General :—

“Such is the distracted state of the Sikh country, that Mr. Louis (one of General Perron’s officers) appears to have obtained possession of a considerable tract of country without the least resistance having been opposed to him. There can be no doubt of General Perron’s intention to assume as large a portion of the Punjab as he may think himself able to manage, or it may be convenient to him to retain, and it is equally certain that the actual state of that country will render it an easy conquest to anything like a regular force.

“This measure is necessarily preliminary to the accomplishment of our ultimate purpose, that of withholding or detaching the Government of Scinde from connections with our enemies, as well as the more proximate purpose of securing an authentic channel of information and intelligence on points of the utmost importance to our interests. ‘No specific engagement could be entered into with that government without the establishment of direct intercourse on a permanent footing,’ ‘the attainment of which will afford the means of watching its proceedings and of obtaining authentic intelligence concerning the the designs of our enemies.’ (Secret and separate general letter).” (Pp. 177-178.)

"One of the greatest dangers to be apprehended from the establishment of a French force in the Punjab is the means it would afford the French force of extending their conquest down the Indus, and of securing a communication with the sea by means of that river. This would remove every obstacle to their receiving supplies of men and stores from Europe, for there is no British force on that side of India nor are there any native powers, situated at the mouths of the Indus, capable of opposing a regular force with any prospect of success."

The opinion of the military adventurer, George Thomas, as to the ease with which the Punjab could be conquered, was also at that time well known. But it was not the policy of the Marquess Wellesley at that time to fight the Sikhs or annex their country. On the contrary, he wanted to cultivate their friendship and raise them into a power as a buffer state against the Afghans on the one hand and the Marathas on the other. With this object in view, he wrote to General Lake a letter instructing him to contract an alliance with Ranjit Singh and prevail upon that Sikh Prince and other Sikh Chiefs to assist the East India Company in their war with the Marathas ; or if they were not able to render any assistance, at least they should remain neutral. Ranjit Singh obliged the British by not joining the Marathas ; and when Holkar sought refuge in the Punjab, instead of interceding on his behalf with the English, he allowed the troops of the latter to enter his province, in order

to capture Holkar. He did all these, thinking that the British, out of sheer gratitude, would befriend him. To be on friendly term with the rising power of the English, he was even ready to sacrifice and betray his own co-religionists into their hands. In the despatch to the Honorable the Secret Committee of the Honorable the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, September 29th, 1803, the Governor-General in Council wrote :—

“Raja Ranjit Singh, the Raja of Lahore and the principal amongst the Sikh chieftains, has transmitted proposals to the Commander-in-chief for the transfer of the territory belonging to that nation south of the river Sutledge, on the condition of mutual defence against the respective enemies of that chieftain and of the British nation.”

But this evidently did not suit the British and so they did not enter into any alliance with Ranjit Singh. That Sikh prince saw how he had been made to serve the interests of the selfish and designing British without so far receiving any material benefit from them. Accordingly, he considered it proper to bring the territory south of the river Sutledge under his direct control. He was not going to transfer it to the East India Company.

Unfortunately for the Punjab, Ranjit Singh was no statesman. Had he been so, he would have adopted a course different from what he did at this critical period of the history of the British in India. In the Doab, that is the territory between the rivers Sutledge and Jumna, were a number of

petty Sikh chieftains who had been, before the second Maratha war, vassals of the Maharaja Sindhia. On the eve of the war with the Marathas towards the end of the year 1803, the English servants of the E. I. Company under the Governor-General's instructions had opened intrigues with these Sikh chieftains. In his secret and official letter to Lieutenant-General Lake, dated Fort William, August 2, 1803, the Marquess Wellesley wrote :—

"I am not sufficiently apprized of the names, possessions, and relative conditions of the various Sikh chieftains occupying the territory between Patiala and Jumna, to be enabled to address letters to all of them, or to prescribe the detail of your Excellency's proceedings with regard to them. Your Excellency will endeavour to acquire the requisite information, and you will regulate your communications with those chieftains accordingly, in the spirit of these instructions."

* * * * *

"Such of those chieftains as are subject to the control and exactions of the Maratha power, may perhaps be detached from the interests of that nation by promises of protection from the British Government, and of exemption from the payment of tribute in future.

* * * * *

"If it should appear impracticable to obtain the co-operation of those chieftains, it would still be an object of importance to secure their neutrality."

But those chieftains did not come to the assistance of the Marathas and thus played into the

hands of the British. The latter were, in honour bound, to render them every help they could and extricate them out of their difficulties. In return for what they had done for the English these Sikh chieftains expected their sympathy and active co-operation in their troubles.

Had Ranjit Singh been a far-seeing statesman he would have formed a confederacy with these petty Sikh chieftains and welded all these states into an United Sikh Empire. But he was no statesman. He was bent on the destruction of these Sikh chieftains. At first, to curry favour with the British, he proposed to betray and sell these chieftains of his race and creed to them. But when he found no favorable response from the latter to his proposal, he wanted to reduce all these chieftains and confiscate their properties and estates. To effect these, he set out from Lahore and crossed the Sutledge. The chieftains of the Doab were naturally alarmed and they appealed to the British Government for help against Ranjit Singh. The Governor-General seemed to have been at first inclined to leave these chieftains to the tender mercies of Ranjit Singh. In the second Maratha war, these Sikh chieftains had been as much useful to the British as the princes of Rajputana, but the British did not scruple to exhibit their bad faith towards the Rajput princes, as already narrated before. The Sikh chieftains would not have fared better than

the Rajput princes but for the circumstances to be presently mentioned.

The Sikh chieftains of the Doab, as said before, appealed for help to the British Government, and in order to alarm Ranjit Singh and make him return to Lahore, they industriously circulated a report that their application had been favorably considered. Prof. H. H. Wilson writes :—

“In order to discover the truth of this assertion, Ranjit addressed a letter to the Governor-General, stating that he had learned that troops were assembling at Jumna, and requesting to be informed of the cause. He declared his wish to continue on friendly terms, but ventured to add, ‘The country on this side of the Jumna, except the stations occupied by the English, is subject to my authority. Let it remain so.’

“Although Lord Minto was resolved to resist the pretensions of Ranjit Singh to the exercise of any authority on the right bank of the Jumna, yet the policy of securing his concurrence in the scheme of defensive alliance which it was sought to frame against the hostile designs upon India avowed by the Emperor Napoleon, suspended the announcement of the Governor-General's sentiments ; and Ranjit was referred for a reply to Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Metcalfe, whom it had been determined to send on a friendly mission to the Sikh ruler.” (VII. pp : 140-141).

Metcalfe was a civilian and as such came out to India while yet in his teens. He received his initiation into the art of Machiavellian diplomacy under the Marquess Wellesley, and consequently he was always indebted to that Irish Governor-

General for the interest the latter took in him. After the departure of Lord William Bentinck, Metcalfe acted for some time as Governor-General of India. It was in that capacity that he wrote a letter to his patron, the Marquess Wellesley, dated Dec. 23, 1834. As this letter sheds much side-light on his character, it is reproduced below :—

“My Lord,—Few things in life have given me greater pleasure than the receipt of your Lordship’s kind letter delivered by Lieut. Campbell. It is now within a few days of thirty-four years since I had the honour of being presented to you. You were then Governor-General of India, and I was a boy of fifteen entering on my career ; I shall never forget the kindness with which you treated me from first to last during your stay in India ; nor the honor and happiness which I enjoyed in being for a considerable period a member of your family. So much depends on the first turns given to a man’s course, that I have a right to attribute all of good that has since happened to me, to the countenance and favor with which you distinguished me at that early period. *My public principles were learned in your school, pre-eminently the school of honor, zeal, public spirit, and patriotism ;* and to my adherence to the principles there acquired I venture to ascribe all the success that has attended me.”

The words put in italics in the above, clearly show what policy Metcalfe would have adopted in India towards the native states had he been appointed as its Governor-General. That he considered the school of Wellesley “the school of honor” is more than what we can understand, since that

Irish Governor-General lacked all principles of honor and honesty. The secret and official letter which the Marquess Wellesly wrote to General Lake on the 2nd August, 1803, extracts from which have already been given above, regarding the Sikh states and Ranjit Singh, was examined and despatched by Metcalfe. Hence he was quite familiar with the views which the Marquess Wellesly entertained towards Ranjit Singh. It is probable that on this account, he was chosen as ambassador to the Court of Ranjit Singh.*

* That Metcalfe was chosen as an envoy to Ranjit was due to the fact that he was a jingoist. Although a civilian, he loved war more than peace. Countess Minto in her work *Lord Minto in India*, (pp. 97-98), writes :—

"The position of England relatively to Europe after the peace of Tilsit (June 1807) is thus commented on in a letter from a young Englishman in India to a friend: 'What an unexampled and surprising picture the state of Europe now presents; France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Germany, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Italy, Turkey—all Europe, save little Sweden, combined against our country. We may truly call ourselves "*divisos orbe Britannos*." Although this is a state of things which no one could ever have wished to see, I confess that I feel a pride in it.....I hope that we shall do as well as possible under such strange circumstances."

* * * * *

"We have at different times paid Austria, Prussia, France, and Germany; we preserved to Turkey a great portion of its Empire, driving out its enemies, the French ;

At that time, Metcalfe was Political Assistant at Delhi. So he set out from Delhi towards the end of August, 1808, and crossed the Sutledge on the 1st of September, and reached the camp of Ranjit

we have constantly fought the battles of Europe against France ; and all powers are now ranged on the side of France against us. Hurrah for the tight little Island !”

Countess Minto continues :—

“We should hardly have ventured to quote so glaring a specimen of a spirit described in the slang of the present day as Jingoism—the English language having apparently no term of reprobation for it—had the writer borne a name less known and honoured than that of Metcalfe.”

“It was, however, the sort of spirit which, combined with conspicuous ability and strong character, had attracted the attention of Lord Wellesley, who when Metcalfe was only nineteen, sent him in a political capacity to the camp of Lord Lake ; and which in this year 1808, marked him out in the judgment of Lord Minto for a still more important mission.....”

The importance of the Punjab and Afghanistan, through which countries the French and the Russians must pass in their contemplated invasion of India, was fully recognized by Minto and hence contracting alliance with them, (or if necessary, bringing their territories under the control of the East India Company), was considered expedient. In a minute dated 15th September, 1808, he remarked that “even should France succeed in establishing an ascendancy in Persia, much would remain to be accomplished before India could be successfully invaded, and the hostility of the interjacent states, especially if seconded by the co-operation of the British power, might yet be

Singh at Kasur on the 11th. On the next day, the Sikh prince granted an interview to the British Envoy. "The first visits of oriental diplomacy," writes Kaye, "are visits of courtesy and congratulation. It is a kind of diplomatic measuring of swords before the conflict commences."

expected to frustrate the design, or at least to reduce the invading army to a degree of debility which would give the troops of the Government of India a decided superiority in the field." Hence the necessity of establishing a direct communication with those states was evident.

In a letter to the President of the Board of Control, dated 10th February 1808, Lord Minto wrote:—

"If the views of the enemy should extend to the direct invasion of India by an army proportioned to that undertaking, their march must probably be to the Indus, and must lead through the kingdom of Cabul and the territories of Lahore, It has appeared to be extremely desirable to push forward a British agency as far beyond our own frontiers, and as near the countries from which the enemy is to take his departure, as possible. We have not, till of late, had much inducement to frequent or to make much enquiry concerning the countries beyond the Indus; and there are difficulties attending the usual means of establishing an amicable intercourse with those governments or their subjects. We cannot safely rely on the fidelity or discernment of native agents, either for furnishing information or accomplishing any political objects our interests might require. I understand that the employment of Europeans in such services would be subject to great difficulties. Regular and avowed embassies, which would furnish occasion to the fixed

Metcalfe was received by Ranjit Singh with great cordiality and courtesy.

"The Raja," wrote Metcalfe, "met us on the outside of a large enclosure, and having embraced all the gentlemen of the mission, conducted us within, where tents had been prepared for our reception. This interview was prolonged by the Raja beyond the usual time of visits of ceremony; but nothing of consequence passed at it." (Kaye's *Lives of Indian Officers*, Vol. 1. p. 393.)

residence, during periods like the present, of Europeans qualified in those countries, would undoubtedly be best calculated to fulfil my present views, which aim, first at obtaining early intelligence of the enemy's designs and secondly at casting obstacles to his progress."

Lord Minto entertained hostile designs against Ranjit Singh. His selection of Metcalfe was also with that object in view. He wanted some pretext and sought means to provoke Ranjit Singh to hostilities. In his despatch to the Secret Committee of March 1808, he wrote:—

"Although as a general principle we cordially recognize the wisdom and the justice of abstaining from all interference in the contests, disputes, and concerns of states with which we are unconnected by the obligations of alliance, and are fully convinced of the embarrassments and inconveniences of extending our protection to petty chieftains, who are unable to protect their territories from the aggressions of more powerful neighbours, yet we are disposed to think that cases may occur in which a temporary deviation from these general principles may be a measure of defensive policy, the neglect of which might be productive of much more danger and embarrassment than the prosecution of it. and that the certain

On the 16th, Ranjit Singh returned the visit of the English diplomat. It was on the 22nd that negotiations were formally opened. Ranjit was told that the French had designs on Afghanistan and the Punjab and that he ought to enter into an alliance with the English.

resolution of the Rajah of Lahore to subjugate the states situated between the Sutledge and the frontier of our Dominion would, under other circumstances than the present, constitute a case on which, on grounds of self-defence, the interposition of the British Power for the purpose of preventing the execution of such a project, would be equally just and prudent. Yet the accomplishment of the more important views already described seems evidently incompatible with a rupture with him."

Again in another minute dated June, 1808, he wrote:—

"It is well known that the habitual and undistiguish-ing jealousy, which is the personal character of Ranjit Singh, has been directed specifically against the British Government. He is aware that our interests and principles are unfavourable to some of the chief objects of his ambition; and, in addition to this particular cause of distrust, means have been found to create in his mind a still stronger jealousy amounting almost to personal apprehension."

"It is certain that our endeavours to open a communication with Cabul, and to establish intimate relations with that state, will furnish abundant matter of uneasiness, and supply fresh food to the jealousy already entertained by Ranjit Singh, both of Cabul and of our Government."

Metcalfe wrote to the Governor-General that

"In the course of this conversation, I endeavoured, in conformity to the instructions of the supreme Government, to alarm the Raja for the safety of his territories, and at the same time to give him confidence in our protection." (Ibid. p. 394.)

In non-diplomatic language it means that he told a pack of lies to Ranjit Singh.

Ranjit Singh was not going to be so easily outwitted by the Christian diplomat. He asked Metcalfe whether the British Government would recognise his sovereignty over all the Sikh states on both sides of the Sutledge. But Metcalfe only

So Metcalfe was sent to woo the Raja; but should the Sikh sovereign resist the overtures of the Christian Envoy, means had been prepared to annihilate him. Countess Minto in her work on "*Lord Minto in India*" writes:—(p. 154.)

"The Commander-in-chief received orders to prepare for an advance, and a private letter to him from Lord Minto shows that in the event of serious resistance from Runjit, it was in the contemplation of Government to substitute a friendly for a hostile power between our frontier and the Indus. 'There is reason to believe that a considerable portion of the country usurped by Runjit Singh is strongly disaffected, and should any grand effort be made, and be crowned with success, nothing would be more advantageous to our interests than the substitution of friends and dependants for hostile and rival powers throughout the country between our frontier and the Indus.'"

replied that he had no authority to express the views of his Government on this subject. At this reply, Ranjit was much disgusted, and illiterate and wanting in manners as he was, his behavior towards the foreign envoy appeared hardly cordial or friendly. To show his defiance towards the English, he invaded the Doab and exacted tribute from some of the petty chieftains. All the while Metcalfe still remained at his court as the accredited agent of the English.

In the meanwhile the danger of the so-called French invasion of India altogether disappeared and so the Governor-General was not very anxious to contract a friendly alliance with Ranjit Singh. Moreover, it would seem that the Envoy having espied out the country and the weakness of the military organisation of the Sikhs, the exaggerated notion of Ranjit's resources appeared to be a myth to him. Hence the Governor-General and his agent did not consider it necessary to any longer temporise with Ranjit Singh. On the 22nd December, 1808, Metcalfe personally communicated to Ranjit the intentions of the Government of India, that the territories between the Sutledge and the Jumna were under British protection, and that he might retain such acquisitions as he had made on this side of the Sutledge previously to the existence of the relations which had been formed with the protected states, but that he must restore all that had

been made subsequently; and that in order to guard against any future encroachments, a military post would be established on the left bank of the river.*

When these communications were made to Ranjit Singh, he was furious; to quote the words of Sir John Kaye (*Lives of Indian Officers*, Vol. I. p. 396),

"He left the room, descended to the court-yard below, mounted a horse, and began caracolliing about with what the young English envoy described as 'surprising levity.' But it was not levity. He was striving to subdue his strong feelings, and was gaining time to consider the answer he was to give to the British Envoy. After a while he returned to another room and took counsel with his ministers,....."

* These Sikh Chieftains were not now to be treated as allies but as dependants of the British Government, for they had to enter into an agreement by which their states were to be escheated and taken charge of by the British on failure of their heirs; the privilege of adoption was denied to them. It was in this manner that the principalities of Amballa, Kaithal and several other trans-Sutledge Sikh states came into the possession of the British. Lord Dalhousie vigorously acted upon the policy which was first of all initiated by Lord Minto, who like himself was a native of Scotland.

Baron Hagel (*Travels*, page 279) attributes the interference of the English to selfishness, the motive being the desire of benefiting by escheats, which the dissipated character of the chiefs was likely to render speedy and numerous.

"On the same evening he sent a message to Metcalfe saying that the proposal of the British Government to send troops to the Sutledge was of so strange a character that he could not finally announce his determination till he had consulted with his chiefs, and that he proposed to proceed for that purpose to Umritsar, and he requested the British Envoy to attend him." (*Ibid.* p. 396).

But the British Government did not communicate its intention to Ranjit Singh without making a show of military operations. In the middle of January 1809, a detachment under Colonel Ochterlony crossed the Jumna and proceeded to Ludhiana, whilst an army of reserve under the command of Major-General St. Leger was prepared to support the advance, should protracted operations become necessary. The troops of Ranjit Singh fell back as Colonel Ochterlony's detachment approached.

Ranjit Singh was sorely irritated, and how he must have cursed himself for not affording aid to the Marathas in their struggle with the English, with whom at times he thought of trying conclusions! But an incident occurred which is said to have damped Ranjit's courage, and convinced him of his inability to successfully fight the English.

During the month of February, 1809, when Metcalfe was in Amritsar, the anniversary of the Maharram occurred, which the Shia Mohammedans of his escort celebrated, as usual, with public demonstrations of passionate sorrow and religious fervour. Since the ascendancy of the power of the

Sikhs this celebration of the Maharram had been stopped and so the conduct and behavior of Metcalfe's escort gave great offence to the population of Amritsar, a place which is sacred to all Sikhs. The Akalis, a sect of Sikh fanatics, who are half soldiers and half saints, attacked the camp of Metcalfe. A little tact and ordinary courtesy would have dictated that Christian Envoy not to have allowed the Shia Mohammedans of his escort to celebrate the Maharram in the sacred city of the Sikhs without the special permission of Ranjit Singh. Of course the Akalis were fanatics and were no match for the trained soldiers of Metcalfe's escort. The steady discipline of the latter prevailed and the Akalis broke and fled. Ranjit Singh came up at the close of the affray and assisted in quelling the tumult. Metcalfe's camp was removed to a greater distance from the town.

This incident is said by the British writers to have made a great impression on Ranjit's mind. Sir John Kaye writes that Ranjit

"saw clearly that the English, who could make such good soldiers of men not naturally warlike, were a people not to be despised." (*Ibid.* p. 397).

How much truth there is in this assertion, it is impossible to say, for the incident above referred to, rests solely on the authority of the Christian Envoy and Christian writers, whose testimony could hardly be relied upon, since they are the

interested party in the affair. This incident occurred in February and from the fact that the English did not demand any satisfaction from Ranjit Singh for his subjects attacking the escort of a friendly foreign mission, and also when we remember the fact that Ranjit Singh did not at once, after its occurrence, conclude a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the British, it appears to us that this incident did not influence the conduct of Ranjit towards the English.*

The British Government, in order to carry on the negotiations to a satisfactory termination, had moved the troops and threatened Ranjit with hostilities. But as waging war against the princes of India was strictly forbidden by the authorities in England, it does not appear that Lord Minto was serious as to going to war with the Sikh Prince. The negotiations dragged on from month's end to month's end till the 25th April, 1809, when a treaty was concluded which placed all the

* In his history of the Sikhs, Captain Cunningham does not allude to this incident having influenced his conduct towards the English. In a footnote (page 138, 2nd edition) he writes :—

“Moorcroft ascertained that Ranjit Singh had serious thoughts of appealing to the sword, so unpalatable was English interference. The well-known Fukcer Uzeez-ooddeen was one of the two persons who dissuaded him from war.”

petty Sikh chieftains in the territory between the rivers Sutledge and Jumna under the protection of the British.* But Ranjit Singh, illiterate and lacking in the foresight and forethought of a gifted statesman, imagined that he had his compensation for the sacrifices which he had made in gaining the friendship of the English and currying favor with them by the latter allowing him a free hand over the territories and peoples to the North and West of the Sutledge. By this clause of the treaty it was to be clearly understood that Ranjit Singh was to invade the dominions of the King of Cabul. There was not much love lost between the Sikhs and the Afghans and this treaty was meant to

* Captain Cunningham writes :—

“In the beginning of February 1809 Sir David Ochterlony had issued a proclamation declaring the Cis-Sutledge states to be under British protection, and that any aggressions of the chief of Lahore would be resisted with arms. Ranjit Singh then perceived that the British authorities were in earnest, and the fear struck him that the still independent leaders of the Punjab might likewise tender their allegiance and have it accepted. All chance of empire would thus be lost, and he prudently made up his mind without further delay. He withdrew his troops as required, he relinquished his last acquisitions and at Amritsar, on the 25th April 1809, the now single chief of Lahore signed a treaty which left him the master of the tracts he had originally occupied to the south of the Sutledge, but confined his ambition for the future to the north and westward of that river.”

widen the differences between those two peoples. This treaty served to make Ranjit Singh the catspaw of the British for their ulterior purposes and render the Punjab the buffer state against the Afghan monarch and the threatened invasion of India by the combined forces of France and Russia through Central Asia. It was on this account that Elphinstone's embassy to Peshawar, to which reference will be presently made, did not conclude any definite treaty with the Afghan monarch.

The mission to Afghanistan was entrusted to Elphinstone. It was feared that the combined forces of France and Russia would invade India through Afghanistan; and therefore it was considered necessary to despatch an embassy to the King of Cabul.* Shah Suja was the reigning monarch at that time at Cabul. The diplomatic mission of Elphinstone consisted in endeavouring to rouse Shah Suja's fears for his own safety and to play him off against Persia. It was not the policy of the British Government to enter into any alliance with the Afghan monarch, although Elphinstone was at the same time told that "should the contract-

* Countess Minto in her work on Lord Minto in India writes :—

"We are informed that papers exist to prove that Bonaparte had fixed on the Gomul Pass, leading from Guznee to Dera Ismael Khan, as the line of his advance from Afghanistan into India." (P. 163. f. n.)

ing of these engagements be absolutely required by the king, the eventual aid to be afforded by us ought to be limited to supplies of arms, ordnance, military stores, rather than troops."

The mission did not pass through the Punjab. Perhaps at this time the British Government feared that Ranjit Singh would not allow passage to the mission. As said before, Ranjit kept neutral while the Marathas were struggling with the English for their independence and their country. Ranjit, again, did not object to the British troops under Lord Lake penetrating to the heart of the Punjab in pursuit of Holkar. For concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with the English, Ranjit was even willing to betray the chieftains of his creed occupying the tract of the country between the Sutledge and the Jumna. But all this labors and sacrifices for the sake of the British had been in vain. He had never derived any benefit so far from them and was naturally much disappointed. So it appears that the British Government of India, at this time, had no face to ask for a further favor from Ranjit to allow the mission to pass through the Punjab to the court of the ruler of Afghanistan. Consequently the mission proceeded by the route of Bikanir, Bhahwulpur and Mooltan, and reached Peshawar on the 25th of February, 1809.*

* After reaching Mooltan the mission were detained for some time while communications were carried on by

At that time the tract of the country through which Elphinstone proceeded to Afghanistan was a *terra incognita* to the British Government of India. It would seem that the object of the mission was as much to gather information regarding the country, as to espy out the resources of the Afghan monarch. Afghanistan was at this period the scene of unhappy internal dissensions and its ruler a victim of domestic feuds. Shah Suja' granted an interview to Elphinstone on the 5th of March, 1809. He showed great courtesy and hospitality to the mission and as he was given to understand that the British Government was desirous of entering into a friendly alliance with him, he naturally expected help and co-operation from the mission

letter with the king of Cabul. For without his consent, and the protection of a guard from His Majesty, it was impossible to travel among the tribes beyond the Indus. The answer to Mr. Elphinstone's application was long in coming, for, as they afterwards learned, the news of the approach of the mission was at first regarded with strong prejudice and distrust: the Afghan nobles disliked the idea of an alliance between the king and the British power, as likely to strengthen him to their detriment; and the king himself thought it very natural that the British should seek to profit by the internal dissensions of a neighbouring kingdom, and endeavour to annex it to their empire. Curiosity is said to have had much to do with the final decision to receive the mission at Peshawar. Lord Minto in India, pp.161-162.

in extricating him from his domestic troubles. But in this he was disappointed. Sir John Kaye writes that Shah Suja

"was distracted by domestic cares. He had a dangerous revolution to cope with in his own kingdom. He did not wish the British Mission to proceed any further into the heart of his dominions, which were in a distracted state ; indeed, the best advice he could give to the English gentlemen was, that they should go home as fast as they could, unless they were inclined to help him against his enemies. When a man's own house is on fire, it is no time to alarm him on the score of remote dangers and he soon found that the British Government would not help him to extinguish these domestic flames."

Poor deluded Shah Suja ! Had he known that it was the British Government which was at the bottom in enkindling these domestic flames, for it was the interest of that Government to do so, and for the avowed object of which it had sent an embassy to Persia and paid a subsidy in money to the Persian Government, he would not have expected the British Government to help him to extinguish these domestic flames.

To quote Sir John Kaye again :—

"The Afghan Ministers, it must be admitted, argued the case acutely and not without some amount of fairness. They could not see why, if the English wished the King of Cabul to help them against their enemies, they should not in their turn help the King to resist his ; but as it was, they said, all the advantage was on our side, and all the danger on the side of the King. 'They stated,' wrote

Mr. Elphinstone in a letter to Lord Minto, 'that an alliance for the purpose of repelling our enemy was imperfect, and the true friendship between two states could only be maintained by indentifying their interests in all cases ; that Shah Mahmud had no influence over the Douranees, and would be obliged—if he obtained the crown—to put himself under the protection of the Persians to maintain his authority ; *that he had before connection with that people and was naturally inclined to them, ; and that from the moment of his restoration to the Government of this country we might consider the French and Persians as already on the Indus.*' (Ibid, pp. 241-242.)

The importance of the words put in italics will be easily understood when the fact is remembered that Sir John Malcolm was sent in 1799 to Persia by the Marquess Wellesley to instigate the king to create distractions in Afghanistan. As said before, a subsidy even was paid to the Persian King to carry out this atrocious piece of business. The object of the British Government was gained, for Shah Mahmud with the help of the Persians raised the standard of revolt in Afghanistan, seized the Afghan monarch Zemaun Shah who was his half-brother, deposed him, put out his eyes and placed him in close confinement in the Bala Hissar at Cabul. But Shah Mahmoud did not retain his ill-gotten power very long. He was dethroned by Shah Suja in 1803.

So the deposition and blindness of Zemaun Shah relieved the British Government of the incubus of the invasion of India with which the Afghan

monarch had threatened them so often. The domestic dissensions and internecine feuds in Afghanistan, brought about through the instrumentality of the Persian King prevented the successors of Zemaun Shah from ever carrying out his threat into execution.*

* "Two years before Malcolm went to Persia a Persian nobleman naturalised in India, named Mehdi Ali Khan, had been sent to Teheran by the Governor of Bombay, with instructions 'to take measures for inducing the Court of Persia to keep Shah Zemaun in perpetual check (so as to preclude him from returning to India), but without any decided act of hostility.' What Mehdi Ali Khan did in Persia, is described by Lieut-Colonel P. M. Sykes, in his *History of Persia* (Vol. II. p. 397) as follows :—

"Mehdi Ali Khan, a skilful diplomatist of the Persian school, had written letters from Bushire to the Court at Teheran in which he excited the indignation of the Shah by an account of atrocities committed by the Sunni Afghans on the Shias of Lahore, thousands of whom, he declared, had fled for refuge to the territories ruled by the East India Company, and at the same time urged that if Zemaun Shah were checked a service would be rendered to God and man. He stated, further more, that the Governor-General did not at all apprehend an Afghan invasion of Hindustan, because the fame of the English artillery was well known. As an example of what English troops could do, he asserted that seven hundred of these brave soldiers had defeated the army of Suraj-u-Dola numbering three hundred thousand men."

"In the autumn of 1799 Mehdi Ali Khan was received in person by the Shah. Spending large sums in presents,

To keep Persia and Afghanistan always at war with one another and never allow them to unite and make a common cause seemed to have been the object of Elphinstone's mission. As said before, Malcolm had succeeded in playing off Persia against Afghanistan and now Elphinstone was trying to pit the Afghan ruler against the Persian monarch. But no treaty of any definite character was concluded with the Afghan sovereign to instigate him to invade or create distractions in the territory of Persia. There are two reasons to be assigned for the English refraining from any assistance to the Afghan ruler in extinguishing his domestic flames. The first reason was that they did not want to have a prosperous and happy Afghanistan ruled over by Shah Suja, the brother of Zemaun Shah, who had so often threatened them with the invasion of India; they were afraid that Shah Suja might carry into execution the often repeated threat of his brother and invade India, if his subjects in Afghanistan were happy and contented and did not rise in revolt against their ruler. The second reason which influenced the English in refusing to contract a defensive alliance with the Afghan ruler is to be

he succeeded in persuading the Persian monarch to continue hostilities against Afghanistan; and he then returned to Bushire where he met Captain Malcolm, who had recently landed on his first memorable mission."

found in the fact that they had to compensate Ranjit Singh for his renouncing all claims over the chieftains of the Doab, by giving him a free hand in conquering territories to the North and West of the river Indus. Had they formed an alliance with Shah Suja, there would have been no chance for Ranjit Singh to extend his dominions. They knew that the Sikh prince—whom they were wont to call the Lion of the Punjab—although no statesman, was an ambitious, capable and skilful general. He could have given them much trouble had he any inclination of doing so. Moreover, Ranjit had, on two previous occasions, obliged them first by his remaining neutral and not rendering any aid to the Marathas in their struggle with the English, and secondly, by his permitting the troops under Lake to penetrate into the Punjab in pursuit of Holkar.

It would not have done, therefore, to have contracted a defensive alliance with Shah Suja and restricted the ambitious schemes of Ranjit. Moreover, as a French writer has said, the English encouraged the Sikh prince to invade the territories of the Afghan monarch, for they knew that on the death of Ranjit the Punjab as well as his conquests in the Afghan territory would pass into their hands.

Even so early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Afghans seem to have been acquainted with "*Perfidie Albion*." Regarding the conversation

with Moolah Jaffier, an Afghan minister, Elphinstone writes :—

“He said that he did not believe that we intended to impose upon the king, but he did not think that we were so plain as we pretended to be. * * * He frankly owned that we had the character of being very designing and that most people thought it necessary to be very vigilant in all transactions with us.” (*Ibid*, p. 244, f. n.)

The English were secretly glad at the disturbed condition of Afghanistan. Elphinstone espied out the resources of the country and, according to Sir John Kaye, Elphinstone

“had indeed done all that it was requisite to do ; for the dangers which he had been sent to anticipate had disappeared by themselves. The king of Cabul undertook to prevent the passage of the French and Persians through his kingdom, and the English undertook to provide money for the purpose.” (*Ibid*, p. 247.)

Elphinstone and his party returned to India through the Punjab. Of course, there was no objection on the part of Ranjit Singh to grant them the passage through his country, for he had now entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with them.

Thus then Lord Minto's Government took every precaution to preserve the supremacy of the British influence in India, and duly safeguarded themselves against the rising of the inhabitants of the territories at that time under the administration

of the English, as well as protected India against the native powers of Hindustan. For the first time in the history of British India, the fear of the invasion of India from its North-Western frontier seized the minds of the Christian rulers and hence the various missions were sent to the Punjab, Afghanistan, Sindh and Persia, not only to contract defensive alliance with the rulers of those countries but also to espy out the military resources and strategical positions of those states.

But the British still apprehended danger from the sea. It was not impossible for any maritime power to invade their possessions in India by sea and so it appeared necessary for Lord Minto's Government to reduce such places as might serve as bases of operations for any maritime nation hostilely inclined against British supremacy in India. The influence of sea-power was fully recognized by them, but at this time there was not the remotest chance for any nation to approach the shores of India and invade the country by the sea. The danger was apprehended from France, but at this time the French navy was almost a thing of the past and hence Napoleon tried to conquer the sea by land. But this naval weakness of France gave the opportunity to the English to attack and capture their colonies in different parts of the world. Napoleon's schemes of conquest of the different countries of Europe necessarily left

the French colonies unguarded by the French fleet and so the British Government made elaborate preparations for their invasion.

The French possessions in the Indian Ocean, viz., the Isle of France, Bourbon and Rodriguez, were always considered as sources of danger to the British Government in India, since these islands harboured asylums to pirates who inflicted serious damage upon the Company's commerce. These islands were also looked upon as the bases of operations against the British possessions in India in the event of the outbreak of hostilities between the French and the English. Tippoo was alleged to have sent his agents to the Isle of France for the purpose of enlisting French recruits in his army to fight the English.

The reduction of these French possessions was considered to be of great political importance by the authorities both in England and India, and Marquess Wellesley had at one time seriously thought of sending expeditions against them. But the low state of finances did not allow him to carry out his intention into execution; as any expedition against the islands would involve great expense both for their reduction and maintenance. But in 1809, when Lord Minto was the Governor-General of India, the British Government at Home authorized the Government of India to attempt a rigorous blockade of the French islands in the

Indian Ocean. It will be foreign to our purpose to describe in detail the methods which were adopted to execute this order, which finally led to the capture and annexation of those French colonies in 1810. Suffice it to say that India had to bear the expenses of the expedition. By the reduction of these islands, the energies of the naval power of France in the East were paralysed once for all, and the French incubus no longer disturbed the sleep of the rulers of British India.

The attention of the authorities in England was also drawn to the Dutch possessions in the East, for it was thought that

“They constituted a rallying point, which was likely to become of more consideration after the destruction of those asylums which lay more in the route of the Indian trade ; and it was incompatible with the interests of India and the policy of England longer to permit the presence of an enemy in any part of the Eastern hemisphere.”

Accordingly under instructions from the home authorities, Lord Minto fitted out an expedition to reduce the Dutch possessions in the East. By the end of 1811 all the Dutch possessions in the Indian Archipelago came under the rule of the British Government.

After the termination of the expedition against the Dutch possessions in the East, Lord Minto was recalled and he left India in 1813.

The authoress of "*Lord Minto in India*" (pp. 343-344) writes:—

"Lord Minto had intimated to the Directors his wish to be relieved from the government early in 1814. The day he had named as that of his departure from India was indeed January 1. In the summer of 1813 he learned that, six months before, it had been decided to supersede him in the government of India, and that the appointment had been bestowed on the Earl of Moira, to whom the Prince Regent conceived himself peculiarly indebted for the assistance rendered by him while a new ministry was in process of formation after Mr. Perceval's death.Nothing could be more undeserved, more ungracious, or more discreditable to the parties concerned, than the recall of an able and uniformly successful Governor-General to make room for a personal friend of the Regent's."

During his administration of six years, Lord Minto did not extend the boundaries of the British possessions in India either by means of force or fraud. But he preserved the Empire by means which are Machiavellian and for which the natives of England ought always to be grateful to him. He came out to India at a period when the military prestige of the British was at its lowest ebb and when their public credit was shaken. It was the most critical period for them in India. To have preserved the ship of the state in such a stormy weather is a strong testimony to his ability and talents. He safeguarded the interests of his country by taking steps which had the effect of preventing

insurrections in and foreign invasions of India. The methods which he adopted have already been mentioned; and if the end justifies the means, then Lord Minto must be pronounced to have been a very successful administrator from the point of view of the British people.

CHAPTER XLIII

The Mutiny at Madras

The mutiny at Vellore produced great sensation in England. There is little doubt now that it was caused by the belief then prevalent that the authorities in India, especially in Madras, were bent on converting the natives of this country to Christianity. Lord William Bentinck, as Governor of Madras, gave every encouragement to the Christian missionaries to carry on their proselytising propaganda in India. It was, therefore, necessary to remove the impression from the minds of the people then under the administration of the East India Company that the authorities meant to interfere with their religious customs and observances. Great credit is due to Lord Minto for doing everything in his power to discourage the invasion of India by Christian missionaries. In his letter to the Chairman of the East India Company, dated September 1807, he wrote :—

“The only successful engine of sedition in any part of India must be that of persuading the people that our Government entertains hostile and systematic designs against their religion.” (*Minto in India*, p. 62).

The Serampore Mission, headed by Dr. Carey,

printed many books in the vernaculars. Lady Minto in her work on Lord Minto in India writes:—

“Soon after Lord Minto’s arrival, some of these publications attracted the attention of Government and it being undeniable that they were calculated to offend the feelings of the native population, containing as they did offensive attacks on the Hindu mythology, and the Mus-sulman Prophet, the Secretary to Government received instructions to communicate to the Revd. Dr. Carey, the leading member of the mission at Serampore, a resolution arrived at by the Governor-General in Council to place their press under regulation, and to suspend the practice of public preaching by the natives in the native dialects at the seat of Government.

“In an official letter addressed by Mr. Edmonstone to Dr. Carey it was stated that ‘the issue of publications and the public delivery of discourses of the nature above alluded to, are evidently calculated to produce consequences in the highest degree detrimental to the tranquility of the British dominions in India, and it becomes the indispensable duty of the British Government to arrest the progress of any proceedings of that nature. In the present instance this objection is enforced by the necessity of maintaining the public faith, which under the express injunctions of the Legislature has been repeatedly pledged to leave the native subjects of the Company in India to the full, free, and undisturbed exercise of their respective religions.’” (*Ibid*, p. 65).

The natives of India set more store by their religions than by anything else. Thus they were easily conciliated to the Company’s Government by the attitude which Lord Minto manifested towards the Christian missionaries.

But the case was quite different with Lord Minto's co-religionists and compatriots in India, who came out to this country as "birds of prey and passage," to shake the pagoda tree, amass "filthy lucre", and then return home laden with their booty to play "the Nabob" there. Anything which touched their pockets made them indignant and turn against those who ventured to do it.

The financial crisis of the Government of India at the period when Minto came as Governor-General has been already mentioned before. To tide over the crisis, it was necessary to make retrenchment in all departments of the state.

Military officers, in addition to their salary, drew several other allowances. Thus it was the practice to grant to the commanders of the native corps a monthly allowance known as the "Tent Contract," meant for the provision of camp equipage. In the Madras Presidency, Sir George Barlow, as its governor, abolished, with the approval of the Supreme Government in Bengal, this allowance by a general order, dated May, 1808. This was enough to offend the British officers and make them rise in mutiny.

Perhaps there would have been no mutiny of these officers had the Governor of Madras been possessed of tact. But Sir George Barlow was a man of stern, cold, and repulsive manners, and the civil as well as military British servants of Madras

considered it a grievance that a man who had been bred to public business in Bengal should have been appointed to the highest office without having the advantages of local and personal knowledge of that presidency.

The British officers burst into open mutiny at Masulipatam, Seringapatam, Hyderabad and other places. Lord Minto was of opinion

“that the successful combination of the Bengal officers in 1796, when Government at home took fright, is the real root of the late insubordination in the army of the Madras Presidency.” (Lord Minto in India, p. 210).

The mutiny took a serious aspect when

“blood was shed in Mysore, for, as a mutinous battalion was marching from Chitteldroog to join the mutineers at Seringapatam, they encountered resistance from a body of dutiful troops, and fired upon and received the fire of their own countrymen or friends and fellow-soldiers. This was a dangerous spectacle to exhibit to the armed sepoys and the native inhabitants.” (Macfarlane’s *Our Indian Empire*, (Vol. II, p. 181).*

* No British historian of India has given an account of the Mutiny at Madras in greater detail than Mr. Macfarlane, who in the footnotes at pages 182-184 has narrated things not referred to by other writers. He concludes his footnote at page 184 as follows :—

“In the histories and other books written by the functionaries and servants of the East India Company, we

In quelling the mutiny of the Christian European officers, such steps were not taken as are invariably done when the mutineers happen to be non-Christian and coloured persons. No Christian officer was hanged or blown from the mouth of canon. To conciliate the mutineers and to redress their grievances, as it were, some of the most distinguished political officers of the time, such as Colonels Barry Close, John Malcolm, the Honourable Arthur Cole, were sent to stations where mutinous dispositions were manifested. Lord Minto even went to Madras to make the mutineers understand the serious situation they had created by their conduct. No one can say what the consequences would have been, had the mutineers delayed in returning to their allegiance to the properly constituted authorities. It would have perhaps encouraged the Marathas to try to get back the territories that had been wrested from them a few years before and the Nizam and the Peishwa, prisoners as they were, would have tried to come out of their prisons and throw off the

see, generally, a disposition to glide over the whole of this story as quickly as possible. This surely is not the proper way to treat a subject which was so important and so critical at the time, and which contains lessons and warnings proper for all times."

yoke of the subsidiary alliance that had been placed on their necks by the British.*

* M. Victor Jacquemont, writing ^{*}to his father on October 28th, 1830, said :—

"The English officers of the Indian army are exceedingly dissatisfied with Lord William and the Court of Directors, on account of the reduction recently made in their pay. Twenty years ago, a sedition of this kind, provoked by the same cause, broke out in the Madras Presidency.....This happened at a critical period. If Runjit Sing had then crossed the Sutledge, the Mahrattas and Bundelcund, which were not then reduced to submission, and marched to Bengal, the British power would no doubt have re-entered into the limits conquered by Lord Clive ;—but the revolted of Madras soon perceived the danger and returned of themselves to their duty,.....
..... and *the Government had the weakness not to shoot a single officer.*" (Pp. 323-324, Vol. I. of *Letters from India*. The italics are ours.)

CHAPTER XLIV

The Marquess of Hastings's Administration

(1813-1823)

The nobleman who succeeded Lord Minto in the Government of India deserves a very close study of his character to enable one to understand the nature of his Indian administration. His rule forms a very conspicuous signpost in the history of British India. His is the central figure in the Trinity of European Christian nobles who within the first fifty-six years of the nineteenth century, trampled the rights of the princes and peoples of Hindustan under foot, and succeeded by means of fraud and force in depriving Indians of their independence, and rivetting the chain of slavery round their necks. Wellesley, Hastings and Dalhousie constitute the Trinity of empire-builders in the Christian administration of India during the nineteenth century.

The Marquess of Hastings was a native of Scotland by nationality, and he entered the army while still in his teens. He served under Cornwallis during the American War of Independence. Like his chief, he had to surrender his sword to the leader of the American rebels, and thus his military career,

at its very start, was anything but a success. As a nobleman of the united kingdom of England and Scotland, he had a seat in the Upper House of Parliament, but it does not appear that he ever cut a very prominent figure in politics. But by the manner in which he ingratiated himself with the ministry of the day in the first decade of the nineteenth century, he was chosen to establish a reputation for himself in India, where alone at that time it was possible to make amends for the failures sustained in Christendom and to win laurels, by diplomacy or by unsheathing the sword.

No satisfactory explanation has ever been given for the step which the ministry took in recalling Lord Minto from India. But to us it seems that the ministry at that time wanted to bring more territory in India under the jurisdiction of their countrymen, and so they did not like a peace-loving man like Lord Minto to be at the helm of their affairs in India. They wanted the pursuit of a more vigorous policy in India, in unison with their political affairs in Europe, so as to catch the imagination, kindle the interest and win the applause of the British people. This aspect of the question should always be borne in mind by all writers of Indian history; for the policy of the political party in power in England has often guided Indian affairs and have made them run parallel to those of England; after making every effort by strong

advocacy and otherwise, to induce the majority of the British public and others, to look at things from their own view-point.

What was the state of England and of Europe at that time, then? Napoleon Bonaparte was the virtual dictator of the whole of Europe, and he held all the states of that continent within the hollow of his hand. England alone stood against him and spent money like water, to bribe all the powers of Europe in order to bring about his downfall. But where did all this money come from? England at the beginning of the nineteenth century was not so rich as she was at its close. Her principal source of wealth was her commerce. It is well known that Napoleon prohibited the importation of English goods into any part of the vast European continent. Napoleon tried to conquer the sea by land. His navy had been destroyed by England and so he could not do any harm to England on the sea, but the loss which England suffered by the prohibition of the importation of her manufactured articles into any state of Europe was great. She had to make up this loss in the best way she could. There was no other way of effectually gaining this end than that of forcing her goods on India. England was the mistress of the sea, and India was the only country which Napoleon's octopus-like arms did not reach. The importance of India at this crisis to England has

been fully appreciated by so competent a writer as Sir George Birdwood, who in his introduction to *The First Letter Book of the East India Company, 1600-1619*, states that it was the Company's possession of India which enabled England, at the commencement of the nineteenth century, to successfully resist the machinations of Napoleon I., and he declares that

'the continued possession of India will be our chief stay in sustaining the manufacturing and mercantile preponderance in this country in the crushing commercial competition with which we have now everywhere to contend.'

It was by bleeding India that England succeeded in raising money to intrigue with other European powers against, and to fight with, Napoleon. How the interests of India were at this time sacrificed for those of England is not well known to all. Till the beginning of the nineteenth century, India was not only an agricultural, but also a manufacturing country. Before the establishment of British rule, India was the greatest manufacturing country in the world. Her cotton fabrics used to be imported into every country of the civilised world. It was to buy her cotton fabrics that the Christian nations of Europe made their way to India. It was by destroying this cotton manufacture of India, that England succeeded in raising money to overcome Napoleon. In order to secure the cotton manufacture

for herself, England forbade the importation of India's cottons into England; nay, on the contrary, when Napoleon had shut England out from the markets of continental Europe, she forced the East India Company to lower all the duties hitherto levied on English goods entering India. She thus flooded India with cheap cotton, and brought about the ruin of the Indian weavers and of Indian cotton manufacture. Regarding the destruction of the Indian cotton manufacture, Professor H. H. Wilson has written as follows:—

“The history of the trade of cotton cloths with India affords a singular exemplification of the inapplicability to all times and circumstances of that principle of free trade which advocates the unrestricted admission of a cheap article, in place of protecting by heavy duties a dearer one of home manufacture. *It is also a melancholy instance of the wrong done to India by the country on which she had become dependent.* It was stated in evidence, that the cotton and silk goods of India up to this period (1813) could be sold for a profit in the British market, at a price from fifty to sixty per cent. lower than those fabricated in England. It consequently became necessary to protect the latter by duties of seventy and eighty per cent. on their value, or by positive prohibition. Had this not been the case, had not such prohibitory duties and decrees existed, the mills of Paisley and of Manchester would have been stopped in their outset, and could scarcely have been again set in motion even by the powers of steam. *They were created by the sacrifice of the Indian manufacture.* Had India been independent, she would have retaliated, would have imposed preventive

duties upon British goods, and thus would have preserved her own productive industry from annihilation. This act of self-defence was not permitted her; she was at the mercy of the stranger. *British goods were forced upon her without paying any duty, and the foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor with whom he could not have contended on equal terms.*" (VII. p. 385.)

Thus by destroying India's cotton manufacture England established her market in India. The money required in order to bribe, corrupt and subsidise the states of Europe was so large that England was loaded with a very heavy debt. The resources of "Golden India" were indented upon to liquidate this debt. It was therefore necessary to bring under the British administration and to reduce as many independent states of India as possible. It seems clear then that Lord Minto was replaced by the Marquess of Hastings to carry out the policy of the English ministry of the day to extend the boundaries of their empire,* to strangle the weaving industry of India, and thus to create a market for English goods and ultimately enrich

* In May 1823, the officers in London gave Lord Hastings a dinner; Lord W. C. Bentinck in the chair. Lord Hastings then declared that he had "followed in the footsteps of the Marquess Wellesley." In other words, he was as unscrupulous as Lord Wellesley.

England and enable her to hold her own against Napoleon.*

If we remember these facts and take into due consideration their significance, then we shall be able to fully understand this period of Indian history and the object of the wars which were carried on during the Marquess of Hastings's regime.

It has already been said before that there is a great deal of resemblance between the chequered military career of Cornwallis and that of the Marquess of Hastings. Cornwallis came out to India to retrieve his character and rehabilitate himself in the estimation of the English people. He was not only the Governor-General of India but also its Commander-in-Chief. To the functions of the statesman he added those of the soldier. Similarly when the Marquess of Hastings was sent out to India, he came in the double capacity of the Governor-General as well as of Commander-in-Chief. Whatever plausible arguments might be adduced in favour of this combination of civil and military duties in one person, at the time of the appointment of the Marquess of Hastings, can

* Not only the acquisition of India did not cost England a single farthing, but on the contrary, India was made to pay for all the wars which England waged against Napoleon, either for her own self-defence, or for the establishment of her supremacy as the First Power in the world.

hardly apply to the circumstances of the period, when he was sent to govern India. The very fact of the Marquess of Hastings becoming the military chief of India, as well as its governor-general, clearly indicates that the Ministry wanted to give him a free hand in the management of India affairs. It is quite probable that the Marquess of Hastings must have expressed a desire to be the Commander-in-chief in India, in addition to his other duties in order to leave a name in the temple of fame as a military genius, and thus to wipe out the blot that was attached to his name for having surrendered his sword to Washington.

The following facts then should be remembered in order to fully understand the Indian career of the Marquess of Hastings:—

1. The recall of Lord Minto, which has never been satisfactorily explained.

2. The appointment of the Marquess of Hastings as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of India.

3. The resemblance between the chequered military careers of the Marquess Cornwallis and the Marquess of Hastings in America.

4. The situation of political affairs in Europe, and how Napoleon had prohibited the importation of English goods in all the countries of that continent.

5. The necessity felt by England for raising

money to corrupt, bribe and intrigue with other European powers against Napoleon, and also to fight him in order to establish her supremacy as the First Power in the world.

6. England succeeded in raising money by destroying the cotton manufacture of India.

The English writers of Indian history have not brought out in bold relief the fact that the Marquess of Hastings was the prototype of the Marquess of Dalhousie as regards his policy towards the independent native states of India. In one of his papers Mr. Henry St. George Tucker, who was Director of the East India Company, writes :—

"The Marquess of Hastings took charge of the government in 1813, and manifested at a very early period, that his views of our foreign policy differed widely from those of his immediate predecessors."

In a foot note to this passage Mr. Tucker adds :—

"I don't think it necessary to refer to his lordship's minutes and correspondence, in which this opinion is expressed. It is throughout maintained and acted upon."

Then Mr. Tucker continues :—

"He (the Marquess of Hastings) was evidently impressed with the opinion that the absolute supremacy of the British power throughout India must be maintained, and that the native states must be united in one great federative league, under a supreme head, which should control and protect them."

"This broad scheme of policy, which has found some strenuous advocates, is very much in unison with that

which was for some time successfully pursued in Europe by the late ruler of France (i. e. Napoleon Bonaparte).*** It was perfectly simple in its own nature, and reducible to one single proposition—the establishment of the well-meant despotism of a powerful state over all its weaker neighbours”.*

If we bear the above in mind, we shall be enabled to understand all the wars which the Marquess of Hastings waged against the native powers of India.

* *Memorials of Indian Government*, being a selection from the papers of Henry St. George Tucker. Edited by John William Kaye. Pp. 233-234.

CHAPTER XLV

Reflections on the E. I. Co.'s Charter of 1813

The Earl of Moira embarked at Portsmouth, on board H. M. S. *The Stirling Castle*, under command of Admiral Sir Home Popham, accompanied by the Countess of Loudoun and Moira and his three eldest children, on the 14th of April; and landed at Madras on the 11th of September, 1813. It was during Earl Moira's voyage to India that Act 53 Geor. III. Cap. 155, commonly known as the East India Company's Charter of 1813, was passed in England.

It is necessary here to offer a few reflections on the East India Company's Charter of 1813.

The far-reaching consequences of the terms on which the Charter of the East India Company was renewed in 1813 have not received that attention from the writers of Indian history which they deserve. India had been conquered and ruled by other nations before the English became masters of the country. But none inflicted such miseries on her as the English. Other rulers of India were imperialists, that is to say, they were content to keep power in their hands and exercise it. But the English were primarily a nation of

shop-keepers. They were not satisfied merely with becoming the rulers of India ; they desired also to become shopkeepers in India and, therefore, opened shops in this country.

The commercial character of British rule in its present form dates from the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1813. True it is that the East India Company was a trading corporation. But they were not so much the importers of English manufactured goods into India as exporters of Indian goods from India to Europe. The deliberate destruction of Indian industries dates from 1813 when English goods were forced on India on the principle of Free Trade. Since that date has commenced India's degradation. If India is poverty-stricken to-day, that should be attributed to the Charter of 1813—to the crushing of India's manufactures.

If economically the renewal of the Company's Charter was disastrous to India, it was no less morally also. Since time immemorial, "plain living and high thinking" has been the guiding principle of the natives of Hindustan. But the philanthropists of England, on the occasion of the renewal of the Charter in 1813, were anxious to see Indians give up plain living. They wanted to make them luxurious and addicted to drinking, &c.* How

* Mr. Holt Mackenzie, in his evidence before the

often was the question put to the witnesses who appeared before the Select Committees of the two Houses of Parliament whether the rich natives spent their superfluous wealth in the purchase of English commodities ! Unless the natives of India were of luxurious and to some extent 'depraved habits, there was not much likelihood of their patronising

Commons' Committee, on the 23rd February, 1832, said :—

"I believe intercourse with Europeans leads to indulgence in the use of wine and spirits, which, though it may be lamented on the score of morals, must be beneficial to the revenue ; their servants are generally better clothed, and the articles of clothing being subject to taxation, that would increase the revenue, * * *

"Judging from Calcutta, there has been, I think, a marked tendency among the natives to indulge in English luxuries ; they have well-furnished houses, many wear watches, they are fond of carriages, and are understood to drink wines."

Yes, it gladdened the hearts of many a Christian Anglo-Indian that the natives had taken to the drinking of wines. In his evidence before the Commons' Committee on the 24th March, 1832, Mr. Bracken said that

"Liquors in Calcutta are now consumed in large quantities by natives who can afford to purchase them."

In answer to another question the same witness said :—

"I heard from a native shopkeeper in Calcutta, who is one of the largest retail shopkeepers, that his customers for wines, and brandy, and beer, were principally natives.

"1936. What should you say was the favorite wine among the natives ?—Champaigne.

English goods. So India, which was sober, India, which was abstemious, was to be made intemperate and luxurious, in order to extend the market of England. But the masses of the Indian people did not require any luxuries, for they had hardly any wants. Their wants were supplied by Nature and the arts of their country. So England had to destroy the industries of the Indians in order to oblige them to purchase English goods.

It is a pity that there was no Indian living in 1813 who could see through the designs of the English when the Company's Charter was renewed. Even the enlightened and far-seeing Ram Mohun Roy failed to do so. Had the Indians been able to understand the intentions of their rulers in 1813, the birth of the Swadeshi *cum* boycott movement would have then taken place. The success of that movement in India would have been as great then as it had been in America on the eve of the Revolution. But unfortunately the natives of India had been so successfully hypnotised by the English that they believed them to be their benefactors

"1937. Formerly did they not consume any wine?—Very little, I believe.

"1938. Is it not contrary to their religion?—I do not know whether it is contrary to their religion, but it is contrary to their habits ;** it is not done openly, but when done it is a violation of their custom rather than of their religion."

and that whatever they did was for the benefit of India.

It was because England wanted to create and extend her market in India, that the policy of exterminating the native states of India was mercilessly pursued. On the occasion of the renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1793, through the exertions of Sir Philip Francis, a clause was inserted in the Charter Act that

"To pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honor, and policy of this nation," &c.

But no inquiry was made in 1813 whether that clause had been violated or not by the Company. No, in the Charter Act of 1813, when its framers showed their solicitude for promoting the happiness of the natives of India, knowing how flagrantly the provision of the Charter Act of 1793 contained in the clause quoted above, had been violated by Wellesley, did nothing to restrain any other Governor-General from following his example. That omission in the Charter Act of 1813 was a significant one. No, it was not the interest of the English in 1813 to express their repugnance at the schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India as it was in 1793. They had to create and extend the market in India for English manufactures, and therefore, it was necessary to bring as much territory under the

dominion of England as it was possible by means of fraud and force.

About the time when the Company's Charter was to be renewed in 1813, Sir Thomas Munro wrote :—

“It is our political power, acquired by the Company's arms, that has made the trade to India what it is : without that power, it would have been kept within narrow bounds by the jealousy and exactions of the Native Princes, and by some, such as Tippoo, could have been prohibited altogether.”*

Sir Thomas Munro represented the opinions and views of the politicians and statesmen of his time who had anything to do with India. Under the circumstance, it is quite reasonable to infer that the wars which were waged against the native Powers of India after 1813 were not “repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy” of the natives of England. That accounts for the honors and rewards that were conferred on Earl Moira and every subsequent Governor-General who followed in his footsteps.

While it is considered indefensible on moral considerations to tax the Roman Catholics of Ireland to maintain Protestant clergymen in their land, while people, although Christian, are protesting loudly against the Church of England Establishment in their midst, it is sad to think that the Charter of 1813 saddled India—a non-Christian

* Gleig's *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, Vol. II. (1831), p. 347.

country—with the cost of the Clerical Establishment. It was not fair dealing, nay, it was not even honest to do so.

The principle of religious neutrality which was the boast of the English in their Government of India was sacrificed when the Charter of 1813 permitted missionaries to proceed to India to preach the Gospel and convert its inhabitants. Religious neutrality demanded that the East India Company should have, when they permitted Christian missionaries to proceed to India and sanctioned a Clerical Establishment at the expense of the heathens, encouraged Hindoo and Muhammadan priests to preach and practise their religions by giving them stipends out of the revenues of India. But this they did not do.

Next to the destruction of the Indian industries, the greatest wrong which the Charter of 1813 inflicted on the Indian people was the permission granted to the Europeans to freely resort to India. They believed that this would in time lead to the colonization of India. And this there can be no doubt was their intention. In this, they considered, lay the security and permanence of their rule over the natives of Hindustan. The oppressions and cruelties practised by the adventurers of England on the inhabitants of India would, they probably thought, serve to strengthen the British dominion, by dispiriting and disheartening the latter. Colonization

means displacement, and so, perhaps, it was thought that the lives of the inhabitants of India would be almost of as much value to the British adventurers as those of the North American aborigines to the Pilgrim Fathers, of the Mexicans and Peruvians to the Spaniards, of Kaffirs to the South African settlers and of Maoris to the Australian colonisers. It was probably for this reason, that, in spite of the protests of Warren Hastings and others who could speak with authority on the subject, the free influx of Europeans into India was demanded. But owing perhaps to the numerous population of India, her advanced civilization and latent strength, Indians could not be treated as the natives of other regions had been by the white settlers.

The deliberate destruction of the Indian industries, making Indians give up their plain living and take to some of the vices as well as the luxurious life of the Western nations and thus demoralising them, allowing adventurers of Great Britain to freely resort to India to oppress and plunder its inhabitants, saddling non-Christian natives of India with the expense of a costly Christian clerical establishment, permitting missionaries of the Christian persuasion to proceed to India to insult and outrage the religious susceptibilities of the non-Christians, conniving at the wars on the native princes and the annexation of their dominions in order to extend their commerce, (for trade follows

the flag), were considered by the scheming and designing politicians of England of a century ago as promoting the interest and happiness of the natives of India. It was "the duty" of England to pursue these measures from motives of philanthropy and altruism !

The natives of England were put to great straits by Napoleon, who threatened to cripple, if not altogether destroy, their industries and commerce by blockading the ports of the continent of Europe. They were anxious to create a market for their goods in India. With this object in view, they did all they could to impose such terms on the East India Company on the occasion of the renewal of their Charter in 1813 as were calculated to promote their interests. They covered their selfish motives under the cloak of philanthropy. But a couple of years after the renewal of the Charter in 1813, the battle of Waterloo was fought, which resulted in the capture and exile of Napoleon. This was of great importance to England. The English industries were no longer threatened with extinction. The blockade being removed from the ports of the continent against English goods and a market being created for them in India, gave a great impetus to the industries and commerce of England. The Marquess of Wellesley had waged his wars against the native princes of India on the ostensible plea of removing centres of intrigue with the French.

It was presumed that the French had been intriguing with the princes of India and as a measure of self-defence it was considered necessary by Wellesley to deprive the native states of their independence. Whether such a step was just or proper, and whether in going to war against the Indian princes, the Marquess was giving effect to that clause of the Charter Act of 1793 which declared, that "to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of the English nation," were questions which the Marquess never troubled to take into consideration.

But whatever justification might be urged in favour of the wars of the Marquess Wellesley, there was none for those of the Marquess of Hastings. The French were no longer supposed to be intriguing with the native princes of India. The English historians do not tell us, but the terms of the renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1813 do not leave any room for doubt, that the wars against and annexation of the territories of the native princes were prompted by the following two considerations, viz. :—(1) to extend the territories under the British supremacy in India in order to find a market for English goods, and (2) to bring hilly tracts under the jurisdiction of the company, in order to find suitable places for

settlement and colonization by the English, which was sure to follow on their free influx into India.

The renewal of the East India Company's Charter in 1813 was designed to toll the death-knell of the Indian industries and to plunge Indians in poverty and misery. The merchants of England sent their agents and emissaries to learn the wants of the natives of the country and thus to enable them to successfully cater to their needs.

If India is to-day poverty-stricken, if the land of plenty is the home of scarcity and recurrent famines and of plague, if the people have been demoralised and Indian society disorganised, if there is unrest in India, the cause of all these troubles may to a great extent be traced to the Charter of 1813. It did not confer any concessions on Indians, on the contrary, it had the effect of making their lot much worse than before. Had the framers of the Charter Act of 1813 used plain and unvarnished language they should have worded the 33rd section of that Act as follows :—

Whereas it is the duty of this country to enrich and aggrandise itself by all available means even if they lead to the infliction of miseries and degradation on the native inhabitants of the British dominions in India : etc., instead of the language of that section breathing lofty philanthropy and altruism. The sum total of the Charter of 1813 was that India was not for Indians but for England and Englishmen.

Earl Moira had to carry out and give effect to the policy underlying the Charter of 1813. If we keep this fact in mind, we shall be able to understand the secret of his administration in India.

CHAPTER XLVI

The Nepal War

I. *Its Causes*

The Marquess of Hastings arrived in Calcutta on the first of October 1813, and on the fourth of that month assumed charge of the office of Commander-in-chief combined with that of Governor-General.

The first act of his administration was to declare war against Nepal. It was a war in which the reputation of the British arms was greatly tarnished and they suffered great humiliation by the reverses inflicted on them by their Hindoo antagonists.

British writers have tried to make out that the Nepalese government was the aggressive party and thus obliged the British government to go to war. We have not come across any narrative of the war written by the Nepalese, but a perusal of the English account of the war, leaves the impression on one's mind that if the Nepalese took the offensive first, they were provoked to do so by the behavior of their adversaries towards them. The disputes which led to the war could have been, in all probability, amicably settled, had the British been inclined to do so.

The disputes arose over certain lands on the borders of the British and Nepalese territories. These lands lay in the districts of Saran and Gorakhpur. The Nepalese government advanced their claims over these lands ; while, on the other hand, the British Indian government contended that these lands belonged to Zemindars who were under their protection, since they paid land tax to them. These border questions had their origin in the fact of the frontier being ill-defined. Although attempts had, from time to time, been made to define the frontier, these attempts generally ended in failure. It is also on record that the British government also connived at, and thus encouraged the Nepal government in their alleged aggressions on the territories of Border Zemindars who were under the protection of the British. Mr. Henry T. Prinsep in his "History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings." (pp. 63 *et seq.*) writes :—

"The Goorkhas, . . . as each Raja in the hills successively fell before them, exterminated the family ; and becoming heir to all its possessions took up likewise the old Raja's claims and contests with his neighbours. This brought them into contact with our Zemindars, who were, of course, unable to maintain themselves against such an enemy, and generally therefore had to resign the object in dispute ; for unless when the encroachment was gross and easy of proof, it was vain to hope to interest the British Government in their favor. That government was, in the first place, no loser by the usurpation, for the public

revenue was fully secured by the perpetual settlement, and by the increased value of the entire estate against any loss from a partial aggression. Moreover, it was, on principle, distrustful of the pretensions of its own subjects, which were generally exaggerated; while it regarded the Goorkha nation as a well-disposed neighbour, whom it was desirable to conciliate; hence an injured Raja of the plains would seldom succeed in procuring any powerful support to his cause, unless, as above observed, the case was very flagrant, when *the Goorkhas would on remonstrance make reparation.*"

From the above it is quite clear that the pretensions advanced by the Zemindars were in most instances not correct and that the Nepalese government were open to reason and would make reparations when they were in the wrong. It is moreover also evident that neither the British nor the Nepalese government so far ever desired to settle any dispute by the sword. So far all the Border differences and disputes between the two governments used to be settled by means of commissions consisting of nominees of both the governments. Their findings were usually considered to be satisfactory to both the parties. But with the arrival of the Marquess of Hastings affairs assumed a different complexion. When he landed on the shores of India, a commission was inquiring into these disputes. Major Bradshaw was the nominee of the government of India on this commission. But it would seem that he must have known the aggressive

policy of the new Governor-General. On this ground alone, we can account for his offensive and ungentlemanly behavior towards the Nepalese Commissioners. It is on record that,

"they (the Nepalese Commissioners) had an interview with the Major, who made use of improper language towards them ; in consequence of which they remained silent ; and, seeing no business brought forward, they came away." (Mill and Wilson, VIII, p. 12 foot note).

This occurred in March 1814.

Lord Hastings also did not try to smooth matters. He addressed to the Raja of Nepal a peremptory requisition to evacuate the lands under dispute ; and he sent the letter through the Magistrate of Gorukhpoor, giving that officer authority to order the advance of a body of troops to occupy the contested lands, in case the Raja's order for their evacuation should not arrive within twenty-five days from the date of his forwarding the letter. The Nepal government was further informed that the Magistrate had these orders.

The die was now cast. The Government of India were fully determined upon hostilities. The peremptory tone of the Governor-General's letter to the Rájá of Nepal was not calculated to preserve peace and amity between the two governments. The Gurkha government was not going to be so easily cowed down by the threatening attitude assumed by the British. Never in their history, had the Gurkhas so

far known what defeats and disasters meant. They could look back with pride to their glorious past and the chivalrous conduct of their ancestors. Within the memory of their men then living, it was not forgotten how the Gurkhas had inflicted defeat on the English who had been made to precipitate an ignominious retreat. An expedition in 1767 against Nepal was undertaken by the government of Bengal at the recommendation of Mr. Golding, the commercial agent at Betia, who feared that the success of the Goorkhas would ruin the trade he carried on with Nepal. Major Kinloch commanded the expedition. He advanced into the hills in October, 1767 and had not strength enough to establish a chain of depots to secure his communication with the plains; consequently, having penetrated to Hureehurpoor, he was detained there by a nulla, not formidable, and the bridge and raft he constructed were carried away after a fall of rain, which swelled the torrent unnaturally. The delay thus experienced exhausted his supplies, and produced sickness; so that, finally, he was obliged to return early in December.

The lesson then learnt was not easily and soon forgotten by the English. But they were also smarting under the humiliation they had then been subjected to. They were watching for nearly half a century for an opportunity to wipe out the disgrace of ignominious retreat before the Gurkhas. The Marquess of Hastings thought that the favorable

opportunity for striking the blow at the Goorkhas had come.

The Goorkhas did not, of course, sue for peace. They boldly and bravely took up the challenge of the English. It would have shown pusillanimity and cowardice on their part, had they yielded to the threat. Their principal chiefs held a council and deliberately considered the question of peace or war. The decision of the council was for war. Their determination indicated a lofty and patriotic spirit.

But they did not make their decision known to the British Government, because they were as yet quite unprepared for the war. The Governor-General's threatening letter was answered by mere commonplace assurances of respect, and of a desire to keep up a good understanding with the English, but omitting all mention of the subject of the disputed lands.

Under such circumstances, it was proper for the India government not to occupy the disputed lands without further consideration, but the Magistrate of Goruckpore was only too anxious to carry into execution the orders of the Governor-General, and so, on the expiration of the period, he addressed the commanding officer at the station, and three companies marched to occupy the lands. The Goorkha officers retired before them, without making the slightest opposition.

But the Nepalese were not idle. When the troops

under British officers occupied the disputed lands, they did not offer any resistance, because they had not till then made all the necessary preparations for the war. The Indian government were thus thrown off their guard. Having established a few police Thanas in the disputed districts, and without anticipating attack or hostility on the part of the Goorkhas, the troops were ordered to retire from the disputed districts.

Here was the opportunity now for the Gurkhas to take advantage of the want of foresight and forethought on the part of the Indian government. The troops had hardly returned to Gorukhpoor when on the morning of the 29th May, 1814, the Gurkhas attacked the newly established police Thanas.

Of course, the British government were not going to submit to this insult at the hands of the Nepalese. They did not at once declare war against the government of Nepal. The cause of this delay has been thus explained by Mr. Prinsep in his work already alluded to above:—

“The formal declaration of war was purposely delayed till the close of the rains in order to allow time for persons engaged in trade with Nepal to withdraw their capital, as well as to give the Nepalese the opportunity of disavowing the act of Munraj, and punishing the perpetrators, if so inclined. They showed no disposition to do so ; but, on the contrary, made the most active military preparations along the whole extent of their frontier. The declaration of war was accordingly at length issued

by his Lordship from Lukhnow, on the 1st November, 1814." (P. 78).

Reviewing the whole situation of affairs after a century, the conclusions which any unprejudiced man would come to, is that the Nepalese were provoked to the war by the British and that the war could have been averted had the British government been so inclined.

When the war against Nepal was declared, the financial position of the Company's government in India was very deplorable. The credit of the government bonds for monies borrowed was so low that twelve per cent discount was the regular calculable rate in the market. There was little possibility for government to raise more money by loan to carry on the war. Lord Hastings followed the examples set by some of his predecessors in squeezing the Nawab Vizier of Oudh. When he came out to India as its Governor-General, the prince of Oudh was Ghaziuddin Hyder. Prisoner as this Muhammadan prince was, his life was being made miserable by his Christian keeper, named Major Baillie. Reports of his ill-treatment by the latter reached the Governor-General, who proceeded to Lucknow, ostensibly to lessen the weight of the chain by which the Vizier was held in thralldom, but in reality to squeeze him to successfully carry on the war with Nepal. He succeeded so far that the Nawab-Vizier, it was said, "out

of gratitude," advanced him a loan of two and a half crores of rupees, with which money it was not difficult for Hastings to prosecute the war.

It was certainly not out of gratitude that the above-mentioned sum of money was paid by the Oude prince. How he was tortured to part with that amount has been narrated in "*Dacoitee in excelsis*" in detail in Chapter IV (pp. 58-76). In the course of that chapter, the author of that work writes :—

"Such was the style in which the Indian Government approached its victim, while its policy was to flatter. The '*Mine of Munificence*' was thus worked with cautious approaches, and pious ejaculations, and every fresh shaft was opened with official prayer." When the '*Mine*' was impoverished, the process was different....."

But the people of Nepal did not forget that their country would not have been invaded, and a great portion of it sequestered, had not Oude helped the British government with money. Vengeance sleeps long but it never dies. It was, therefore, that the Nepalese came to the help of the English in the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and carried fire and sword through Oude and plundered it to their hearts' content, and killed thousands of its inhabitants in cold blood.

CHAPTER XLVII

The Nepal War

II. The First Campaign

The Nepal War was the bloodiest that had ever been fought by the British in India. The heroism and chivalry which the Nepalese showed on the occasion have become a matter of history. It will be of no use to enter into the labyrinth of details regarding the War, but a few salient points only are necessary to be mentioned.

It has been already said before that the new Governor-General had determined to distinguish himself by military exploits and by bringing new territories under the administration of the East India Company. It would seem that with these objects in view, he set out in June, 1814 for the Upper Provinces to make a tour of inspection. It was while touring in these provinces that he matured out his scheme of operations against the Nepalese. He had already threatened them with war and they replied to it by attacking the outposts and *thanas* which the British Government had established in the disputed districts. War was inevitable and the British made all the necessary preparations before formally declaring it. *

* It is certain that the British Government of India had at this time not a very high opinion of the military

The principality of Nepal at this time was small compared to the territories then, under the administration of the East India Company. The Nepalese had a very long frontier to guard. It is true that they had subjected many of the petty

skill of the Gurkhas. They were not much to blame when the fact is taken into consideration that even the Sikhs had duped the astute Gurkha general Amar Singh Thapa, only four or five years previously. In the beginning of the 19th century the Sikhs were not recognized as a military power in India and it was not considered difficult by the British to conquer or defeat them. In fact the easy conquest of the Punjab was proposed to Lord Wellesley by that military adventurer, George Thomas. Lord Hastings' government must have argued in this wise, that if such an insignificant people as the Sikhs could outwit and defeat the Gurkhas it would certainly not be a difficult task for him to beat and vanquish the Nepalese. Captain Cunningham has very graphically described the manner in which the Nepalese Commander was duped by the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh. He writes :—

“He (Ranjit Singh) was invited, almost at the same time (i. e. 1809), by Sundar Chund of Kotoch, to aid in resisting the Gurkhas, who were still pressing their long continued siege of Kángra, and who had effectually dispelled the Rajput prince's dreams of a supremacy reaching from the Jumna to the Jhelum. The stronghold was offered to the Sikh ruler as the price of his assistance, but Sunder Chand hoped, in the meantime, to gain admittance himself, by showing to the Goorkhas the futility of resisting Ranjit Singh, and by promising to surrender

hill chiefs and tribes on their frontier, but this added to their weakness rather than to their strength. Add to these, the discipline and superior arms of the British, and then it will be quite clear that the Nepalese were to fight against odds and under great and many disadvantages. They were not in

the fort to the Nepal commander, if allowed to withdraw his family. The Maharaja saw through the schemes of Sundâr Chand, and he made the son of his ally a prisoner, while he dexterously cajoled the Kathmandoo general Ummer Singh Thapa, who proposed a joint warfare against the Rajput mountaineers, and to take, or receive in the meantime, the fort of Kángra as part of the *Goorkha* share of the general spoil. The Sikhs got possession of the place by suddenly demanding admittance as the expected relief. Sundâr Chund was foiled, and Ummer Singh retreated across the Sutlej, loudly exclaiming that he had been grossly duped. The active Nepalese Commander soon put down some disorders which had arisen in his rear, but the disgrace of his failure before Kángra rankled in his mind, and he made preparations for another expedition against it. He proposed to Sir David Ochterlony a joint march to the Indus, and a separate appropriation of the plains and the hills; and Runjit Singh, ignorant alike of English moderation and of international law, became apprehensive lest the allies of Nepál should be glad of a pretext for coercing one who had so unwillingly acceded to their limitation of his ambition.....
.....But Ummer Singh long brooded over his reverse and tried in various ways to induce the British authorities to join him in assailing the Punjab. The treaty with Nepál, he would say, made all strangers the mutual

a position to bring into the fields so many fighting men and pieces of cannon as their adversaries. They had also neither the tact and knowledge nor the necessary funds to intrigue with and corrupt the men in the ranks of their opponents. These facts should not be lost sight of in connection with the war.

friends or enemies of the two governments, and Runjit Singh had wantonly attacked the Goorkha possessions in Kotoch. Besides, he would argue, to advance is the safest policy, and what could have brought the English to the Sutlej but the intention of going beyond it?"

From the above it is evident then that the English had a very contemptuous opinion of the Goorkhas and it would seem that they intended to pit the Sikhs against the Goorkhas; for while they withheld all hopes of help to the Goorkhas, they nevertheless promised Ranjit Singh assistance against the Nepalese. Captain Cunningham writes:—

"He (Ranjit Singh) made known that *he* was desirous of meeting Ummer Singh Thapa on his own ground; and the reply of the governor-general that he might not only himself cross the Sutlej to chastise the invading Goorkhas in the hills but that, if they descended into the plains of Sirhind, he would receive English assistance, gave him another proof that the river of the treaty was really to be an impassable barrier. He had got the assurance he wanted, and he talked no more of carrying his horsemen into mountain recesses."

This declaration of the policy of the British Government of India towards Ranjit Singh must have impressed the Gurkhas with the belief that the British did not like

The war was formally declared against Nepal on the 1st November, 1814. But before this announcement, the British were making elaborate military preparations for the purpose of overawing the Nepalese. Mr. Prinsep (pp. 83*et seq.*) writes that Lord Hastings

"resolved to act offensively against the enemy along the whole line of frontier, from the Sutlej to the Koosoo; and the following was the allotment ultimately made of this space to the several divisions that were brought into the field.

"It was assigned to Colonel Ochterlony who commanded the post established at Loodherana in 1808-9, to operate in the hilly country lying near the Sutlej. The force under this officer's command was exclusively native infantry and artillery, and amounted to about six thousand men; it had a train of two 18-pounders, ten 6-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers."

"From Meeruth in the Dooab, Major-General Gillespie * * * was to proceed first against the Dehra Doon

to live on terms of peace with them, and perhaps must have deterred them from amicably settling the frontier disputes. It is certain that had the British Government shown that spirit towards the Goorkhas which neighbours desirous of living on terms of peace with each other ought to do, and tried to make up differences between Runjeet Singh and the Nepalese, there would have been no misunderstanding between the English and the Goorkhas and thus in all probability, the Nepal War would not have taken place. But from the conduct of the English Government it seems that they provoked the Nepalese to go to war with them.

* * * and as soon as this should be reduced, which it was expected would not be an operation of much time or difficulty, the force was to divide; and while a detachment attacked Gurhwal and Sirinugur, under the snowy range, the main body was to proceed against Nahn, to the west of the Jumna, in aid of the operations of Major-General Ochterlony against Umur Singh. General Gillespie's force originally consisted of his Majesty's 53d, which, with artillery and a few dismounted dragoons, made up about one thousand Europeans, and two thousand five hundred native infantry. * * * * *

"From Bunarus and Gourukpoor a force was collected, and placed under the command of Major-General John Sullivan Wood, and his instructions were to penetrate by Bootwul into Palpa. This division consisted of his Majesty's 17th foot, nine hundred and fifty strong, and about three thousand native infantry; it had a train of seven 6 and 3-pounders, and four mortars and howitzers. * * * * *

"Further east from Patna and Moorshedabad, another force of a strength of near eight thousand men, including his Majesty's 24th foot, nine hundred and seven strong, was collected for the main attack, which was intended to be made direct upon the capital of Katmandoo by the passes between the Gundak and Bagmuttee. Major-general Marley was entrusted with the command of this army, and there was a train attached to it of four 18-pounders, eight 6 and 3-pounders, and fourteen mortars and howitzers. The Ganges was to be crossed by the troops from Patna on the 15th of November; and a further brigade was formed, from troops at more distant stations, to follow the army and secure its depots and rear, as it advanced into the hills.

"Beyond the Koossee eastward, Major Latter was fur-

nished with two thousand men, including his district battalion, for the defence of the Poornea frontier. This officer was desired to open a communication with the petty Raja of Sikkim, and to give him every assistance and encouragement to expel the Goorkhas from the eastern hills, short of an actual advance of troops for the purpose.

Thus the Government of India kept ready 30,000 men and 60 guns for the purpose of invading the country of the Goorkhas. The latter could, with great difficulty, muster 12,000 men, and these were ill-armed and ill-disciplined.

Major General Gillespie's force was the first to penetrate the Nepalese frontier. On the 22nd of October he seized the Keree pass leading into the Doon, and thence proceeded to Dehra, without meeting any opposition. The Gurkha Government had allotted a force of about six hundred men under the command of Captain Bulbhudur Singh for the defence of the Doon. The prodigies of valor wrought by this Hindoo militant are worthy subjects for the pen of some epic poets of India. Regarding this episode of the Nepal War, a distinguished Indian gentleman (Baboo Sishir Kumar Ghose) writes :—

It is not quite correct to say that but for the English the Mussalmans would have cut the Hindus to pieces.

The English came when Hindus had not been able to recover completely from the shock of the destructive Mussalman occupation. This second shock broke them down completely. To ascertain what Hindus were like in

the early days, we have to see whether there is yet any State in India which had not been bled and weakened by the Mussalman onslaught. The only State which escaped this destructive flood of Mussalman occupation, was Nepal. So when the English went to fight with the Nepalese, they found what the Hindus were like in early days, not demoralized by defeat and disaster. We shall here describe the first brush of the English with a handful of Nepalese, some three hundred in number, badly armed, badly protected, and weighted with the disadvantage of the presence of women and children.

War was declared against Nepal on the 1st November, 1814. A little before this declaration, it was resolved to make a grand military demonstration for the purpose of over-awing the enemy. For this, four separate regiments had been ordered to march simultaneously from four different military stations. Major-General Gillespie commanded one of them.

On the 24th October, Gillespie's regiment reached Dehra Dun. Gillespie was not with his force. Colonel Mawbey had the command.

About three miles and a half from Dehra Dun was the little fortress of Kulunga, situated in a nook of the hills of Nalapani. It was something like a stone-henge,—a small table-land surrounded by large blocks of stone which acted as the fort-wall,—which again was protected by a thick range of *sal* trees.

Finding the British force at his doors, Balabhadra Singh, nephew of Amar Singh, the Chief of Nahan, had taken refuge in this fortress of Nature with a few chosen followers, not exceeding three hundred. This was unbearable to Colonel Mawbey—the hill-fortress being within four miles of the great military station of Dehra Dun. Colonel Mawbey had reached Dehra Dun on the 24th. On

that very night he had written to Balabhadra to surrender, and had received a proud reply of meeting him on the battle-field. Next morning, the active British General was marching up hill. He reached the base of the Nalapani Hills, and fixed his battery there ; but, when he saw that with all his efforts, he could make no impression upon the enemy, he sent news to Gillespie at Saharanpur, and the Major-General made his appearance on the scene the next day, the 26th October. In two or three days he completed his preparations for the siege. Four detachments under Colonel Carpenter, Captain Faust, Major Kelly and Captain Campbell, surrounded the place from four sides ; and a regiment under Major Ludlow was kept in reserve.

The siege began. The discharge from the British battery was returned by volleys of musketry, which wrought immense havoc amongst the British forces. Though the British cannon did much harm amongst the brave three hundred, they showed no sign whatever of giving way. The determined manner in which the post was defended by a small number of men against tremendous odds, guided by the best generals of the age, created a mingled feeling of surprise and indignation in the minds of the besiegers. The leaders of the siege forgot themselves ; and, in attempting to scale the walls, Lieutenant Ellis and Major-General Gillespie lost their lives. *

* The death of general Gillespie was very tragic and associated with the cowardice of the British troops. Professor Horace Hayman Wilson writes :—

"General Gillespie, irritated by the repulse which had been sustained, persisted in renewing the attempt, declaring aloud his determination to carry the fort or lose his life. Accordingly, he placed himself at the head of three

The command then devolved on Colonel Mawbey as the senior officer. He found that it would be rashness to proceed further in the siege, and that his prudent course would be to make a hasty retreat. This he did, and asked for re-inforcements and a battering train from Delhi. It took a month's time for the train to arrive; but, there was no help for it. The expected re-inforcements and battering train reaching him on the 24th November, a second attack was made the next day, and it was repulsed for a second time.

Meantime, the water-supply of the besieged had fallen short. The only supply was from the water-falls outside the fortress near the British encampment at Nalapani and this had virtually been cut off. In the midst

fresh companies of the 53rd regiment and of the dragoons, and led them again towards the gate of the fort. *When within range of the enemy's matchlocks, the men of the 53rd hung back. The General, in advance of the line, in vain called on them to follow him; and while waving his sword to encourage them to come on, he was shot through the heart, and immediately expired.*"

In a footnote, Wilson adds:—"The men of this regiment were in a discontented and sullen mood, conceiving themselves to have been overworked by the necessary repetition of parade exercise.

Those Englishmen who say that they have acquired India by the sword and hold India by the sword, should remember the fact that it was not the sword of their co-religionists which secured India for them. In fact, in almost all Indian campaigns where there was any hard fighting, British soldiers showed great cowardice and pusillanimity. Compare their behavior at the siege of Bharatpur with that of the Indian Sepoys.

of the shots which were rapidly decimating their numbers, the groans of the wounded, the cries of the women and children for water, the besieged had to defend their apology of a fort in which breeches had been made on all sides, from an overwhelming force, thirsting for their blood. They, however, did not mind the shots of the besiegers as the burning thirst which overcame them and all their dependants: From three hundred the number had been reduced to seventy. They might have then surrendered; and, their generous enemy filled with admiration at their noble conduct would have warmly accepted it. But the besieged heroes disdained to yield, and admit defeat!

On the last day of the month, when the batteries of the British troops were hurrying on their work, and volleys after volleys from the Gurkha musketry responded to them, there was a pause of a few minutes in the ranks of the besieged. Suddenly the iron gates were flung open, and out came the immortal seventy "with drawn swords in their hands, guns on their arms, the *kukri* or *bhujali* hanging from their belts, and the *chakra* or wheel resplendent on their head-dress, led by their chief, Balabhadra, —brave, erect, cheerful and in his measured military gait," and, before the astounded British force had time to reflect, they had cut right through the line, drank to their hearts' content from the springs of Nalapani, and in no time disappeared without any one of them being hurt!

The English razed Kulunga to the ground. The English historian of Dehra Dun, R. C. Williams, B. A., C. S., thus remarks on the incident: "Such was the conclusion of the defence of Kulunga,—a feat of arms worthy of the best of chivalry, conducted with a heroism almost sufficient to palliate the disgrace of our own reverses." And in the silent forests at Dehra Dun, on the banks of

the river Riechpana, stands a small monument, "as a tribute of respect for our gallant Adversary Balabhadra Singh."

Another Indian gentleman, Baboo Mati Lal Ghose, writes in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* for February 16, 1900 :—

We have read of Leonidas in Greek history. He has been immortalized by Greek historians. But he belongs to ancient history ; besides, his exploits have been recorded by his own countrymen. But Balabhadra belongs to modern history, and it was his enemies who recorded his exploits. Leonidas opposed an ill-armed barbarian horde, but Balabhadra opposed a far better-armed and better-disciplined enemy. When he refused to surrender, General Gillespie was amazed at his audacity !

* * * *

We have heard innumerable accounts of bravery and chivalry, but Balabhadra's feat will beat every one of them. The world cannot show one equal to it.

Capt. Vansittart refers to this heroism of Balabhadra in his book "Notes on Nepal." He says : "In this defence Balabhadra with his 600 Gurkhas repulsed two assaults, inflicting on the British division a loss of 31 officers including General Gillespie, who was killed in the first assault, and 718 men, killed, wounded and missing."

* * * *

Mind, the Gurkhas were only 600 and badly armed and without any adequate cover. Mind, they were subjected to "incessant shelling for three days," as Capt. Vansittart says. Mind, they had no water to slake their thirst.

What followed was still more wonderful. "The survivors, 90 in number," says Captain Vansittart, "cut their way through our posts and escaped." And thus, these 90

heroes, with only *kulries* in their hands, cut a passage for themselves, through the British lines!

Says Captain Vansittart: "During the assaults in the fort, women were seen hurling stones and undauntedly exposing themselves, and several of their dead bodies were subsequently found amidst the ruins of the fort."

When the British entered the fort they "saw the evidence of the desperate courage and bloody resistance of these six hundred men opposed to means so overwhelming." "For, the whole area of the fort was a slaughter house, strowed with the bodies of the dead and wounded." Captain Vansittart continues to say: "The defence of this fort retarded a whole division for over a month." So, was not Balabhadra, as described by his opponents, greater than Leonidas? Yet Leonidas is known to everybody, and Balabhadra to none!

But if they showed courage, they also shewed the highest generosity. They never touched the dead bodies of the enemy or stripped any one of them. They were too high-minded to offer insult to the dead.

It was evident then that the British could not succeed in subduing the Gurkhas by means of the sword alone. It was found necessary to supplement the sword by fraud. Accordingly Colonel Mawbey who had succeeded General Gillespie in the command detached Lieut. Colonel Carpenter to a position on the right bank of the Jumna in order to intrigue with the hill tribes, should any of them show a disposition to rise and throw off the Gurkha yoke. It is on record that

"The people of Jounsarin consequence took up arms, and so much alarmed the Gurkha garrison of Barat, a

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stronghold in the mountains, that they hastily evacuated a fort which could not have been reduced without troubles and loss." (Mill and Wilson, VIII. p. 22).

Notwithstanding these intrigues, the British again met with reverses and disasters, which did not reflect much credit on their generals and military officers.

Colonel Mawbey himself marched towards Nahan, the capital of the small state of Sirmor. The Raja of this state was dispossessed by the Gurkhas and so he entered into an intrigue with the British. To this circumstance, in all probability, should be attributed the fact of the Gurkhas evacuating this place and retiring to Jythak. Mr. Prinsep (I. pp. 95-96) writes :—

"Nahn * * * though upon a hill two thousand feet high, was not deemed by the enemy to be of sufficient strength for their main stand. Accordingly Runjoor Singh had received Umar Singh's orders to retire to a position north of the town, and to occupy the surrounding heights and the fort of Jythuk, situated at a point where two spurs of mountainous ridges meet, and the peak at the intersection rises to a height of three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the plains of Hindustan."

At Jythak the Gurkhas were about two thousand strong, while their enemy had at least an equal number of men. Major-general Martindel having been appointed to succeed General Gillespie, took over the command of the division from Colonel Mawbey on the 20th December. Having ascertained

the evacuation of Nahn, he caused it to be occupied by Major Ludlow on the 24th of December and on the following day proceeded with his whole force against Jythuk, which was defended by stockades at various heights.

The British succeeded in capturing the fort of Kulunga and dislodging Balbhadra with his men, women and children from it only when the water-supply of the besieged had fallen short. The lesson learnt from that campaign was not lost upon General Martindell. He directed his attention to the water-supply of the Jythuk garrison and he discovered that they depended for their supply of water upon wells situated at some distance below and exterior to the fort. Two detachments were formed to occupy different arms of the ridges as well as to cut off the water-supply of the garrison. Majors Richards and Ludlow were entrusted with the commands of these detachments.

Both these detachments met with defeats at the hands of the Gurkhas and had to retreat precipitately, leaving behind a very large number of officers and men among killed, wounded and prisoners. The English did not anticipate and were not prepared for the disaster. Professor H. H. Wilson writes :—

“This repulse had a most mischievous effect upon the progress of the campaign, as General Martindell did not think himself competent to resume offensive measures

until he was reinforced; and military operations in this quarter were consequently arrested." (Mill and Wilson, VIII. p. 26).

Thus closed the year 1814 upon this division, which had to record nothing but a chapter of defeats, disasters and reverses.

Of all the commanders, General Ochterlony alone did not show that incompetency and want of self-reliance and coolness of head which characterised others. He alone distinguished himself in this war and but for him it is not too much to say that the British would not have succeeded in bringing the war to a successful termination. Ochterlony was the Resident at Delhi and had adopted some of the Eastern vices, such as the keeping of a harem and a number of concubines. By these means, he learnt that art of intrigues of which he was the past master. It was this knowledge which gave him an advantage over other British generals and officers. He spread the net of intrigues and ensnared some of the feudatory chiefs under the Nepalese government and thus with their help succeeded in gaining his object.

General Ochterlony was in charge of the most westernmost division of troops that penetrated the Nepalese frontier from the Sutlej, by a pass less difficult than most of those further east, and was opposed to Amar Singh in person. From the left bank of the Sutlej, there rises a succession of

mountains, on three of whose ranges the Goorkhas had built the forts of Nalagerh, Ramgerh and Malam. Between and beyond these ranges were fertile valleys in possession of chiefs who were tributaries to the Nepal government. It was the interest of General Ochterlony to intrigue with them and tempt them to betray their suzerain, and he succeeded. One of them, the Raja of Hindur, very easily fell a victim to the machinations of the Christians. He became their ally and rendered them valuable services both by means of men and provisions.*

* In a footnote Captain Cunningham in his history of the Sikhs writes:—

“During the war of 1814 Sir David Ochterlony sometimes almost despaired of success: and, amid his vexations, he once at least recorded his opinion that the sepoys of the Indian army were unequal to the mountain warfare as was being waged. * * * The most active and useful ally of the English during the war, was Raja Ramsurrun of Hindoor (or Nalagurh), the descendant of the Hurree Chand slain by Gooroo Govind, and who was himself the ready coadjutor of Sunsar Chund in many aggressions upon others, as well as in resistance to the Goorkhas. The venerable chief was still alive in 1846, and he continued to talk with admiration of Sir David Ochterlony and his ‘eighteen pounders,’ and to expatiate upon the aid he himself rendered in dragging them up the steep slopes of the Himalayas.”

In another place of his work, the same author pays the following tribute to the memory of Sir David

General Ochterlony's division ascended the hills on the 31st of October and, resolving to put nothing to hazard, made a road with great labor, and sat himself down, with heavy guns, before Nalagarh on the 2nd of November. The garrisons of Nalagarh and Taragarh could not hold out against the superior force of their enemy, and so they were compelled to surrender on the 6th of November. There was, however, no cowardice on the part of the Gurkhas. What could these two garrisons, hardly five hundred strong, have done against 7,000 men?

At Ramgarh, Amar Singh had taken his post. It was against him that the General directed his attention. By all accounts, Amar Singh had not more than 3,000 troops under him, whereas he was opposed to at least 7,000 troops under British officers. After capturing Nalagarh and Taragarh, General Ochterlony made one week's preparations, before he proceeded on the 13th of November against Ramgarh.

Amar Singh was more than a match for General Ochterlony. It speaks volumes in favor of the

Ochterlony:—"Sir David Ochterlony will long live in the memory of the people of Northern India as one of the greatest of the conquering English chiefs; and he was the very last of the British leaders who endeared himself, both to the army which followed him and to the princes who bowed before the colossal power of his race."

military skill of this Gurkha general that with only 3,000 troops he not only kept the English general and his officers at bay, but inflicted heavy defeats on them. But in their hour of triumph, the Gurkhas did not fail to show that generosity to the vanquished, for which, the Hindus alone of all other nations of the earth are noted. Mr. Prinsep writes :—

“The Goorkhas gave permission to remove and bury the dead, a courtesy they never refused during the war, and not the only one we experienced at their hands.”

The checks and repulses did not cow down the heart of General Ochterlony, although at this time, according to Mr Prinsep, he

“had serious doubts of our (British) ultimate success in the struggle, and he feared that our native army, with all its discipline, would be found ill-adapted to warfare in a country too rugged to admit of its superior tactics being brought to play. These apprehensions were, however, expressed to none but his commander-in-chief.”

The Commander-in-chief at this time was the Governor-General himself. As soon as he heard of the critical state of affairs, he determined to send reinforcements to General Ochterlony. It cannot be denied that Lord Hastings had not anticipated these disasters and reverses.

But before the arrival of the expected reinforcements, General Ochterlony was deep in intrigues with the neighbouring chiefs. He succeeded in winning over the Raja of Hindur, whom

he got to lend his exertions in making a road for artillery from Mukram, by Khundnee to Nahur, where he had for some time fixed his headquarters.

He also intrigued with the Raja of Bilaspore and brought him also over to his side. Mr. Prinsep writes:—

“This Raja, though connected with Umar Singh’s family by a recent marriage, was induced at last, through fear of seeing his capital and country given over to another, to make his terms and submit.”

Thus the Christian general had not only more than twice the number of troops than his Hindoo opponent, but he succeeded in raising traitors in his opponents’ camp, whom he tempted to betray their suzerain. But notwithstanding the possession of all these advantages, General Ochterlony had to remain idle during the winter months and made little progress towards accomplishing the object of the campaign before the beginning of the next April.

Mr. Prinsep is compelled to pay a tribute of praise to the military skill of Amar Singh in the following words:—

“Umar Singh had fully justified the reputation he enjoyed as a soldier by the manner in which he met, and sometimes defeated, the sagacious plans of the British commander. Nothing decisive, indeed, had yet been done by either army; but, considering that the British had been reinforced to near seven thousand men,

while Umar Singh had never more than two thousand eight hundred or at the most three thousand, this was the best possible proof of the skill with which he had availed himself of the advantage of ground, which was all he had to compensate for his numerical inferiority."

The other divisions which had assembled at Goruckpore and Behar for the purpose of penetrating the Nepalese frontier from the east, also met with defeats and reverses, and some of the British generals showed such incompetency and cowardice that there was no other alternative left for the Governor-General than that of their removal from their respective commands. It is not necessary to minutely refer to the operations of these divisions or the defeats and reverses they sustained at the hands of their Hindu adversaries. Suffice it to say that such disasters had been almost unparalleled in the history of British India and every nerve was strained to increase the strength of all divisions so as to bring the war to a successful termination as soon as possible.

Regarding the critical state of affairs of the British, Mr Prinsep writes :—

"General Ochterlony alone had not been foiled. He was steadily pursuing his plan by slow and secure manœuvres, but had yet gained no brilliant advantage over his equally cautious antagonist. General Martindel's division had failed three several times : twice before Nalapanee, and the third time in the attempt to take up positions before Jythuk. Moreover, the aggregate loss sustained by this division had amounted to a third of the

numbers that originally took the field from Meeruth. The army assembled at Gourukpoor had allowed itself to retire before the enemy under circumstances amounting to a repulse ; while, as we have seen, the Behar division, which was thought strong enough to have penetrated to Katmandoo, had lost two detachments of five hundred men each, without an equivalent success of any kind. From the frontier of Oudh to Rungpoor, our armies were completely held in check on the outside of the forest ; while our territory was insulted with impunity and the most extravagant alarms spread through the country."

Notwithstanding all the advantages which the Gurkhas gained over the British, during the course of this war, they were obliged to act on the defensive and were unable to execute any offensive operations on account of their numerical inferiority and lack of that tact and knowledge to intrigue with and corrupt the officers and men under the British, as well as, it may be added, want of money, which is essentially necessary for carrying on offensive measures to any very large extent.

When the English found, to their cost, that they could not succeed by fair means, in bringing the war to a successful termination, they did not scruple to intrigue with the chiefs and men who were subject to the Nepalese Government and tempted them to throw off their allegiance to and betray their suzerain. Of course, it is a motto of the British that in love and war everything is

justifiable, and so they did not stop to consider whether they were acting on that prayer which they were taught to offer to God everyday by Him whom they call their Saviour, "Father, lead us not into temptations, but deliver us from all evils." How General Ochterlony intrigued with the Rajas of Hindur and Bilaspur has been already mentioned. Intrigues on a larger scale took place with the chiefs on the eastern boundary and centre of the Nepalese territories.

Professor H. H. Wilson (VIII, pp. 37-38) writes :—

"While the two divisions in Gorakhpur and Saran disappointed the calculations upon which they had been organised, the smaller body, under Major Latter, in the same direction, had surpassed expectation and accomplished more than it was destined to attempt. Not only had the boundary east of the Kusi river been protected from insult, but the Gurkhas had been driven from all their positions: occupation had been taken of the province of Morang, and an alliance had been formed with a hill chief, the Raja of Sikim, a small state east of Nepal; *which, * * gave the British a useful confederate, and additional means of acting upon the resources of the enemy.*

"Another element in the plan of the campaign, intended to take but a subordinate and contingent share, was equally attended with success, and was productive of highly important consequences. The province of Kamaon, forming the central part of the Gurkha conquests, was under the authority of a chief, Chautra Bam

Sah, who was known to be disaffected to the ruling dynasty of Nepal : while the people of Kamaon, and the adjacent province of Gerhwal, who had been subject to the Raja of Srinagar, but had been alienated by his tyrannical conduct and had consequently facilitated the Gurkha invasion, were now as hostile to their new and not less oppressive rulers, and *were anxious to transfer their allegiance to the British. No serious obstacles were thought likely, therefore, to impede the British possession of the country, and its occupation was strongly recommended by its central situation.*"

Of course Professor Wilson uses the language of occidental diplomacy, but the sentences which have been put in italics in the above clearly show the nature of the intrigues in which the English indulged. So the Governor-General determined to penetrate the Nepalese territory through Kumaon. The task of intriguing with the natives of that province was ably performed by Colonel Gardner. This British officer was one of those military adventurers who flocked into the courts of the Indian princes towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. He entered Holkar's service in 1798; but a disagreement arose between him and his master and Gardner left him. The cause of the disagreement seems to have been the suspicion of treachery entertained by Holkar against Gardner, which was not altogether unfounded when we take into consideration the fact of his subsequently serving

under the British Government and fighting against Holkar.

Gardner was a past master in the art of intrigue. He married an Indian lady of the Muhm-madan persuasion and according to the rites of Islam. Thus his position in India was very critical and he had to indulge in intrigues in self-defence.

Having thus distinguished himself in the art of intrigue, he was chosen a tool for intriguing with the people of Kumaon by Lord Hastings. And, as said before, Gardner succeeded in this task.

It was some time before the Governor-General succeeded in assembling an army on the Kumaon frontier. The Nepalese Government had a frontier of over 600 miles to guard and, as mentioned before, they could not muster more than 12,000 men. The region of Kumaon, it would seem, was altogether neglected by the Gurkha government, for they never expected the British invasion of their territories from that quarter. It was this weak spot in the strategical situation of the Gurkhas which proved a source of strength to the English, who, however, would not have succeeded against the Gurkhas but for their underhand and low intrigues.

Colonel Gardner having paved the way, a large force under Colonel Nicholls was despatched in April, 1815, to Kumaon and without much bloodshed, the provinces of Kumaon and Garhwal

were taken possession of by the British. This was almost a foregone conclusion, because the loyalty and fidelity of the natives of those provinces to their rightful suzerain had been tampered with by the British, who resorted more to intrigue and fraud than to force in gaining their object.

The dismemberment of the fertile provinces of Kumaon and Garhwal by the British was the most severe blow suffered by the government of Nepal. The prestige of the British was retrieved and, had they been desirous of concluding peace with the Nepalese, there is every reason to believe that the latter would have, considering how traitors had been raised in their own camp, submitted to terms favourable to the British Government. But Lord Hastings was not in a mood for peace; he was desirous of wiping out the independent existence of the principality of Nepal. With this object in view, he increased the strength of all the divisions that were sent to operate against the Gurkhas.

The Gurkhas were not savages, they had some thing to teach in the art of warfare to the ever boastful natives of England. It was only when the English learnt the Gurkha method of warfare that the latter found themselves outmatched not so much by the military tactics of their opponents as by their fraud and long purse. Mr. Prinsep (Vol. I, p. 136), writes:—

“It must be allowed to the Gurkhas that they were

an experienced as well as a brave enemy : they had been continually waging war in the mountains for more than fifty years, and knew well how to turn every thing to the best advantage. Caution and judgment were, therefore, more required against them, than boldness of action or of decision ; * * * ”

“It will be perceived that little advance was made in the campaign until we had learnt to turn the same advantages to account against the enemy, by the help of which he foiled us so often at the commencement ; for *with all the Indian warfare, combined with the professional science of Europe, our officers found yet something to learn from these Goorkhas. We adopted from them the plan of stockading posts, which the nature of the campaign frequently rendered it necessary to place beyond the limit of prompt support.* * * *

Sir David Ochterloney has the merit of having first resorted to this plan. * * *

“The strength of the stockades was originally greatly miscalculated : made up of rough hewn wood and stones, heaped together between an inner and outer palisade, they were in appearance so contemptible as to invite assault without even seeming to require breaching * * * The lighter artillery made little or no impression, and the difficulty of bringing up heavy guns, rendered them in truth, most formidable defences. The wood and materials for raising them were everywhere at hand, and the celerity with which they could be prepared in any position formed a main source of the strength of the country. *But this was a resource equally available to an invader, and one which placed the issue in the power of continuance, that is, in the length of the purse.*”

The sentences put in italics in the above ex-

tract clearly show the advantages which the English possessed over the Gurkhas in adopting the military tactics of the latter principally owing to the length of their purse. It does not require much intelligence to understand the causes which principally contributed to the success of the British over the Gurkhas. The latter could not boast of such a long purse as their enemy and, moreover, they were numerically inferior to him. Add to these, the wonderful capacity which the British possessed for intrigues and conspiracies and for raising traitors by holding out temptations and specious promises in the camp of their opponents, and no wonder need be expressed at their final triumph over the Gurkhas.

There is no necessity here to enter into details regarding all the battles fought before the first campaign against the Gurkhas was brought to an end. Suffice it to say that the result of the campaign was highly favourable to the British—a result which surpassed all their sanguine expectations and anticipations. What these were, will be related in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XLVIII,

The Nepal War.

THE SECOND CAMPAIGN.

It has been said that had the Governor-General of India been bent upon peace, there would have been no difficulty in its accomplishment, for the Nepalese Government had been fully convinced of the uselessness of any struggle with an enemy whom they were unable to subdue. The sovereign of Nepal had sent his family priest, Gooroo Gujraj Misur, to the camp of the British political agent, Major Bradshaw, to sue for peace. Had generosity towards a fallen foe formed any part in the creed of the British, they would have succeeded in concluding peace without the loss of any more blood or treasure. But the Britishers who ruled India never displayed any generous feelings towards their fallen enemies. It was, therefore, too much to expect that Marquess Hastings would have easily acceded to the overture for peace made by the Nepalese. He demanded the following sacrifices from them:—

1st. The perpetual cession of all the hill country taken in the campaign, *viz.*, from the Kalee westward.

2nd. A like cession of the entire Terai, from the foot of the outer hills along the whole line of the remaining territory of the Gurkhas.

3rd. The relinquishment by the Gurkhas of the footing they had gained in the territory of the Sikkim Raja and the surrender to that chief of the stockaded forts of Nagree and Nagarkot.

4th. The reception of a Resident, with the usual escort and establishment, at Katmandoo, and the customary stipulation not to receive or give service to Europeans without the special sanction of Government.

Like Shylock, the Marquess Hastings demanded from the Raja of Nepal the above sacrifices to the full. In vain did the Nepal Government ask the Governor-General to reconsider and modify his demands. Marquess Hastings knew fully well that his demands could not be acceded to by the proud Gurkhas without further fighting. It was just what he himself anticipated and desired, and therefore he kept the army in a state of equipment ready to take the field immediately on the return of the favourable season.

That astute Gurkha General, Amar Singh, with rare political sagacity and foresight rightly warned the Government of his country not to conclude peace with the British without further resistance. In March 1815, when he himself was besieged by the British Generals, he wrote a letter to the Court at Katmandu which was intercepted by the English. If this letter is not a forgery, it exacts admiration

for the Gurkha General, for his having fully understood the nature of the enemy of his country. The points dwelt upon in this letter have been thus summarized by Mr. Prinsep (Vol. I, p. 192):

“Firstly. That a treaty concluded after defeat could not be trusted to, as the British, knowing the terms to be conceded through fear, would presume upon the weakness of the nation, and seek new causes of quarrel, until its absolute subjugation was effected.

“Secondly. That the constitution of the Gurkha power, which held several subordinate Rajas and nations in subjection, would afford the British numberless occasions of interference; and that they would thus by intrigue, during peace, effectually weaken and undermine the dominion established.

“Thirdly. The danger of allowing a Resident to be permanently fixed at Katmandoo, is particularly dwelt upon as likely to lead to the introduction of a subsidiary force, and to prove a preliminary step to absolute subjection.

“Fourthly. The advantage of manful resistance, as opposed to concession and submissiveness, is strongly urged, from the prosperity enjoyed by the Bhurtpoor Raja since his successful defence of that fortress, contrasted with the utter ruin by which Tippoo Sultan was overtaken, after the concessions made by him to effect the peace signed by Lord Cornwallis in 1790.”

It cannot be denied that this Gurkha warrior had properly judged the character of the assailants of his country. If the British Government of India were not inclined to conclude peace, the Nepalese

also were not overanxious to accept the humiliating terms offered to them, by their enemy. The recurrence of hostilities was therefore inevitable, and so in the beginning of the year 1816, the second campaign of the Nepal War commenced. This campaign was of short duration, for it was not possible for a small power like that of Nepal to carry on hostilities with their wealthy and unscrupulous opponents. By the beginning of March 1816, the Nepal War came to an end and a treaty was concluded on terms very advantageous to the British. Although Nepal was not annexed, yet the Gurkhas were crushed never to rise again. As a result of the Nepal War, Mr. Prinsep (vol. I. p. 207) has truly observed that

“Its effect has been to shut out the Nepalese from any ambitious views of aggrandizement to the east, and to circumscribe their territory on three sides by the British power, while on the fourth, the stupendous range of the Himalaya, and the Chinese frontier, present an effectual barrier. Thus, while the British and Chinese empires continue in their present strength, the hope of extending their dominion must be extinguished, and the military spirit, which was fostered by the series of victories gained over the surrounding Rajas, must die away for want of employment.”

Not only were the Gurkhas crushed as a military nation, but since the establishment of a British resident at the Court of Nepal, to quote the words

of Dr. Wright, the author of a History of Nepal (p. 54).

"The records of Nepal furnish little of interest, except a history of intestinal struggles for power between the Thapa and Panre factions, and futile attempts at forming combinations with other states in Hindustan against the British."

It also seems probable that the Marquess of Hastings was anxious to go to war with Nepal, because he knew that by defeating the Nepalese, the British would become masters of the pleasant Himalayan heights and valleys which in time they could settle and colonize. Prof. H. H. Wilson writes:—

"Under a climate more congenial to European organisation than the sultry plains of India, and with space through which they may freely spread, the descendants of a northern race may be able to aggregate and multiply; and if British colonies be ever formed in the east, with a chance of preserving the moral and physical energies of the parent country, it is to the vales and mountains of the Indian Alps that we must look for their existence,—it will be to the Gurkha war that they will trace their origin." (Vol. VIII, pp. 59-60).

Appendix to Chapter XLVIII

The Nepal War has formed the subject of study of several British military officers. Thus the articles of Colonel W. G. Hamilton, D. S. O., in the *United Service Journal* for July 1903 and

April 1912, and that of Colonel L. W. Shakespeare, in the same journal for October 1912, deserve special mention. These officers have given the authorities whom they have consulted in preparing their contributions. Colonel Hamilton specially relied on "Papers respecting the Nepal War printed in conformity to the resolution of the Court of Proprietors of the East India stock, of the 3rd March 1824." These papers "form a valuable mine of information on the subject."

Colonel Shakespeare relied on the following books, *viz.*,

Life of Rollo Gillespie.

Memoirs of Gillespie by Egerton and Thorne.

Military History of the Nepal War.

Narrative of Nepal by Capt. T. H. Smith, P. A. in Nepal, 1841.

Records, 53rd foot.

Colonel Hamilton attributes the British success in the war to Ochterlony, "whose fame rests mainly on his outstanding qualities as a commander and leader of men in the Nepal War," and to one "Dr. Rutherford, who provided the best and most accurate information regarding the Gurkha army, its leaders, its organization and fighting value, and the topography of Kumaon and Gurhwal." He was the trade agent for the Company and civil surgeon at Moradabad. He employed "Pandits, Gurkhali soldiers and others, as paid spies." So "his services

in the Kumaon campaign were invaluable, but his equal does not appear to have been found elsewhere, while his sound advice and opinions expressed before the war do not appear to have carried the conviction they deserved."

"Ochterlony brought himself into touch with native life in a way which, though not uncommon a hundred years ago, hardly commends itself to the moral sense of more recent days. In private life he dressed and lived as a native of India, while a harem (the inmates of which were not always affectionately subservient) formed part of his domestic establishment."

Colonel Shakespeare pays a tribute to the gallant Gurkha soldiers in the following terms:—

"Unlike other Asiatic enemies the Nepalese showed a remarkable spirit of courtesy towards us, worthy of a more enlightened people. The cases of poisoned wells or arrows, or cruelty to wounded, is only recorded in one for two cases, no rancorous spirit of revenge appeared to animate them, they fought in fair conflict like men, and abstained from insulting the bodies of dead or wounded. In no case was there any interference with the dismal duty of collecting the casualties at the close of an action."

The British officers and men did not receive any medals for taking part in the war with Nepal. The same officer writes:—

"It is curious to note that this war, which lasted in its first phase from October 1814 to May 1815, and in its second phase from January 1816 to May that year, was full of hard fighting, losses, and hard work.

produced no medals, nor is it inscribed on the war honours of the numbers of regiments, English and Native, who took part in it. How different to the lavish distribution of such in our day."

The first hill war in India should have been more handsomely commemorated than it evidently was by the Company's Government of that period.

Regarding the wisdom of Amar Singh Thapa, Colonel Shakespeare writes:—

"It is also worthy of note that Amar Singh's policy of keeping out the English at all costs from Nepal, so gravely impressed by him on Durbar then, is still kept up; and who shall say that he was not wise?"

CHAPTER XLIX

Treaty with Cutch

Lord Hastings extended the British influence in the Bombay Presidency by concluding a treaty with Cutch and thus bringing it under the protection of the East India Company. Cutch is a small principality ruled by Jareja Rajputs and as it is bounded on the North by Sindh and on the East and South by Kathiawar, the language there spoken is a mixture of Sindhi and Guzerati, and having the Arabian Sea on the West, its inhabitants are a daring maritime people. During the war in Nepal, free-booters from this principality raided some parts of Kathiawad, which at that time owned allegiance to the Peishwa and the Guicowar, who were in alliance with the British, to whom it thus served as a pretext to despatch a force under Colonel East to Cutch, who without difficulty captured the fortress of Anjar. Soon afterwards, in 1816, a treaty was entered into with the ruling prince, by which Cutch became a feudatory state. It was thus that the Company's frontier was advanced to the mouths of the Indus.

The ruling prince of Cutch, it would seem, very readily entered into an alliance with the

English, because, otherwise the latter would have helped the Ameers of Sind, who it was said, contemplated the conquest of Cutch, and for this object they solicited the aid of the English when the mission was sent to them by Lord Minto in 1809.

CHAPTER L

The Pindari War

The taste of blood whetted the appetite for more. The Nepal War, however iniquitous in its origin, ended in a manner highly advantageous to the British Government of India. They became masters of territories several hundreds of miles in extent, and of revenues estimated at 7 or 8 figures in rupees per annum. Emboldened by the success in the war with Nepal, coffers of state well replenished with loot and indemnity moneys, Lord Hastings did not let the grass grow under his feet before he was seen preparing for war on a scale unprecedented in the annals of British India. He tried his best to make the population of India believe that all his preparations were meant to crush the Pindaris; but no prophet was necessary to come and tell them the real motives which actuated the Governor-General in undertaking the projected war.

The Pindaris were a sort of unpaid militia, whose services were requisitioned by the Indian princes in times of war. They used to accompany the princes in their campaigns and helped them by plundering and harassing the camps and followers of the enemy. But in time of peace, they

were engaged in the occupations of all loyal and peaceful citizens. For services which they either voluntarily rendered or were required to render in time of war, they were given jagirs and lands which they cultivated and lived upon when they had not to accompany any army.

That they served the purpose of what in modern times may be called militia or reservists will be evident from the following passage extracted from Malcom's Report on Central India (Vol. I, p. 436 of 2nd Edition):—

"During the time of Mulhar Row and Tukajee Holkar, the Pindarries, who always encamped separately, had, when within the Maratha territories and not permitted to plunder, an allowance which averaged four annas, or a quarter of a rupee, a day; and they further supported themselves by employing their small horses and bullocks in carrying grain, forage and wood, for which articles the Pindarry bazar was the great mart. When let loose to pillage, which was always the case some days before the army entered an enemy's country, all allowances stopped."

It is clear then that the Pindaries were not robbers or free booters, but they formed the militia, reservists or auxiliaries of the regular Maratha forces in the time of their taking the field. If we remember this fact, we shall be in a position to know their true character and why the Maratha princes were so unwilling to withdraw their patronage from them.

Before we proceed to describe the war which brought about their annihilation, it is necessary to trace the rise and progress of the Pindaries.

No satisfactory etymology* has been traced of the term Pindary. Sir John Malcolm writes that

"The most popular one among the natives is, that they derived it from their dissolute habits, leading them constantly to resort to the shops of the sellers of an intoxicating drink termed Pinda." (*Ibid.* p. 433 f. n.)

In the history of northern India, there is no mention of the Pindaries, but in the history of the Deccan we read that in the latter part of the reign of Aurangzeb, that is about 1689, a Pindary named Poonapah is mentioned as an auxiliary of the Marathas. But when the Maratha Empire was in the zenith of its power, or when anarchy had not broken out in the territories which owned allegiance to the rule of the Marathas, the Pindaries had not gained that name for ferocity and perpetration of cruelties with which their character is represented by English writers. It was in Central India that their existence attracted the notice of the Government of India and measures were concerted to encompass their ruin. It will, therefore, be necessary to narrate their history since their first settlement in that part of India.

*Messrs. Yule and Burnell have inserted a long dissertation on the term *Pindary* in their *Hobson-Jobson* (New edition, edited by William Crook. London 1903. pp. 711—713).

The leaders of the Pindaries were mostly Afghans by nationality and military adventurers by profession. There was no lack of these Pathan adventurers in the army of Sivaji. One of them named Nusroo, was a Jemadar under him. His son Chekun also filled the same station and was the father of Ghaziuddin, who may be described as the progenitor of the race of Pindaries of Central India. The Peishwa Bajee Rao the first tried to extend the boundaries of the Maratha kingdom by attacking Malwa, which till then had formed part of the Moghul Empire of Delhi. Ghaziuddin was in the service of this Maratha leader and died when employed with a detachment at Ujjain. Of his two sons, Gurdee Khan and Shah Baz Khan, the former was taken in the service of Mulhar Rao Holkar, and accompanied him on his expedition to Hindustan. His duty was to harass the enemy and lay waste his country. Mulhar Rao Holkar was so pleased with the manner in which he performed his duty that he presented him with a Zeree or golden flag which was the means of attracting many other freebooters and Pathans, and thus Gurdee Khan increased his followers. On his death, he was succeeded in the leadership of the Pindaries by his son Lal Mohamad, who left it to his son Emam Buksh. But the latter was not a capable leader and was therefore superseded by one named Kader Buksh. Besides him, there were two

other Pindaries of note, named Tukoo and Bahadur Khan, attached to the family of Holkar when the Pindary war broke out. These Pindaries were known as Holkar Shahy or adherents of Holkar.

The other Maratha prince of Central India—Sindhia—was not without his Pindary adherents. It has been mentioned above that of the two sons of Ghaziuddeen Gurdee Khan was taken in the service of Mulhar Rao Holkar. The second son, Shah Baz Khan, entered the service of Ranoojee Sindhia and followed his fortunes. He was killed in an action at Tonk. His two sons—Heera and Burran, were distinguished Pindari leaders in the army of Madhoji Sindhia. Heera was succeeded on his death in the command of the Pindaries by his two sons Dost Mahomed and Wasil Mahomed. It was Wasil Mahomed whose incursion into the British territories served as a pretext for the Government of India to go to war with the Pindaries.

Burran's son Dadar Buksh did not succeed to any authority. But one Dooblah Jemadar became leader of the Pindaries who were under the command of Burran. Rajun became the nominal head of the Pindaries on the death of his father Dooblah Jemadar, but it was Cheetoo, whom the latter had adopted as his son, who became their leader. The origin and early history of Cheetoo are involved in obscurity. He is said to have been a native of

Mewat in Rajputana, a Jat by birth. He was purchased during a famine and then afterwards adopted by Dooblah Jemadar as mentioned above. He was an able man, and on the death of Doolabh Jemadar, succeeded to his command and was honored with the title of Nawab by Dowlat Rao Sindhia and granted a Jagir.

Another well-known Pindari leader in the service of Dowlat Rao Sindhia was Karim Khan. He was a Pathan by birth, was equally with Cheetoo honored with the title of Nawab and granted a Jagir by Dowlat Rao Sindhia.

Thus it will be seen that Dowlat Rao possessed a larger number of Pindary adherents than Holkar, in whose service, except Amir Khan, there was no other Pindary leader of note.

The Pindaries, as said so often before, formed the auxiliary forces of the Maratha Chiefs of Central India and after the second Maratha War their services were requisitioned because the policy adopted by Sir George Barlow towards the princes of India was one calculated to make them go to war with one another and cut each other's throat. It was more in self-defence than in anything else that the Maratha princes had to entertain the Pindaries as irregular forces. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the entertainment of the Pindaries was a new institution and, therefore, it could be done away with at a moment's notice from

the British Government. The Pindaries had been in existence for a century and more and served very useful purposes in the military organization of the Marathas. Their annihilation was demanded, because they are said to have committed ravages in the districts under the government of the British. Let us see how far this is borne out by facts.

That for a long time the Pindaries respected the persons and properties of the British and their subjects is a fact which no one can deny. Captain Grant Duff's testimony to this may be mentioned. Amir Khan, a well-known freebooter, was patronized and encouraged by the British to commit all sorts of excesses.

The Pindaries are said to have twice given trouble to the British Government of India—once in 1808-9, when they entered Guzerat, and again in 1812, when they devastated Mirzapur and Shaha-bad. But on these two occasions no step seems to have been taken by the British Government to punish them and it seems to us that the Pindaries also did not mean to come to blows with the British Government. They might have imitated the dacoits and thus entered the British territories. But they did not seem to have committed much mischief. It was not until they were provoked to do so by the British themselves that any Pindary horde committed those ravages in British Districts which were proclaimed to the world as a pretext for the

British to go to war with them. It was in October 1815 that a party of the Pindaries was first attacked by Major Fraser, who was in command of the Nizam's reformed Infantry and was accompanied by about a hundred horse.

It is said that the Pindaries had meditated an attack on the Southern Provinces of British India and therefore it was only expedient on the part of the British Indian Government to have ordered Major Fraser to attack them. It is difficult to say what were the intentions of the Pindaries, but there can be no doubt that the latter were now provoked to attack the British territories. The party of the Pindaries routed by Major Fraser proceeded to the banks of the Krishna river committing depredations all along the route.

The Pindaries knew that the British Government were bent on their destruction and, therefore, committed all sorts of depredations in the territories of the British and of their ally the Nizam. Some of the places in the Madras Presidency were plundered by them and the amount of the loot is said to have been so considerable that merchants from Oojein were sent for to purchase many of the valuables obtained.

But we must not place much credence on what the British writers say as to the cruelties and ravages committed by the Pindaries on men, women and children of the British territories. That the

Pindaries were not demons but men with humane feelings and generous impulses may be gathered from the following incident casually mentioned by Sir John Malcolm in his celebrated report on Central India :

"It is a remarkable fact," writes Sir John Malcolm, "and one of the few creditable to the late community of the Pindaries that among the numerous prisoners of all ages and sexes whom they took, though they employed them as servants, gave them to their chiefs and accepted ransoms for them from their relations, they never sold them into bondage, nor carried on, like the Brinjarries, a traffic in slaves."

If they could have been so humane and generous to their prisoners, it is difficult to believe all the cruelties and acts of savagery which have been laid at their door by British writers of Indian history. Of course, the Government of India were making a case against the Pindaries, in order to justify their waging the war, and as such we should make allowances for all the statements of the English charging the Pindaries with atrocities and cruelties.

The real motive which actuated the British Indian Government to destroy the Pindaries is mentioned by Mr. Prinsep, who, in his History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the administration of the Marquesss of Hastings, thus writes on the subject.

"Their actual condition at that period (1814). En-

titled them to be regarded as a distinct political interest of the day, requiring an equal exertion of vigilance and circumspection as Hyder in the height of his power and inveterate animosity. These materials formed the groundwork of an interest formidable at least to our repose, if not to our safety: and its central situation in India, nearly equidistant from the dominions of the three presidencies, imposed the necessity of the most extensive annual precautions of defence, in spite of which the territories of our allies were continually overrun." (Vol. I, pp. 33—34)

The same author also observes (*Ibid*, p. 32) that the entertainment of the Pindaries might have made the Maratha princes strong, which was of course not desirable for the British power in India.

"It is by no means improbable," writes Mr. Prinsep, "that the Mahratta states viewed the increase of the Pindaries with an eye to eventual service from their arms; for they avowedly attributed the disasters of the operations of 1803 to their having imitated the European mode of warfare, and affected to believe, that had they adhered to the Parthian method of their ancestors, the results of the contest would have been very different."

But, as said so often before, the Pindaries formed a sort of auxiliary force in the military organization of the Maratha princes and it was not easy for them to destroy the Pindaries within a moment's notice from the Government of India. The increase in the number of the Pindaries is to be attributed to the anarchy and disorder which reigned supreme

in the native states of India, as a result of Barlow's policy towards them. That administrator considered that the safety of British rule in India consisted in making the native states wage war against each other and fight amongst themselves. It was then this Machiavellian policy of Barlow to which must be attributed the increase in the number of the Pindaries; for it was in self-defence that the Maratha princes had to entertain the services of the Pindaries.

But no greater mistake could be committed than that into which Mr. Prinsep has fallen in attributing the plundering expedition of the Pindaries in the British territories to the instigation of the Maratha princes. The above-named author writes :

"It was an insidious kind of hostility, thus under the mask of friendship and professions of attachment, to instigate the attacks of these irresponsible, unacknowledged bands; but it is not on that account the less likely to have been suggested by the hatred and fears of the Mahratta chiefs, or recommended by their notions of morality." (*Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 334).

Now, this is all gratuitous presumption on the part of the writer for which there is not a tittle of evidence. The arguments adduced in support of the above presumption may be better stated in his own words :—

"It would seem that the Pindary leaders had this

season (1815) come to a resolution to respect the territories of the Mahratta chiefs, and to direct their ravages chiefly, if not exclusively, against those of the Nizam and of the British Government. This had been publicly given out in the hordes: and some of the few stragglers that were left behind and taken, stated the same thing on their examinations. Such a resolution may have been the result of the secret negotiations carried on by the Mahratta agents, particularly Balajee Koonjur, a person of high repute and formerly a minister of the Peshwa. This man, having left Poona some years before in apparent disgrace, had latterly visited all the Mahratta Courts, where he was received with marked attention, and evidently had some important business in hand. He was known to have had communication with the Pindaries, on his way to Nagpoor from Sindhia's camp, in the early part of 1815; and from that city he went to Cheetoo's cantonment at Nemawar, as if purposely to make them a party to the intrigue he was conducting." (*Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 334).

The evidence of Balaji Koonjur's having instigated the Pindaries are not only very meagre but totally unreliable. The reasons for the incursion of the Pindaries into the British territories have been already mentioned before. There was enough provocation for the course which they adopted and it seems that they acted in self-defence.

The statement of "the few stragglers," even if true, which we doubt, cannot amount to much.

Again, it was the Pindaries who were adherents of Sindhia who are said to have committed depredations in the British territories. Hence it follows

that the British should have asked Sindhia to punish his Pindaries. But this they did not do. Moreover, if it was their object to crush those Pindaries who had committed ravages in their territories and were known to have been professed adherents of the House of Sindhia, the British should have invaded the territories of Sindhia alone in order to crush his Pindaries. But their warlike preparations were out of all proportion to the object against which they were directed. The Pindaries of the day were robbers, and so were the dacoits. The one had their headquarters in the native states, the other in British territories. No warlike preparations on any large scale were undertaken against the dacoits as they were against the Pindaries. Hence it follows that in proclaiming the war against the Pindaries, the British had some ulterior object in view.

Mr. Prinsep writes further on:—

“If any proof were wanting, that these enterprises of the Pindaries were undertaken in concert with the Mahratta powers, it might be found in the circumstance of the latter having afterwards chosen the particular moment of our prosecuting measures for the suppression of the predatory associations, to rise themselves against the British supremacy. Without some assurance of such support, whenever our strength should be put forth against them, the Pindary leaders would scarcely have commenced, at this particular juncture, a plan of systematic

depredation, pointedly aimed at the only power they had reason to fear." (*Ibid.* Vol. I, p. 335).

The analysis of the involved reasonings contained in the above sentences yields the following:—

1. The Maratha powers were in league with the Pindaries, otherwise they would not have risen against the British when the latter proclaimed the Pindary War.

2. The Pindaries expected support from the Maratha powers, therefore they commenced their plan of systematic depredations in the British territories at a time when the British were making preparations for the war against the Pindaries.

The above reasonings of Mr. Prinsep carry their own refutation with them. The Pindaries might or might not have expected help from the Maratha princes. But they had received provocation from the British and, moreover, they had good reasons to believe that the latter meditated their destruction. Under these circumstances it was but natural for them to have taken the course they adopted, and overrun the British territories.

The Maratha princes were not taken into the confidence of the British and were not consulted as to the measures which the latter had contemplated for the destruction of the Pindaries. They were alarmed at the warlike preparations and were justified in believing that the British meant to wage war against them. In self-defence they rose against the British. That they had good grounds for this will be narrated in the following pages.

CHAPTER LI

The Pindari War

In his *Private Journal*, dated February 1, 1814, the Marquess of Hastings wrote:—

“To us the Pindarries are no eventual resource, for a stipulation in their engagement is invariably an unlimited right of plunder; an atrocity to which no extremity could make us give countenance” (p. 24, Panini Office reprint).

In a previous chapter, it has been shown that it was the policy of the East India Company's Government in India to encourage the Pindaris—nay to engage them for creating disturbances in the territories of those princes who were not on friendly terms with them.

But the Marquess of Hastings found that it did not pay the Company to avail themselves of the services of the Pindaris. Hence he wrote in his diary what has been quoted above.

In proclaiming the war against the Pindaris, the British Government, as said before, had ulterior designs. Lord Wellesley and his successor had to hurriedly conclude treaties with the Maratha princes, because it was impossible to any longer prosecute the war against them with advantage.

True it is that Lord Lake chased Jeswunt Rao Holkar, but the power of that Maratha prince was not crushed. In fact in most of the early battles with him, the British came off second best. Again, the siege of Bhurtpore hardly redounded to the credit of the British army. The failure of the British in all these expeditions must be attributed to a certain extent to their want of knowledge of Central India. The topography of that portion of India being unknown to the British, it was not possible for them to carry on military operations with success. Central India was to a great extent a *terra incognita* to them; hence they were obliged to cease from war.

But at the time when the Marquess of Hastings assumed the Governor-Generalship of India, a great change had come over the aspect of affairs. It is questionable if he would have undertaken the task of annihilating the Pindaries, had he not come to possess a thorough knowledge of the country which was to be the scene of bloodshed and murder. The man who made his Lordship acquainted with the geography of that *terra incognita* now known as Central India deserves more than a passing notice.

After the conclusion of the second Maratha war, the embassy sent to Sindhia in 1805 under Mr. Graeme Mercer, possessed in its rank a young officer who was a native of Scotland, and who in

after years became well-known in the literary world as Colonel James Tod.

This officer was born in 1782. At the age of 17 or 18, he came out to India as a cadet in the military service of the East India Company. After serving for about 22 or 23 years, he retired from India in 1823 and died in his native land in 1835. From 1806 to 1823, he was employed in Rajputana at first to survey it and afterwards as political agent there. The nature of his services in that province will be evident from the following extract from the *Annual Biography and Obituary* for 1835 :—

“Almost immediately upon his arrival in that country, he began its survey, the details of which he has stated in the Memoir, and the result is given in the magnificent map which graces the *Annals*. In the maps prior to this survey, Rajputana was almost a total blank: nearly all the western and central states are wanting; the rivers were supposed to have a southerly course into the Nerbudda, and the position of the two capitals (the ancient and the modern) of Mewar, was precisely reversed; The map of Colonel Tod was completed in 1815, and presented to the Marquis of Hastings : *The map was of vast utility to the Government, being made one of the foundations of Lord Hastings’ plan of operations in the year 1817.*

“His surveys were continued without interruption, except by his indefatigable researches into the history and antiquities of the Rajput States, till 1817, when he was

appointed political agent of government, having the sole control over the five principalities of Rajasthan: Mewar Marwar, Jessulmer, Kotah, and Boondi."

The policy which was adopted towards the states of Central India by the Government of India has already been narrated. Colonel Tod, it seems, took advantage of the situation, by trying to produce in the minds of the Rajputs bitter hatred against the Marathas as well as Mahomedans. It was considered a matter of political expediency that the Rajputs, Marathas and the Moghuls should not unite and make common cause against the British. Colonel Tod tried his best to bring about this state of affairs. It should be remembered that the Marathas would not have succeeded in gaining a rood of land in Central India but for the help which they received from the Rajput princes. Sir John Malcolm, in his Memoir of Central India, truly observes

"that the Rajput princes and chiefs of Jeypoor, Marwar, Mewar and Malwa, were either secretly or openly the supporters of the Mahratta invaders, to whose first invasion of Malwa, we are told by every Persian or Hindu writer that notices the subject, hardly any opposition was given; and we possess many testimonies to show, that they chiefly attributed their success, on this occasion, to the action of religious feeling." (*Ibid*, vol. I, p. 53)

The above-named author has alluded to the correspondence that took place between the Rajput

Prince Raja Jey Singh and the Peishwa Bajirao the first. He writes:—

“The celebrated Raja Jey Singh, prince of Jeypoor, greatly contributed to the conquest of Malwa and indeed of Hindustan, by the Mahrattas. The correspondence between this chief and the first Bajirao, would, if obtained, throw light upon this period of history. It is said to have commenced in a communication very characteristic of the times and the parties:—the ruler of the Mahratta State sent a verse of the Purana to Jeysingh which may be literally translated—“Thou art like the cloud which drinketh the waters of the sea, and returneth them with thunder to fertilize the earth. The mountains, in dread of Indra, fly to thee for protection. Thou art the tree of desires. Thou art the sea whence springeth the tree of desires. Who can tell thy depth? I have no power to describe the depth of the ocean: but in all thy actions remember Agastya Moonee.” (*Ibid*, pp. 54-55).

According to Hindu mythology, the sage Agastya Moonee drank up the sea. The communication, therefore, though flattering, conveyed a metaphorical, but distinct warning of what might happen, if he opposed the Brahmin sway.

“Jey Singh’s answer, taken from the same sacred volume, was as follows:

“If the offspring of Brahma sin with me, I forgive them. This pledge I hold sacred. It was of no consequence that Agastya Moonee drank up the sea; but if God should doom the walls that retain the ocean to be thrown down, then the world would be destroyed, and what would become of Agastya Moonee?” (*Ibid*, p. 55).

Raja Jey Singh’s metaphorical language was

not difficult for the Peishwa to understand. It was a warning of the consequences that would ensue from breaking down long-established authority. It need hardly be said that the Peishwa and his successors always tried their best not to destroy the ancient houses of the reigning princes of Rajputana. Of course, Sindhia and Holkar, and their mercenary bands, perhaps at the instigation of the British Government of India, often fought with and plundered the Rajput princes, but they stopped short of their total annihilation.

It was reserved for Colonel Tod to enlarge on this aspect of affairs, to paint the Marathas in the blackest color possible and to represent the Rajput princes as the aggrieved and injured party. In an article in the first volume of the *Journal of the Puna Sarrajanik Sabha* under the heading of Maratha Bakhars or chronicles and Grant Duff's History of the Marathas, which there are good reasons to believe was penned by the well-known Mr. Justice Ranade, the criticism on Colonel Tod as an historian is so very just, that it is reproduced below :—

“He (Colonel Tod) has one measure of justice for the Rajputs, another for their Mahomedan and Maratha conquerors. He will speak with praise of a miserable and unprovoked raid by a Rajput chief, but has nothing but hard words to use when he has to describe perhaps a more excusable act of power on the part of other nationalities. This partiality to his pet race leads the historian

to render less than justice to the other nationalities, and to none more so than to the Marathas."

Colonel Tod was not content with abusing only the Marathas, but did not even spare one of the greatest, best and noblest of all the monarchs who ruled over India, of whose authentic history there is no doubt. If we are to believe Colonel Tod, Akbar the Great was the veriest incarnation of the devil who ever ruled India.

For our own part, we are inclined to the belief that Colonel Tod did all these to foment dissensions between the Rajputs on the one hand, and Marathas and Moghuls on the other and thus prevent for ever their making any common cause. There may be after all some truth in what he was accused of by his co-religionists and compatriots. It was alleged against him that he was corrupt and used to take bribes from the princes of Rajputana. Of course, the writer of the biographical sketch from which an extract has already been given above comes to his defence and says:—

"We have some reason to think that the elevation of a person of Colonel Tod's military rank to a post not merely high, but to which so much power and authority was attached, gave umbrage to the late Sir David Ochterlony, who might feel that Colonel Tod's appointment trenchd upod his own powers in the country. Surrounded, as Sir David always was, with natives, it is not to be wondered at if some of them breathed that calumny

upon the purity of Colonel Tod's political conduct to which Bishop Heber rather indiscreetly alludes." * *

A man of Sir David Ochterlony's position would not have recklessly made a statement casting reflections on the conduct of a brother officer without being convinced of the truthfulness and justification of his allegation. Every one knows how difficult it is to prove such a charge as the one which Ochterlony preferred against Colonel Tod. That gallant knight must have been morally certain, although there was not sufficient legal evidence to bring the charge home against Tod.

The Governor-General, armed with the map of Central India and quite sanguine that the Rajput princes would remain neutral, nay would even help the British, assembled troops ostensibly to crush the Pindaries, but in reality the Maratha sovereigns. Mr. H. T. Prinsep even goes to the length of not only hinting but plainly putting black on white that the Pindaries were instigated by the Maratha princes to commit ravages in the British territories. He writes:—

"It was an insidious kind of hostility, thus, under the mask of friendship and professions of attachment, to instigate the attacks of these irresponsible, unacknowledged bands; but it is not on this account the less likely to have been suggested by the hatred and fears of the Marhatta chiefs, or recommended by their notions of morality. If any proof were wanting, that these enterprises of the Pindaries were undertaken in concert with the Mahratta

powers, it might be found in the circumstance of the latter having afterwards chosen the particular moment of our prosecuting measures for the suppression of the predatory associations, to rise themselves against the British supremacy." (*Ibid*, Vol. I. p. 334).

From the above extract, it appears Mr. Prinsep bases his presumption of the Pindaries being instigated by the Maratha princes on the fact of the latter going to war with the British at a time when they had assembled troops ostensibly with the object of crushing the Pindaries. He adduces no arguments, brings no evidence in support of his statement. It has already been stated before that the Pindaries had been provoked to commit depredations in British territories by the latter trying to pursue and punish them. Even if they had not been provoked to do so, it is a gratuitous presumption on the part of the above-named author to say that the Maratha princes were in league with the Pindaries because they themselves rose against the British supremacy at the moment when measures were being prosecuted for the suppression of the predatory associations. There is no iota of evidence to support this presumption.

The Maratha princes rose because they were alarmed by the warlike preparations of the British and because they had not been taken into confidence and consulted as to the measures that should be pursued for the destruction of the Pindaries.

They concluded that all the preparations were meant to be directed against them. They suspected, nay believed this, and it cannot be denied that they had good and strong grounds for this.

In his life and correspondence of Sir John Malcolm (Vol. II, p. 187) Sir John Kaye has tried to prove, and no unprejudiced reader can say that he has failed to do so, that the warlike preparations of the British were directed against the Maratha princes.

"Our military preparations" writes Sir John Kaye, "were on so grand a scale that these threatening appearances at the native courts were regarded fearlessly by all, hopefully by many. The magnificent army, or, rather the two magnificent armies which had taken the field, were equal to any human emergency that could arise. * * *

"Let the reader place before him any map of India, and contemplate the expanse of country lying between the Kistnah and the Ganges rivers. Let him glance from Poona in the south-west to Cawnpore in the north-east; mark the positions of the principal native courts, and think of the magnificent armies, the very flower of the three presidencies, which were spreading themselves over that spacious territory, closing in upon Hindustan and the Deccan and compassing alike the Pindaree hordes and the substantive states in their toils. The sportsmen of the day, indeed, regarded it as a grand *battue* of the princes and chiefs of India; and we cannot be surprised if those princes and chiefs looked upon the matter somewhat in the same light, and thought that the Feringhees, after a long season of rest, were now again bracing themselves up for vigorous action, and were putting forth all their

immense military resources in one comprehensive effort to sweep the native principalities from the face of the earth.

"The Mahratta was roused. He had been uneasy. He was now alarmed. * * *

"So it was, it appears to me, with the Peishwa and the Raja of Berar. They were alarmed by the gathering and the advance by our armies. They did not believe that these immense military preparations had been made simply for the suppression of the Pindaries. They thought that whatever the primary and ostensible object of the campaign might be—a campaign conducted by the Governor-General himself in person, at the head of the grand army, it would eventually be directed against the substantive Mahratta States. And this was no baseless suspicion. The probability of another Marhatta war, as the sequel of the Pindaree campaign, was the subject of elaborate state papers, and the small gossip of our camps. Statesmen solemnly discussed it at the council-board, and soldiers joyously predicted it at the mess-table. * * * It would have been wonderful if, under such circumstances, there had not been another war; if, considering the character of these princes, the evil councillors by whom they were surrounded, and their limited understanding of the views and intentions of the British Government, they had not regarded the movements of our armies with suspicion and alarm, and concerted the means of resisting our probable aggressions. They had at least as good a right to prepare for contingencies as we had. If, when the British Government first took up arms, and calculated the scale on which it would be expedient to conduct its military aspirations, the contingency of a Marhatta war was duly provided for, and that provision is to be considered demonstrative only of wisdom and forethought, we must be surely blinded by our national self-love, if we would

denounce as treachery, or as folly, a like provision on the part of the Marhattas, who were in much greater danger than ourselves. We cannot surely expect all the world to dismount their guns whilst our own are loaded and primed and the portfire is burning in our hands."

That the Governor-General was of a perfidious character, that the proclamation against the Pindaries was merely a contrivance to deceive people and prevent them from knowing his real intention, which was to wage war on the Maratha princes, will be evident from the order which he issued to his troops after signing the treaty with Dowlat Rao Sindhia. The Governor-General was sorry that there was no war with that Maratha sovereign. His order ran as follows :—

"The Governor-General has great pleasure in announcing to the army that the Maharajah Dowlat Rao Sindhia, has signed a treaty, by which his Highness engages to afford every facilitation to the British troops in their pursuit of the Pindaries through his dominions, and to co-operate actively towards the extermination of these brutal free-booters. In consequence, the troops and country of his Highness are to be regarded as those of an ally. *The generous confidence and animated zeal of the army may experience a shade of disappointment in the diminished prospect of serious exertion*; but the Governor-General is convinced that the reflection of every officer and soldier in the army will satisfy him that the carrying every point by equity and moderation is the proudest triumph for the British character."

With reference to this order, Sir John Kaye truly observes:

"It proves how little he (Lord Hastings) desired to conceal the fact that the army were longing for a war with the Mahratta States." (*Ibid.* vol. II, p. 193. f. n.)

Had the British taken the Maratha princes into their confidence and consulted them as to the best measures that should be adopted for crushing the Pindaries, there would have been no Maratha war at all. The above-quoted author is also of the same opinion. He writes:—

"Had the whole scope of our policy been fully understood at the Mahratta courts, had they known that we were really acting in good faith towards them, and that our steady friendship could be secured by honestly co-operating with us for the suppression of the Pindaree hordes, whilst no real danger threatened their independence but that which they might bring upon themselves by their own rashness, they would not have suffered their fears to hurry them into aggression. But they only knew that we were putting our armies in motion from all points and that in every cantonment of India the talk was about the probabilities of another war with the Mahrattas." (*Ibid.* Vol. II, p. 189).

Sir John Kaye was after all an Englishman and so he takes a lenient view of the conduct of his co-religionists and compatriots. But, as said above, the Britishers were not acting in good faith towards the princes of India. Thus Jeypore was sacrificed to the greed of adventurers of the type of Ameer Khan.

But Earl Moira, desirous of going to war with the Marathas, by means of his emissaries induced the Rajput princes to send embassies to him asking him to take them under the protection of the East India Company's Government. These requests of the Rajput princes served him as a pretext to intimate to Sindhia that the solemn treaty which the British Government of India had concluded with him a decade ago was to be abrogated and a new one to be substituted in its stead. For our own part, we believe that Colonel Tod, the historian of the Rajputs, was the principal emissary of the Marquess of Hastings in stirring up the princes of Rajputana and inducing them to seek the protection of the Company.

It was perhaps the part of an emissary which Tod played so successfully in Rajputana, which led Hastings to appoint him to the important charge of five states, thus passing over the claims of others who were senior to him in age and service.

Tod succeeded in coaxing the Rajputs to seek the protection of the East India Company. It was perhaps with this object in view that he flattered their national vanity and was induced to write that history of their race, which, possessing great and undoubted merits, is disfigured by statements which are greatly exaggerated and are also devoid of truth Sir Henry Lawrence, who was accredited

to Rajputana as the Governor-General's agent in Lord Dalhousie's time, wrote in a letter to Sir John Kaye, dated Mount Aboo, June 19th, 1854:—

"You are right in thinking that the Rajputs are a dissatisfied, opium-eating race. Tod's picture, however it may have applied to the past, was a caricature on the present. There is little, if any, truth or honesty in them and not much more manliness. Every principality is more or less in trouble." (*Life of Sir H. Lawrence* by Sir Herbert Edwardes and H. Merivale. Vol. II, p. 256).

Lord Hastings brought the Rajput princes into the web of the Company's subsidiary alliance. It will be remembered that the Jeypore prince had greatly helped the Government of India in the time of the Marquess Wellesley in their war with the Marathas. But after the departure of the Marquess Wellesley, Sir George Barlow adopted a line of policy regarding which Sir Charles Metcalfe said :—

"He (Sir George Barlow) contemplates in the discord of the native powers an additional source of strength ; and, if I am not mistaken, some of his plans go directly and *are designed* to foment discord among those states..... But I can contemplate no source of strength in the discord of contiguous powers.....It is impossible completely to insulate ourselves, and we must be subject to the same chances which work upon states situated as we 'are.'" (*Kaye's Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*, p. 7).

Why the Governor-General entered into alliance

with the Rajputs has been narrated by him as follows:—

“The former treaty with Sindhia, which I had declared annulled on the proof of his hostile practices, contained an article, equally discreditable and embarrassing. We were bound by it to have no correspondence with the Rajput States, and were thus debarred from granting to them that protection which they offered to repay by co-operating for the suppression of the Pindaries. Emancipated from so injurious a shackle, I received all these states as fendatory to the British Government. Though each possessed considerable force, their reciprocal estrangements (proceeding chiefly from punctilious, and often hereditary quarrels between the reigning princes) prevented their ever forming any union.” (Lord Hastings’ Summary, p. 100. General Appendix to Report from Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Committee).

How Lord Hastings obliged Sindhia to accept the treaty forced on him has been narrated by that nobleman as follows:—

“Certainly, had Sindhia, by much the most powerful of the native sovereigns, been in the field at the head of his assembled veteran troops, with the fine and well-manned artillery which he possessed, time, as well as encouragement, would have been afforded to the other confederated powers for resorting to arms in so many quarters as must have made our movements cautious, consequently protracted, under heavy expense. The incurrence of such circumstances was at all events to be risked by us: since, I repeat, it was not a matter of option, whether the extinction of an evil so intolerable as

the ravages of the Pindaries should be undertaken. It has been said, however, that a confident expectation was entertained of achieving the main purpose, while every hostile speculation of the native sovereigns would be repressed by our sudden pre-occupation of particular positions ; and this calculation applied in a more special degree to Sindhia. Residing at Gwalior, he was in the heart of the richest part of his dominions ; but independently of the objection, that those provinces were separated from our territory only by the Jumna, there was a military defect in the situation, to which it must be supposed the Maharaja had never adverted. About twenty miles south of Gwalior, a ridge of very abrupt hills, covered with the tangled wood peculiar to India, extends from the little Sind to the Chumbal, which rivers form the flank boundaries of the Gwalior district and its dependencies. There are but two routes by which carriages, and perhaps cavalry, can pass that chain ; one along the little Sind, and another not far from the Chumbal. By my seizing with the centre division a position which would bar any movement along the little Sind and placing Major-General Donkin's division at the back of the other pass, Sindhia was reduced to the dilemma of subscribing the treaty which I offered to him or of crossing the hills through bye-paths, attended by the few followers who might be able to accompany him, sacrificing his splendid train of artillery (above one hundred brass guns) with all its appendages, and abandoning at once to us his most valuable possessions. The terms imposed upon him were essentially unqualified submission, though so coloured as to avoid making him feel public humiliation." (Lord Hastings, Summary, p. 97).

The Pindaries were divided into different *durras*

or *lubbars*, that is, companies, and as long as they acted in concert, they were almost invincible. But dissensions broke out among them, and so it was not very difficult to destroy them. It is not necessary to describe in detail all the actions that were fought against them. The several works on British Indian History, written by Mill and Wilson, Thornton, Macfarlane, Beveridge, Nolan, Malcolm and, above all, Prinsep's Transactions have given detailed information regarding the manner in which the Pindary hordes were dealt with by the troops commanded by British officers. Those Pindary leaders who submitted and betrayed their whilom comrades were provided with lands calculated to produce several thousand rupees a year. But Cheetoo alone held out and did not surrender himself to the British. His fate was miserable, for he met with a tragic end, being devoured by a tiger.

Although the latter-day Pindaries were mostly bandits and robbers, yet they were not altogether devoid of humane feelings and therefore they were able to gather many followers. Writes Wilson (Vol. III, p. 211).

"That so many should still have adhered to their leaders, amidst all the hardships and dangers which they underwent, is a singular proof of that fidelity to their leaders, which characterises the natives of India; as nothing could have been more easy than for a Pindary to have deserted his captain, and become indentified

with the peasantry. The tenacity with which some of their principal leaders clung to the life of a wanderer and a plunderer, preferring privation, peril and death, to the ease and security of tranquil social existence, exhibited also that impatience of control, that love of independence which is the general attribute of half-civilised and martial people. It has been remarked as extraordinary, that in many parts of the country, and particularly in Harawati, the villagers were disinclined to give any information that might lead to the discovery and destruction of a Pindary band: but the inhabitants of those countries had never suffered any greater injury from the Pindaries than from the other component members of the Marhatta army, they considered rapine inherent in the system, had often taken part in it themselves, looked with sympathy and admiration upon the hardships and hazards which their countrymen and fellow-plunderers underwent. The state of society in Central India was similar to that of Europe in the early part of the middle ages, when robbers and outlaws, free companions and banditti, were objects of less terror than the more powerful and equally rapacious baron, the more necessitous and equally unscrupulous monarch."

CHAPTER LII.

The War with the Jat Princes.

Lord Hastings succeeded admirably by his diplomacy to detach Scindhia from the other Maratha confederates and prevented him from joining them in the war which was going to be undertaken against them. He also made the Rajputs subserve his purpose. But he was not easy in his mind regarding the Jat princes of the Doab. Of course the most notable Jat prince was that of Bharatpur. Lord Lake had signally failed in his two attempts to capture that place. Lord Hastings did not consider it expedient to court another disaster by declaring war against Bharatpur. But it was deemed politic by him to fight two petty princes of that race in the Doab. These were the Rajas of Hathras and Moorsan. Mr. Prinsep mentions why it was necessary for the Governor-General to reduce these princes.

“Hutras was reckoned one of the strongest forts in India. Dya-Ram was a Jât, and derived no small accession of confidence and estimation, from being a relation of the Bhurtpoor Raja, with whom he claimed equality of rank. The fort was kept in the closest state of repair. ... At the close of 1816, it was resolved to reduce both Dya-

Ram and Bhugwant (Raja of Moorsan) to the level of subjects, and to employ an overwhelming force for the purpose, as well to bear down all opposition, as to give *eclat* to the measure. ... On the 11th of February (1817), the place (Hattras) was invested on all sides. Dya-Ram was then summoned to surrender a gate of his fort and allow of its being dismantled." (vol. I, p. 418).

In his *Private Journal*, dated January 10th, 1816, (Panini Office reprint, p. 273), the Marquess of Hastings wrote that Dya-Ram "refused to let any of the Company's servants, civil or military, go into the fort of Hattrass." For this great offence he was to be punished. It was said that the fort of Hathras was built after the model of that of Bharatpur and hence the Governor-General was desirous that the British officers should be allowed to inspect it and be thus enabled to successfully besiege and reduce that fortress, before which they had been defeated and had thus lost their military prestige.

Of course, the spirited Jat prince was not going to tamely submit and very properly refused to surrender the fort and comply with the demand of the British lord, whose aggression on his territory was quite unprovoked. Raja Dya Ram's resources were not equal to those of the Company and so resistance for him for any length of time was not to be expected. But he fought very bravely.

Writes H. H. Wilson :—

"Batteries were opened against the town and fort,

and a vigorous bombardment was kept up upon the latter. A practical breach was effected in the walls of the town by the 23rd. On the 2nd of March, a shell made its way into the powder magazine, and was followed by a tremendous explosion, which completed the work of desolation within the ramparts. The besieged still maintained a show of resistance, and returned the fire of the batteries ; but Daya Ram, now convinced of the futility of resistance, ... effected his escape at midnight with a small body of retainers. They were encountered by a party of the dragoons, but made good their retreat, after inflicting more loss than they suffered, being armed with back and breast-plates and gauntlets of steel." (Mill & Wilson, VIII, pp. 93-94).

The capture of Hathras dispirited the Raja of Moorsan, who surrendered his fort without any resistance.

"Thus", writes Mr. Prinsep, "was this important object gained, without any sacrifice of lives ; while the impression of the utter futility of resistance spread far and wide through Hindustan, and even through the remote Dukhun, where it materially influenced the subsequent conduct of the Maratha chiefs and killedars." (vol. I, pp. 419-420).

CHAPTER LIII

The War with the Maratha Princes

Of the four Maratha Princes, *viz.*, The Scindhia, the Peishwa, the Bhonsla of Nagpoor, and the Holkar, the manner in which the Scindhia had been entrapped by Lord Hastings has been already mentioned before. The other three were being so badly treated by the British, that they were provoked to go to war with them. How Lord Hastings made preparations for the war has been thus described in "Memoirs of Colonel Skinner" (Vol. II, pp. 124 and 129) :—

"So early as the end of 1816, a number of detachments were thrown out from various points, with so much skill as to check the lubburs of that season with considerable success, and great loss on the part of the Pindarees. But arrangements on a far more extensive scale were in progress ; and while negotiations were opened with those princes or chieftains who could be brought to reason, the preparations for coercing the refractory were silently but industriously carried on. During the summer and autumn of 1817, the various bodies of troops assembled at their posts. The grand army, under command of Lord Hastings in person, consisting of about 34,000 regular troops, was formed in three divisions and a reserve, and occupied positions at Agra, Secundra, near Kalpee, on the Jumna, and

Kalinger in Bundelcund ; the reserve being stationed at Rewaree, south west of Dehlee.

"The army of the Dekkan, under command of Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Hislop, was formed in five divisions and a reserve; and amounted to 57,000 regulars, which were disposed so as to cross the Nerbudda simultaneously at Hindia and Hoshingabad, to occupy positions in Berar and in Candeish and act as circumstances should indicate; while a division from Guzerat was to enter Malwah by Dohud. To this large force of regular troops—the largest by far that ever took the field from British India—was added 23,000 of irregular horse, of which 13,000 were attached to the army of the Dekkan, and 10,000 to that of Bengal.

"This vast scheme, rendered complete by some subsidiary details, was calculated to embrace the whole disaffected region; and advancing inwards, like one of Timour's or Chengiz-Khan's gigantic hunts, to converge to any central point that should prove the fittest for final action, and thus gather together and crush, without hope of escape, every refractory or treacherous power within its circuit. Never, assuredly, was any plan of military operations better concerted to effect its purpose and never was any combination of diplomatic and military tactics more completely crowned with success. The end of that year, and the space of a single month, saw the Peishwah and the Bhonslah, with the representatives of Holcar, baffled alike in their intrigues and their efforts at open resistance. The battle of Kirkee, sent the first a hunted fugitive, to a quiet asylum. The battles of Seetabuldee and Nagpore, in like manner, proved the death-blows to the Bhonslah chief;..... The subjection of the once proud family of Holcar cost even less time and trouble."

In the following chapters will be mentioned the manner in which war was brought about with those Maratha princes.

CHAPTER LIV

The Last of the Peishwas

The treatment which the last Peishwa received at the hands of the English was only a shade less cruel and tyrannical than that which their prototypes, the Spanish, are charged with in their dealings with the monarchs of Peru and Mexico. But for the help which the last Peishwa Baji Rao rendered to the English, the consolidation of their power over the peninsula of India would have been impossible. It is true he played into their hands. He was false to himself and false to the people over whom he ruled, but it must be admitted that he was always true to the British. Gratitude forms a marked trait in the character of Asiatics in general and of the Hindoos in particular. Baji Rao was grateful to the English for regaining his throne at Poona. He was never tired of giving expression to the deep debt of gratitude he owed to the British for his position.

In the early years of the nineteenth century Lord Valentia, a well-known traveller, came out to India and paid a visit to Poona. He was no mean judge of men. He had three interviews with the Peishwa and on page 130, Vol. II,

of his Travels, he has recorded the impression produced on his mind by Baji Rao. Lord Valentia was satisfied that the Peishwa highly valued the English alliance and was sincerely delighted when he heard the news that Holkar's fort of Chandor in Nasik had fallen into the hands of the English army.

Sir James Mackintosh, Chief Justice of Bombay, was undoubtedly the most learned man of his age. He had travelled widely and seen many countries and nations. Certainly he can be credited with being a very good judge of human character. He was so favourably impressed with the personality of Baji Rao, that he considered that Brahmin ruler of the Deccan far superior to George III and Napoleon, to whom he had been presented.

The British resident at the Court of the Peishwa was Colonel Barry Close. He had every opportunity to know the Peishwa very intimately and to become acquainted with his views and sentiments. That Resident had no doubt that the Peishwa was sincere in his gratitude to the English. He had never seen the Peishwa so evidently pleased or heard him more unequivocally declare his sentiments.

It was his interest to be grateful to the British for his restoration to power. Mrs. Maria Graham, afterwards better known as Lady Caldecott, visited Poona in 1809 and she described the Peishwa

as a prisoner in the hands of the English. She was quite right in looking upon his situation as that of a prisoner.

Prisoner though he was, he was grateful to the English for his existence. While he expressed his sentiments of gratitude to the English, what were the feelings of the latter towards him? They behaved towards him in a manner which goaded him to make the last effort, which is not unusual for a prisoner to make, to get out of his prison house. The British had no regard for him and they taxed and strained his patience to the utmost.

To fully understand the nature of the treatment which Baji Rao received at the hands of the English, we have to turn our attention to that period of Indian history when the Duke of Wellington was commanding the combined forces of the allies in the Deccan. That Duke entertained no high opinion of any Indian,—prince or peasant. This is not to be wondered at. A jaundiced man sees everything yellow. Because he himself did not act upon the ten commandments of the religion which he professed, he naturally thought others were also as bad as he himself.* With his per-

* Mr. Pearson, in his "National Life and Character," says:—"Nelson, who intrigued with his friend's wife; Wellington, who was certainly not irreproachable, and Warren Hastings, who purchased a divorced wife from

verse moral nature, it was not unnatural for him to impute motives to others, not to see anything good in their conduct and always seem to see instances of 'bad faith' in their acts and doings, forgetting all the while that it was his co-religionists and compatriots in India who were guilty of bad faith towards the princes and people of the country.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, as the Duke of Wellington then was, advised his co-religionists to practise treachery in their dealings with their ally the Peishwa. To raise traitors in the camp of the Peishwa was the policy that he urged his countrymen to adopt. In his dispatches, he wrote :

"I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peishawa ; he has no public feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive proof that he has been treacherous, but I have a strong suspicion of it.

"It may be asked, will you leave a fellow of that kind in possession of that government? I answer, I have no remedy ; I cannot take it for the British Government, without a breach of faith and another war. I do not know whether I should mend the matter in respect to treachery by giving him either of his brothers as a dewan ; but I do know, that if I was to give the government over to Amrut Rao, I should establish there a most able fellow who, if he should prove treacherous. would be a worse

a needy foreigner, would scarcely be permitted now to save the Empire." (Page 213).

thorn in the side of the British Government than the creature who is Peishawa at present can ever be." (Vol. III, p. 19)

Again, in his letter to Lieut. Frissell, dated 17th February 1804, he wrote many things which he considered to be acts of treachery on the part of the Peishwa against the British.

Yes, the ministers of the Peishwa were to be bribed in order to betray their master. This was a counsel of perfection which was out-machiavelling Machiavelli himself. But as long as Sir Barry Close was the Resident at Poona, he did not act on the Wellesleyan policy. There is no evidence at least from the published records to say that that resident carried into execution Sir Arthur Wellesley's suggestion. Sir Barry Close's opinion of the Peishwa has already been given above.

But with the appointment of Mountstuart Elphinstone as Resident of Poona, the advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley began to be carried out to the very letter. Mountstuart Elphinstone was a native of Scotland and the youngest son of a Scotch Baron. He had not received much of literary education in his native country when he was sent out at the early age of sixteen as a writer on the East India Company's establishment in Bengal. This appointment was secured to him through the interest of his uncle, who was at that time Chairman of the East India

Company. In those days Scotchmen were given many lucrative posts in India, because Mr. Dundas, who was at the head of Indian affairs at home, was himself a native of Scotland and so naturally preferred his kith and kin to outsiders. Mr. Elphinstone's mother prevailed on Mr. Dundas to use his influence with Lord Mornington in favour of her son. Lord Mornington was at that time Governor-General of India. So on the recommendation of Mr. Dundas, he took great interest in Elphinstone and appointed him to the diplomatic service as one of the Assistants to the Resident at Poona. When he was appointed diplomatic Assistant at Poona, the Peishwa had not parted with his independence, for he had not as yet agreed to Lord Mornington's scheme of subsidiary alliance. The British Government at that time were making every attempt to ensnare the Peishawa in that scheme, and from Mr. Elphinstone's Journals, extracts from which have been given by his biographer Sir T. E. Colebrooke, it is evident how the Political Resident and his assistants at Poona worked hard to make the Peishwa believe that his safety consisted in placing the yoke of the subsidiary alliance on his neck. The following extract from Mr. Elphinstone's Journal needs no word of comment:—

“Major Hemming said the Maharattas were too wise to be tempted to admit a subsidiary force of ours.

He mentioned that the Peishwa was going to raise several battalions, to be commanded by Brahmins. It appears to me that the Peishwa must feel his subjection to Sindia, that he must be convinced that Sindia's strength arises from his disciplined troops, that as soon as he is convinced that none but Europeans can form corps capable of opposing other Europeans, he will see the advantage of having Englishmen to oppose Sindia's Frenchmen. Sindia is not at present in a condition to resist any attempt of ours to establish troops at Poona. I hope he may not be so weak as to free the Peishwa from apprehension." (Vol. I, p-34).

The Peishwa became a prisoner of the English by signing the Treaty of Bassein and this Treaty was the cause of the Second Maratha War.* Throughout the whole of this war, Mr. Elphinstone served as an assistant on the staff of Sir Arthur Wellesley. It was in this capacity that he learned

* It is evident that the Peishwa was not consulted when the British went to war with Dowlat Rao Sindhia. In his *Military Reminiscences* (Vol. I, pp. 155 *et seq*), Colonel James Welsh writes:—

"Very much in the dark with regard to Indian politics, we had naturally concluded, that as we came to succour the Peishwa, his friends would be our friends, and his foes our likeliest opponents; but here we reckoned without our host, for the man we were now to attack was not Holkar who had deposed him, but Scindiah who had upheld him, and actually suffered a defeat, near Poona, in his cause! Having never troubled my head with the intricacy of state affairs, I have, therefore, never learned the real cause of this war."

from the Iron Duke that crooked policy which passes under the name of diplomacy and statecraft in Indian history.

After the war with the Marathas was over, Mr. Elphinstone was appointed Resident at Nagpur, and there he served upwards of four years. The objects for which the East India Company used to appoint Residents at the Courts of Indian princes were to foment intrigues and domestic dissensions, and thus to pave the way for the ultimate absorption of those principalities.

The Company's government expected Mr. Elphinstone to discharge these duties with enthusiasm and zeal, that is to say, he was to carry on intrigues and play the part of a spy. His patron, Sir Arthur Wellesley, wrote to him, when he was appointed Political Resident at Nagpur:—

“I beg you will do whatever you think necessary to procure intelligence. If you think that Jye Kishen Ram will procure it for you or give it to you, promise to recommend him to the Governor-General, and write to his Excellency on the subject.”

What was meant by such a recommendation is explained by Sir Arthur Wellesley in another letter to Elphinstone.

“Before Ram Chandra went away, he offered his services. I recommended him to you. He appears to be a shrewd fellow, and he has certainly been employed by the Raja in most important negotiations. I recommended him to the Governor-General for a pension of 6,000,

rupees a year. I think he will give you useful intelligence."

The course of intrigue which Elphinstone followed in Nagpur, made him a perfect master of statecraft and his moral nature debased and degraded. This he himself admitted, for he wrote in one of his Journals:—

"Since I came to Nagpur I have been dreadfully coarse and unfeeling. This I attribute in some measure to business, which forces and leads me to despise refined thought."

This training in intrigues, in tempting others with corruption and bribery in order to betray their masters, made Elphinstone a renowned diplomatist, a perfect hypocrite, and a successful follower of Machiavelli. On this depended his promotion and his subsequent employment to all offices of diplomacy.

He served in Nagpur for four years. In 1809 he was sent to Afghanistan. But his diplomatic mission to Afghanistan during the regime of Lord Minto was an utter failure, for he did not succeed in duping the wideawake Afghan monarch.*

* "The Mission was now virtually closed, though the name was kept up for some months to enable the envoy and his coadjutors to prepare their report on the countries they had visited. He returned depressed at the failure of the sanguine hopes with which he had started some six months before; and he never, in his letters or journals,

Like all other Britishers, he was ambitious to make a name for himself and also to benefit his coreligionists and compatriots serving in India. While he was in Afghanistan, he wrote to the Governor-General to take Sind from the Amirs of that country.*

reverted to this period of his career without some expression of dissatisfaction." Colebrooke's *Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone*, Vol. 1, p. 218.

* "The Dooranee Government, pressed by their urgent wants, made overtures to the Indian Government, which might have proved tempting under other circumstances, to raise money on the security of the revenues of Sind. The first proposal amounted to no more than the ordinary methods of Eastern governments, of granting assignments of the revenues of provinces, either for Military Service, or to Bankers for advances of money. The proposal was that the Indian Government should rent Sind, and did not necessarily convey a cession of sovereign rights, though it involved complete independence of administration.

"The proposal was summarily rejected. Somewhat later the subject was renewed and a proposal was made for a complete cession of the right to the territory, in consideration of an annual payment. In the meantime, intelligence reached Peshawar that our relations with the rulers of Sind were embroiled, and that the envoy sent to Hyderabad had left the country, and that a friendly reception had been given to an agent representing Persian and the dead French influence."

"Mr. Elphinstone thought it his duty to submit the King's proposal to the Government of Calcutta, alluding,

Lord Minto was at that time the Governor-General. He turned a deaf ear to Elphinstone's proposal, since it was not agreeable to him. But now as Resident at Poona, he had to serve a

at the same time, to the departure of the British envoy from Hyderabad, and assuming, therefore, that the proposal might fall in with the views of the Government. This proposal was accompanied by another suggestion equally important, and which may be regarded as Mr. Elphinstone's own. A moderate subsidy would, he thought, give the King such a preponderance over his rivals as to render his throne for the time stable, and bind him to our interests against any invasion from the west; and this, if combined with the cession of Sind, would give some vigour to our ally, without diminishing our own resources, and the whole proposal would have the effect of shutting up the southern route to India, while it afforded the means of defence on the northern.

"..... This bold proposal, thus submitted to the Government, though guarded with every consideration of prudence and justice, brought on the young envoy a severe reproof. The plan of subsidising the Cabul monarchy appeared rash and an uncertain advantage.

"..... Whatever might be the King's claim on Sind, the territory was virtually independent, and he could transfer only a nominal sovereignty. The Government would be disinclined under any circumstances to enter on a project of such extent. 'But in fact', so the despatch proceeded, 'considerations intimately connected with those fundamental principles of political discretion, as well as of political morality, by which alone the true honour and prosperity of the British Empire in the East

different master. The Marquess of Hastings was an unscrupulous and ambitious man. It was his policy to bring as much of India under the sway of his countrymen as he possibly could, by fraud

can be permanently maintained, would under any circumstances, oppose the adoption of that project; while its practicability and success are too doubtful to warrant the attempt, even if it were unopposed by the dictates of prudent policy and the obligations of political justice.'"
Ibid, pages 218 to 221.

Elphinstone was so ambitious that, because there was no scope for his ambition in India after the third Mahratta war, he did not accept the Governor-Generalship of India when offered to him. In his diary, dated September 1, 1834, he wrote :

"But the first question is, would the situation suit me if there were no obstacle to my taking it ? I must premise that, as there is no particular crisis in India, and I have no particular abilities. I may assume that it is of no consequence to the public whether I go or another. I have, therefore, only personal considerations to attend to. *Now the chance of great events occurring is not considerable*, nor is it certain if they did occur, that I should conduct them with distinction In foreign politics I should probably be most in my element. I suppose, coming after an unpopular man, ... I should go on smoothly with the service ; but *I could not expect to be so popular as at Bombay, ... and where I brought along with me an addition of territory, increase to allowances, ... The chance, therefore, is on the whole that I should not augment my reputation*, Titles, even if I gained them, would be of no value unless gained by

and force. And in Elphinstone he found an admirable tool to carry out his purpose.*

Elphinstone served under Wellington in the Second Maratha War. While serving in this

actions, the chance of which has been discussed. My time out there would pass in comparative misery....

"I ought to remember, however, that in these days glory is out of fashion, and if I were to resist a Russian, it would be less thought of than if I had proposed a reduction in some trifling tax at home; while, with respect to faults, I shall find the popular leaders much more captious and quick-sighted than the old members of Parliament, and the Ministers much less decided in defending measures of which they had not previously expressed disapprobation."

From the above, there can be no doubt in the mind of any reasonable man of the ambitious nature of Elphinstone.

* How unscrupulous Elphinstone himself was will be evident from the following extracts from one of his papers, probably written in 1811 and 1812.

"To resume our former policy and seize every opportunity of returning to the situation from which we voluntarily receded in 1805, and to proceed in the same spirit till we had established an efficient control over every state on this side of the Indus, I see no difficulty in effecting this except what arises from our treaties, which I would not take a step, directly or indirectly, to infringe; but I think that it requires pains and sacrifices on our part to preserve those treaties which are so hurtful to our interest. and that, by letting things take their

capacity, intimacy sprang up between him and the future Duke. After the conclusion of that war, he was posted as Resident at Nagpur. In a letter to him dated 26th January, -1804, the future Duke gave expression to his views regarding the Marathas, which should be quoted here. He wrote to Elphinstone :—

“The Mahrattas are but little in the habit of adhering to truth . . .” Again, “Under these circumstances of irregularity and *want of principle and good faith*, and as it appears impossible to raise the views of those with whom we are obliged to act above those of a pindary

natural course, we should soon get rid of them. Holkar’s Government has expired, and its treaties along with it. Nothing prevents our making a subsidiary treaty with the Raja of Berar. Sindia would soon fall either into our arms or those of Meer Khan; and his surrender of his claims on the Rajputs might be made the condition of his obtaining peace in the one case, or our alliance in the other Ranjeet Singh’s sincere friendship would be of the greatest value to us; but if he quarrelled with us within a year or two, we shall be able to overturn his Government . . . , As for the Talpoorees, I would greatly prefer a just war with them to a treaty.”

Colebrooke, the biographer of Elphinstone, says, “there is no reason to suppose that it ever formed the base of a State paper.” No, on the contrary, the biographer should have written that “there is every reason to suppose that that paper guided the policy of Marquess Hastings and of Elphinstone in their dealings with the princes of India.”

or a rapacious amildar, I have only to recommend to you to continue your efforts to oblige the Rajah to withdraw the few troops who remain in Berar; * * *"

The words put in italics in the above extract are no doubt curious reading. What principle and good faith, were the British themselves exhibiting in their dealings with their non-Christian antagonists?

The Duke himself lacked in principle and good faith for the manner in which he poisoned the mind of every one in authority against the Peishwa. In his letter to Major Shawe, dated the 26th January, 1804, the Duke wrote:—

"I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peishwa; he has no public feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive proof that he has been treacherous but I have a strong suspicion of it; . . ."

Again, he wrote to Major Malcolm on the 27th January, 1804:—

"I have written fully to the Governor-General and to Shawe about the Peishwa; . . . I have also laid open the Peishwa's character, rather more than it has been lately."

Yet with that consummate hypocrisy and art of dissimulation of which he was a perfect master, he wrote on the 30th January, 1804, to Lieut. Frissell, who was acting as Resident at Poona:—

"The Peishwa should be made to understand, that the British Government feel for the honour, the security, and the prosperity of his Government, in the same manner as

they do for that of the Company ; that they are too strong to render it necessary *that they should have recourse to intrigues to overturn his Government, if they should wish it, which is by no means likely*”

The words in italics are a curious commentary on the Duke's advocating the bribing of the Peishwa's ministers to betray their master and the measures adopted by Elphinstone, which will be presently narrated, to encompass the ruin of the Peishwa.

The future Duke failed in his attempt to poison the mind of Sir Barry Close, who was Resident at Poona, against the Peishwa ; he did not succeed in imparting to the Resident that hatred which he cherished in his bosom against the Peishwa. For seven years, Sir Barry Close was Resident at Poona. During that long time, he had good opportunities to judge the character of the Peishwa. The opinion he formed of Baji Rao, has already been given above. Sir Barry Close was not influenced by the perverse views of the future Duke. He refused to borrow other's eyes or spectacles to see the conduct of the Peishwa or to read in his actions some sinister motives. What sort of man Sir Barry Close was will be gathered from the description of Elphinstone himself. According to him,

“A strong and hardy frame, a clear head, and vigorous understanding, fixed principles, unshaken courage, con-

tempt for pomp and pleasure, entire devotion to the public service, joined to the utmost modesty and simplicity formed the character of Sir Barry Close—a character such as one would rather think imagined in ancient Rome than met with in our own age and nation.” (Colebrooke’s Elphinstone, Vol. 1, p. 270).

Instead of dealing direct with the Peishwa Sir Barry Close appointed a Parsee by name Kharshedji Jamsedji Modi as his agent to transact business with the Peishwa and his Court. This appointment gave satisfaction to all the parties concerned in the matter, since the Parsee agent was a man of judgment and great address. But when Elphinstone came as Resident to Poona in 1811, he upset Colonel Close’s arrangement, which had so far acted very smoothly without producing any friction between the Peishwa and the British. It does not appear from the records that the interests of the latter suffered in any way by the manner in which Kharshedji transacted the business of the British Residency. But the first act of Elphinstone when he came to Poona was the removal of this man from the post which he had held with great credit to himself and to the benefit of all parties concerned.*

* In Colebrook’s Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone there is no mention of Mr. Kharshedji Modi at all. It must be admitted that Colebrooke has suppressed many important facts and has painted his hero as an immaculate saint

Elphinstone considered himself so well-versed in Maratha statecraft that in his opinion it was not necessary for him to employ the Parsee any longer as intermediary between himself and the Peishwa for the transaction of state business. Moreover, it was alleged that Kharshedji had been won over to the Peishwa's interests, of which, of course, there is no evidence. In the step which Elphinstone took he displayed considerable want of tact. Kharshedji had been in power for a number of years and had enjoyed the confidence of Colonel Sir Barry Close. But with the arrival of Elphinstone, he found himself deprived of his power, shorn of authority, and, as it appeared to him, disgraced in the eyes of the public. The change

rather than a worldly-wise man and diplomatist with little sense of high moral principles.

From one of the extracts from Elphinstone's diary with which Colebrooke has furnished us it would seem that Elphinstone used to exhibit his temper or rather adopt a bullying tone while talking to the Peishawa and his Minister. Under date October 20, 1812, Elphinstone writes in his diary :—

"I have been thinking of another resolution which I must mention more openly from the details which it involves; this is to correct my temper, particularly on occasions of business . . . I must be particularly cautious with the Peishwa and his Minister, whom it is my business to conciliate, though I have neither respect nor esteem for either of them" (I. 271).

was also not welcome to the Peishwa. As diplomats and political officers the British are very troublesome to deal with. Why is it that the Afghan people opposed, with tooth and nail as it were, the imposition on them of British ambassadors? Because they thought that with the entrance of European ambassadors into their country their national existence would become a thing of the past, as Europeans possess wonderful capacity for intrigues and conspiracies and stirring up quarrels. His removal from authority was nothing short of humiliation to Kharshedji and was not calculated to inspire the Peishwa with confidence in Elphinstone. Since power is sweet to everyone, it is not impossible, that to avenge himself on Elphinstone, Kharshedji made the Peishwa acquainted with Elphinstone's political views and scheming designs. The Peishwa was alarmed and naturally could not look upon the new British political as his friend and well-wisher. He commenced to cherish the most bitter hatred against Elphinstone.

Kharshedji seemed to Elphinstone to be a thorn in his side, and hence his destruction or removal from the Peishwa's dominion in the Deccan was highly desirable. Elphinstone, on the mere suspicion of his advising the Peishwa against the British, required him to leave the Deccan and retire to Guzerat. But as Kharshedji was about to leave Poona, he died of poison. According to the versi-

on of the British, either he took the poison himself in order to commit suicide, or else he was poisoned at the Peishwa's suggestion. None of these theories advanced by the British satisfactorily account for Kharshedji's death. They based the theory of his committing suicide on the allegation that his corrupt practices would become public as soon as he left Poona. Now, this theory will hardly hold water when we remember the fact that he was already in the bad books of Elphinstone and his going to Guzerat would place him beyond the reach of Elphinstone's power to punish him.

The alternative theory that he was poisoned at the Peishwa's suggestion, is equally absurd. It is alleged that the Peishwa did so because Kharshedji knew too many of his secrets. Now, what was the reason which prompted Elphinstone to remove Kharshedji from the Deccan? It was because it was alleged that he had been won over to the Peishwa's interest and because it was suspected that he had been advising the Peishwa against the British "by constantly enlarging on the great gains which the British Government had received from the treaty of Bassein." If these allegations and suspicions have any leg to stand upon, does it stand to reason that the Peishwa should have poisoned his well-wisher and friend? The esteem in which he was held by the Peishwa is evident

from his having given land to him in Guzerat, which Kharshedji's descendants enjoy to this day. It being admitted by the English that Kharshedji was a great favorite with the Peishwa, it passes one's understanding why the Peishwa should have poisoned him.

The above considerations lead to one and only one reasonable conclusion, *viz.*, that if Kharshedji died of poison, he did not take it himself to commit suicide, nor could it have been given to him at the Peishwa's suggestion, but in all probability it was administered to him by some one of the hired emissaries of Elphinstone. There is nothing improbable or impossible in it. The attitude of Elphinstone towards Kharshedji is in itself sufficient to cast the suspicion on him. Kharshedji knew a great many of Elphinstone's secrets; he knew the plot that was being hatched in the Residency against the Peishwa, hence it was desirable to remove him by poison, just as the Borgias used to do in bye-gone days.

But the measure which Elphinstone adopted in ordering Kharshedji to leave Poona was not the only one which destroyed good understanding between him and the Peishwa. Elphinstone did every thing in his power to try the patience of the Peishwa and alienate his friendship. The Peishwa repeatedly asked the Resident to settle his claims on the Nizam and on the Guicowar.

Elphinstone did not display his wonted energy in settling the matter.

It is necessary here to refer in more detail to the nature of the claims which the Peishwa advanced on the Guicowar's government.

It was in 1751 that Dummajee Guicowar was made a prisoner by the Peishwa Ballajee Rao in the Deccan and was not released till he had executed a bond by which he agreed to equally partition both the territory already acquired, and all future conquests in Guzerat. Dummajee also bound himself to maintain ten thousand horse to assist the Peishwa when required, and to pay an annual tribute of five lacs and twenty-five thousand rupees, and to contribute a certain sum for the support of the Satara Raja's establishment. Part of this tribute Dummajee and his descendants never paid to the Peishwa; the arrears thus amounted to about a crore of rupees. The Peishwa urged the Resident to take steps to settle these pecuniary claims of his on the Guicowar. There was an agent of the Guicowar at Poona by the name of Bappoo Myral, who was found unfit to settle these matters. Hence the Peishwa desired that some one else should be sent from Baroda who was competent to deal with those questions. The Baroda government nominated Gangadhar Shastree as Guicowar's agent. The nomination of this man was highly

offensive to the Peishwa and he strongly objected to it. But Mr. Elphinstone totally ignored the Peishwa's protests and forced, as it were, Gangadhar Shastree on him. Mr. Elphinstone refused to attach any weight to the Peishwa's objection, because when Gangadhar Shastree's name was proposed to the Peishwa in 1811, the latter did not raise any objection !

It is necessary to narrate the rise of Gangadhar Shastree. He was a Brahman of very humble parentage. In his early life, he was a servant in the Phadkay family of Poona and it was said that he had been once insolent to the Peishwa. Vain and shrewd as he was, he knew how to get on in the world. At the time of which we are writing, the English were by fraud and intrigue trying to consolidate their power in the land of the Marathas and depriving the latter of the territories which their genius and valor had secured them. In Gangadhar Shastree the English found a fit instrument to carry on their designs and give effect to their schemes. The author of the Baroda Gazetteer, Mr. F. A. H. Elliot, thus writes of this Brahmin :

" His (Gangadhar Shastree's) usefulness was already well-known to the Honorable Company and he rapidly acquired the confidence of a strong party in the Darbar headed by Babaji and afterwards by Fatehsing, till, at last, feared or respected by the British and the courts of

Poona and Baroda, the Shastree came to play the most important part in the history of Baroda." (P. 209)

The same author also informs us that Gangadhar Shastri,

"accompanying Major A. Walker to Baroda entered the government service of the British in 1802. In June 1803, the village of Dendole in the *pargana* of Chorasi in the Surat *athharisi* was granted him and his heirs in perpetuity. It was worth 5000 rupees per annum

"On the 12th of January 1805, on his daughter's marriage, the Bombay Government presented him with Rs. 4000. On the 15th of May, 1806, a palanquin was given him with allowance of Rs. 1200 a year for its maintenance (p. 210, f. n.).

The close-fisted English must have derived great material advantages through the instrumentality of this man which led them to confer on him all these honors and favours.*

* The East India Company's Government was indebted to him for his bringing the Baroda State under the supremacy of that Government. When Govind Rao Gaikwar died in September, 1800, he was succeeded by his son, Anand Rao, who "was a thorough simpleton, and had the misfortune to have left to him as legacy from his father a mutinous rabble of an army. This rabble mainly consisted of Arabs...Raojee Appajee, on Anand Rao's part—who, though a simpleton, had sense enough to feel the galling sway of the Arab Jamadars, opened negotiations with the English,... These negotiations were first carried on secretly, until the time that the Honorable Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, could convince himself

Naturally this man was looked upon by the Peishwa and many of the dignitaries and nobles of Baroda as a traitor, ready to sell his countrymen and sacrifice their interests in order to gain the smile of, and curry favour with the English. The Peishwa strongly objected to his appointment, but, as said before, Mr. Elphinstone turned a deaf ear to his protests. Nay, Mr. Elphinstone went a step further. Knowing the unpopularity of Gangadhar Shastree at Baroda and the enemies that he had created by his over-bearing manner, Mr. Elphinstone had ample reasons to fear that the life of his protegee would not be safe in the Deccan. Ganga-

that they were earnest on the part of Anand Rao. Then, although prepared with an expeditionary force to back the Gaikwar against Mulhar Rao (one of his family then in arms) and the mutineer Arabs as well as the British officer deputed to his Court, the Honorable Jonathan Duncan instructed Major Alexander Walker, the officer he had selected for the service, to go and judge of the state of matters at Baroda, before joining the force he was to command at Bombay, the place of rendezvous. In obedience to the orders of the Governor, Major Alexander Walker set out for Baroda, and was accompanied on his way thither by Gangadhar Shastree, "who has exercised *no uncommon* influence over the modelling of the events which led to the establishment of English supremacy in the Baroda Darbar, and the subsequent history of Guzerat and the Deccan." (Pp. 6—8 of *History of the Rise, Decline and Present State of the Shastree Family, published in 1868 from Bombay*).

dhār Shastree himself was unwilling to move out of Baroda, for somehow or other he had some premonition of the danger that was to befall him. Under the circumstances, he should not have been forced to go to Poona as the Guicowar's agent. But without the Peishwa's knowledge, Elphinstone gave a formal guarantee for the Shastree's safety from the British Government. This conduct of Mr. Elphinstone highly offended the Peishwa, who had also several other well-founded reasons to be dissatisfied with the manner in which he was being treated by the English. He was supposed to be their ally, but he was not treated as such. He was the sovereign of Kathiawad, but the English conducted the war in that province without his sanction, and inflicted fines on Navanagar and Junagad of which he had not been officially apprised, and above all, of the settlement made by Colonel Walker which was an undoubted infringement of the Peishwa's suzerainty.

Gangadhar Shastree set out from Baroda on the 19th of October 1813, and on his arrival in Poona Bajee Rao refused to see him. But knowing that he was in the good books of the English, and he was their protegee and under their protection in Poona, he commenced a career of intrigues having for their object the ruin and downfall of the Peishwa.

Mention has already been made above of Mr.

Kharsedji Modi. He was the confidential servant of Sir Barry Close, but he was deprived of authority by Mr. Elphinstone. He was still in Poona when Gangadhar Shastree arrived there. This Brahman upstart knowing that Mr. Kharsedji was not in the good books of Mr. Elphinstone left no stone unturned to poison his mind against that Parsee. We are told that—

“In May (1814), the Shastree requested (Mr. Elphinstone) that one man might be either removed from office or wholly trusted. This was Kharsetji Modi whom the Shastree suspected of working with Trimbakji to influence the Peishwa by keeping him in a state of alarm as to the designs of Fatesing and the British.” (Baroda Gazetteer, p. 219).

The manner in which Kharsedji was ordered to leave Poona and his subsequent fate have already been narrated. But no sensible man can have any reason to doubt that this Parsee met his death at the hands of some of the numerous emissaries of the Poona Resident, Mr. Elphinstone.

The mission with which Gangadhar Shastree was charged, did not consist merely in settling the pecuniary claims of the Peishwa on the Guicowar, but also to secure the lease of the Ahmedabad farm of his master. It has been said before that half of Gujrat belonged to the Guicowar and the other half to the Peishwa. The Peishwa's share in Gujrat had been leased to the Guicowar. The

terms of the lease were now approaching their close. The Peishwa was unwilling to grant the lease to the Guicowar, but the British Government wished that the farm of Ahmedabad should be retained by the Guicowar. We are told on official authority that—

“The Peishwa very sensibly feared that if he continued to grant long leases of the Ahmedabad farm to the Guicowar, the renewal of them would at length come to be a matter of course and that Ahmedabad would in fact lapse into a mere tributary province. The retention by the Guicowar of the farm of Ahmedabad was anxiously desired by the Bombay Government, whose boundaries touched it at many points and *it was important to thwart every attempt of Baji Rao to create fresh political ties between the courts of Baroda and Poona.*” (*Ibid*, p. 219).

From the words put in italics in the above extract it will be observed that the British Government had been intriguing against the Peishwa. The Peishwa had every right to farm out his share of Gujrat to whomsoever he liked. But it was just what did not suit the convenience of the Bombay Government of the day, and hence Mr. Elphinstone surrounded the Peishwa with spies and it is not improbable that he employed a large number of intriguers to create troubles in the Peishwa's territories. Well, he was acting on a Machiavellian policy, for political expediency dictated him to do so. This Gangadhar Shastree was a fit instrument in

Elphinstone's hand to carry out all his intrigues. Mr. Elphinstone himself has left a description of the Shastree which shows what sort of man this Brahman upstart was. He describes

"Gangadhar Shastree as a person of great shrewdness and talent who keeps the whole state of Baroda in the highest order, at Poona, lavishes money and marshals suwary in such style as to draw the attention of the whole place. Though a very learned Shastree he affects to be quite an Englishman, walks fast, talks fast, interrupts and contradicts, and calls the Peishwa and his ministers old fools and 'damned rascals' or rather 'dam rascals'." (Colebrooke's Elphinstone, I, 276).

Knowing the sentiments of Gangadhar towards the Peishwa and his ministers, a sense of prudence should have told Elphinstone to remove the Shastree as soon as possible from Poona. But the tragical drama would not have been unfolded had Mr. Elphinstone been a little prudent in all his dealings with the Peishwa. Nay, it was the interest of Mr. Elphinstone to keep the Shastree in Poona, because the latter was serving as his tool and playing the part of a spy on the Peishwa. The person of an ambassador is held sacred according to canons of the International Law of Nations of the civilized world. But it is also a well-known maxim of International Law that the lives of spies and emissaries should not be spared. Since his arrival in Poona, Gangadhar Shastree had done his best to create ill feeling between

the Peishwa and the English, and he richly deserved the fate which subsequently befell him. There can be no doubt to any reasonable man that Mr. Elphinstone gave the formal guarantee for the Shastree's safety from the British Government knowing the part which that Brahmin upstart had to play and for which International Law prescribes one penalty only, namely, forfeiture of life. Ambassadors and diplomatists are supposed to possess a great deal of that undefinable thing called tact and to act on Talleyrand's saying that language is given unto us to conceal our thoughts. But this Brahman upstart sadly lacked the one and never acted on the other. The manner in which he indulged in vituperation of the Peishwa and his ministers shows how utterly unfit he was for the mission with which he was charged to Poona.

Gangadhar Shastree being known to be a dangerous man, it was the interest of the Peishwa to either conciliate, or if possible, annihilate him. Months passed, and yet the objects for which he was sent to Poona were not accomplished. The lease of the Ahmedabad farm was not renewed in favour of the Guicowar but given to Trimbakji Danglia, said to have been a great favourite of the Peishwa. When he found the lease of the much coveted Ahmedabad farm was given to another man and not his master, he thought his stay any longer in Poona was useless, and so

also thought the Guicowar and the British Government. Accordingly Gangadhar Shastree was ordered to quit Poona and to return to Baroda.

But, as said before, he was a dangerous man and the Peishwa and all his well-wishers tried to buy him off if possible. Trimbakji Danglia, reputed be the greatest favourite of the Peishwa, tried his best to effect reconciliation between his master and Gangadhar. We are told by the author of the *Bombay Gazetteer*, Baroda volume, Mr. F. A. H. Eliot, that

"Trimbakji Danglia, very probably at this time really intended a reconciliation. He is said to have confessed to the Shastree that he had at one time during the negotiation intended to murder him." (Loc. cit. p. 222 f. n.)

Now, if his confession be at all true, then nothing short of lunacy and madness would have prompted him to commit the dastardly deed with which, as we shall presently see, he was charged.

In the eyes of the Peishwa, the Shastree's friendship and good-will appeared so important that he left no stone unturned to secure them. But as he was such an important tool in the hands of the English, they were equally determined that he should not be bought over by the Peishwa. The latter offered the Shastree the post of his minister, but we are told that "this offer the

Shastree rejected at the desire of Mr. Elphinstone."

The Peishwa made a proposal that the Shastree's son should be married to his sister-in-law. The Shastree agreed to this proposal and accordingly preparations for its celebration were being made at Nasik, where it was to take place. But almost at the eleventh hour, when the preparations were well advanced, the Shastree, without assigning any cause, broke off the marriage contract. Happily for him, the law of breach of promise of marriage of the Christian countries of the West is not applicable to India, otherwise he would have had to pay a very large sum of money in damages. The Shastree also prevented his wife from visiting the Peishwa's palace. Of course, no English writers have given or even tried to give any explanation for these unusual steps, which the Shastree adopted; but there can be no doubt to any reasonable man that, in all probability, he was ordered to do so by the Resident at Poona, that is, Mr. Elphinstone. Not cordiality but estrangement of feeling between the Poona and Baroda governments was the object aimed at by the British Government, and this the latter did not even conceal. The scandalous manner in which the Shastree was behaving towards the Peishwa was enough to have enraged any one, but to the latter's credit it must be said that he took all these things very calmly.

Although the Ahmedabad farm was not again leased out to the Guicowar, it would seem that Gangadhar Shastree tried to settle the pecuniary claims of the Peishwa on his master in a manner which was agreeable to the Brahman chief. The Shastree

“granted that the sum of 39 lakhs with interest on the same, was owing to the Guikwar, and in lieu of all claims, which were then laid by the Peishwa at one crore of arrears and 40 lakhs of tribute, he proposed to surrender territory worth 7 lakhs. At the same time he apprehended that Fatesing would never part with so large a portion of his territory, and prayed the Resident to assist him in influencing the Baroda Court.” (Baroda Gazetteer, p. 221).

Had the British Government carried out the prayer of the Shastree, all the differences between the Peishwa and the Guicowar would have been settled. But it was not their policy to do so. Fatesing Guicowar did not like the arrangement, and months passed without his vouchsafing any reply to his agent, *i.e.*, the Shastree at Poona. This arrangement was favourable to the Peishwa. It would seem that the British Government did not take any step to settle it, for, in the words of Colonel Wallace, the Peishwa at this time was “growing daily more and more the object of suspicion” of the English. Naturally, Gangadhar

Shastree was alarmed at the position of affairs. To quote again the above-named English author:—

“The first shock to Gangadhar Shastree’s already insecure position was given by the silence of his government respecting the arrangement which he had taken upon himself to propose to the Peishwa as a solution of existing difficulties, and to which the Peishwa had verbally consented. He saw he had authorised the suspicion that he had neglected his master’s interests in forwarding his own. To lose the favour of his own prince and to be found fraternizing with one growing daily more and more the object of suspicion to his still more powerful patrons the English!! The dilemma was awful!” (P.200 of Wallace’s History of the Guicowars).

Had the British Government raised their little finger at this time, all the difficulties would have been easily smoothed over and the settlement of the Peishwa’s claims effected. But, as said before, it was not their policy to do so.

Gangadhar Shastree, too, had he been a wise man, would not have stayed a day longer in Poona, seeing the turn which affairs had taken. He was sent to Poona as the Guicowar’s agent and as such he had full powers to settle the affairs of his master. But his master did not agree to his arrangement. What more service could he have rendered to his master by his stay in the capital of the Peishwas? At the bidding of the English Resident at Poona, he sacrificed his own interests, for he had to reject the Peishwa’s offer of the

post of his minister and to break off the intended nuptials of his son with the Peishwa's sister-in-law.

But he still stayed in Poona, for according to Colonel Wallace,

"He hoped to conciliate Baji Rao, and yet to retain the good opinion of his English patrons, on whose guarantee for his safety, from long observations of its efficacy in Gujrat, he was disposed to place too entire a confidence." (*Ibid*, p. 207)

To make a long story short, he accompanied the Peishwa to Pandharpur, where he was assassinated on the 14th July, 1815. The assassination has been attributed to the instigation of the Peishwa. It is alleged that the Peishwa's favorite, Trimbakji Danglia, hired assassins to do the job, for he was directed by his master to do so.*

* Futeh Sing Guicowar was the reigning prince at Baroda when Gangadhar Shastree was assassinated. He invited to Baroda the three sons of the deceased, who were at that time at Poona and settled princely allowances on them by means of a *Sunad*, which, however, did not receive the guarantee of the British Government. Fateh Singh's successor, Sayaji Rao, reduced their allowances, on which they appealed to the Bombay Government, at the head of which was at that time, Mr. Elphinstone. He "did not ask the reason of the appeal and by whose negligence it was that the guarantee was not extended to the family which had indirectly been the cause of his *release* from the Residency duties at Poona, and *elevation* to the Bombay Governorship, but summarily decided that, as

It is difficult to connect Baji Rao or his favourite Trimbakji with this cowardly and dastardly act. What motive or motives could have prompted them to commit the murder? Of course, Ganga-

they could show no guarantee from the British Government, he believed his Government had no right to interfere, except by simple advice or recommendation." (Pp. 41-42 of *History of the Rise, Decline and Present State of the Shastree Family*.)

What idea of gratitude was possessed by Mr. Elphinstone !

How the murder of Gangadhar Shastree was beneficial to the British is thus narrated by Prinsep :—

"In the issue to which matters were brought by the Shastree's murder, we stood forth in the character of avengers of the death of a Brahmin ambassador, and had the full advantage of the popular voice on our side, even among the Peishwa's own subjects. This favourable impression lasted beyond the immediate occasion, in-somuch that two years afterwards, when a rupture occurred with nearly all the Maratha states, the cause of the British nation derived a vast accession of strength in public opinion from recollection of the foul murder of this Brahmin, in which the quarrel had originated, and the indifference manifested upon the subsequent down-fall of the Peishwa's dynasty was owing in a great measure to its being regarded as a judgment on the reigning head of the family for his participation in this crime, polluted as he was already by the yet unexpiated murder of Narayan Rao by his father, Raghunath. (P. 321, Vol. I of Prinsep's *History of the Political and Military Transactions*).

dhar Shastree was vain, a dangerous man and played the spy on the Peishwa, and by causing Kharsedji Modi to be removed from Poona, severely wounded the feelings of Baji Rao. As a spy he richly deserved the fate which befell him and for which no reasonable man should sympathize with him. But had the Peishwa been bent upon taking his life, he could have done it very easily at Poona and not at Pandharpur, the sancity of which alone would have prevented a superstitious man like the Peishwa from committing such a foul deed. The author of the *Bombay Gazetteer*, Poona volume, writes that Baji Rao

"claimed great holiness and was most careful to keep all religious rules and ceremonies. Apparently, to lay the ghost of Narayan Rao Peishwa, whom his parents had murdered and who seems to have haunted him, Baji Rao planted several hundred thousand mango trees about Poona, gave largesses to Brahmans and religious establishments, and was particularly generous to Vithoba's temple at Pandharpore." (Part II, p. 293).

In a foot-note to the above the same author writes:—"It was probably Narayanrao's ghost that so often took him to Pandharpore." Now, when to propitiate one ghost, Baji Rao was taking all these troubles at Pandharpur, it is a psychological puzzle to understand, much less to believe, that at the same place this very superstitious Baji Rao should even think of perpetrating a crime similar to that of his parent. When he

was taking all these measures to free his father of his sin, does it stand to reason, that he himself should stain his hands in the same sort of sin?

It may be argued that Gangadhar Shastree had offended Baji Rao by breaking off the intended nuptials of his son with the latter's sister-in-law and preventing his wife from visiting the Peishwa's palace. It does not seem that Baji Rao was enraged at this conduct of that Brahman upstart, or thought of depriving him of his life for this strange behavior of his. Of course, there was a time when the Peishwa would have been fully justified in taking the life of Gangadhar Shastree when the latter was playing the part of a spy on him and was intriguing with the English against him. But latterly, Gangadhar was reconciled to the Peishwa. His arrangement about the settlement of the pecuniary claims of Baji Rao on the Guicowar was favorable to the Peishwa and it is not likely that the latter should have conspired to assassinate him for his useful services.

It is equally improbable that Trimbakjee Danglia should have had any hand in the murder of the Shastree. What motive could have actuated him to perpetrate this foul deed? It is said that Trimbakjee subsequently confessed that he had done the deed by the order of his master. Now, it is a well-known thing that those who confess either overdo a thing or underdo it. They never

tell the truth. We have only to turn even to the confessions of Rousseau. No sensible man now places any reliance on the sensational confessions of Rousseau.

Even if Trimbakjee did not confess in the spirit of bravado, we should not forget how confessions are sometimes extorted in India by the police and other administrators of a so-called justice. It is a matter of everyday occurrence in India, how the innocent are made to confess. So the confession of Trimbakjee that he had done the deed is not worth much and that he did it by the order of his master is highly improbable for the reason set forth above.

Gangadhar Shastree, as said above, had made many enemies in Baroda and he was highly unpopular there. When Elphinstone guaranteed his safety in the Peishwa's territories, some of his enemies came to the Deccan, it would seem, with the avowed object of murdering him; for they knew that the Peishwa being not in the good books of the English, all the blame would fall on him and they themselves would go scot-free.* At

* Mr. Elphinstone had guaranteed safe conduct to the Shastree: but he never took any trouble to protect his person. He should have furnished the Shastree with an escort to accompany him everywhere he went. Strange to say that while the Shastree went to Pandharpur with the Peishwa, Mr. Elphinstone did not take

the time when the Shastree was murdered, there were two agents of Seetaram Rowjee there. The grudge which Seetaram bore to the Shastree is well-known. It is also said that

"The Shastree had in his possession a letter addressed by Govindrao to the Rani Takhtibai which contained the ominous threat that under certain contingencies the Shastree will never more look that way. that is, return to Baroda" (*Baroda Gazetteer*, p. 222).

any precautionary measure to protect his protegee but went on a pleasant excursion to Ellora. His biographer writes that "Mr. Elphinstone took advantage of the opportunity to enter on another exploring expedition, this to the far-famed caves of Ellora."

The Shastree was murdered during Elphinstone's absence at Ellora.

Mr. Edward Moor, well-known as the author of "The Hindu Pantheon", towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century served in Poona under Sir Charles Malet, the British Resident in the court of the Peishwa. He was well acquainted with the last Peishwa Baji Rao. In his above-mentioned work, he refers to the horror in which the murder of Brahmans was held by the subjects of his Brahman Government. He quotes the following verses from Manu :—

"A twice-born man who barely assaults a Brahman with intention to hurt him, shall be whirled about for a century in the hell called *Tamisra*."

"He who, through ignorance of the law, sheds blood from the body of a Brahman, not engaged in battle, shall feel excessive pain in his future life."

"As many particles of dust as the blood shall roll

If this be true, then there can be no doubt that the Shastree's murder was planned and carried out by some of the numerous enemies he had made at Baroda.

But Mr. Elphinstone was determined to connect the Peishwa and his favorite, Trimbakjee Danglia, with this murder. He is said to have held an investigation and proved that Danglia had engaged the assassins. What sort of investigation it was, and whether the accused Trimbakjee had been given an opportunity to know the nature of the

up from the ground, for so many years shall the shedder of that blood be mangled by other animals in his next birth,"

"Never shall the king slay a Brahman, though convicted of all possible crimes: let him banish the offender from his realm, but with all his property secure, and his body unhurt."

"No greater crime is known on earth than slaying a Brahman: and the king, therefore, must not even form in his mind the idea of killing a priest."

From his long experience of and residence in Poona, Mr. Moor could give only three instances of Brahmans being put to death. He writes:—

"The violent death of one of these persons, transcendently divine, as they are deemed by Manu, it may be supposed rarely occurs. I have however, known of three being put to death, and that too at Poona, the immediate seat of Brahmanical government....."

Of these three the first was that of the notorious Ghasiram Kotwal. It cannot be denied that that man

investigation, are matters which are not mentioned in official records. Trimbakjee was an eyesore to Elphinstone and the English, because he was a favorite of the Peishwa. That in itself would not have been a great offence, had it not been for the other fact that he had been granted the lease of the much-coveted Ahmedabad farm. It has been already mentioned before, how desirous were the English to see the lease of that farm renewed in favor of their protegee the Guicowar. But when the Peishwa did not do so, they were

deserved the death that befell him. However it should not be forgotten that he was stoned to death by Brahman of the *Telinga* sect. After narrating the circumstances of the murder of this Brahman, Mr. Moor truly observes :—

“I have heard it said and have, I think, seen it related that on such an occasion (that, however, of popular insurrection, is very uncommon in India,) the victim has been put in a bag, and beaten, to avoid the denunciation against shedding a Brahman’s blood.”

The second and the third instances of Brahmanicide mentioned by Moor, need not be referred to here.

These instances are cited to show the horror in which Brahmanicide was regarded during the regime of the Peishwas. The Peishwa Baji Rao was well-versed in the Shastras of the Hindoos and besides he was a very superstitious man. Taking all these facts into consideration, it is extremely improbable that Baji Rao ordered, or Trimbakjee Danglia executed, the murder of the Brahman ambassador.

determined on his humiliation and subsequent ruin.

It was then, we take it, a matter of political expediency to have connected the Peishwa and his favorite Trimbakjee with the murder of Gangadhar Shastree. For the present it was decided not to consider the Peishwa as a party to the murder. But Elphinstone demanded of the Peishwa the surrender of his favorite Trimbakjee to the English. Now, this demand on the part of Mr. Elphinstone was against the spirit of all International Law. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Trimbakjee was implicated in the murder of Gangadhar Shastree, it does not follow that the English had any right to punish him. Both Trimbakjee and the murdered were, as it were, the subjects of the Peishwa and so the latter had every authority to deal with the accused as he thought proper. The demands of justice would have been fully satisfied by punishing these Baroda agents, who had been caught, as it were, red-handed in the murder of the Shastree. But Elphinstone had ulterior designs in demanding the surrender of Trimbakjee.* He did not care

* In his letter to the Marquess of Hastings, Elphinstone set forth his reasons for demanding the immediate surrender of Trimbakjee. He wrote:—

“If Trimbakji expected to be accused by our government, * * * he would probably have employed the inter-

much whether the step he was going to take would wound the feelings of the Peishwa, whose sworn enemy he was. Baji Rao, as in honor bound, resisted Elphinstone's demand. But Elphinstone was inexorable. He was about to surround Poona with British troops and lay a regular siege to it.

val in perverting the Peishwa's mind and engaging him in acts of violence at home, and in such foreign negotiations as are inconsistent with the alliance. This would be facilitated by the Peishwa remaining so long in suspense whether the accusation might not be directed against himself."

Thus it was political expediency which dictated Elphinstone to accuse Trimbakjee of the murder without any proof, because Trimbakjee was an able, ambitious and hence a dangerous man whose removal from Poona was desirable at any cost.

At the time when it pleased Elphinstone to accuse Trimbakjee of the murder, he had no evidence worth speaking of against that unfortunate Maratha minister. It was after the flight of the Peishwa and the annexation of his territories that strong evidence is alleged to have been obtained by Elphinstone and the English to satisfy them that the Peishwa and Trimbakjee planned the murder. Colebrooke, in his life of Elphinstone writes:—

"There is no part of Indian History on which so full a light has been thrown, as the murder of the unfortunate Shastree, and the important events which followed. Our subsequent conquest of the country gave us sources of information which were improved by the local inquiries of Grant Duff, and we can trace the undercurrent of intrigue by the light of subsequent knowledge, and *with the*

How bitterly at this moment Baji Rao must have rued the day he signed the treaty of Bassein and entered into alliance with the English who were not remarkable for faithfulness. Naturally of a timid disposition and, as said before, false to himself and false to the people over whom he ruled, Baji Rao's heart failed him when he found his capital was to be besieged by the British troops. He was obliged to make over his favorite Trimbakjee to the English. The English incarcerated Trimbakjee in the Thana Fort.

aid that Mr. Elphinstone did not at the time possess."
(The italics are ours.)

Of course, after the conquest, everything was possible. To curry favor with the victorious English, numbers of blackguards and intriguers of the type of Balaji Pant Natoo came forward to give, nay fabricate, false evidence against the fallen Peishwa and his minister. No reliance could be placed on such evidence.

That Trimbakjee was not altogether a bad man is admitted even by Mr. Elphinstone himself. On May 8th, 1815, Mr. Elphinstone wrote in his diary :—

"It is pleasant to see Trimbakjee remember old friends and townsmen in his elevation, and this, with his care of his native village, building walls to it, etc., incline one to think well of him *if his general character would admit of it.*" (The italics are ours.)

Of course Elphinstone was strongly biased against Trimbakjee and therefore in spite of all the benevolent and charitable acts of Trimbakjee, which he saw with his own eyes, he was not inclined to think well of him.

Thus by fraud and force, Elphinstone succeeded in depriving Baji Rao of two of his best well-wishers and faithful servants, viz., Kharsedjee Modi and Trimbakjee Danglia. Baji Rao's eyes were now opened. There is a proverb that even a worm would turn round and bite. Though timid and false to himself, the humiliation to which he had been subjected was enough to make him seek for vengeance on his British persecutors. The British Government was at this time engaged in war with Nepal. The reverses which the British troops suffered in that war must have made Baji Rao very jubilant and it is not at all unlikely that at this time he intrigued with other Maratha princes to concert measures to throw off the yoke of the English, which was so galling to him.

After the murder of Gangadhar Shastree there was a discussion for the settlement of the Peishwa's claims on the Guicowar. But all these discussions ended in smoke. The Guicowar, probably at the dictation of the English, did not accept the settlement which the Shastree had made. Seeing that no settlement had been arrived at between the Peishwa and the Guicowar, it was the duty of the English to have acted as arbitrators and mediators, but this is exactly what they did not like to do ; for had they done so, they would not have got a pretext, a handle, to deprive the Peishwa of his territories or to go to war with him.

Mr. Elphinstone and the British Government complained of Baji Rao's conduct, because he asserted that he had the right to nominate the Guicowar's Diwan and also of enquiring into the Guicowar's domestic concerns. In fact Baji Rao looked upon the Guicowar as his feudatory.

"This policy of the Peishwa met with the strong disapproval of the British Government, who considered that the only power left to the Peishwa of all his old connections with the Guicowar was that of granting investiture to the legal successor to the Baroda *Gadi*." (*Baroda Gazetteer*, p. 221).

The British Government was not going to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Peishwa over the Guicowar, for it considered that the Peishwa had lost his right by the Treaty of Bassein. To the Peishwa's mind this point was not so very clear and decisive, for we are told by Colonel Wallace (p. 207) that

"the assistance given to the Guicowar by the Honorable Company had been timely, and it had been efficacious ; but none was deceived into the idea that it had been disinterested or gratuitous. The Guicowar state had been the utensil of the Honorable Company ; it had been embraced as an ally when required, and dismissed when no longer wanted ; treaties had been made respecting it, in which it was not consulted ; treaties had been made with it which had been abrogated when it suited the Company's convenience ; sometimes it had been induced to wage war with the Peishwa as an independent state and then again, on the return of peace, it had been

acknowledged as a vassal merely of the Maratha Empire ; thus its external policy had been altogether dictated."

From the words put in italics in the above extract it is obvious how uncertain were the relations between the Peishwa and the Guicowar. We cannot find fault with the Peishawa for trying to clearly define his connections with the Guicowar.

But it was not the policy of the British Government to help the Peishwa now in any way in their power. They took no steps to settle his claims on the Guicowar or clearly define his relations with him.

The course which the British Government now adopted towards the Peishwa must be admitted by all candid historians to be nothing short of treachery. The war with Nepal was now over, and so the British had time now to turn to other affairs. The Marquis of Hastings considered the Peishwa an easy game, and so he decided that the British arms should be turned against him. All the benefits which the British had obtained by their connection with him were now forgotten, and as he was no longer of any use to them, so he should be sacrificed now to gratify their ambition.

The territorial revenue of the Bombay Presidency was not at this time enough to support its civil, marine, and military establishments. All the costly establishments of the English, who had been always seeking ways and means to make themselves rich

at the expense of the natives of this country, required money to fill the pockets of their employees. The provinces which formed the Satrapy of the Peishwa were very fertile and the revenue which the Peishwa derived from these provinces amounted to a crore and a half of rupees every year. The eyes of the worldly-minded, ambitious English naturally turned to them. Perhaps this might account for their not trying to compose the differences between the Peishwa and the Guicowar and always trying to find a pretext for a quarrel with Baji Rao, through whose instrumentality they had so enormously benefited.

The English made every preparation for going to war with the Peishwa.

"On the 7th of April 1817, Lord Moira warned Sir Evan Napcan that war between the British and the Peshwa was imminent.....and that he was to hold himself in readiness, to seize the Peshwa's portion of Gujrat and the Northern portion of the Konkon." (Bombay Gazetteer, Baroda volume, page 225).

Thus it was not the Peishwa but the English who wanted war. And if the Peishwa was found to make warlike preparations, we cannot blame him; for knowing the sentiments of the English towards him, and seeing their preparations for war, Baji Rao naturally, as a precautionary measure and in self-defence, tried to amass troops*. But

* If we are to believe the testimony of two English officers, it would seem that it was never the intention

no one could overreach the English diplomatists because of their wonderful capacity for intrigues. Elphinstone's capacity for intrigues was notorious.

of Baji Rao to go to war with the English. This will be evident from the following extract from a paper of Lieut. General Briggs published by Colebrooke in his life of Elphinstone :-

"The doctor, who was in the habit of passing an hour every day with Mr. Elphinstone reading Greek and Italian, was supposed to be in his (Peshwa's) confidence, though he was only treated as a common friend. The Peshwa begged that the doctor might be sent to attend some members of his family, and the kindness that he there received, and the manner in which the Peshwa spoke of his fidelity and attachment to the English deceived the doctor till the day when the war was declared. In the same manner he gained over the services of the English commandant of the contingent, who, to the last hour, professed to believe that the Peshwa would never make war with us."

The following account penned by General Briggs shows the feelings of gratitude which the Peshwa entertained for the British. General John Briggs writes :-

".....At length, one day it was in April 1817 the Peshwa sent a message by his Minister that he desired to see Mr. Elphinstone, to confer on state affairs.

.....On the arrival of Mr. Elphinstone and suit, the Peshwa was found sitting in a small private apartment, from which, after the usual compliments, he dismissed the attendants, and said, 'I have requested this meeting, Mr. Elphinstone, to endeavour to disabuse

The chief among the intriguers whom Elphinstone looked upon as his friend and on whose information he acted was Balajee Pant Natoo, a name which should be held in detestation

your mind of some injurious impressions you seem to have formed as to my feelings and intentions towards your Government. Remember that I have been connected with you from my childhood. Let me go back to the time when a cabal united against my father, now in heaven, on the death of his nephew, who was assassinated by his own guards in his palace, and when he, the next heir, came forward to claim his rights, you are aware how he was persecuted, and driven by the rebellious nobles out of his country. At this crisis there were the great chiefs, Holkar and Scindia and Gaekwar, to whom it would have been natural for him to apply for aid against his own subjects, but he passed them by, and placed himself under the protection of the British Government and made a treaty with it. Scarcely had I reached the age of manhood when an accident left the Masnud again vacant, and my enemies deprived me of my claim of succession. Your Government interfered, and I eventually obtained my rights. But my opponents were too strong, and, having marched an army to Poona, defeated my troops. I fled, not to seek assistance from my countrymen, but from the English at Bombay, and by your armies I was restored to my capital and my throne. How can you believe that, with all this load of obligation to your Government, I should ever have a design to make war against it? My whole body, from my head to feet, has been nourished by the salt of the English. Look at the situation, however, from another point of view, I

by every Indian. His conduct was fully exposed to the world by the agent of the deposed Raja of Satara, Rango Bapoojee. Balajee Pant Natoo was capable of every dishonest and mean act in order

am not so ignorant of the history of British power in this country as not to know that whosoever has engaged in war with it has been defeated, and his sovereignty has passed away. In former times, when Hyder Ally, aided by the French, made war against the English, he could gain no ground; and it is said that on his death-bed he urged his son, Tippu Sultan, to keep at peace and to cultivate the friendship of the English. He was too proud and too confident. In two great wars, although assisted by the French, Tippu was beaten, his territories divided, and at last he was destroyed. Since my re-establishment at Poona, have I not witnessed the defeat of those regular troops of infantry and artillery, trained under European officers for the great Mahratta chiefs, Holkar and Scindia, who carried everything before them in Hindustan, but who when they ventured to oppose the English, were beaten time after time with heavy losses and eventually reduced to make peace at great sacrifices of territory and treasure? In my case, however, I ask, where are the regular troops? Where are my infantry or my guns to cope with your enemies? Yet, I am suspected of desiring to engage in war against my best friends.'

"During the whole of this speech, which was delivered in his native tongue, Mahrattée, the Peshwa was perfectly cool, nor did he exhibit any symptoms either of agitation or resentment."

Memoir of John Briggs, pp. 44-45.

to curry favour with the English. And yet he was the confidential friend of Mr. Elphinstone, who followed his advice and acted on his information.*

* Balaji Pant Natoo was a menial employed on 5 or 6 rupees a month at Bhore in the Satara District. From Bhore he went to Poona and was in the service of the Rastia Sardars. These Sardars were not in the good graces of the Peishwa Baji Rao. Balaji Pant Natoo was introduced into the British Residency at Poona as an agent of the Rastia Sardars. In that capacity he used to tell the successive British Residents, tales and fibs against the Peishwa, for he thought that by so doing he would further the cause of his masters, the Rastia Sardars. He so far ingratiated himself with Mr. Elphinstone that the latter looked upon him as his right-hand man, and depended upon him for all informations regarding the Peishwa and his doings.

After the overthrow of the Peishwa, Balaji Pant Natoo was highly praised and recommended to the Governor-General of India by Mr. Elphinstone for the grant of a jaghire. In his letter to Mr. John Adam, Chief Secretary to Government, Fort William, dated camp at Corygaum, 5th September, 1818, Mr. Elphinstone wrote :

"... .. The services of Balaji Pant have been before brought to the notice of His Excellency the most noble the Governor-General ; he has since conducted himself with exemplary fidelity notwithstanding the Peishwa's frequent attempts to corrupt him. His services were of the greatest use both during the war and the period which preceded it and he is at present employed under Captain Grant with the Raja of Satara, the most con-

Another confidential friend of Mr. Elphinstone was Yashvantrav Ghorepade. Regarding this man,

fidential situation held by any native in this part of the country. I therefore beg leave earnestly to recommend the villages mentioned in the enclosed should be confirmed to him by a regular Enam grant under the seal of the Governor-General or under mine by His Excellency's authority.

"His present salary is calculated on the principle of his receiving the pension formerly granted to him. I would therefore not recommend his pension being reduced in consequence of his new grant. It is indeed desirable to make the grant in a spirit of liberality, as it is the first reward yet made to any of our immediate dependants, and as the zeal with which we are served must depend on those rewards. The grant will of course be included in the one I have recommended for rewards to adherents."

Of course the Governor-General approved of the recommendation of Mr. Elphinstone. When the latter left India for good he gave the following certificate to Balaji Pant Natoo written with his own hand :

"Balaji Pant Natoo was connected with the Poona Residency from the time of Sir Barry Close in 1803 or 4. He entered into the residency employments about 1816 and in the troubles that followed and in the settlement of the country showed himself an able, zealous, and trustworthy public servant. He was my principal native agent during most of the time I was commissioner in the Deccan, was consulted by me on all subjects and gave me every reason to be satisfied with his judgment and fidelity.

Bombay, 13th November, 1829.

(Sd.) M. Elphinstone."

the author of the Poona volume of the Bombay Gazetteer (part II, p. 299) writes:—

“Yashvantrav Ghorepade, a friend of Mr. Elphinstone and of many British officers, was at this time in disgrace with Mr. Elphinstone on account of some intrigues.”

But Yashvantrav knew the royal road to favour with Mr. Elphinstone. The latter hated the Peishwa like anything and so any cock and bull story against Baji Rao would not only please Elphinstone but certainly secure his favour and good-will. So all the evidence of the so-called treachery of the Peishwa rests on Mr. Elphinstone's correspondence, who depended for information on such men as Balaji Pant Natoo and Yashvantrav Ghorepade.

We have said before that Baji Rao's preparations were in their very nature indicatory of self-defence. Elphinstone, knowing that the English Government wanted to go to war with the Peishwa, made some extraordinary demands on him.* Trimbakji Danglia had been confined at

* How Elphinstone was anxious for the sight of a war will be evident from the following extract from his diary :

“Active employment, bodily or mental, here or in a camp ; enlarging my knowledge, keeping awake my imagination ; enterprising journeys ; *the sight of a war if possible* ; bustle at Calcutta ; applause for zeal and energy —these must be the grand objects of my desires, and must not be longed for, but prized or worked for.”

Tannah under the guard of British troops. But he escaped from his place of confinement and was again at large. It did not reflect much credit on the English vigilance, that one of their prisoners escaped from their prison without their knowing anything about it. Trimbakji was said to be in the Peishwa's territory. Without showing much respect or courtesy to the Peishwa, Elphinstone taxed him in a very offensive manner to deliver up Trimbakji, or war with the English must follow. He demanded the surrender of Trimbakji within a month and the immediate delivery of the three hill forts of Sinhgad, Purandhar and Raigad as a pledge that Trimbakji would be surrendered.*

Again, under April 6th, 1817, he entered in his diary :

"I think a quarrel with the Peishwa desirable, and therefore look on everything with perfect security, except the prospect of undecided conduct on the part of Lord Moira. Even on the 31st I did not feel the slightest anxiety."

* Trimbakji was confined a prisoner in Chunar fort, not far distant from Benares. Here he was visited by several European travellers, the most noted of whom was Bishop Heber, who saw him in September, 1824 and in his Indian Journal writes that Trimbakji was "confined with great strictness, having an European as well as a Sepoy guard, and never being trusted out of sight of the sentries. Even his bed-chamber has three grated windows open into the verandah, which serves as guard room a little garden shaded with a peepul tree which he has planted very prettily with balsams

Elphinstone was going to invest Poona with British troops, when on the 8th May, 1817, Baji Rao issued an order for the surrender of the three hill forts. With the humiliation inflicted on

and other flowers. Four of his own servants are allowed to attend him, but they are always searched before they quit or return to the fort, and must be always there at night. He is a little, lively, irritable looking man, dressed, when I saw him, in a dirty cotton mantle, with a broad red border thrown carelessly over his head and shoulders. He has been now, I believe, five years in prison and seems likely to remain there during life, or till the death of his patron and tool, Bajee Rao, may lessen his power of doing mischief. He has often offered to give security to any amount for his good behaviour, but his applications have been in vain. He attributes their failure to Mr. Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, who is, he says resolutely fixed on keeping him in prison and urging the supreme court to distrust all his protestations. His life must now be dismally monotonous and wearisome. Though a Brahmin of high caste, and so long a minister of State, he can neither read nor write, ..."

There can be little doubt that the harshness and rigour of his confinement undermined his health : for another European traveller, Major Archer, in visiting Chunar on February 16, 1829, wrote about him :—

"His confinement has continued since 1818, but his term is nearly bounded by the great enemy, Death ; his medical attendants declaring he cannot last many months. When we passed, his liver was so much affected as to protrude his side to the size of a half quartern loaf. His state was one of great emaciation, and he was a truly

the Peishwa, one would have thought that the English would have been quite content. But the English were quite prepared for the war. So to add insult to injury, the Brahman chief was obliged to sign the treaty known as Treaty of Poona, dated 13th June, 1817. This was forced on him in a manner which he could not resist. The English wanted a pretext for this new treaty and so it was alleged to be necessary as a compensation for the murder of Gangadhar Shastree. Two years had elapsed since the murder of that Brahman ambassador, and it would be remembered that it was convenient for the English Government to affect to believe that the Peishwa was not a party to the murder. But circumstances had now altered,

pitiable object. His prayer (and it was unheeded) was to be permitted to die at Benares, but the suspicions of the Government are too lively for this indulgence---no great one. Trimbuck was a wicked monster; but the good accruing from allowing him to go loose, in creating a favourable opinion of British generosity, would more than balance the chance of danger or inconvenience which such a measure might be thought to risk. The boon to an expiring man would, it is conceived, impress the natives with the notions that our mercy was equal to our power, and that generosity was nearly allied to our justice." (Pp. 108-109, vol. II, *Tours in Upper India and in parts of the Himalayas mountains; with accounts of the native princes, &c., by Major Archer, late Aide-de-camp to Lord Combermere; London, 1833*).

and so the English raked up the old matter and made the Peishwa confess at the point of the bayonet that he had a hand in the murder of Gangadhar Shastree. The Peishwa was a weak man and, as repeatedly said above, he was false to himself. To him power was sweet, and the friendship with the English was sweeter still. To maintain the show of authority and also the friendship of the English, he was ready to do anything. So there was not much difficulty for Elphinstone to extort the so-called confession of the murder of the Shastree from the Peishwa. Baji Rao did not possess that metal of which Pratap Singh, the Raja of Satara, was made. When the English charged the Raja of Satara with conspiring against them, the Raja was told that if he would sign a paper admitting his guilt, all differences then existing should fall into oblivion. It is well-known how the Raja lost his kingdom but did not sign that paper. The Raja was true to himself, which the Peishwa was not. For reasons already adduced before it is impossible to believe that the Peishwa was guilty of the murder. But supposing that Baji Rao was a party to the murder, why were two years allowed to expire before any reparation was demanded of him?

By this new treaty of Poona, Baji Rao lost most of his fertile provinces, and his resources were seriously crippled. The British Government

did not arbitrate to settle the pecuniary demands of the Peishwa on the Gaikwar, but by this treaty the Peishwa was made to part with his share of the revenue of Gujrat in settlement of all his claims on the Gaikwar. Of course the English had all along an eye on the fertile provinces of Gujrat, and the Peshwa and Trimbakji Danglia incurred their displeasure because the lease of the Ahmedabad Farm was not renewed in favour of the Gaikwar but was given to Trimbakji.

The blow dealt to the Peishwa by this new Treaty was one from which it was difficult for him to recover. He was so much disgusted with all these transactions that he left Poona and went to Pandharpur and thence to Mahuli in the vicinity of Satara at the junction of the two rivers Kristna and Yena and hence a place regarded as sacred by all devout Hindus. It was at this place that he requested Sir John Malcolm to see him—a request which Malcolm complied with. Baji Rao complained of his crippled state under the Treaty of Poona and of the loss of the friendship of the English, and declared his longing to have the friendship renewed. Sir John Malcolm advised him to collect troops and send a contingent to the aid of the English in the coming war with the Pindaris. Sir John Kaye, the biographer of Malcolm, writes:—

“When, in August, Malcolm was importuned to visit

him, he (Baji Rao) had appeared to be really sincere in the expression of his desire to stand fast by the British alliance, but he had then been much exasperated by recent transactions—an unwelcome treaty had been forced upon him and it was not difficult, in this frame of mind, to persuade him that the sovereignty of the Marhattas was threatened; and that his true interest lay in hostility to the British Government. So the troops that he had collected avowedly with the intention of aiding our operations, were now held together for the purpose of resisting them.

“Such a gathering of troops at Poonah could have but one result. A large body of ill-disciplined Mahratta soldiers were little likely, under any circumstances, to remain quiescent in the neighbourhood of the capital. It was necessary that they should commit excesses of some kind; and the temper which they manifested in the autumn of 1817 rendered certain the direction in which excesses would be committed. Their minds had been inflamed by false (?) representations of the hostile designs of the British. They believed that their very existence, as a military body, was threatened and that there would soon be nothing but Company’s service from one end of India to the other.” * (*Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm*, Vol. II, p. 191).

* In an official despatch, Mr. Elphinstone wrote :

“The openness and vigor of His Highness’s preparations, joined, perhaps, with some pity for his losses and to some hope of the restoration of the Mahratta greatness, render His Highness’s cause more popular than it used to be ;... ..” (*Colebrooke’s Life of Elphinstone*, I. 371).

When such were the feelings of the Mahrattas in general against the English, we cannot reasonably blame Baji Rao for his inability to send any contingent to the aid of the English. Vengeance sleeps long, but it never dies. Baji Rao, though a weak man and false to himself, tried to get rid of the halter which had been tightened round his neck by the English. He was their prisoner and he tried to break out of the prison house. It is true, as observed by Kaye, that Baji Rao "had been much exasperated by the recent transactions." Seeing the faithlessness of the English, he could not easily believe that they had not some ulterior motives in requesting him to send a contingent of troops to their aid. What he probably suspected was that the English meditated treachery. By denuding his territories of troops, it would be an easy task for the English to force another unwelcome treaty on him and to further cripple his state. This thought was not unnatural for him to indulge in, seeing the treatment he had been subjected to.

His subjects also, seeing the state of affairs, cried loudly for war. Bapu Gokhla pledged his honor and offered his services to lead the troops against the English. No British author has a word to say against this Mahratta chief. He had no selfish motive to serve by siding with the Peishwa.

Bapu Gokhla was not an enemy of the English. The dispatches of the Duke of Wellington bear testimony to the assistance which he rendered to them. He was instrumental also to a certain extent in getting the treaty of Bassein signed by the Peishwa. Taking all these facts into consideration it cannot be said that he was a bitter enemy of the English. No, he was disgusted with the 'grasping policy' of the English and sincerely believed that they were bent upon the destruction of the Mahratta nation.

Bapu Gokhla was now appointed as the Peishwa's commander-in-chief. But Elphinstone was not idle. The exaggerated reports as to the Peishawa's doings and the lies as to his movements which emissaries and confidential friends like Balajee Pant Natoo whispered into Elphinstone's ears led him to ask the British troops to come to his assistance at once.* Two English commanders,

* From the procrastination and delay on the part of the Peishwa and his commander-in-chief it is not unreasonable to suppose that they did not seriously think of going to war with the English. They would have also in all probability sent the contingent to the aid of the English, but Mr. Elphinstone's doings provoked the war. His biographer, Sir T. E. Colebrooke, writes :—

"The cantonment had been placed in the immediate vicinity of the city by Sir Arthur Wellesley, with a view to its defence; but it was surrounded by enclosures,

General Smith and Colonel Burr, came with their troops to Poonah and on the 5th November, 1817 was fought the memorable battle of Kirkee in which the Peishwa's troops were defeated. The Peishwa

and owing to the close proximity of the Peishwa's army an attack might have been made without a moment's warning....

"To withdraw the troops from their dangerous position was to provoke the hostility for which the court was preparing..... The precautionary step, however, admitted of no delay, and Mr. Elphinstone quietly intimated to the Peishwa that Sir Thomas Hislop's orders to move the troops to Kirkee would be acted upon immediately. Orders were sent to hasten the march of a European regiment from Bombay, and General Smith was requested to send back a light battalion to the cantonment at Siroor." (Vol. I, p. 373).

It does not appear from the official records that Mr. Elphinstone ever asked the Peishwa to send his contingent to the aid of the British ; he never remonstrated with him for levying such a large number of troops. But, on the contrary, we find Elphinstone himself making every preparation for war and thus provoked the Peishwa and the Mahrattas to go to war against the English. His biographer writes :—

"On the afternoon of October 30th, the British battalion marched into the cantonment, and Mr. Elphinstone hesitated no longer to order the withdrawal of the whole force to a well-chosen position four miles from the city, an act which both parties understood as a preparation for war. This seasonable reinforcement, and the additional security we obtained by the position of the troops, put

watched the battle from the celebrated Parvati Temple. The defeat did not cast any reflection on Bapu Gokhla's military skill; for not having worthy generals under him, he had to plan and conduct

an end to the motives which made Mr. Elphinstone desire to anticipate hostilities, and he now calmly awaited the attack, knowing the moral importance which belongs to the fact of not appearing to be the aggressor in such a conflict." (Vol. I, p. 375),

Thus it is evident that Mr. Elphinstone did everything in his power to provoke the war.

The want of plan of campaign also shows that the Peishwa and his ministers never contemplated seriously to go to war with the English. Bapu Gokhla was credited with possessing a thorough knowledge of the tactics of European warfare. Hence, had he strong and good grounds to believe that the Peishwa meant war with the English, it is not likely that he would have committed those fatal mistakes which cost him his life and the Peishwa his kingdom. In all probability he would have made his plan of campaign such as would have led him to success, victory and glory, had the Peishwa been determined on war with the English. The author of "Fifteen Years in India" writes :—

"Thoughtless, in reflecting upon what he saw and heard, was much at a loss to account for the conduct of the Peishwa, who, considering it a hopeless undertaking again to attack Colonel Burr, nevertheless remained near Poonah in a position backed by a chain of high hills, affording no retreat but through difficult passes, while an enemy, flushed with success and inflamed with resentment, was approaching to attack him. In short, Charles expected

every movement of the troops. Besides there were traitors in his camp who not only supplied information to the Resident, Mr. Elphinstone, but did everything in their power to defeat Bapu Gokhla's undertaking. Moreover, his advice to attack the English before the junction of the troops under General Smith and Colonel Burr could take place, was not attended to. All these points satisfactorily account for the defeat of the Peishwa at Kirkee. The author of "Fifteen Years in India", who was an officer and took part in the battle at Kirkee, thus bears testimony to the high military skill possessed by Gokhla :

"Gokhla's men were individually brave, and he was an experienced and able general, well acquainted with our tactics, for he had fought as an auxiliary

that the force would have been immediately led against the enemy, with the certainty of complete success ; he inferred that the Peishwa had committed a fatal error by awaiting the junction of General Smith's division with that of Colonel Burr, and that after his failure at Kirkee, his real interests demanded a retreat from Poonah into the plains of the Deccan, where his numerous cavalry would have been useful in harrassing a pursuing enemy and in keeping up the spirit of his confederates."

It seems that the Peishwa had no intention to go to war with the English, but seeing the threatening position of the English, there was no other alternative for him than to attack the English, without forming any definite plan of campaign.

under Sir Arthur Wellesley, and seen some of the most dashing service in India; but his troops being in a disorganised state, and without that mutual dependence upon each other which discipline ensures, he never could actuate them with his own brave spirit, and they invariably deserted him in the hour of trial." *

The same author in another place of his work thus speaks of him :—

"His (Gokhla's) person was large, his features fine and manly, and his complexion nearly fair.....It is impossible not to respect the spirit of Gokhla. The judgment with which he prepared to receive General Smith was only equalled by his valour and skill in bravely endeavouring to retrieve the day.....and the muse of history will encircle his name with a laurel for fidelity and devotion in his country's cause."†

After the battle of Kirkee, the Peishwa left Poonah as a fugitive, still at the head of a large army under command of Bapu Gokhla. Several battles were still fought with varying fortunes so inseparable from war. But the death of his able commander-in-chief, Bapu Gokhla, seemed to have damped his spirit and there being no other general who could have properly taken his place, and he himself being of a timid nature and possessing no military training, the

* Fifteen Years in India; or, Sketches of a Soldier's Life. From the journal of an official in His Majesty's service, London, 1823, p. 492.

† Ibid. pp. 304 & 505.

Peishwa was now anxious to sue for peace and accordingly he made overtures to Sir John Malcolm.

Mr. Elphinstone knew fully well how unpopular the English were in the Deccan and even the death and capture of the Peishwa would not crush their spirit of independence. The Marathas were not going to part with their liberty. To pacify them he commenced intriguing with the Raja of Satara.* That prince was at that time in the camp of the fugitive Peishwa. Mr. Elphinstone by means of his emissaries succeeded in getting hold of his

* The manner in which, through the instrumentality of Balaji Pant Natoo and by specious promises, Mr. Elphinstone succeeded in making the Raja of Satara desert the Peishwa has been described on the authority of documents in my *Story of Satara*, in which I have tried to expose the intrigues and conspiracies that had been resorted to by Elphinstone to bring about the downfall and defeat of the Peishwa. In no history of India written by European authors, is there any mention of the Raja of Satara helping the English to restore tranquility in the Deccan by his being made to issue the Proclamation to the inhabitants of the Maharastra to disown the Peishwa and side with the English in the pursuit and conquest of that Brahman chieftain. The Raja of Satara being the descendant of Shivaji the Great, was the undoubted sovereign of the Marathas ; the people owing allegiance to him flocked to his standard and thus they ceased espousing the cause of Baji Rao the Peishwa.

person and used him as a trump card in this political game.

But the timid Baji Rao lost all heart to any longer resist the English. He made overtures to Malcolm, which were very favourably received, the reasons for which Malcolm thus wrote to the Chief Secretary to Government :

"The opportunities I have had of judging the state of feeling of every class, from the prince to the lowest inhabitant of this extensive empire, now and formerly subject to the Mahrattas, makes me not hesitate in affirming that so far as both the fame of the British Government and the tranquillity of India are concerned, the submission of Baji Rao and voluntary abdication of his power are objects far more desirable than either his captivity or death. Should he be slain, his fate would excite pity, and might stimulate ambition, as the discontented would probably, either now or hereafter, rally round a real or pretended heir to his high station. If he were made prisoner, sympathy would attend him and the enemies of the English Government would continue to cherish hopes of his one day effecting his escape. But if he dismisses his adherents, throws himself upon our generosity and voluntarily resigns his power, the effect, so far as general impression is concerned, will be complete, and none will be found to persist in defending a cause which the ruler himself has abandoned." (Kaye's Life of Malcolm, II, 24.)

These considerations prompted Malcolm to obtain as soon as possible the voluntary submission of Baji Rao. He tempted Baji Rao with a large

pension of 8 lakhs of rupees a year. The bait was tempting to the timid Peishwa and he was very easily netted, thus sealing the doom of the line of the Peishwas.

It was not from any spirit of generosity but from sheer selfishness that Malcolm was prompted to grant the pension of 8 lakhs to Baji Rao. This will be apparent from his letters, a few extracts from which are given below. To Sir Thomas Munro he wrote afterwards :—

“I have not been so happy in this case as to anticipate the wishes of the Governor-General. He expected Baji Rao would get no such terms; that his distress would force him to submit on any conditions; and that his enormities deprived him of all right either to princely treatment or princely pension. I think the lord will, when he hears all, regret the precipitation with which he formed his judgement. In the first place, he will find that inspite of the Report made by every commanding officer who ever touched Baji Rao that he had destroyed him, that the latter was not destroyed, but had about six thousand good horses and five thousand infantry, and the gates of Asseer wide open. all his property sent in there, and half his councillors praying him to follow it, while Jeswant Rao Lar was passionately ambitious of being a martyr in the cause of the Marhatta sovereign; add to this the impossibility of besieging Asseer till after the rains—the difficulty of even half blockading it, and the agitated state of the country—and then let the lord pronounce the article I purchased was worth the price I paid; and he will find it proved I could not get it cheaper.” (*Ibid*, p. 257).

Again in a letter to Mr. Adam, dated 19th June, 1818, Malcolm declared, in the first place, that the condition of Baji Rao was not so desperate at the beginning of June but that he might have protracted the war, with no hope assuredly of eventual success, but with the certainty of keeping our armies for some time in the field at a ruinous expense to the State.

Baji Rao made his submission in June, 1818 and was sent to Bithoor, near Cawnpore, on the river Ganges, where he died at an advanced age in 1850. He was the last of the Peishwas and his political career terminated in 1818.

English writers have described him as addicted to all sorts of debauchery, and as a cruel, oppressive and tyrannical sovereign. The falsity of these statements will become evident when we remember the fact of the old age which he attained and the vigorous physical constitution which he always maintained—quite impossible for any man addicted to debauchery.

But even assuming that he was a debauched prince, was he worse than many of the sovereigns of that period? Why do English writers take delight in painting him in the blackest colours possible, forgetting that the members of their own royal family of that period were not immaculate saints? What about the secret history of the Georges and the mysteries of the court London?

If it be true that he was cruel and oppressive to his subjects, then it would have been quite impossible for his subjects to have attained that material prosperity which they undoubtedly did under his *regime*. The population of Poona at that time was much larger than it is now, and as to its prosperous condition, an Englishman has borne testimony as follows :—

“On a late excursion into the Deccan I was exceedingly pleased and surprised to observe the great appearance of prosperity which the city of Poonah exhibited, and which was the more remarkable after the scenes of desolation, plunder and famine, it had been so lately subjected to : all the principal streets and bazars were crowded with people, whose dress and general appearance displayed symptoms of comfort and happiness, of business and industry, not to be exceeded in any of our own great commercial towns. The whole, indeed, was a smiling scene of general welfare and abundance. On noticing this to the Resident, he informed me that the Peishwa, since his return, with a view of promoting the prosperity of Poonah, had exempted it and the surrounding country from every description of tax ; and to prevent the possibility of exactions unknown to himself, had even abolished the office of Cutwal. This fact is at least one proof, among various others, of the practicability of introducing what are termed the European principles of economy into Indian societies, with the same happy effects as have been experienced elsewhere.”*

* R. Richards, 23rd July, 1801. Quoted by Mr. William Digby, C. I. E., in his “Prosperous British India—a Revelation”, page 150.

But it must be admitted that Baji Rao was a timid man and false to himself, for he tried to curry favour with the English. Had he not done so, he would have met with treatment far different from what he did.

He was an unlucky man, and though possessing the sweetest of tempers and most fascinating manners, the times were against him and he was a victim of base intrigues and foul conspiracies on the part of the English in general and Elphinstone in particular. From the analysis of the facts which have been set forth above, it will be gathered that Elphinstone all along treated him with scant courtesy and defied his authority, and, by forcing on him the unwelcome treaty of 1817, provoked him to war, which certainly was not of Baji Rao's own seeking. Then it should be remembered how Elphinstone surrounded the Peishwa with spies and paid emissaries and intriguers to calumniate him and keep himself informed of all his doings.* An upright Resident

* "So complete was our information, that one of the charges made by Baji Rao to Sir J. Malcolm at Maholy against Mr. Elphinstone, was, that he was so completely watched that the latter knew the very dishes that were served at his meals."

(Lieut General Briggs's memorandum quoted by Sir T. E. Colebrooke in his *Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone*. Vol. I, p. 303.)

would have certainly prevented those occurrences which brought the Peishwa to ruin and would have made the English name famous for justice and fair play. But in all the acts of Mr. Elphinstone are to be seen his meanness of spirit and selfish motives for aggrandisement at the expense of the Peishwa.*

* It was the policy of the British Government of India of the day to bring about the ruin of the Peishwa, for he was considered to be the main link which had held together the Maratha Confederacy, and by his being struck out of the chain that confederacy was disunited for ever.

In order to effect the ruin of the Peishwa, he was illtreated and provoked to hostilities by the British authorities. Some color is lent to this view by the Parliamentary Papers relating to the Raja of Satara, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 18th August, 1843. On page 914 of these Papers it is stated :—

“The dispute between the Peishwa and the English might have been adjusted after having been investigated, through Gangadhar Shastree, had the mutual agreement in question not been pledged.”

What “the mutual agreement” was is described as follows in these Papers :—

“In consequence of Baji Rao’s conduct, the disaffection of the people, and the opposition he had caused to His Highness the Maharaj, and, in order to adjust the irregularity, His Highness the Maharaj considered that a man of great riches will of course have weight with a great one ; and Baji Rao was reconciled with the English, and their business commenced forthwith.

"Chutoorsing Raja Bhoslay, who deputed Jaderow Dadrou and Bapoo Phurness to the Governor-General while he was at Delhi, requested an order to the governor, Mr. Duncan, at Bombay, for the management of the country, who, in reply, stated that the request cannot be acceded to until any differences are brought into the treaty which has been made between the English Government and Baji Rao Peishwa; and if such should happen, His Highness should rest assured that, he being the possessor of the dominion, it shall then revert to him.

"Afterwards Mr. Elphinstone, the late Governor of Bombay, who for the purpose of obtaining information relative to the affair of Kolapoorkur, invited Balwantrow Malahar, the Chitnees Pandit Soomunt, and his father, when they both satisfied Mr. Elphinstone of the supreme power of His Highness over the chieftains, as the Peishwa pretended to be independent of His Highness. Mr. Elphinstone, on having been explained by them the fact, stated, that when any differences occur in the treaty between the English and Baji Rao, or should he anywhere levy war, then His Highness the Maharaj should be confident of my word which I have just pledged, for the restoration of his Government."

CHAPTER LV

Appa Saheb, The Raja of Nagpur

The Maratha prince of the family of Bhonsle, with his capital at Nagpur, was called in Marathi chronicles the Raja of Berar. But after the Second Maratha War, Berar was taken from him and handed over to the Nizam. Hence, although he was often styled Raja of Berar, yet correctly his appellation should be the Raja of Nagpur. The name of the Raja—at the time when the Marquis of Hastings was moving troops to ostentatiously ruin the Pindaries but in reality to deprive the Maratha princes of their territories and independence—was Appa Saheb. After the Second Maratha War, the Raja of Nagpur, although often requested to enter into the Subsidiary Alliance with the East India Company, very wisely declined to do so. But hardly a dozen years had elapsed since that war, when circumstances arose which obliged the ruling prince of Nagpur to conclude a treaty with the British Government and allow their troops to take the place of those of his own dominion.

After the Second Maratha War, Mr. Elphinstone was accredited to the Court at Nagpur as representative of the British Government. He served as Resident at Nagpur for four years. The manner in which he carried on intrigues with the officers and ministers of that principality, demoralized them and paved the way to the Subsidiary Alliance, which seemed to have been the object which the then British Indian Government had in view. Mr. Elphinstone was a creature of the Duke of Wellington and had been trained in his school of diplomacy. After the Second Maratha War, it was Wellington who was instrumental in getting Elphinstone appointed as Envoy to the Court of Nagpur. In recommending Elphinstone to his brother, the then Governor General of India, the hero of Assaye wrote :—

“Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice to that gentleman to inform your Excellency that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the language, has experience and a knowledge of the Maratha powers and their relation with each other and with the British Government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at all the sieges. He is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, *and with my sentiments upon all subjects*. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your Excellency” (Wellington Despatches, II, 595).

The words put in italics require to be specially taken note of. The Iron Duke had succeeded in making Elphinstone a past master in the craft of the Machiavellian diplomacy, and initiating him in the art of intrigue, all which had for their object the ruin of the princes to whose courts these Envoys were accredited. Truly did General Gordon, who met his death at Khartoum in 1885, observe :—

“We are an honest nation but our diplomatists are conies, and not officially honest.”

In another place of his journal, the same author wrote :—

“I must say I hate our diplomatists. I think with few exceptions they are arrant humbugs, and I expect they know it.”

At the time when Elphinstone was accredited to the Court of the Raja of Nagpur he was only 24 years of age and seemed not to have been well versed in the art of intrigue which passed for diplomacy. We are told by his biographer, Sir J. E. Colebrooke, Baronet, M. P., that

“The hardest of his tasks remained when the letter of the treaty was fulfilled. The aim of the British Government, in insisting that a British representative should reside at the Court, was not merely to cultivate general relations of amity, but to provide against future ruptures. Mr. Elphinstone’s instructions assumed that a sovereign whose treachery was notorious, and whose sacrifices had been so great, might be induced to renew the war, in the hope of recovering part of what he had

lost. The new secretary was therefore enjoined to be accurately informed of all that passed in the Durbar, particularly to watch the embassies of Sindia and Holkar, and at the same time obtain distinct information of the numbers and disposition of the Raja's troops. It will appear that this portion of Mr. Elphinstone's instructions caused him no little embarrassment. The information required could only be obtained through the ministers themselves : and *to prove such sources of intelligence involved a course of intrigue that was repugnant to his nature.*" (Vol. 1., p. 112).

The words italicised in the above extract show that at the time he was sent to Nagpur, Mr. Elphinstone was not well versed in the art of intriguing. It seems that he turned to his patron, Sir Arthur Wellesley, to come to his rescue, and wrote to him for instructions on the subject. The reply to Elphinstone's letter was characteristic of the future conqueror of Napoleon. General Wellesley wrote :—

"In answer to your letter of the 6th, I beg you will do whatever you think necessary to procure intelligence. If you think that Jye Kishen Ram will procure it for you or give it to you, promise to recommend him to the Governor-General, and write to his Excellency on the subject." (Ibid, p. 113).

General Wellesley's recommendation in plain language meant corruption. This is evident from another letter of his to Elphinstone in which he wrote :—

"Before Ram Chunder went away he offered his

services. I recommend him to you. He appears a shrewd fellow, and he has certainly been employed by the Raja in his most important negotiations. I have recommended him to the Governor-General for a pension of 6,000 rupees a year. I think he will give you useful intelligence." (Ibid).

Thus Elphinstone was enjoined to raise traitors in the camp of the Raja, by holding out temptations to them. Yet Sir Arthur Wellesley is looked upon as a paragon of all Christian virtues and must have prayed every day, "Lead us not into temptations, but deliver us from all evils."

Although Elphinstone did not succeed in involving the Bhonsla Raj in ruin, or inflicting the curse of the Subsidiary Alliance on that prince, for we are told that 'the Raja appears to have acted in a straightforward way' and that he 'remained steady to his resolve to avoid a new rupture'; yet the lessons in the art of intrigue which he had learnt at Nagpur, he brought to good use when he was appointed at Poona, for there he succeeded in bringing about the downfall of the Peishwa.

But when the Marquis of Hastings went to war with the Marathas, Elphinstone was not the Resident at Nagpur, and the reigning prince was Appa Saheb. The Raja who had signed the treaty with the British was now dead; and the Nagpur state had also entered into Subsidiary Alliance with the East India Company.

Mr. Jenkins was the Resident now and he was a bosom friend of Mr. Elphinstone. The biographer of Elphinstone writes :—

“Like Elphinstone, Jenkins had commenced his diplomatic career during the Mahratta war, which brought so many of our best Indian statesmen to the front. Ten years later, Jenkins, like Elphinstone, had to contend with the intrigues, and ultimately with the open hostility of a Mahratta Court, at a crisis of Indian history. To complete the parallel, these two Indian statesmen had congenial pursuits.” (*Ibid*, p. 151)

Does it not follow, therefore, that Jenkins must have adopted the same diplomatic tactics at Nagpur, which Elphinstone did at Poona ?

But it will be necessary to narrate in detail the events which preceded the hostilities between Appa Saheb and the troops of the Company. As long as Raghujee Bhosla, the sovereign of Nagpur, who was a party to the Treaty of Deogaum, was alive, he did not, and would not, part with his independence by entering into a subsidiary alliance with the East India Company. Times without number their government had asked him through their representative at Nagpur to form such an alliance. But all their attempts failed, as they were bound to do, for Raghujee had no faith in them, as he was well acquainted with their character. But his death in April, 1816 was hailed with delight by them, for now was the opportunity for them to get the object so dear to

their hearts accomplished. The long train of intrigues which had been set in motion ever since the appointment of Elphinstone as Envoy at Nagpur was now to carry them to the desired goal.

Raghujee Bhosla had a son named Pursajee, commonly known as Bala Saheb. This prince was of weak intellect and incapable of managing his affairs. But he had a cousin, the celebrated Appa Saheb, who was a capable man and every one in Nagpur used to look upon him as the future successor of Raghujee. The English Resident also did the same and, therefore, even in the life-time of Raghujee, to win him over to the cause of the British Government, intrigued with him by showing him some undue favors. Appa Saheb had not been on good terms with his uncle, who for some causes, the nature of which it is difficult to ascertain now, desired to deprive him of a portion of his estate which he had inherited from his father. There can be no question of the legality and validity of such a step on the part of Raghujee, for he was the independent sovereign of his kingdom and exercised unlimited power over the lives and properties of his subjects. But his nephew, Appa Saheb, appealed to the Resident to intercede on his behalf and prevent the Raja from accomplishing his desire. The Resident, of course, had no power to do so. Yet, setting all articles of the treaty at naught, he interested himself in the

cause of Appa Saheb. We are told that his estate

'had been preserved to him, at last, by the aid of a remonstrance of the British Resident at Nagpur ; and this circumstance not only produced an irreconcilable difference between the two princes, but induced Raghujee to have recourse to a series of measures, calculated to annoy and distress his nephew in every possible way.' *

Thus was Appa Saheb won over to the side of the English and was therefore no doubt the centre of intrigues in Nagpur. However, when his uncle was on his death-bed, he was sent for and earnestly entreated, as a dying request, to look after the welfare of the principality. Raghujee placed the hand of his son within that of Appa Saheb and said that he made him the depository of the family honor.

On the death of Raghujee, owing to the incapacity of his son, a council of regency was formed, of which Appa Saheb was the head. No sooner was the news of Roghujee's death known than the Marquess of Hastings issued instructions to Mr. Jenkins to draw, by any means within his power, Appa Saheb into the net of the Subsidiary Alliance. He looked on the death of Raghujee as the long

* Prinsep's History of the Political and Military Transactions in India, Vol 1., p. 345.

sought for opportunity to accomplish this object. Mr. Prinsep writes :—

“The intrigues and passing occurrences of that court likewise promised equally to give the long-sought opportunity of establishing a subsidiary connection with the Nagpur State.”

It is not necessary to enter into the labyrinth of these intrigues which, it is not unreasonable to suppose, was to a great extent the creation of the English to gain their end. How desirous the Governor-General was for the alliance and the advantages which he thought would be derived from it, is evident from what Mr. Prinsep has written in the work* referred to above.

Amidst all these intrigues, Pursajee was formally installed as Raja, and Appa Saheb was solemnly declared to be vested, by the Raja himself, with the sole and entire conduct of the public affairs. Mr. Prinsep writes that—

“Mr. Jenkins was the first to offer his own congratulations and those of the government he represented, upon the auspicious commencement of the new reign” (Ibid, p. 356).

Well might Mr. Jenkins have done so, knowing how useful a tool Appa Saheb would prove in his hands. Mr. Prinsep has shown in his

* See pages 340-341 and 350 and 351 of the History of Political and Military Transactions in India.

work* the nature of the intrigues that reigned in Nagpur.

It was these intrigues which, it is said, induced Appa Sabeab to seek the aid of the English. Mr. Jenkins was only too glad to embrace the opportunity to place the yoke of the subsidiary alliance on the neck of the Nagpur Chief. It was necessary to mature the conspiracy at the dead of night. Accordingly it was done on the night of the 24th April.† How this nefarious business was

* Pages 357-358 of Vol. 1.

† From the Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, pp. 254 *et seq.*, Panini Office reprint:--"June 1st [1816]. This day has brought to me the treaty of alliance by which Nagpore in fact ranges itself as a feudatory State under our protection. A singular contention of personal interests at the court of that country, resulting from the unexpected death of Raghujee Bhoosla, the late Rajah, has enabled me to effect that which has been fruitlessly labored at for the last twelve years. Though dexterity has been requisite, and money has removed obstructions, I can affirm, that the principles of my engagement are of the purest nature. Pursojee Bhoosla, only son of the late Rajah, succeeded to the musnad without opposition. He is blind, and thence *used to remain* unseen in the palace so that in fact he was unknown. He was generally understood to be of weak capacity, but when his elevation gave people the opportunity of examining him, he was discovered to be literally an idiot. His cousin Appa Saheb, an active sensible man about twenty years of age, is presumptive heir to the

transacted has been very well described by Mr. Prinsep in his *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India*, pages 358-368, Vol. I.

musnad, Pursojee having no children. Through his natural pretension, and with as much of assent as the Rajah could comprehend and testify, Appa Saheb was called to the guidance of affairs as minister. Aware that there is a strong party against him in the palace, he feared that Pursojee might be made to adopt a son, which according to Mahratta institutions would cut out Appa Saheb. The latter had to apprehend that this would be a machination of Scindiah's with the women of the palace, and those apparent dependents who really guide them; and he foresaw that in such an event Scindiah would support the adopted child with troops, in order to acquire the rule over Nagpore.

"Under these impressions, Appa Saheb was not difficult to be worked upon. He is confirmed in his legitimate power, and he is ensured against the adoption by my professing to consider Pursojee incapable of the volition necessary to the act. This is most strictly true, for the poor Rajah has no will or wish beyond eating and sleeping. The security, therefore, to Appa Saheb is only simple justice. I believe the advantage of our having thus converted Nagpore from a very doubtful neighbour into a devoted friend is universally felt here; yet the whole extent of the gain will not be thoroughly computed. The arrangement enables me to leave unguarded above three hundred miles of frontier, for which I had difficulty to allot defence; it totally over-sets the plan at which Scindiah has been secretly working for inducing the Peishwa to re-establish the Mahratta confederacy; it deprives Scindiah of troops

The Subsidiary Alliance which Appa Saheb contracted with the then British Government was very unpopular with the nobles and people of Nagpur. Mr. Jenkins knew as much. As long as Pursajee was alive, there was a fear lest he should some day try to revoke the alliance. On the morning of the 1st February 1817, Pursajee was found dead in his bed, which suggested that violence had been used in causing his death. Of course, at that time Appa Saheb was not in Nagpur. *

Mr. Jenkins took no notice of all that the people were talking about it and even did not refer to it in his correspondence with the Governor-General.

and treasure, on which he calculated in all his hostile speculations ; it gives to me, by the junction of Colonel Doveton's Corps with the Nagpore forces, an efficient army on the open flank of Scindiah's country ; and it renders the interception of the Pindaries, should they venture another inroad into our southern territories, almost certain. I regard this event as giving me the fairest ground of confidence that I shall be able to achieve all I wish to effect for the Company's interest without any war. This rests on our presumption of the Peishwa's fidelity. If he be treacherous (and there is no answering for a Mahratta), we might have a struggle ; but the consequence of such a contest could not now be doubtful, and it would only make the ultimate arrangement more beneficial to the Company."

* The circumstances which led to his leaving Nagpur have been narrated by Mr. Prinsep in his History, Vol. I, pages 421-426.

In his letter to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 21st August, 1820, the Marquis of Hastings wrote :

"This letter stated the Resident's conviction, that the late Raja of Nagpore, Bala Sahib, had been murdered by order of Appa Sahib. The Court of Directors were referred, in the letter of the Governor-General in Council dated the 1st of October 1819, to the proofs by which this fact became satisfactorily established. I now allude to it because the circumstances which impressed Mr. Jenkins with the belief of this atrocity having been committed materially induced his resolution to arrest the Rajah. Mr. Jenkins's suspicions as to the fact had, indeed, been excited at the period of Bala Sahib's decease, but circumstances, which I need not recapitulate, having somewhat lessened them, and the difficulty of acquiring satisfactory proof being apparent, he did not deem it right to intimate, even to his own government, doubts which had been in a great degree dismissed from his own mind nearly as soon as they had been admitted."

Now, the above clearly leads to the suspicion that Mr. Jenkins was a party to the murder, (supposing the death of Bala Sahib was due to foul play), for he at that time did nothing to investigate it, although by his own showing it was being freely whispered in Nagpur and that he failed in his duty in not reporting the matter to the Government of India ; or that charging Appa Sahib with the murder was merely an after-thought made with some ulterior motives the nature of which it is not difficult to guess. As

to the so-called proofs, it is notorious how easily evidence could be fabricated by a little manipulation on the part of the men in power against a fallen man. Truly did Macaulay write in his famous essay on Warren Hastings :—

“They considered him a fallen man, and they acted after the kind some of our readers may have seen in India, a crowd of crows pecking a sick vulture to death. No bad type of what happens in that country, as often as fortune deserts one who had been great and dreaded. In an instant, all the sycophants who had lately been ready to lie for him, to forge for him, to pander for him, to poison for him, hasten to purchase the favor of his victorious enemies by accusing him. An Indian Government has only to let it be understood that it wishes a particular man to be ruined, and in twenty-four hours it will be furnished with grave charges, supported by depositions so full and circumstantial, that any person unaccustomed to Asiatic mendacity, would regard them as decisive. It is well if the signature of the destined victim is not counterfeited at the foot of some illegal compact, and if some illegal paper is not slipped into a hiding place in the house.”

Such being the case, the statement that Bala Saheb was murdered by his cousin Appa Saheb may be doubted. However, after Bala Saheb's death, Appa Saheb returned to Nagpur, but his attitude towards his British allies was much changed. The Subsidiary Alliance proved a galling yoke to his neck and he seemed to have bitterly repented the hour when he was lured into its snare.

"The conditions of the treaty were somewhat severe," writes Prof. Horace Hayman Wilson, (Vol. VIII, p. 186), "and the amount of the subsidy exceeded a due proportion of the revenues of the country. The charge of the contingent was an addition to a burthen already too weighty for the State, and the Raja had some grounds for complaining of the costliness of his new friends."

In a foot-note to the above passage the same author adds:—

"The whole charge of the subsidy and contingent, amounted to between twenty and thirty lakhs a year, and was more than one-third of the whole revenue."

Thus Appa Saheb had good cause for his dissatisfaction with the greedy Company's servants. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the manner in which he was being ill-treated and bullied by his English friends made him determined to throw off their yoke.*

How the Raja was being subjected to petty annoyances may also be gathered from the following extracts from the letter of the Marquis of Hastings to the Secret Committee of the East India Company, dated 21st August, 1820. He wrote:—

"We had, soon after his accession, much reason to be dissatisfied with his conduct, both as to his dismissal

* The treatment which he was at this time receiving at the hands of Mr. Jenkins, has been described by Mr. Prinsep in his History, Vol. I, pp. 427—430.

of the ministers, Nagoo Pundit and Narayan Pundit, who had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the alliance, and as to his continued negotiations with Bajee Rao. The latter, although they might not be pronounced positive indications of a hostile spirit, considering the Maratha habits of deception, were still direct infractions of the treaty. His entire failure in the organization and maintenance of his contingent on the footing which the treaty entitled us to expect and demand, and his evident disregard, notwithstanding his professions to the contrary, of the Resident's repeated instances directed to that object constituted an equally important ground of complaint.....

"Although every exertion, in the form of advice and of kind admonition, was employed by the Resident to direct the attention of the Rajah to the true character of the conduct which he was pursuing, and to its unavoidable tendency to the destruction of the alliance from which he, and the state under his rule, has already so largely benefited, no impression seemed to have been made on him until the termination of the discussions at Poona, in June 1817. That event was calculated to have a salutary influence on his future views and procedures, and might have warned him of the peril to which he would expose himself and his government, should he permit himself to be allured by the fallacious project of a general combination against our power."*

It was of course necessary for the British Government of those days not to take into consideration the fact that their ally was not in a position to

* Papers respecting the Pindary and Mahratta Wars, p. 423.

carry out all the conditions and provisions of the Treaty into which he had been betrayed by scheming and designing men in the pay of the Company. That Appa Saheb was anxious to do everything in his power to conciliate the British Government and not to offend them is evident from the testimony of Sir John Malcolm, not an inexperienced diplomatist and certainly a better qualified man than Mr. Jenkins. In his dispatch, dated 9th October 1817, to the Governor-General, he wrote :—

“Having received instructions from his Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop to proceed to Nagpore, for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the resources of the country and making such arrangements with the Resident and the local Government, as were necessary for the general objects of the public Service, I left Hyderabad on the 4th of September, and reached Nagpore on the 23rd of that month ; and during a stay of ten days every object that was in the contemplation of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has, I hope, been accomplished It only remains, therefore, for me to state the general tenor of the Conference I had with the Raja, and the impression left upon my mind by his sentiments and conduct.

“The Raja came to a garden three miles from Nagpore to meet me and was very pointed in paying me every compliment that could mark the gratification he received from the visit ; but as the meeting was one of ceremony, nothing particular passed. Two days after I paid my respects to him at his palace in the city, and after sitting some time in public durbar, he retired to another room, accompanied by Mr. Jenkins, Ram Chander Waugh, and myself. He, upon this occasion, entered full into a

discussion of all points connected with the full performance of his engagements, and expressed himself very solicitous to deserve your Lordship's approbation by his efforts on the present occasion; which, I stated to him, in the strongest manner, presented the most favorable opportunity for proving the sincerity of his professions.....

"The day after this interview I went with Mr. Jenkins to look at the contingent, of whom there were drawn up for inspection two thousand five hundred horse, and two thousand infantry. The horse were in appearance better than I had expected, several parties were very well mounted. The infantry, though an undisciplined rabble, are stout men, and may, even in their present state (if they are regularly paid), be found serviceable in the defence of posts and the guarding of passes over rivers and mountains.

"I paid my visit of leave on the 4th instant, the day I left Nagpore; and though the Raja was in considerable distress on account of the dangerous illness of his favorite wife, he did not decline entering upon business. The minister being absent, he retired, unattended by anyone but Mr. Jenkins and myself, to a private room, where he took the opportunity of entering very fully into his condition, and that of his country. He had, he observed, deliberately and advisedly abandoned all other connections for that of the British Government. He knew, he said, his own stability and the prosperity of his subjects depended upon his adherence to this policy, which nothing could ever make him change. He earnestly solicited me to impress this upon your Lordship's mind;.....

"I believe the Raja to be sincere in the professions he made to me at these conferences, but though satisfied that he at present harbours no unfriendly feelings to the

alliance, and that any desire which the artifice of others might lead him to form for disobeying it, would be checked by his apprehensions of our power, I fear his inexperience, the intrigues of a divided court, and the actual condition of the state he rules, will prevent our receiving for some period that efficient aid from the resources of his country, which might, under a general view, be anticipated. The recent changes that have taken place in his ministers must have increased the violence of the different parties; combinations will continue to be formed against the favorite of the day, and his disgrace will be sought through the usual means of misrepresenting and counteracting his measures. The Raja, though convinced of the necessity of an alliance with the British Government, has a natural jealousy of the progress of that to encroach upon his independence. This is the ground, therefore, which is taken by men, who, covering their private feelings under the garb of patriotic spirit, desire to impress his mind with a belief, that his minister is in reality our agent; and the caution this imposes upon the latter must create delays and obstructions to the public service that will often wear the appearance of indifference, if not of hostility.....

"Besides all these causes, a degree of inertness appears to pervade every department of this government, which requires to be seen before it can be believed. We should not perhaps quarrel with a failing to which we, in a considerable degree, owe the incalculable advantages we have already derived from the connection: and the inconveniences we now experience from this cause will, I am assured, be corrected, as far as it is possible they can be, by the unremitting efforts of the Resident, to whose knowledge and energy I look, with a hope that nothing else could inspire, for the gradual fulfilment

of every object that your Lordship's foresight contemplated in the formation of this important alliance."

Malcolm's usual quickness of perception grasped the situation at once ; and had he, or a man of his type, been the political resident at Nagpur, matters would not have come to that pass which they did under the blundering policy of Jenkins, who, as said before, resembled Elphinstone in almost every respect. Although the Raja always called him his brother, that resident never did any brotherly act to that unfortunate prince. Indeed, as the subsequent events show, he was bent upon his ruin.

The Peishwa Baji Rao, at this time, sent a *Khillut*, with the knowledge and approval of Mr. Elphinstone, to the Nagpur Raja. This *Khillut* arrived at Nagpur towards the middle of November, 1817. The Raja invited Mr. Jenkins to the ceremonial *darbar* that was to be held to invest him with the *Khillut*. But this he declined to do. He explained his conduct in a letter which he wrote to Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, Bart, dated 24th November, 1817. He wrote :

"Last night I received a note from Ramchunder Waugh, stating that a *Khillut* had arrived from the Peishwa for the Raja. This *Khillut*, he said, had been brought by Kundoo Pundit, the Raja's Vakeel lately dismissed by the Peishwa, under the treaty of Poona : and that Mr. Elphinstone had been the means of procuring for the Raja this mark of distinction, that to-morrow

as a lucky day was fixed for receiving it with due ceremonies, which consisted in the Raja going out in state to his camp with his Zuryputka, firing salutes, and remaining three days at the head of his troops. The Raja requested that either I would attend myself, or send some one on my part to be present at the ceremony and that I would also order a salute to be fired on the occasion: to this communication I replied, that when the *Khillut* in question left Poona, the Peishwa was still on terms of amity with the British Government and His Highness, that what had since happened, which His Highness well knew, placed the Peishwa in the light of an enemy to both states; that under such circumstances the accepting of a *Khillut* from the Peishwa, in such a public manner, would have a very bad appearance; that I was convinced that the Governor-General would not receive a *Khillut* from the Peishwa under such circumstances, and certainly would not expect His Highness to do any such thing; and having said this, I left the matter to his prudence, and a due sense of what might be the consequence. Notwithstanding this remonstrance, I received this morning a note from Ramchunder Waugh saying that the Raja intended to receive the *Khillut* in the manner before-mentioned, but that it ought not to raise any unpleasant feelings in my mind, as it had been sent through our channel, and could excite no enmity between the two states, as they are one.

"The Raja accordingly, having first received the *Khillut* in public durbar, and the nuzurs of all his chiefs and ministers, proceeded to his principal camp on the west side of the town, where he was received with uncommon demonstrations of pomp and show, and with every ceremony indicative of his having received the

dignity of Senapati, or general-in-chief of the armies of the Mahratta Empire. On this I have only to remark, that it is generally considered as a demonstration of the Raja's alliance with the Peishwa and his determination to follow the path already entered upon by Bajee Row."

It is not necessary to make lengthy comments on the above. Mr. Jenkins should not have tried to obstruct—nay, positively prohibit—a ceremonial occasion as the one which the Raja was going to celebrate. If he could not have joined in the ceremony, he should have kept quiet, instead of from that moment looking upon the Raja as his enemy. How devoted the Raja was to the British is evident from the letter from which extracts have been made above. Mr. Jenkins in continuation of his above-mentioned letter wrote:

"With regard to the project of attacking the British troops at this place, I have received continual communications since my Despatches of the 14th instant, to your Excellency and Sir J. Malcolm, describing the arguments which have been used to excite the Rajah to such a step, and the hitherto successful oppositoin of his more prudent advisers; but not a word indicative of any complaint against us, or any intention on the part of the Raja to break with us has appeared from any of his public communications: On the contrary, His Highness being alarmed a few nights ago by a false report, doubtless fabricated by the warlike faction, that the British troops were moving out to attack him, sent for my Mahratta moonshee, and talked for an hour against the treachery of the Peishwa, and the impossibility of his

following his example, whether his means were considered, his actual situation, living as he was with his family in an open town and without any fort of consequence, except Chanda, to place them in security; and above all, his gratitude towards the British Government, to whose favour and protection he owed everything, and should always desire to owe everything to it, and it alone."

But all these sincere professions and protestations of good will and friendship on the part of Appa Saheb, towards the British Government had no effect on the Resident. Appa Saheb, if anything, was a fool and a timid man, and to consider him as capable of harboring any scheme of war against the English is simply preposterous. However it suited the interests of the Government of India at that time to treat him as an enemy.

Prof. H. H. Wilson's opinion that the alliance was not of much profit to Appa Saheb has already been quoted before. The Raja therefore naturally wanted that some modifications should be made in the terms of the alliance which were pressing very heavily on him. The points which the Raja wanted to be adjusted were as follows :—

"1st, Goojubhur be sent back to Nagpore; 2ndly, the contingent be not too nicely inspected; 3rdly, some arrangement be made to prevent the Raja's revenue suffering so much as it did by the remission of duties on grain, &c., for the use of our large armies; 4thly, our troops in the Raja's territory be reduced to the number

fixed by treaty ; 5thly, some consideration be shewn to the Raja's pecuniary necessities, which, from our demands and those of his own troops, almost reduced him to despair."

It cannot be said that these points did not require immediate adjustment. But Mr. Jenkins was of a different opinion. Although he had heard of these grievances before, yet he took no steps to redress them and he looked upon this public mention of them as 'a full admission of an hostile purpose.' For in his dispatch to the Governor-General dated 26th November, 1817, he wrote :

"I had before received private overtures from Nagoo Pundit mentioning these as the Raja's grievances, and offering his services to accommodate everything. but this is the first public mention of these grievances. and is a full admission of an hostile purpose."*

At the same time Mr. Jenkins ordered the marching in of British troops to Nagpur. In concluding the above-mentioned dispatch, Mr. Jenkins wrote to the Governor-General :

"The detachment under Colonel Gahan has been ordered to march in, leaving its baggage ; and it ought to arrive to-morrow night. Nothing but the Raja's entire submission and full security for the future, which can be a work I conceive neither of time nor of difficulty, ought now to cause any relaxation in the most active means to

* Papers relating to the War in India ; presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of the Prince Regent, Feb. 1819, page 70.

reduce him, and I hope that either his Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop or Brigadier General Doveton will be shortly on their march."

The words of the above passage are specially commended to the notice of those who think that Appa Saheb forced the British to go to war with him. If anything, it was Mr. Jenkins who provoked the Nagpur chief to hostilities. It is not human nature to sit idle while one's enemies are busily engaged in making warlike preparations.

On the evening of the 26th November, 1817, the Raja's troops fired on the Residency but were repulsed. The news of the marching in of the British troops and the habitual contempt with which the Raja and his advisers and followers were treated by the Resident must have undoubtedly influenced the Raja's troops to commence hostilities. That the Raja himself did not instigate these hostilities is perfectly certain from his subsequent conduct.* His troops must have got out of hand and been

* Mr. Prinsep, in his History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the administration of Marquess of Hastings, Vol. II, pp, 102-104, refers to his "decided pusillanimity," "extreme weakness and irresolution",

Is it not clear from the above, that Appa Saheb did not meditate any attack on the Residency or seriously think of going to war with the British? It is sheer nonsense to say that he betrayed 'extreme weakness and irresolution.' He knew the consequences that would result from

incited to this rash act by the Raja's enemies. We should not forget what Malcolm wrote to the Governor-General in his letter dated 9th October, 1817, from which extracts have already been given before. He wrote :—

“The recent changes that have taken place in his ministers must have increased the violence of the different parties ; combinations will continue to be formed against the favorite of the day, and his disgrace will be sought through the usual means of misrepresenting and counter-acting his measures.”

When we take all these circumstances into consideration, it is highly probable that the Raja did not instigate the attack on the Residency. Even if he did, he should be exonerated from all blame, because he had been provoked by the war-like preparations of the Resident himself. The

attacking the Residency. Had he ordered the attack, it is not probable that he would have shown such want of common sense as not to have persisted in it and tried to cut off the advancing troops that were marching on Nagpur.

It is said that when he was made a prisoner, he confessed to having ordered the attack on the Residency. This alleged confession of Appa Saheb rests on the testimony of Mr. Jenkins himself and as such it is hardly worth much credit. Even assuming he confessed, does it not stand to reason, that this confession was extorted from him under threats and promises the nature of which need not be dilated upon here. Every ‘schoolboy’ in India knows how confessions are extorted by the police.

Marquess of Hastings, in the 43rd paragraph of his letter to the Secret Committee of the East India Company, wrote :—

"His (Mr. Jenkins's) first step was to secure the Residency from surprise, and to enable him to hold it and the adjacent hill until he could be joined by the troops from the cantonment ; a measure, the adoption of which, in the event of necessity, he had concerted with Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, the commanding officer."

Of course it was the policy of the Resident to represent these as defensive measures. But these preparations combined with the news of the marching in of British troops wore quite a different complexion before the eyes of the people of Nagpur. No wonder, if under provocation, they struck the first blow, thinking that under these circumstances, the party which is first in the field has generally the better chance of success.

But their attack failed. This circumstance alone is sufficient to demonstrate the fact of the thorough preparation which Mr. Jenkins had made to receive the blow, or even to offer it if necessary. Prof. H.H. Wilson may again be quoted to show the nature and extent of the Resident's preparation. He writes :—

"The greater part of the Berar subsidiary force had already taken the field, and there remained within reach a detachment which had been posted at Ramtok, about three miles distant, under the command of Lieutenant-

Colonel Scott, consisting of two battalions of Madras Sipahies, the first of the 20th and first of the 24th regiments of Native infantry: a detachment of European foot and of Native horse artillery, and three troops of the 6th Bengal Cavalry. These, upon the Resident's requisition, marched on the 25th, to the Residency grounds and were there joined by the escort, consisting of about four hundred men, with two guns, two companies of the Bengal infantry, and a few troopers of the Madras horse. On the morning of the 26th, they were placed in position on the Sitabaldi hills." (Loc. Cit. p. 188).

Of course, the situation occupied by the Resident and his men was so strong and he had made preparations so very carefully that it was not possible for the Nagpur prince's troops to successfully take it by assault. The nature of the Resident's threatening position must have alarmed them and they, without carefully making the necessary preparations on the evening of the 26th instant, opened fire on the Residency with disastrous consequences to themselves.

As said before, the subsequent conduct of Appa Sahab showed that he had no intention of bringing about hostilities with the English. He sent a messenger to the Resident expressing his regret at what had happened, declaring that his troops had acted without his orders and that he was ready to abide by such terms as Mr. Jenkins proposed. Of course, the British troops were on their march to Nagpur, and this enabled the Resident to dictate

very harsh and severe terms to his "brother," Appa Saheb. What these were may be better described in the words of the Marquess of Hastings :—

"Immediately after the termination of the contest at Seetabuldee, the Raja sent a message to Mr. Jenkins, expressive of his concern for what had happened and his earnest desire to revert to his former relations of friendship with the British Government. Mr Jenkins very properly replied to this overture, that the Raja's own proceedings had already placed the whole question beyond his discretion: that the future measures of the British Government would now be devised by higher authority than his : and that pending the receipt of my instructions as to what was to follow, all that he could do after having strenuously exerted himself to avoid the occurrence of hostilities was to maintain the advantages already gained by our troops, until the reinforcements which he had called for should come in, and enable him to execute the commands of his Government. At the same time, he declined all further negotiations with the Raja, unless his troops were withdrawn from the positions which they then held to those which they had formerly occupied. This demand was complied with, and the Raja's forces were all withdrawn during the evening and night of the 27th of November."

The Raja's complying with the demand of the Resident immediately shows how desirous he was to try to bring about amicable relations with the British. But if treachery and perfidy are to be attributed to anybody, it is to the Resident. It was convenient and necessary for him to suspend hostilities and to gain time and not to have any

regard for the Raja's feelings and meet his wishes. The Governor-General continues his letter as follows :—

"Mr. Jenkins, in acceding to a cessation of hostilities, was chiefly influenced by the opinion of the commanding officer relative to the harassed condition of the troops after memorable exertions on the preceding days, and by the consideration of the near approach of the expected reinforcements, as well as of the additional reputation gained by granting it on the request of an enemy beaten by an inferior force; a circumstance calculated to inspire fresh confidence in our troops and the reverse in those of the Raja."

The poor Raja, in the simplicity of his heart, placed implicit confidence in the words of the Resident and acted as that officer asked him to do. To quote again from the Marquess of Hastings' letter :—

"In answer to the Raja's reiterated professions of concern and desire of renewed friendship, Mr. Jenkins continued to plead his want of authority to decide as to future measures, and took occasion to intimate, that if the Raja left Nagpore, or if a single shot was fired, his throne was irretrievably lost, his only chance of preservation from ruin being unqualified submission.

"Early on the morning of the 29th, a regiment of Native Cavalry with its Gallopers arrived; and on the same evening, a message and a note were sent to Mr. Jenkins by the Raja, in which after repeating his usual expressions of contrition and reliance on our indulgence, he signified his intention of disbanding the greater part of his troops, in the hope that the treaty would be allowed

to remain in force, and his former requests, noticed in a preceding paragraph, be satisfactorily adjusted. To this communication was added a solicitation, that our troops marching upon Nagpore might be ordered to halt. Mr Jenkins was again compelled to go over the same ground of reply which he had already taken and to point out how little dependence could be placed on the Raja's assurances, consequently how essentially vital it was to the British interests, not to neglect every practicable means of security; and also to repeat, that the Raja's own acts had already placed all future procedures with regard to him beyond the reach of his (Mr. Jenkins's) authority....."

The Raja was in the habit of hearing the Europeans boasting of their religion being one of peace, meekness and forgiveness and of their Divine Founder enjoining His followers to turn the left cheek to those who smote on the right. Acting on that belief he implored the Resident for mercy, but that officer knew not what mercy meant; he showed marked rudeness towards that prince. The Marquess of Hastings writes :—

"From this time up to the 2nd of December, on the evening of which the Rajah returned to his palace, messages of the same character were repeatedly brought ;...

"On the 5th of December our troops at Nagpore were reinforced by a detachment of the Nizam's Regular Infantry and Reformed Horse under Major Pitman, and on the 12th, Brigadier-General Doveton arrived with his cavalry and light troops; the remainder of his division marched in on the following day.

".....Mr. Jenkins and Brigadier-General Doveton, in the absence of my instructions, which had not yet reached Nagpore, and the uncertainty of the period which might elapse before their arrival, resolved to bring matters to a termination. On the 14th, terms were offered to the Raja for his acceptance; his refusal to comply with which, before daybreak on the 16th, it was determined immediately to follow up by a general attack on the positions of his troops.

"The terms offered were, in substance, the following : That the Raja should acknowledge that his recent attack on our troops had placed his whole state at our mercy, and that his only hope was in our forbearance and moderation; that his whole ordnance and warlike stores should be delivered up to us, a portion of them eventually to be restored on fixing the military establishments of the state; that he should disband, in concert with the Resident, his Arabs and other troops, as soon as practicable; that his army should immediately move to a position to be assigned for it; that the city of Nagpore should be evacuated and occupied by our troops, public and private property being protected, the Raja's civil authorities remaining in the exercise of their functions on his behalf and the city being restored on the conclusion of a treaty; that the Raja should repair to the British Residency or camp, and reside there until everything should be settled; that the terms granted should not go to deprive him of any considerable portion of territory, beyond what might be necessary for the payment of the subsidy and the efficient maintenance of the contingent as fixed by the former treaty,.....; and that if the terms should be complied with by four o'clock on the morning of the 16th, the latest period allowed for an answer, the Raja's army should be

withdrawn from their positions in and about the city, and the city occupied by British troops at seven o'clock on the same morning, the Raja himself being at liberty to come in, either before the execution of the terms or afterwards in the course of the day, as might be most agreeable."

The terms were no doubt most humiliating to the Raja. But that prince was a timid man and a great fool besides, for he reposed confidence in the so-called good intentions of his allies. It is therefore to be surmised, that he accepted all the terms which were dictated to him. But his troops were not composed of men who like him were cowards. Moreover, they would not knowingly agree to their extinction. They resolved to make a stand and tried to prevent the Raja from going over to the British. To quote again from the Marquess of Hastings' dispatch :---

"The next morning, at six o'clock, a message was received at the Residency, that the Arabs would not allow the Raja to come in, and that it would take some time to give up the guns, but that all would be settled in two or three days. On this Mr. Jenkins, in communication with Brigadier-General Doveton, the troops in the meanwhile being drawn out in battle order, gave the Raja time until nine o'clock to come in, intimating that if he did so, more time might be allowed for executing the other conditions, but that if he demurred, the troops would immediately move on to the attack. A little before nine the Raja accordingly arrived at the Residency,"

But his troops were not to be so easily coerced by the harsh terms of the Resident and they defied the orders of the Nagpur Raja to encompass their own ruin. That the Raja could not be charged with the faults of his troops every sensible man would admit. Even Professor H. H. Wilson, who, as a thoroughbred Anglo-Indian, had very little sympathy with the Indian princes, writes :—

“The disregard apparently shown to the orders of the Raja might have been preconcerted ; but it not improbably arose from the headstrong wilfulness of individual leaders, and was characteristic of the relaxation of authority which prevailed generally in the Maratha armies.” (Loc. Cit. p. 197).

Now ensued another battle, the main object of which was to crush the Raja's troops. To quote again from the Marquess of Hastings' dispatch :—

“The next delay took place the surrender of the guns, and the removal of the Raja's troops to the positions fixed for them. For these purposes the period allowed was extended until twelve o'clock ; but on our troops proceeding at that hour to take charge of the guns, the heads of the columns were fired on by troops posted in an enclosed garden, and subsequently from several batteries in the front of Brigadier-General Doveton's lines. Our troops were immediately disposed for the attack, and the action commenced,.....”

Of course, the Raja's troops without proper leaders and equipment were merely a rabble, and

therefore it was no difficult task to defeat them. Although worsted, they yet did not leave Nagpur. The Marquess of Hastings writes :

"The 17th and 18th of December, the days following the action, were given to the Raja to prevail on the Arabs to evacuate the city ; but although their arrears had been paid by the Raja, and every security offered on the part of the British Government for their march out of the territories of Nagpur, the evacuation was not effected. It thence became necessary for Brigadier-General Doveton to commence military operations against that part of the city where they were posted, and in order to increase his means, the place being strong, instructions were immediately issued for the march of his battering train from Akolah. Mun Bhuh, one of the principal leaders of the War-party, with the other chiefs whom Brigadier-General Doveton had just defeated, were said to be with them and to be urgent in encouraging them to resist. The Raja's horse remained scattered in every direction, with the exception of a considerable body collected at Ramteg : but although they had plundered some of our cattle bringing in grain, they had not ventured to interfere with our operations."

Of course, these gallant Arabs, although defeated, with bulldog-like pertinacity stuck to their posts, and were not to be so easily persuaded to give up resisting the British troops, on whom they once at least succeeded in inflicting heavy losses. The Marquess of Hastings continues in his dispatch :—

"The efforts of the troops under Brigadier-General Doveton were still directed to the dislodgement of the Arabs from the palace, on the gates of which an unsuccess-

ful assault was made on the 24th of December, in which our troops suffered considerable loss, although the gallantry and steadiness of both officers and men were on that occasion eminently conspicuous..... Notwithstanding the failure in the immediate object of the attack, such an impression was created by it that the Arabs soon signified their willingness to evacuate on conditions; and on Brigadier-General Doveton's agreeing to the proposed terms, they marched out of the city on the morning of the 30th. It was occupied by the British troops on the noon of the same day. No formal articles of capitulation were executed, the Arabs only asking for their personal safety, and a British officer with a small escort, to give them and their families a safe conduct to Mulcapore. It being anxiously desired that the city should be secured against hazard of destruction, and it being considered of importance to obtain possession of it as soon as possible, their request was granted,

"On the occupation of Nagpore by the British troops, many of the principal people came in to the Residency, and proclamations, in the name of the Raja and the Resident, were issued throughout the country in order to promote tranquillity."

Mr. Jenkins now gained all his desired objects and it was expected that he would fulfil the promises he had held out to the Raja when he asked him to come over to the Residency and become a prisoner of the British. As said before, the Raja was given to understand

"that the terms granted should not go to deprive him of any considerable portion of territory, beyond what might be necessary for the payment of the subsidy, and

the efficient maintenance of the contingent, as fixed by the former treaty, all other changes being directed solely to the preservation of tranquillity, with a due regard to the respectability of the Raja's government."

When the Raja entered into subsidiary alliance with the British Government, he was required to pay the subsidy in money and not in the cession of any territory, and it has been also pointed out before that the payment of the subsidy cost him about one-third of the gross revenue of his principality. It was on these grounds, he had asked the British Government to make some modifications in the original terms of the treaty of the subsidiary alliance. But then broke out the hostilities, and when the Raja was prevailed upon to go to the British Camp as a prisoner, he understood, as it was quite natural for a man in his situation to do, that his allies would be convinced of his innocence and would treat him with that generosity which he deserved. It was therefore that he readily accepted the terms proffered by Mr. Jenkins.

In his letter to the Marquess of Hastings dated 9th October 1817, from which extracts have already been given before, Malcolm wrote that the Raja "always called" Mr. Jenkins "his brother", and that his "Lordship stood in the relation of a father." But neither "his brother" nor "a father" was going to behave towards him as such.

The Marquess of Hastings wanted the deposition

of the Raja, and the Resident knowing the mind of his chief, was, to use a mild expression, guilty of a flagrant breach of faith : for the terms which he now offered to the Raja to conclude the treaty with the British were not the same on the distinct understanding of which the Raja had come over as a prisoner to the Residency. To quote the words of the Marquess of Hastings :—

“Immediately after the quiet occupation of the city of Nagpore by the British troops, Mr. Jenkins contemplated the return of Appa Sahib to his palace, and had prepared the draft of a definitive treaty to be signed previously to the Raja’s quitting the Residency.....But in the mean time, my original instructions, framed on my being informed of the attack on the Residency, reached him, and he thus, for the first time, became apprized of my decided reluctance to the restoration of Appa Sahib to power on any conditions. He accordingly desisted from proceeding to the signature of the treaty ; but as the return of Appa Sahib to the palace, and his eventual restoration to the throne, had been virtually promised, he judged himself bound to carry that measure into effect, subject to confirmation or annulment from me, and substituted for the treaty a provisional engagement, according to which the Raja was, until my further orders could be known, to retain the throne on the following conditions: That he should cede all his territories to the northward of the Nerbudda, as well as certain possessions on the southern bank, and all his rights in Berar, Gawilguh, Sirgoojah and Jushpore in lieu of the former subsidy and contingent ; that the civil and military affairs of the government should be settled and conduc-

ted by ministers in the confidence of the British government, according to the advice of the resident; that the Raja, with his family, should reside in the palace at Nagpore, under the protection of British troops; that the arrears of the subsidy should be paid up and the subsidy itself should continue to be paid, until the final transfer of the above-mentioned territories had taken place; that any forts in his territory which we might wish to occupy should immediately be given up; that the persons whom he described as principally concerned in resisting his orders should receive no favour, but be declaredly cast off by him, and if possible, be seized and delivered to the officers of the British Government; and that the two hills of Sectabuldee with the bazars, and an adequate portion of land adjoining should be ceded to the British Government, which should be at liberty to erect on them such military works as might be deemed necessary."

There was no other alternative for the Raja than to put up with these disgraceful terms as best as he could. The Governor-General writes :

"These conditions having been accepted by the Raja, he returned to his palace on the 9th of January, both that and the city being still garrisoned by our troops."

Henceforth the Raja had no shadow or semblance of independence. His lot was a very pitiable one and it was abuse of authority and language to charge him with treasonable designs or perfidious conduct. He had not the power to be guilty of these things, for not only were his resources crippled, but he was virtually a prisoner in the hands of the British in his own capital. But since the

Governor-General wanted to depose him, there was no difficulty in trumping up false charges against him. Let us again quote the words of the Governor-General whom Appa Saheb had looked upon "in the relation of a father to him." The Marquess of Hastings wrote :

"My determination to remove him from power was founded alike on the horror and disgust excited by his atrocious perfidy, on the conviction of its being impossible ever to repose confidence on one so destitute of principle and on my conception of the importance of holding up to India, as an example, the signal chastisement of so remarkable an instance of political depravity."

Such were the sentiments of the Governor-General towards Appa Saheb. Although he acquiesced in the arrangement which Mr. Jenkins had provisionally entered into with Appa Saheb, yet from the tenor of his dispatches from the passages which have been already quoted above, it is evident that he would have been extremely glad at the deposition of Appa Saheb. Mr. Jenkins seeing which side the wind was blowing, did everything in his power to please his chief. He accused the Raja of several charges the nature of which will be presently mentioned.

The new terms which were imposed on the Raja, were very galling and humiliating, and the slender resources left to him were such as he could hardly maintain his dignity with as a reigning prince, so

that he was obliged to propose to the Resident the cession of his principality in lieu of a pension. The Governor-General writes :

"It is proper to notice in this place a proposal made by Appa Sahib to Mr. Jenkins, for transferring to the British Government, on certain conditions, the whole of the possessions of the State of Nagpore, himself retaining the name and form of sovereignty alone, and receiving a stipulated share of the revenues. This project he wished to substitute, instead of completing the arrangements detailed in the draft of the proposed definitive treaty which would have left in the hands of the Rajah, under prescribed limitations, the administration of the territories to the State of Nagpore."

But this arrangement did not suit the Government of India ; because they knew that the revenues of the Nagpur state would not be sufficient to meet the charges which they had imposed on that prince in the shape of the subsidiary alliance and civil and military administration and then to pay the Raja a pension which would enable him to maintain his dignity and respectability. Accordingly, the Raja's proposal was declined. The Governor-General wrote to the Secret Committee of the East India Company :—

"After giving my most deliberate attention to the plan suggested by the Rajah, it seemed to me that your financial interests would be better consulted by adhering to the arrangement originally contemplated. Excluding from the calculation, on both sides of the question, that portion of our military expenditure which, under any plan, would

be incurred for the defence of the country and the support of the new order of things, I was of opinion that it would be more beneficial to us to obtain possession of a territory yielding a revenue of twenty lacs of rupees annually, unburthened by any other charge than that of the requisite civil establishments, than to undertake the management of a country producing annually sixty lacs of rupees, encumbered with provisions for the Rajah, his family, and the principal officers of his Government, as well as with the debts of the Rajah. The large establishments, moreover, which it would be necessary for us to maintain from the nature of a considerable portion of the territory, and its distance from the seat of our Government, might be found much out of proportion to the pecuniary value of the possession."

It cannot be denied that the Raja consulted the interests of his subjects when he proposed to the British Government to take his territory and give him a pension. But it would not have paid the British Government to have done so. The Governor-General's own words, quoted above, conclusively prove that the Raja was called upon to make such payments to the British Government as his exchequer did not and could not allow him to do. But the demands of the Government were to be met by the Raja anyhow. Had his proposal been acceded to, then the door of the future aggrandisement on his territory by the Government would have been closed. His very inability to pay their exorbitant demands was serving as a pretext to the British Government to hold him up as their faithless ally

and to practise all sorts of refined brutality on him at their sweet will and convenience and to deprive him of his rights and privileges to suit their own interests.

The Raja's proposal then was not given that careful consideration which its importance demanded. It was dismissed altogether by the Governor-General. The promised treaty with the Raja was not concluded. Mr. Jenkins said that he had discovered treasonable designs on the part of the Raja, who was therefore to be punished with deposition and imprisonment. To quote again from the Marquess of Hastings' despatch ;—

"Before, as I have already stated, the despatch which was to make known to Mr. Jenkins my sentiments and instructions could be prepared, a second revolution at Nagpore was on the eve of its accomplishment. To avert the danger which it menaced to our interests, it became indispensable that Mr. Jenkins should abandon the course then contemplated, and should, without reference to my authority, resort to measures of vigour and severity, which the unanticipated crisis rendered imperative.

"Mr. Jenkins's suspicions of the renewed machinations of Appa Sahib against the British Government were first most strongly excited by the resistance of the Killadars of Chouragarh and Mundela, notwithstanding public orders which they had received for the delivery of those fortresses to the officers of our government and by Major Roughsedge's reports of unfriendly conduct manifested by the Rajah's subedar of Ruttonpore....; but here

it is only necessary to observe, that it seemed improbable the garrisons of either of the former places would have held out against the offer which had been made of paying their arrears, unless their resistance had been dictated by superior authority. In fact, the Killadar of Chouragurh himself declared, that he had secret orders contravening his public instructions and the truth of the assertion was supported by information derived by Mr. Jenkins from other quarters. With regard to Mundela, Mr. Jenkins's suspicions of the same process of intrigue being in existence were confirmed by his intercepting a letter from the Killadar's agent to his master, in which allusion was made to his secret orders.

"In addition to these circumstances, Mr. Jenkins received frequent reports of an intercourse by letters being kept up with Bajee Rao and Gunput Rao, and of secret conferences of the Rajah with Nagoo Pundit and Ram Chunder Waugh, the mischievous purposes of which were to be inferred from the exclusion of Narayan Pundit, against whom the Rajah showed much discontent. He complained of that minister's having persuaded him to come into the Residency and it was evident he thought that had he held out he could at least have secured better terms. The rumours of his meditating an escape were very general and it was perfectly understood that one of the disaffected chiefs had received a sum of money for the levy of troops... On the whole, Mr. Jenkins looked on the combination of circumstances as affording little short of positive proof of the guilt of Appa Sahib and his associates, and his only hesitation in removing the Rajah from the throne arose from a just conception that such a measure must be irrevocable if once undertaken. He consequently hastened to apprise me of the state of affairs, requesting my early instructions. Mr. Jenkins,

however, at the same time very properly determined to secure the Rajah's person, if before receiving my instructions he should judge the probability of Appa Sahib's escaping to require such a step.

"The restoration of Appa Sahib to the throne seemed to me to render his subsequent removal a measure of considerable awkwardness : and I feel it to be indispensable, that its adoption should be supported, not merely by evidence sufficient for my own moral conviction of his renewed intrigues and designs against us, but such as should satisfy the superior authorities in England, as well as the public mind, that there was an absolute necessity for displacing him. In the event of such evidence being obtained, or of Appa Sahib's attempting to escape from Nagpore, which might be looked on as a distinct proof of treacherous intention. I could have no hesitation in sanctioning his arrest and conveyance to the nearest place of strength within your provinces ; but the circumstances detailed by Mr. Jenkins.....did not, in my judgment, amount to such proof as would justify so decisive a course of proceeding. It was, however, sufficiently strong against Nagoo Pundit and Ram Chunder Waugh, to warrant and require their removal from the territory of Nagpore, a step which I accordingly authorized. In ordering instructions to this effect to be conveyed to Mr. Jenkins, I also directed every precaution to be taken to prevent the Rajah's escape, without giving him alarm for his personal freedom, and to secure the tranquil and peaceable administration of the country. Within a few days after those instructions had been despatched, a further letter was received by Mr. Adam from Mr. Jenkins, which apprized me of the actual seizure of the Rajah and his confidential minister in consequence of the additional and incontestable proofs of their treachery

which had come to Mr. Jenkins' knowledge. This letter stated the Resident's conviction that the late Rajah of Nagpore, Bala Sahib, had been murdered by order of Appa Sahib.....The circumstances which impressed Mr. Jenkins with the belief of this atrocity having been committed, materially induced his resolution to arrest the Rajah.....Two cases consequently required his deliberate consideration. It seemed doubtful in the event of Appa Sahib's being condemned on what Mr. Jenkins had already brought forward to prove his unworthiness, whether it would be proper to try him for the murder of his kinsman and sovereign, though that prince had been under our special protection: and it was still more so whether, supposing the previous circumstances to be deemed inconclusive, the other enquiry should be prosecuted. In the first case there was less difficulty, as Appa Sahib would then cease, even nominally, to be a sovereign. It appeared, however, that for our reputation, we could not go on stronger grounds in deposing him than those of such a murder. The proofs for conviction were easily producible, should the case be tried: but considerable difficulty presented itself with regard to the situation of the Rajah pending the enquiry. It was to be feared, that were he at liberty he would endeavour to escape, whether guilty or not. If innocent, he would be disposed to think that the British Government had resolved to degrade, if not to depose him, and he would hardly expect a fair trial; if guilty, there could be no doubt of his flying. At any rate, therefore, it appeared to Mr. Jenkins necessary to secure his person before his trial, should such an investigation be deemed expedient. The trial of the Rajah's instruments would have imposed the same necessity.

“Under all circumstances, and particularly with

advertence to his apprehension of escape, grounded on the knowledge of the Rajah and his advisers having become greatly alarmed at the enquiries already set on foot regarding his intrigues, which it was impossible altogether to keep secret. Mr. Jenkins determined to take the decisive step of removing him from the palace and bringing him to the Residency, where he was merely to be told that he was suspected of treachery, and that his fate would depend on the orders which further discoveries on the point might produce from me. Every suitable precaution was taken by Mr. Jenkins to prevent commotion, and on the 15th of March Appa Sahib was conveyed to the Residency. Nagoo Pundit and Ram Chunder were at the same time arrested."

The extract given above from the Governor-General's despatch is a long one, but it was necessary to do so, to show the charges against the Raja and the nature of the evidence by which those charges were to be substantiated. That the so-called intrigues of the Raja against the British Government did not deserve much credit is evident even from the Governor-General's own showing. He wrote :—

"But the circumstances detailed by Mr. Jenkins, ... did not, in my judgment, amount to such proof as would justify so decisive a course of proceeding."

It is only necessary therefore to say that those charges could not be proved against the Raja.

Mr. Jenkins knew as much and therefore he brought a fresh charge against that unfortunate sovereign. He charged him with having murdered

his cousin. A good deal has been said above to show the worthlessness of this charge. It was an after-thought on the part of Mr. Jenkins to accuse the Raja of such a heinous crime in order to get the object so dear to his heart accomplished. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Raja committed the murder, the Resident or for the matter of that the British Government had no authority to try or punish him for that crime. At the time of the committal of that crime, the Nagpur State was in alliance with, and not dependent upon, the British Government. And as such the Resident had no jurisdiction to try the Raja.

It should also be remembered that the Raja was never given an opportunity to know the nature of the charges, and the evidence by which those could be substantiated. He was made a prisoner and was going to be condemned unheard. Even the farce of a trial was denied to the Bhosla Raja, whom to make a prisoner in the Residency, it is not improbable that Mr. Jenkins had recourse to treachery.

After the imprisonment of the Raja, evidence flowed in from all the quarters of the globe, as it were, to incriminate him. Intelligence was alleged to have been received, "through Mr. Elphinstone, from Bajee Rao's camp, of a letter having reached the Peishwah from Appa Sahib, written in his own hand, explaining his circumstances and proposing

a combined movement." Only credulous persons and dishonest diplomats could pin their faith on the truth of such intelligence. But every rumour, every story, however absurd, against the Raja, was to be eagerly swallowed as gospel-truth when it served the purpose of the Company's servants to do so. Appa Saheb, who had been reduced to a position of perfect impotency, was totally incapable of all those designs of which he was suspected.

As regards the allegation that the Killadars of Chouragarh and Mundela offered resistance to the British troops because they had been secretly dictated to do so by some higher authority, there is hardly any evidence worthy of credit to prove it. It is said that the Killadars on their trial justified their conduct as they had secret orders from the Raja to do so. The Raja was made a prisoner on the 15th March and the trial of this Killadar of Mundela took place about a month after that date. Knowing that the Raja was a prisoner in the hands of the British, and also that he was in disgrace and that it was the intention of the British Government to depose him, no one having the least particle of common sense in him would doubt that the Killadar said what he knew would not only lead to his acquittal but would immensely please his victors. And he was not wrong in his surmises.

As said before, Appa Saheb was not given any

opportunity to say anything in his defence. He was not tried for the crimes with which he was charged. He was condemned unheard by one whom he had looked upon as standing "in the relation of a father to him" and by another whom he "always called his brother." It was decided that he should be kept a state prisoner in the fort of Allahabad, and the infant grandson of the late Raghujee Bhosla was to be placed on the *musnad* of Nagpur. This arrangement suited the convenience of the British Government, for during the long minority of the new Raja, the affairs of the Nagpur State were to be managed by the Resident.

The treaty of subsidiary alliance then with the Nagpur State was extremely beneficial to the Government of India ;—it enabled them to be masters of nearly half of the territory of that principality and that too of a very fertile tract of it. The Governor-General wrote :—

"The province of Garrah Mundelah, of which Jubbulpore is the principal town, and Soliagpore to the north of the Nerbudda, as well as the adjacent districts of Hoosingabad, Seonee, Chupara, and Gurrawarah, to the south of that river, formed the chief part of the territory proposed to be ceded to the British Government, according to the preliminary engagement concluded by Mr. Jenkins with Appa Sahib."

The gross revenue of the Nagpur State amounted to about sixty lacs, but that of the proposed

cessions was not less than 28 lacs. The Governor-General wrote :

"You will observe that the gross revenue of the cessions fixed by the provisional engagement amounts to nearly twenty-eight lacs of rupees, while the net revenue is calculated at about twenty-two and a half lacs annually."

No wonder that Appa Saheb was desirous of giving up the whole of the Nagpur State to the British and content to live on a pension from them.

The subsequent events in the life of Appa Saheb after he was sent as a prisoner to be confined in Allahabad fort need not deter us long. He was not destined to be an inmate of the Allahabad fort. He had experienced treachery and perfidy in the conduct of his allies in whom he had reposed implicit confidence. How bitterly in his after-life he repented the day or rather the midnight hour, when he concluded the treaty of subsidiary alliance with the British Government, an alliance which brought nothing but misfortune to him and ruin to the fertile principality of Nagpur !

Had Appa Sahib been acquainted with the English language, he would have no doubt credited Mr. Burke with prophetic vision into the future, so far at least as the behaviour of the British Government related to him. In the course of his speech on the 1st December 1783, on the motion

for going into a committee on Mr. Fox's India Bill, Mr. Burke said:—

“With regard, therefore, to the abuse of the external federal trust, I engage myself to you to make good these three positions: First, I say, that from Mount Imaus ... where it touches us in the latitude of twenty-nine, to Cape Comorin in the latitude of eight, that there is not a single prince, state, or potentate, great or small, in India with whom they have come into contact, whom they have not sold. I say sold, though sometimes they have not been able to deliver according to their bargain. Secondly, I say that there is not a single treaty they have ever made which they have not broken. Thirdly, I say that *there is not a single prince or state who ever put any trust in the Company who is not utterly ruined*; and that none are in any degree secure or flourishing but in the exact proportion to their settled distrust and irreconcilable enmity to this nation.

“These assertions are universal: I say, in the full sense universal. They regard the external and political trust only, but I shall produce others fully equivalent in the internal.”

From his own experience of the treatment he had received at the hands of the British, he must have also formed the same opinion which was so eloquently given expression to by Burke long before he had attained his state of manhood. No wonder that he tried to escape from the bondage imposed upon him by the British.

And escape he did. The manner in which he eluded the vigilance of the escort which was

carrying him a prisoner to Allahabad reads more like a romance than a real incident. The escape of Appa Saheb, being pursued by the troops led by European officers, his finding an asylum in the Courts of some of the ruling princes of those days in India, his wandering as a fakeer, ought to serve as meet subjects for some talented poet, dramatist or novelist to exercise his pen. Regarding the escape of Appa Saheb, the Marquess of Hastings wrote :—

“I deeply regretted the escape of Appa Sahib on account of its tendency to keep unsettled the minds of a portion of the inhabitants of the country ; but from all the information that I had obtained, I was satisfied that his personal qualities and character were not calculated to render him dangerous, and the contempt into which he had sunk had stripped his name of the influence which often attends that of a prince in a similarly fallen condition. I foresaw that even should he, after emerging from the fastnesses where he remained comparatively secure from our attack, continue to elude the efforts for his recapture, he would soon be reduced to the situation of a powerless unregarded fugitive, totally deprived of means to injure our interests.”

The Marquess of Hastings, nevertheless, had taken great pains to recapture him but totally failed in his attempts. Had there been at that time in India any powerful and independent native sovereign, Appa Saheb's fate would have enlisted his sympathy, and the Governor-General would not then have been able to write regarding

him in the manner in which he did in the extract given above.

Appa Saheb, as said before, was brought a prisoner to the Residency on the 15th March 1818. Mr. Jenkins, without giving him an opportunity to say what he had to say in his defence, or even waiting for further instructions from the Governor-General, wrote on the 17th March (*i. e.*, two days after his making the Raja a prisoner) a despatch which was received at three o'clock A.M., on the 20th March, at Jubbulpore, in which he said :—

"I have now, from many proofs of intrigues, found it necessary to seize the person of the Rajah, and I shall send him immediately by Jubbulpore to Lord Hastings. He will have four companies of the Twenty-second and a squadron of cavalry ; and I must trouble you to relieve the squadron with one of your regiment from Chupra or Dhooma. By the time His Highness reaches Bellary or Lohargong, I fancy his destination will be pointed out by Lord Hastings. As it is of consequence to send the Rajah off soon, I have no time to write for other reliefs, but probably you will know where to write to get your squadron relieved."

The destination of the Raja, as said before, was the Allahabad fort. But he escaped from the camp of Rachooree. To quote from the Marquess of Hastings' letter of the 17th October, 1822 :—

"He (the Raja) went off in the dress of a sepoy between two and three o'clock in the morning, accompanied

by six sepoy's of the twenty-second regiment who had been on guard over him, and had been debauched to aid his flight..... The ex-Rajah had three horsemen with him.

"A reward for the apprehension of Appa Sahib was immediately proclaimed by the Commissioner ; . . .

"It appears that Appa Sahib reached Hurrey, a hill fort south of Chouragurh, on the night of the 14th : but that he speedily continued his course to Buthurgurh, where there was a force of his adherents collected, obviously on the contemplation of his escape, amounting to about a thousand well-armed men. At this post, however, he made but a short halt, proceeding to join the Gonds in the Mahadeo hills. Those clans of mountaineers, it would seem, had been prepared to expect him. The new Rajah of Nagpore had by this time been seated on the guddee : but although his elevation was generally hailed with satisfaction by the population of the country, a strong party was understood to be confederated in the city for the cause of Appa Sahib. Subsequent intelligence was received that the ex-Rajah, supported by the Gonds, had taken possession of the fort of Chouragurh, not finding resistance offered by the handful of men who garrisoned it ; also, that he had a vakeel at Boorhampore entertaining Arab soldiery, which could not have taken place but by the connivance of Sindia's Governor of that city.

"Shortly after Sir John Malcolm reported, that one Sheo Persaud, a man of family in the Nagpore State, but latterly serving with Bajee Rao, communicated to him the disposition of Appa Sahib to surrender himself, if Sir John Malcolm would pledge his word for Appa Sahib's security against imprisonment or indignity, and would obtain for him wherewithal to maintain himself decently in retirement. This was represented on the faith of a confidential servant

despatched by Appa Sahib to engage Sheo Persaud's undertaking the negotiation. Sir John Malcolm added, that he had referred the matter to Mr. Jenkins. Government immediately apprized Sir John Malcolm that it would plight the assurance solicited, would allow an income to support Appa Sahib decorously as a private individual of rank, and would promise him all becoming attentions, if he would take up his residence within the Company's provinces. As reference had been made to Mr. Jenkins, that gentleman was informed of this determination on the part of Government ; and he was instructed to intimate, that a lac of rupees was the annual allowance which Government would fix for Appa Sahib in the event of his submission.

"These overtures were clearly made by Appa Sahib with a view of ensuring an eventual resource, should he fail in the intrigues which he was at the same time actively prosecuting

"In the meantime the Resident at Nagpore had communicated his having detected a correspondence maintained between Appa Sahib and his connexions by marriage residing in that city. They were working indefatigably to enrol and organize bodies of armed adherents in the interior, while they supplied Appa Sahib with money for the collection and payment of troops on the frontier

"The machinations of Appa Sahib were indeed carried to a wide extent. His designs to raise the province of Chutteesgurh into insurrection were timely discovered and frustrated ; similar detection attended his underhand endeavours to excite hostile disposition in Raja Keerut, Sing, and other chieftains, against the British Government. His correspondence with Sirdars in the Bhopaul service was at the same time discovered ; and Sir John Malcolm

reported that Amrut Rao Pandit was employed at Oojein in various intrigues for Appa Sahib

".....Towards the latter end of October, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams projected a combined irruption of different columns into the Mahadeo hills, for the purpose of surrounding Appa Sahib, and he moved accordingly. The situation of the ex-Rajah became more critical : therefore he fled from the hills, escorted by a body of horse under Cheetoo Pindarry, to avail himself.....of repeated invitations from Jeswant Rao Lar for Appa Sahib's taking refuge in Asseergurh, should he be doubtful of maintaining his ground among the Gonds.....

".....Sharply pursued in his retreat from the Mahadeo hills, Appa Sahib was overtaken close to Asseergurh, his escort was routed, and he with his followers must have been taken, had not a part of the garrison sallied and saved the fugitive from their pursuers.....

"Cheetoo got away to the jungles, where he was devoured by a tiger.....

"A curious circumstance now occurred. Appa Sahib found means to open secretly from within the fort of Asseergurh a correspondence with Sir John Malcolm, expressing his inclination to surrender himself. As he met frank encouragement, yet did not act upon it, there is no way of accounting for his having thus negotiated, but by supposing him to imagine that, in case of the fort being taken, he might efficaciously plead a purpose which he never really harboured, the voluntarily putting himself into our hands. That he had not the intention of throwing himself upon our generosity is manifest, from his having preferred to make his escape to Boorhampore in the disguise of a fakeer. He was guided by a sepoy, the adopted son of one Hurrey Sing, who resided in Boorhampore under the protection of the Governor. The

latter's concurrence in Appa Sahib's reception in Boorhanpore could not be doubted. Concealment, however, could not be expected to last long ; so that Appa Sahib was counselled to put himself beyond the reach of British preponderance. He consequently proceeded to Lahore, where he has been allowed to live in absolute privacy on a very scanty allowance from Runjeet Sing. That prince, in affording shelter to Appa Sahib, has done it in a manner which shews a sincere attention not to dissatisfy the British Government”

The Marquess of Hastings' narrative regarding the whereabouts of the whilom Nagpur sovereign ends here. But Appa Saheb did not live long on the bounty of Runjeet Singh at Lahore. Prof. H. H. Wilson writes :—

“Upon the withdrawal of his (Ranjit Singh's) countenance, Appa Sahib had recourse to a petty Raja, the Raja of Mundi, beyond the first range of the Himalayas, and was suffered to remain there un molested for several succeeding years. At a subsequent date he returned to Hindustan, and was protected by the Raja of Jodhpur, who was allowed to grant him an asylum, on condition of becoming responsible for his safe custody and peaceable conduct.” (*Loc. cit.* p. 273).

The same author writes again in another part of his history :—

“The ex-Rajah of Nagpore, Appa Sahib, had been tempted to quit his asylum in the mountains about the time of the agitation which prevailed in India at the close of the Burmese war ; and after various adventures, took sanctuary in the temple of Maha Mandira, a celebrated shrine in the territory of Jodhpur. The Raja was at first

required to secure the fugitive and deliver him to the British Agent at Ajmere; but he declined compliance, pleading in excuse his inability to infringe upon the privileges of the temple, and his fear that he should be forever disgraced in the estimation of all Hindustan if he were to refuse to an unfortunate prince the rights of hospitality. The excuse was admitted, and the demand urged no further; but Man Sing was held responsible for the conduct of his guest, and expected to restrain him from any attempts to disturb the public tranquillity. Some obscure intrigues were set on foot by Appa Sahib with individuals of no note, who engaged to accomplish his restoration to sovereignty; but neither the persons nor the projects were of a character to endanger the security or excite the alarm of the Government of Nagpore."

CHAPTER LVI

The War with Holkar

A decade before, the English had to conclude peace with Holkar on terms which were very favourable to that prince. Jashavant Rao Holkar died insane before the Marquess of Hastings landed in India and there were disorders and confusion in the principality after his death. The Governor-General thought that it was a very favourable opportunity to humiliate the house of Holkar. The Rajput princes had been turned into feudatories. The Jat princes in the Doab had been reduced to the status of British subjects. Sindhia had been made, in the manner mentioned before, to accept the treaty dictated to him by the Marquess. So, not having any fear in the rear, the Governor-General prepared to attack the territories of the house of Holkar. Some Afghan military adventurers and mercenaries were in the employ of that prince, foremost amongst whom was Ameer Khan, whose name has been several times mentioned before. He was undoubtedly in the pay of the English (see p. 128, Vol. III.), one of whose historians writes :—

“Among the chiefs who recieved favour from the English was one Ameer Khan, ..., ... Holkar's chief

general, to which office he had risen from the condition of a private horseman. This person had, in spite of previous treaties, a considerable portion of Holkar's territory made over to him by Lord Minto, and a formal treaty sealed the bond of amity between this desperate robber and murderer and the East India Company. Although Lord Minto engaged the alliance of this person, it was not until the Government of the Marquis of Hastings that the plunder was perpetrated upon Holkar in his favour, and a treaty formed to secure it to him through no less a personage than Mr. Metcalfe. One passage of Ameer Khan's history will illustrate the character of the man, and the morality of English policy in those days: for there was no pressing necessity to force the English into an alliance with him to the disadvantage of other chiefs really worthy their protection and amity. This Ameer Khan had been literally hired to murder one Sevaee Sing by a potentate who was the rival of the latter. The Ameer found in this commission an employment to his taste, and accomplished it." (Nolan's *History of the British Empire*, Vol. II. pp. 510—511).

The above-named historian would not have expressed surprise at "the morality of English policy in those days," had he remembered that the Christian power in India had its origin in treachery and murder, for the Company's servants in the eighteenth century in India encouraged traitors like Meer Jaffer and murderers like Raghoba, without whose support, they would not have been able to establish their Empire. The same writer says that

"The intrigues between the English and Meer Khan

against the integrity of Holkar's dominion were not honourable to our nation. In connection with them, all persons about the court, all parties in that state, intrigued for and against the English, and for and against one another. Perjury, perfidy, abduction, assassination, murder, plunder, revolt and civil war rent and stained realms which had owned the sovereignty of the once far-renowned Holkar." (*Ibid*, p. 521).

It was under such adverse circumstances that the Holkar's army, without any capable leader, was attacked by the British, and the battle of Mahidpur was fought on the 20th December, 1817, in which Holkar's army was routed.

The gallantry and military tactics of the British generals would not have succeeded in gaining the battle of Mahidpur had they not been helped by a traitor in the camp of Holkar. In his Autobiography, Lutufullah asserts that the battle was won only through the treachery of the Nawab Abdul Ghafoor Khan. He writes:—

"There would have been a host of about ten thousand armed men to destroy the foreigners, had they lost the battle, but all these hopes were frustrated by news of a contrary nature, which appeared to them incredible at first, considering the strength of Holkar. Little did they know that Nawab Abdul Ghafoor Khan played the part of a traitor to his master, and deserted the field of battle with the force under his command, just at the moment when the English were on the point of losing the battle, through the loyal and gallant exertions of Roshan Beg, the Captain-General of Holkar's artillery. The

stain of this di grace clung too firmly to the name of Abdul Ghafoor as long as he lived, to be effaced by his great liberality towards the poor and others ; and his son Ghazi Mohamed Khan is not un reproached by the natives of India for his late father's misbehaviour, though he enjoys the district of Jaora, assigned to the family, through the favour of the British authorities in India." (Pp. 103—104).

The treaty of Mundisoor, negotiated by Sir John Malcolm, reduced Holkar to the position of a feudatory, and he henceforth never appears in the pages of Indian history as a menace or an object of terror to the British.

Malcolm was rewarded for his diplomacy by being appointed to manage the affairs of the territories which were wrested from Holkar.

CHAPTER LVII

The End of The Third Maratha War

The hill fortresses of Central India were almost impregnable before the invention of modern destructive weapons of war. Regarding these hill fortresses, Lieutenant Lake wrote in his "Journals of the Sieges of the Madras Army" (p. 90):—

"Nothing is necessary, but a determined Garrison to render such positions perfectly impregnable. Fortunately for us, this latter requisite was wanting,...."

Regarding the fortress of Rajdeir, the same author writes (*Ibid*, p. 92):—

"The Engineer, in reporting to the Commanding Officer the result of his reconnoissance, declared his opinion, that, from the great natural strength of this rock, a Garrison of 200 determined men, supplied with the requisite provisions, &c., might bid defiance to the largest and best appointed army; and that its fall must therefore depend on some fortunate occurrence, which might intimidate the Garrison into a surrender."

Regarding the surrender of this strong fortress, the same author writes (p. 97):—

"The immediate cause of the surrender of the fortress, was a quarrel which took place in the Garrison, originating in the Brahmin Killedar's refusal to pay to the families of three men who had been killed, the arrears of pay due to them. In revenge for this, the Garrison set fire to his house, and the manner in which the

flames spread, alarmed them so much, that they were induced to capitulate."

Again, regarding the capture of the fortress of Trimbuck, the same author writes (p. 107) :—

"It is difficult to account for the want of resolution displayed, in the defence of this impregnable fortress. The reasons for it must be sought, in the effect produced on the minds of the Garrison, by our rapid advances to the foot of the scarp, and by seeing their escape prevented by the works on the south side. The absence of their Prince, at this time a fugitive surrounded by British Armies, and the extreme improbability of his ever returning to his own dominions, must also have produced an unfavourable effect on the spirit of the Garrison and prevented them from attempting a more protracted resistance. Seventeen other forts fell on the surrender of Trimbuck, and the whole of this country, *perhaps the strongest in the world*, came into our hands in a few weeks, almost without a struggle.

"In contemplating such pusillanimous conduct, even on the part of our enemies, it is difficult to repress a feeling somewhat resembling disappointment. The idea unavoidably arises, that nature intended these hills for other men, and other deeds. She seems to have marked them out as a theatre, on which the battles of freedom and independence might be successfully fought; for amongst them the undisciplined and half-armed Native would be on a par with the most skilful and experienced veteran: and even in the stones which cover them, nature has furnished abundant arms for their defence. If these ideas, and the stern character of the scenery, which gave rise to them, seem little consonant with the habits and dispositions of the Natives, it should be re-

membered, that even in India the asserters of liberty have been found ; and that it was from these very hills, that Sevajee first endeavoured to break the iron bonds, in which his countrymen were held by Aurangzebe. It was amongst these hills, that his enterprises were planned, and from them, that his " living cloud of war was poured forth." It was here, that he laid the foundation of that Power, which in after times retaliated, upon the fallen Emperor of Delhi, the injury, which the intolerant spirit of that Prince's ancestors had inflicted on the Hindu world ; and here, the last Mahratta sovereign might have made an effectual struggle for independence, but the spirit was wanting, with which the great founder of the tribe had armed his people for conquest. Thirty fortresses, each of which, with a Sevajee as a master, would have defied the whole Anglo-Indian army, fell unresistingly in a few weeks : and this vast Mahratta Empire, which had overshadowed the East, and before which the star of the Mogul had become pale, was destined to furnish in its turn, another great example of the vicissitudes of fortune ; and of the instability of the mightiest thrones, the foundations of which are not laid in the affections of the people."

After the surrender of one of the hill forts, namely, that of Talneir, want of humanity was exhibited by the British officers, when every man in the Fort was put to the sword. Regarding this barbarity, Lake writes in his Journals (p. 57) :—

" On the justice of the sentence passed on the killedar and his Arab commander, and on our right to inflict it, were I qualified to pass an opinion, I should feel little disposed to do so ; but I may be permitted to deplore, in common with all friends of humanity, that

some Ambassador more polished than a British Grenadier, and one acquainted with the language and customs of the Arabs, had not preceded the storming party, to explain to them the terms on which they were to be admitted to quarter....."

The keepers of those fortresses were not often true to their salt and surrendered them, because, in most cases, they must have been bribed to betray their charge.

Aseergarh, one of the strong hill-fortresses of Central India, held out till the 7th April 1819, when, by its surrender, the last Maratha war came to an end. Unfortunately, it was garrisoned mostly by Arab mercenaries who lost nothing by its surrender. Its strength was such that the besiegers made hardly any impression on the besieged, as is evident from the fact that of the latter only forty-three were killed and ninety-five wounded, for the rock and the upper fort towered so high above the batteries of the English that only shells reached them with any effect.

Raja Appa Saheb of Nagpore was reported to have found shelter in the fort of Aseergur. So on its surrender it was thought he would be found there. But to the great disappointment of the English, he was not there.

It was the occidental diplomacy of Sir John Malcolm which made the campaign in Central India terminate so favourably to the Company.

CHAPTER LVIII

Marquess Hastings and the Nawab of Oude

The Nawab Vazir of Oude was the only Indian potentate who was not shorn of his territories by the present Governor-General of India. If anything, he was made much of by the Marquess of Hastings, for he was raised to the dignity of a king, and a district which had been wrested from the Nepalese, was added to his kingdom. But the Governor-General did not do these things out of love for that Muhammadan prince. Scheming, intriguing and plotting as that Marquess was, whatever he did, was from motives of political expediency and with an eye to his own benefit or some pecuniary advantage resulting to the Company whose servant he was.

At the time when the Marquess of Hastings was sent out as Governor-General of India, Ghazi-ud-deen Hyder was the Nawab Vazir of Oude. His life was made a burden to him by the Christian Resident, named Major Bailie, attached to his court, who was practising all sorts of refined brutality on him. That the position of the Nawab Vazir was not an enviable one, is evident from what the Governor-General himself has

recorded in his private journal, under date, October 13, 1814 (Panini Office Reprint, p. 97):—

“Nawab Vizeer had reckoned on being emancipated from the imperious domination of Major Baillie under which his Excellency groaned every hour but that I had riveted him in his position. Major Baillie dictated to him in the merest trifles, broke in upon him at his palace without notice, whensoever he (Major Baillie) had any-thing to prescribe, fixed his (Major Baillie’s) creatures upon his Excellency with large salaries, to be spies upon all his actions; and above all, lowered his Excellency in the eyes of his family and his subjects by the magisterial tone which he constantly assumed.”

However the Nawab Vazir, in the simplicity of his heart, placed unbounded confidence in the so-called good intentions of the East India Company. So when the Marquess of Hastings visited Lucknow, he was treated right royally and the Vazir even went to the length of calling him his father. The Nawab Vazir was made to pay or rather to advance a loan of one crore of rupees and in exchange for this he was given a territory which did not pay one-sixth of the interest which an investment in the Company’s funds would have yielded him.

But then the father promoted his son to the dignity of a king. Here again, he did not do it from any disinterested motive or excessive love of his son. The Nawab Vazir did not benefit in any way from the title of king conferred on him.

Major Archer in his work named *Tours in Upper India* (London, 1833), writes:—

“In 1819, Ghazee Hyder, the then Vizier, desired the dignity of king, which being acquiesced in by the British Government, though upon the express stipulation that the assumption should not be the means of altering the existing relations, he was crowned King in October of that year.”* (Vol. I, p. 2).

Incidentally, it might also be mentioned here how determined the Marquess of Hastings was to degrade the position of the Emperor of Delhi. A dozen years had hardly elapsed since the Government of India of that day had considered it necessary to intrigue with this descendant of the house of Babur to gain his object, and now that that object had been gained, it was thought proper by this Governor-General to treat the Delhi sovereign with scant courtesy, if not with positive rudeness. He writes in his journal, under date of January 22, 1815 (Panini Office reprint, p. 170):—

“Mr. Metcalfe arrived from Delhi. The king had been carrying on a wearisome negotiation with him to obtain that I should visit him. Mr. Metcalfe always returned the same answer,—namely, that I had expressed myself as very desirous of paying my personal attentions to his Majesty; but had told him (Mr. Metcalfe) that I was restrained from doing so by the knowledge that his

* Major Archer was present at the coronation, and has described it as an occasion on which “the lord of misrule was in his full potency.”

Majesty expected my acquiescence in a ceremonial which was to imply his Majesty's being the liege lord of the British possessions. This dependent tenure, Mr. Metcalf assured him, could never be acknowledged by him..... It is dangerous to uphold for the Mussalmans a rallying point, sanctioned by our own acknowledgment that a just title to supremacy exists in the king of Delhi. ... The house of Timour had been put so much out of sight that all habit of adverting to it was failing fast in India ; and nothing has kept up the floating notion of a duty owed to the imperial family but our gratuitous and persevering exhibition of their pretensions—an exhibition attended with much servile obeisance in the etiquettes imposed upon us by the ceremonial of the court."

Regarding this shabby treatment of the Delhi Emperor, Major Archer, in his work already quoted above, wrote :—

"That he likes us (the English) the least, there is no doubt, for from our gripe his Kingdom can never be wrested, to return again into his own keeping ; ... His authority they (the British) have long since refused, but it was stealthy duplicity, honouring him as long as it was found convenient ; and, when no longer requiring the aid of the King's name, that "*tower of strength*," they summed up their acknowledgments within the compass of a pension. Those who defend the Company say, that the King would have been worse used by any of the victorious Native powers ; thus making the scale of evil the rule of conduct. They acted from motives of pure generosity, perhaps ; but merchants are but too rigorous appraisers of profit and loss. On this chapter of accounts, their arithmetic is seldom in error. Let it be stated also, that the King has been shorn of his beams of roy-

alty, his revenues have been seized and converted to the use of strangers, his authority everywhere abrogated but in his own immediate family ; in short, he has lost all the rights, powers, and privileges, everything but the name of a King, and King, too, of Hindustan, for the munificent exchange of twelve lacs annually ! How pleasant it would be to the rulers of the land, to see the heir of the Great Timour defending himself *in forma pauperis* in the petty court for the recovery of small debts in Calcutta. (Vol. I, pp. 126--127).

CHAPTER LIX

Political Aspect of the Marquess of Hastings' Administration

Of the trinity of the Governors-General who extended the dominions of the British in India, during the first half of the nineteenth century, it must be admitted that the means adopted by the Marquess of Hastings appeared in the eyes of the Indian people less objectionable than those of Wellesley or Dalhousie. He appealed partly to arms and not solely to fraud in depriving Indian princes of their territories. And everything being considered just and proper in love and warfare, he has not been so severely handled, and his conduct censured by historians, as were Wellesley and Dalhousie. Perhaps the war with the Gurkhas was not of his own seeking, it might have been forced upon him.

But it cannot be denied that he provoked the Maratha princes to war, which, taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration, must be pronounced to have been an aggressive measure on the part of the Governor-General. He was prompted to undertake the war for his own personal gain and distinctions as well as for making the British Government of India, the head of

what he was pleased to call the "Indian Confederacy." The following record in his *Private Journal* should be adduced in support of the above statement :

"February 1st, 1814.

"Our deficiency in point of numbers might be balanced by the good will acquired from neighbouring powers through our justice and moderation, whence we might look to security against attack. I find nothing of the sort. We are engaged in captious bickerings with all around us. On my taking the reins of government into my hand seven different quarrels likely to demand the decision of arms were transferred to me. Of these Macherry, Rewah, Sawant-Warree, and Kurnool have required military operations. The results have been favorable : but except in the case of Rewah, where it was necessary to punish the Sainghur chiefs, who had waylaid and massacred a party of our sepoy's, not one of these enterprises presents an object which (putting the justice out of the question) was worth the effort. * * * A much more important consideration is that these paltry triumphs leave an inveterate spirit of animosity towards us in the breast of those whom we have overborne.

"A rational jealousy of our power is not likely to excite half the intrigues against us which must naturally be produced by the wanton provocations which we have been giving on trivial subjects to all the states around us.

"With a degree of concert thus indistinctly fashioned, those states must be ready to start up into combination whenever they may see us occupied with an enemy capable of employing our forces for any time. It may not be long before such an enemy may exhibit himself.

The terms of amity on which we at present stand with Runjeet Sing are no guarantee against those projects which his known dislike of us, and his confidence in his own strength, have probably made him revolve in secret. Having reduced all the other communities of the Sikhs beneath his sway, and having subjected all the other territories in his vicinity, he possesses a force which the turbulence of his disposition will impel him to use; and there is no field for its exertion but the part of the British Dominions bordering on the Sutlej. Should the King of Ava, who conceives his armies to be irresistible, at the same moment invade Chittagong, the opposing those attacks at the two extremities of our empire must ungarnish out prodigiously extended flanks. Then, there would be an opening for all the vengeance of the petty states to which I have alluded, as well as for the rapacity of the Pindaries. Such a juncture might be the signal of general effort against us without any apparently adequate cause of war. We have not simply to look to the irritation of those whom we have actually scourged with nettles. Each sovereign must have brought the case home to himself, and must have secretly sympathized with the durbars which he saw insulted and humiliated. The Nawab Vizeer imagined himself to have purchased exemption from these petty but galling vexations by the cession of a large part of his dominions—a cession made under the assurance of his being perfectly independent in what remained. We have been authoritatively interfering with all the minor concerns of his domestic rule, till we have driven him to a desperation which he proclaimed in open durbar. The Rajah of Berar, nominally our friend, has evinced repeatedly his hostile suspicion of us. The Nizam does not disguise his absolute hatred of us, though he is in shackles

whence he cannot extricate himself. The Rajah of Mysore and the British Resident are engaged in a contest of mutual crimination. Scindiah is in the utmost difficulty to find means for keeping his army together, and nothing could be to him a temptation equal to the occasion of plundering our opulent provinces.

Ameer Khan, who wields Holkar's forces, is professedly inimical to us.

Holkar's dominions being exhausted, his army must ravage some other country, otherwise it will dissolve; and he is now negotiating with the Pindarries for a joint attack on Nagpore. This object, on a former occasion, was held so eventually injurious to us that Lord Minto raised an army to march (though under no obligation of a treaty) to protect the Rajah, and baffled the undertaking. I have not money (the Company having no credit in Calcutta) to equip an army even if I saw the policy, as Lord Minto did, of defending Nagpore. Yet I am aware of the possibility that apprehension might make the Rajah suggest to those who are threatening him, a more attractive object for their views by offering to join in an extensive combination for the invasion of our possessions.

In short, I see around me the elements of a war more general than any which we have hitherto encountered in India.

This formidable mischief has arisen from our not having defined to ourselves or made intelligible to the native princes, the quality of the relations which we have established with them.

In our treaties with them we recognise them as independent sovereigns. Then we send a resident to their courts. Instead of acting in the character of ambassador, he assumes the functions of a dictator; interferes in all

their private concerns ; countenances refractory subjects against them ; and makes the most ostentatious exhibition of this exercise of authority. To secure to himself the support of our government, he urges some interest which, under the color thrown upon it by him, is strenuously taken up by our Council ; and the Government identifies itself with the Resident not only on the single point but on the whole tenor of his conduct. In nothing do we violate the feelings of the native princes so much as in the decisions which we claim the privilege of pronouncing with regard to the succession to the musnud. We constantly oppose our construction of Mahomedan law to the right which the Moslem princes claim from usage to choose among their sons the individual to be declared the heir-apparent. It is supposed that by upholding the right of primogeniture we establish an interest with the eldest son which will be beneficial to us when he comes to the throne. I believe nothing can be more delusive. He will profess infinite gratitude as long as our support is useful to him ; but, once seated, his subsequent attachment will always be regulated by the convenience of the day. He, too, will in his turn have to feel our interference in the succession as well as in minor instances. With regard to the latter it might be argued that some interest of the Company is always really involved. The simple existence of such an interest is not the true question. What should be considered, is whether the matter be of a proximity or magnitude to make the prosecution of it desirable at the expense of the disgust and estrangement which you sow by the procedure.

If a willing obedience to the influence of our Government be deemed an essential point, all subordinate concerns ought to be indifferent." (Panini Office Reprint, pp. 24 *et seq.*)

February 6th, 1814.

* * * * *

Our object ought to be, to render the British Government paramount in effect, if not declaredly so. We should hold the other states as vassals, in substance, though not in name; not precisely as they stood in the Mogul Government but possessed of perfect internal sovereignty and only bound to repay the guarantee and protection of their possessions by the British Government with the pledge of two great feudal duties.

First, they should support it with all their forces in any call. Second, they should submit their mutual differences to the head of the confederacy (our Government) without attacking each other's territories, a few subordinate stipulations on our part, with immunities secured in return to the other side (especially with regard to succession), would render the arrangement ample without complication or undue latitude. Were this made palatable to a few states, as perhaps it easily might, the abrogation of treaties with the powers who refuse to submit to the arrangement would soon work upon their apprehensions in a way that would bring them at last within the pale of the compact. The completion of such a system, which must include the extinction of any pretension to pre-eminence in the court of Delhi, demands time and favourable coincidences. While on the other hand the difficulties bequeathed to me are imminent, and might break upon me at any instant. A new Government always produces some suspension in animosities. I have endeavoured to improve the juncture by courteous and conciliatory language to the native powers; and I do hope I may remove considerable soreness. As for the rest, fortune and opportunities must determine; but it is always well to ascertain to one self what one would

precisely desire had one the means of commanding the issue." (*Ibid.*, p. 30)

His declaration to undertake the war for the extermination of the Pindaries was merely a blind to conceal his real object, which was nothing else but that of destroying the power of the Marathas. In the words of a British historian of India, Mr. John Malcolm Ludlow,—who writes :—

"Thus ended the second (or third) Mahratta war,—the last great struggle carried on by the English against the Mahrattas as a nation. One by one all the Mahratta princes had been checked or subdued by force of arms. Yet it is difficult to repress the feeling, that the war, commenced as against each particular chief by some aggression on his part, was rendered inevitable by the proceedings of the English. To assemble 100,000 men for the extirpation of 30,000 ill-armed freebooters, the operations having to be carried on in the heart of the Mahratta country, must have seemed, to each Mahratta prince, a direct threat against him. That there was no previous coalition on their part against us is clearly proved by the desultory nature of their proceedings, even when in the presence of a common danger they might try to combine." (Vol. II, pp.32—33).

The war resulted in the Governor-General becoming richer to the tune of several thousands of pounds than when he had landed on the shores of India. In acknowledgment of the glorious issue of the Maratha war, the East India Company voted the Marquess of Hastings £ 60,000, for the purchase of an estate to be settled in such

manner as might perpetuate the memory of his great services.

The territories added to the Company's Government extended over 50,000 square miles. The whole of the Peishwa's dominions, excepting that portion of the country which was set apart for the Rajah of Satara, came under the sway of the British. The Sindhia, Holkar and Nagpore princes were mulcted of their rich and fertile provinces, and all these territories came to be designated under the euphonious title of "Central Provinces and Central India."

Even the Rajput princes, as price for the protection they had solicited at the hands of the British, were made to contribute both in cash and in land, and thus came into existence the province of Ajmere.

Lord Hastings never cared for ameliorating the condition of the natives of India whom he was sent out to govern. His guiding principles seem to have been to enrich himself and his employers and indirectly his country at the expense of the people of India. It was during his administration that the industries of India were mostly ruined by unjust taxes and exactions. Mr. Ludlow writes :—

"Some very unscrupulous measures, to say the least, in customs' legislation belong, however, also to this period. In the first place, the manufactures of India were, it may be said, deliberately ruined by a general lower-

ing or total abolition of import duties on articles the produce or manufacture of Great Britain, without any reciprocal advantages being given to Indian produce or manufactures when brought home." (*British India*, Part II, pp. (43—44).

He sanctioned the Ryotwari System in Madras, which has done more than anything else to 'abase' the population of that presidency. Regarding the introduction of the Ryotwari System, Mr. Ludlow writes :—

"The system of finance with which Sir Thomas Munro's name is inseparably connected, has worked more deeply than all other causes put together, to 'abase' the whole population which was made subject to it, to render the natives 'more abject and less able to govern themselves,' for, like Lord Wellesley's plan of protection and Subsidiary Alliances, it had this one fault ; that it ignored human nature. Very fascinating, indeed, was the thought of taking account, year by year, of the cultivator's circumstances, asking no more of him but precisely what he could afford at the particular time. True ; but it presupposes only these few little things ; 1st. That the Government shall have at its disposal an unlimited number of angelic officials, perfectly familiar with the languages and customs of the country : 2nd. That such angelic officials shall possess illimitable leisure ; and should be capable of unerring punctuality in their movements ; 3rd. That to such angelic officials, of unlimited leisure and unerring punctuality, the whole revenue functions of the Government shall be confined." (*Ibid*, pp. 37-38).

It may be urged in defence of Lord Hastings that he himself had no hand in the matter, for he

had merely to carry out the orders of his employers, the Directors of the East India Company. How greedy they were of earthly riches, and in what light they looked upon their Indian possessions, will be evident from the following extracts from Financial Letters to Bengal, 6th September, 1813, and 23rd September, 1817. In the latter the Court observes,

"We must explicitly apprise you, that it is to India only, that we look for the supplies necessary to enable us to defray the home territorial charges, by the punctual repayment to the commercial branch of all sums advanced by that branch for territorial purposes in "England;" and again, we cannot contemplate without alarm the possibility of the case assumed by you, however hypothetically, that eventually, it would be your duty to show, that however valuable India would still remain to England, even in a pecuniary point of view, as the course of lucrative commerce and as paying a vast tribute in the returns of private fortunes: yet she demanded in return some aid from England to enable her revenues to bear the expenses necessary to preserve her."

With reference to the above, Prof. H. H. Wilson writes :—

"Divested of all circumlocution, this is an assumption that the people of this country (England) should be taxed for the sake of supporting Indian commerce, and of enabling private individuals in India to acquire fortunes, an assumption which we are confident this country would utterly reject. (*The History of British India*, Mill and Wilson, Vol. 8, p. 400).

It was to enrich England that India's interests were to be sacrificed. To quote the same historian again :—

“The Customs had somewhat declined, but this arose from a measure adopted shortly after the renewal of the charter by which, in consequence of orders from home, the duties were generally lowered, and a variety of articles, the produce or manufacture of Great Britain, wholly exempted from any charge upon their being imported into India. As similar immunities were not granted to the manufactures or products of India in the ports of the United Kingdom, this was a piece of selfish legislation in which the interests of the dominant country were alone consulted, and those of the subordinate dependency deliberately injured, the latter being not only deprived of a legitimate source of revenue, but being further exposed to an unequal competition under which native industry was already rapidly declining. Some compensation was made to the country by the augmentation of its commerce.”

Then, in a footnote, he adds :—

“It might be argued, that India benefited by the reduced price of the commodities imported from Great Britain, in proportion to the amount of the duty remitted. But this was disadvantageous in another respect, as it rendered the articles of domestic production still less able to compete with foreign articles in the market, and further discouraged native industry. The competition was unfair. India was young in the process of manufacture, and was never likely to improve, if her manufactures were to be crushed in their infancy. Could time have been allowed for the acquisition of experience and

the introduction of machinery, her cotton fabrics and her metals would probably have been saleable in her own markets for a less cost than those of Europe. A native sovereign would undoubtedly have given India a chance by the imposition of protective duties." (*Ibid*, p.397).

Had Lord Hastings been possessed of any conscience, he would have strongly protested against all these unjust measures ; and if his protests were of no avail, he should have resigned the office of Governor-General of India, rather than be an instrument in destroying the prosperity of the millions of India's inhabitants.

While, no doubt, he was guilty of much unnecessary bloodshed, and the miseries he inflicted on many Indian princes, nobles, and chiefs, he should be given the credit of a foresighted statesman in that he gave the warning that the frontiers of the British Empire in India should not be pushed to the river Indus and the countries around and beyond it. The conquest of Sind could have been very easily accomplished by him and that, too, without in any way enhancing the reputation of the British for bad faith, (as the subsequent conquest of that country by Sir Charles Napier undoubtedly did), had he been inclined to do so. When during his administration, the little principality of Cutch was drawn into an alliance with the British Government of India, which therefore commenced to interfere in the affairs of that

State, the Ameers of Sind were naturally alarmed by having the English as their neighbours.

Prof. H. H. Wilson quotes from manuscript records the views of Lord Hastings regarding the extension of the boundaries of the British Empire of India to the banks of the Indus.

"Few things," the Government of Bengal remarked, "would be more impolitic than a war with Sindh, as its successful prosecution would not only be unprofitable, but an evil. The country was not worth possessing, and its occupation would involve us in all the intrigues and wars, and incalculable embarrassments of the countries beyond the Indus. Hostilities might become unavoidable hereafter; but it was wise to defer their occurrence as long as possible." (*Ibid*, p. 316).

How devoutly one could have wished that these views had prevailed in the councils of his successors, like Bentinck, Auckland, Ellenborough and Dalhousie. That would have saved India millions of money and thousands of lives, besides which all those provinces would have enjoyed independent existence and consequently the happiness which independence alone confers.*

* It was Metcalfe who induced Lord Hastings not to go to war with the Sindhians. Kaye in his "Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe" (pages 146—148) has given extracts from Metcalfe's Minute on this subject. Kaye says:—"These last extracts are made from the draft of a paper, drawn up in 1819, or 1820, for Lord Hastings, when Metcalfe was Political Secretary.

A party of Scindians, on their way through Cutch to Bombay, had been attacked by a body of our people in pursuit of plunderers; in revenge for which the Scindians devastated a village in Cutch. This affair wellnigh occasioned a war between the English and Scindian powers; but the amicable counsels fostered by Metcalfe, which prevailed at Calcutta, averted hostilities for a time. He lived, however, to see and deplore the rupture which subsequently converted Scinde into a British principality."

CHAPTER LX

Recall of the Marquess of Hastings

The Marquess of Hastings was recalled from the Governor-Generalship of India, because he was not an honest man. Writes Torrens in his *Empire in Asia, How we came by it, A book of confessions* (pp. 290—291, Panini Office Reprint) :—

“To meet the military expenditure which four successive campaigns had entailed, the Governor-General was obliged to raise money on any terms that might be demanded from an insolvent treasury. He borrowed largely from the Vizier of Oude ; and when other securities were not forthcoming, he sold him the provinces left from the Goorkhas,—the foolish Sadat Ali forgetting that he who gave for a valuable consideration could take away without one. Provinces and their inhabitants were treated as chattels by this chivalrous statesman of the superfine court of the Regency, who being a man of sentiment and honour, and not as other men, might do, in short, anything he pleased. It pleased him to sanction a near relative becoming a partner in the financial house of W. Palmer and Co, at Hyderabad, whose usurious dealings with the Nizam were of a nature to call forth the denunciation of the Court of Directors, as being utterly regardless of the limits of decorum. The newly made Marquis defended Palmer and Co. as injured and insulted individuals and challenged the investigation of accounts which had been framed

upon figure-proof principles. The friends of the Viceroy relied upon his character as a man notoriously indifferent as to money to show that he could not have been in any way to blame in the shameful business at Hyderabad. Had he not squandered his patrimony, nobody knew how, and then offered to govern India for the benefit of his creditors? Could anything be more gallant or unsordid? And was he not now "most noble?" The Nizam, it is true, was simply fleeced by a firm of whom the Viceroy's relation was one. But no one could believe that the Marquis knew anything of the transactions; and the tenderness of his domestic affections forbade him to think evil of his kinsfolk. So the Nizam was robbed; and Lord Hastings came home; and,—that was all. Lord Amherst, who succeeded to the Government in 1823, was not a fine gentleman of the George IV. school, but was only an honest man; and one of his first acts, therefore, was to lend the Nizam money to liquidate his debts to Palmer and Co. which he did upon condition that the Court of Hyderabad should have no more dealings with the firm, soon afterwards compelled thereby to suspend their commercial enterprises. The conqueror of the Gurkhas and the Marhattas reappeared in London society as badly off as ever; and after having seized and occupied for a season the throne of Tamerlane, he was glad to take the Governorship of Malta as a sinecure pension for his closing days."

CHAPTER LXI

The Administration of Lord Amherst (1823—1828)

The Marquess of Hastings, without waiting for the arrival of his successor from England, left India for good. The senior member of the Supreme Council was appointed to officiate as Governor-General till the arrival of the permanent incumbent of that post. Mr. Adams, who happened to be senior member was brought up in the atmosphere of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, and the free expression of opinion by the public press was distasteful to him. He did not like to leave it free and untrammelled, but being clothed in brief authority exhibited his power by forcibly shipping off one Mr. J. S. Buckingham to Europe, whose offence was that he had published in the *Calcutta Journal*, of which he was the editor, some remarks on a Scotch clergyman which the acting Governor-General did not like.

Happily, Mr. Adams' tenure of office was only for seven months ; for on the first August 1823, Lord Amherst landed in Calcutta and was installed as Governor-General.

The choice of the authorities in England did

not at first fall on Lord Amherst as successor to the Marquess of Hastings. They offered it to Mr. George Canning, on whose refusal at first and then on his inability to come out to India, Lord Amherst was appointed to that office.

Lord Amherst derived his title from his uncle, who gained the baton of field-marshal, and, for the high reputation he acquired as Commander-in-chief of the army in America from 1758 to 1764, was rewarded with a peerage. So the Governor-General could not boast of being the son of a peer, or of blue blood coursing in his veins.

Lord Amherst had been a few months only in India, when he declared war against Burma.

CHAPTER LXII

The First Burmese War

To understand the causes and circumstances which led to the first Burmese War, it is necessary to go back to the period when Lord Minto was the Governor-General of India. During his tenure of office, persons living within the territory of the East India Company invaded the kingdom of Burma and returned with their spoils to the Company's territory. The chief of these raiders was one Kingberring. His antecedents are thus described by Lord Minto and his colleagues in a despatch to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, dated 23rd January, 1812:—

“In the early part of the past year a native of Arracan, named Kingberring, whose ancestor as well as himself possessed lands to a considerable extent in that province, near the frontier of Chittagong, and who in consequence of his having incurred the displeasure, and been exposed to the resentment of the King of Ava, took refuge with a number of his followers in the district of Chittagong, about fourteen years ago meditated the design of embodying those followers, as well as the other Mugs, who many years since emigrated from Arracan, and invading the latter province. This project

he actually carried into execution in the month of May 1811, having either by persuasion, or by intimidation, induced a large body of the Mugs, settled in Chittagong, to join his standard."

Under the circumstances it was natural for the authorities of Burma to believe that the invasion of the province was instigated and supported by the British Government. The latter did not offer any compensation to the Burmese Government for the injuries suffered by its subjects; but sent an envoy "to undeceive the Burmese Court, with regard to" the British Government's "supposed participation in the proceedings of Kingberring."

Lord Minto had also another object in view in sending the envoy to Burma.

"Independently, however, of the importance of this object, founded on the solicitude of Government to avoid being placed in a state of war with the Kingdom of Ava, it appeared to be essential also with reference to the safety of the British subjects and British property at Rangoon."

The depressed state of the Company's finances did not allow Lord Minto to follow in the footsteps of Lord Wellesley and go to war with the neighbouring states. But he tried to achieve his object by diplomacy and sending to different powers ambassadors, whose profession was to lie as well as to espy out the strength of the Courts to which they were accredited.

Captain Canning was selected for the situation

of an Envoy to the Court of Ava. He had been twice before to Burma, first in 1803 as British Agent at Rangoon, and a second time in 1809, to explain the nature of the blockade imposed upon the trade with the Isles of France. He was therefore peculiarly qualified for the duty of Envoy and was appointed as such on a salary of 1500 Rupees a month. He proceeded to Rangoon in the latter end of September 1811, in the ship *Amboyna*, under an escort consisting of 112 Sepoys, and taking with him presents of the value of 10,000 Rupees for the King of Burma.

The authorities in Burma entertained the belief that a large force of Mugs under Kingberring could not have been collected in a British province, nor the invasion have taken place, without the knowledge and participation of the British Government. This belief was very strong in the minds of the Burmese authorities and owing to that conviction, a few British ships were seized and detained at Rangoon. At the same time a Burmese envoy was also despatched to Calcutta for making representation on the subject of the transactions in Arracan.

The British ships were subsequently released. Captain Canning ascribed their liberation to the effect of the personal interests of the Viceroy of Rangoon, "who, deeply engaged in commercial speculations, was averse to the adoption of

measures tending to disturb the relations of amity between the two states."

Negotiations were also carried on between the representatives of the Raja of Arracan and the Magistrate of Chittagong. The Burmese authorities demanded the surrender of Kingberring and other insurgent Mug refugees, together with the Civil Surgeon of Chittagong, named Dr. M. 'Rae, against whom the charge was preferred by the Rajah of Arracan of having patronized Kingberring. From the manner in which the Burmese authorities persisted in accusing the British of instigating the invasion of Arracan, it does not seem improbable that they might have done so.

What must have strengthened their belief was the manner in which the emigrants from Arracan were treated in Chittagong. It is on record that in the years 1797 and 1798, between thirty and forty thousand persons emigrated from Arracan into the Chittagong District. An officer, Captain Cox, was employed to superintend their location, and the situation in which they were located was subsequently known as Cox's Bazar. The natives of Arracan were encouraged to emigrate into the Company's territory of Chittagong by lands being assigned to them sufficient for their maintenance. H. H. Wilson (Vol. IX, p. 11) writes that "the Government of Bengal had resolved to admit the emigrants to the advantages of permanent coloni-

sation, and assigned them unoccupied lands in the southern portion of the district." These fugitives used to disturb the peace of the Burmese Kingdom.

Lord Minto and his councillors also admitted the just grounds of complaint of the Burmese against the British Government. In their despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 1st August, 1812, they wrote:—

"The State of Ava had sustained a deep injury at the hands of men who were under our authority and protection, and derived their means of committing it from our territory. The Burmese Government had, therefore, some plausible reason for charging us with a participation in that injury. Under this impression, its officers conceived they had a right to demand the surrender of the immediate perpetrators of the outrage."

The demand of the Burmese authorities for the surrender of Kingberring and other Mug insurgent chiefs was not an unjustifiable one—indeed it was founded on precedents. For some twenty years previously, that is in 1793, when some insurgent Burmese chiefs of note fled into the Company's territory of Chittagong, they were delivered to the Burmese authorities and were dealt with according to the laws of their country.

But the British Government was not willing to do that reparation to the Burmese which the laws of nations declare just and equitable to the aggrieved party. Captain Canning was playing the part of a

spy. He was taking note of the military strength of the Burmese Government. He proposed to his Government to enter into something like subsidiary alliance with Burma and thus to reduce it to the position of a feudatory state of India. In their despatch to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, dated 4th March, 1812, Lord Minto and his colleagues wrote :—

“Captain Canning also relates, that antecedently to the arrival of the intelligence of the successes of the Burmese arms against the insurgents, the Viceroy, in a private conversation with the envoy’s interpreter, had remarked of what great utility a battalion of Sepoys would be in suppressing the insurrection ; intimating, at the same time, that such a force, if furnished by us, would of course be paid for by the Burmese Government. * * Captain Canning. * * conceiving it not improbable that some such proposal might be made by the Court of Ava, and desired to receive a communication of our sentiments on the subject, stated that without further specific orders from us he should of course decline acceding to such a proposal ; but observing at the same time, that should it enter into the views of *Government to obtain a preponderating influence in the Burmese dominions, the present was certainly the most favorable moment, as the weakness of the Government and general discontent of the people would put the whole country at the disposal of a very small British force.*”

The words which have been italicised in the above extract leave little room to doubt that Kingberring and other insurgents had been instigated by

the British Government to invade the Burmese dominion with some ulterior object in view.

But Captain Canning had so well noted the military strength of Burma, that he even advised the British Government to go to war with the state. In their despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 1st August, 1812, Lord Minto and his colleagues write :-

"The observations stated by Captain Canning * * regarding the advantages with which the British Government would enter upon a contest with the power of Ava, were unquestionably well founded. The coasts and provinces of that country are certainly exposed to our attack without the means of defence, and the only part of our territory accessible to the Burmese forces might with ease be effectually protected. Of our complete and speedy success in the war, therefore, little doubt could be entertained."

But at that time it was not convenient for the British Government to launch on a war.

"We observed, that the expediency or in expediency of engaging in a contest with the state of Ava did not altogether depend upon the advantages with which it might be undertaken, and the prospect of success; that great inconvenience and embarrassment would attend it with reference to other interests and exigencies of the public service. * * ; and we should consider the extension of our dominion to the Eastward and Southward to be more burthensome than beneficial; and that those considerations outweighed on the whole, at least at that time, the object which we allowed to be desirable, of check-

ing the arrogance and presumption of that weak and contemptible state."

It is clear then why the British Government was so unwilling to make amends to the Burmese for the losses and injuries the latter had suffered at the hands of Kingberring and other domiciled fugitives of the Company's territory. The British Government were making preparations for a war with the Burmese, whom they were bent upon irritating and provoking to war.

What a successful spy Captain Canning proved to be is evident from Minto's dispatch, dated 21st October, 1812, where Captain Canning is credited with

"acquiring that intimate knowledge of the internal condition of the dominion of Ava, the character of its government, and the state of its power and resources, which future events may render essentially important to the interests of the public service."

According to the diplomatic language of Lord Minto and his councillors, Captain Canning's mission to Burma was a successful one. In their despatch of 21st October, 1812, they wrote :—

"We observed, that we considered Captain Canning not only to have accomplished the objects of his mission in the utmost degree practicable under the disadvantages and difficulties arising from the ignorance and arrogance of the barbarous Government to which he had been accredited, by establishing at the Courts of Ummeerapoor and Rangoon the belief which, independently of his

mission, they could not easily have been induced to admit, that the British Government had no concern in the invasion of Kingberring, and by obtaining in consequence the recall of the Burmese troops from the frontier of Chittagong: but to have rendered his mission subservient to purposes of a more general and comprehensive nature, by inspiring the Burmese authorities with juster notions of the character, principles, and power of the British Government, by exacting the respect which was due to it, by supplying to those authorities motives of conduct calculated to restrain the ebullitions of their accustomed insolence and haughtiness, and to render practicable, a continuance of the intercourses of amity between the two states."

The unvarnished truth is just the reverse of the above, which is the language of diplomacy. Captain Canning did not inspire the Burmese "with juster notions of the character, principles, and power of the British Government," for had it been so, the war would never have ensued.

Year after year, whenever the season was propitious, Kingberring used to collect his adherents, the fugitive Mugs, and invade Arracan. The British Government made profuse promises to the Burmese authorities for his apprehension; but all these seem to have been for mere show, for no systematic efforts were ever made to capture him—no efforts like those which were considered necessary to seize the leaders of the Pindaries and to crush their hordes. Uninterrupted or very probably secretly encouraged by the British,

Kingberring and his followers committed depredations in the dominion of Burma, and, when defeated, returned to, and found asylum in, the Company's territory. Their pursuit by the Burmese troops in the British district was strictly forbidden. This state of affairs continued for years. Kingberring, however, died at the commencement of the year 1815.

The news of the death of this insurgent chief was communicated by the British Government to the Burmese authorities. In the despatch from the Governor-General in Council at Fort William in Bengal, to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, dated 20th December, 1817, it is stated :—

“As the death of Kingberring was an occurrence of considerable interest to the Burmese Government, the Vice-President in Council was of opinion that a communication of the intelligence to the Governor of Arracan from the British Government would not fail to be regarded as an acceptable act of friendship, as well as a proof of the sincerity of the disposition which the British Government had uniformly professed to discount, the proceedings of the insurgents.”

The death of Kingberring was expected to produce tranquility in Chittagong and Arracan. But this was not to be. The mantle of Kingberring had fallen on other fugitive chiefs. So again the Burmese authorities made a demand for the surrender of the Mug insurgents. But a compliance with the demand was declined,

"on the grounds of its being inconsistent with the principles of the British Government to deliver up a race of people who had sought protection in its territory, and had resided in it upwards of thirty years."*

It is not improbable that the Burmese authorities, being insulted and slighted by the British, and their dominion being invaded by men whom they suspected of being instigated by the British, were inspired with feelings of hostility against the latter. They could not have gone to war with a strong Power like the British single-handed. Perhaps the Burmese Government sought an alliance with the native powers of India in order to expel the English from India. In the despatch from the Governor-General in Council to the Directors of the East India Company, dated 24th June, 1813, it is stated: —

"The probability of some extravagant scheme being in the contemplation of the Burmese Government was in some measure supported by the narrative of a merchant of Chittagong, who had lately returned to that station from Arracan. . . . The sum of the information collected from the merchant, was, that a plan had been formed by the Burmese Government for uniting the principal States of India in a Confederacy against the British Government, with a view to expel the British force from India

"Visionary and absurd as are the schemes ascribed to

* Papers relating to East India Affairs: *viz.*, Discussions with the Burmese Government, p. 116, paragraph 23.

the King of Ava, we were not disposed to discredit the report of their being actually entertained by the ignorant, arrogant and barbarous government of that country."

It was suspected that emissaries of the King of Ava were intriguing with the Marathas. In the despatch from the Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors, dated 17th March, 1820, it is stated:—

"The Governor of Merghege, a Bunnan chief of great eminence, had been permitted to visit the upper provinces for professed purposes connected with religion. There is reason to surmise that his real object was to ascertain the real strength and determination of the Marathas, in consequence of previous overtures from them: and it is probable that he had adopted delusive notions of both."

We cannot blame the Burmese for the step they took. Indeed they were compelled to adopt it in self-preservation. The English had been scheming for the conquest of Burma and their attitude to that State was anything but friendly. But the Marathas had been crushed and there was no other native power in India whose alliance could have been of any avail to the Burmese.

They turned their attention to Assam, where discord and dissensions were at that time the normal state of affairs. They imitated the English in their dealings with that State. They took advantage of the unsettled condition of Assam and annexed it to the Burmese Empire. This was

considered a grievance by the English. In a despatch from the Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors, dated 31st July, 1823, it is stated:—

“Your honorable Court will be apprised by our regular reports, that the Government of Ava has taken advantage of the dissensions prevailing in the Assamese territory, to obtain military occupation of the country, and to set aside its native princes: thus the Burmese nation has come in contact with our territories, at another and most inconvenient point, and by the possession of Assam they have acquired the command of the upper part of the Burrampootee.”

Again in another despatch, dated the 12th September, 1823, it is stated;—

“Mr. Scott’s letter, contains some remarks on the subject of the occupation of Assam by the Burmese, which will, doubtless, attract the attention of Your Honorable Court.

“He observes, that the Burmese having obtained complete possession of Assam, and a person of that nation (Mengee Maha Silwa) having been appointed to the supreme authority, the country may now be considered as a province of the Burmah Empire; and although it appeared from Lieutenant Davidson’s last letter that he was satisfied in regard to the amicable disposition of their commander, and that he did not consider any immediate reinforcement of his detachment necessary, yet the substitution of a warlike, and, comparatively speaking, powerful government, in the place of the feeble administration that formerly ruled Assam, in a situation so commanding, and with such extensive means of

offence, would no doubt render it necessary that some permanent measures should be adopted for the future security of the Rungpore frontier, and of the country on the lower parts of the Bûrrampooter, Megna and Ganges.

"From the account of the equipment of the Burmese forces furnished by Lieutenant Davidson, he conceived it obvious, that if inclined at any time to assert their claim to the Dacca province, or to plunder that rich country, it will in future be impossible for the British power, either effectually to oppose them, or to overtake them on their retreat, without some other description of force than troops unwilling, or unaccustomed to act both as boatmen and soldiers."

In the above will be noticed the anxiety of the English to go to war with the Burmese. That they even intrigued with the Assamese to expel the Burmese is evident from the following paragraph from the despatch from which extracts have already been made above :---

"We informed Mr. Scott that we had long been sensible of the evil resulting from the conquest of Assam by the Burmese, *and should view, with much satisfaction, any successful attempt on the part of its oppressed inhabitants to expel that people*; but in the present state of our relations with Ava, no countenance could be given by us, directly or indirectly, to the efforts of the Assamese to recover their independence."

Of course, the above is couched in diplomatic language. If divested of the cloud of words, it means that they were doing everything in their power to provoke the Burmese to hostilities.

The Burmese were Buddhists by religion and so were not divided into castes as the Hindoos of India. They were one compact homogeneous nation, and education was prevalent in Burma to a degree which was unknown in Christian countries at that time. It is evident that the Burmese were now bent upon extending their Empire. H. H. Wilson, in his *Narrative of the Burmese War* (pp. 1-2), writes :

"The vigorous despotism of the government, and the confident courage of the people, crowned every enterprise with success, and for above half a century the Burman arms were invariably victorious, whether wielded for attack or defence. Shortly after their insurrection against Pegu, the Burmans became the masters of that Kingdom. They next wrested valuable districts of the Tenasserim coast from Siam. They repelled with great gallantry, a formidable invasion from China, and by the final annexation of Arakan, Manipur, and Assam, to the empire, they established themselves throughout the whole of the narrow, but extensive tract of the country, which separates the Western provinces of China along the Eastern boundaries of Hindustan. Along the greater part of this territory they threatened the open plains of British India, and they only awaited a plausible pretext to assail the barrier, which in their estimation, as presumptuously as idly, opposed the further prosecution of their triumphs."

So the British were alarmed when the Burmese annexed Assam, for, to quote the above-mentioned author again :—

"The vicinity of a powerful and ambitious neighbour

was, therefore, substituted for a feeble and distracted state; and this proximity was the more a subject of reasonable apprehension, as from the country being intersected by numerous rivers, and from the Burmas being equally prepared to combat by water as by land, it was at any time in their power to invade and plunder the British provinces, without its being possible to offer effective opposition, or to intercept their retreat, under the existing constitution of our defensive force." (*Ibid.*, p. 16.)

The British were not to be so easily nonplussed by the Burmese. They intrigued with the prince of Kachar, whom they intended to take under their protection. By this arrangement

"they were enabled to occupy the principal passes into the low lands of Sylhet, and thus effectively oppose the advance of the Burmas from the district of Manipur, which they had some short time previously reduced to their authority." (*Ibid.*, p. 19).

The treaty was concluded between Mr. David Scott, Agent to the Governor-General, on the part of the Honourable East India Company, and Rajah Govind Chunder Naryn of Kachar on the 6th of March, 1824. By this treaty the Raja signed away his independence.

But this move on the part of the English precipitated hostilities with Burma. The British intended to execute the treaty to make Kachar as their base of operations against the Burmese in Assam. The whole of Assam was, as it were, within the sphere of influence of the

Burmese. At that stage when the Burmese "prepared to invade Kachar," the intention on the part of the British of executing a treaty with that principality naturally offended them. H. H. Wilson writes :—

"Notwithstanding the intimation of these determinations to the Burmese, they persisted in their purpose of invading Kachar, and thereby provoked the commencement of actual hostilities in that quarter." (*Ibid.* p. 22).

The war was declared by the Governor-General against Burmah on 5th March, 1824.* And the Treaty with the Rajah of Kachar was executed at Buddeerpore on the 6th of March, 1824. (*Ibid.* p. 79.)

So from the dates mentioned above, it is quite evident that the Burmese gave no reasonable cause of provocation to the British when they invaded Kachar, because that principality had not been then under the protection of the East India Company.

From the side of Chittagong, for many years past, the Burmese had been molested. As narrated before, the British Government, did not make any reparation or pay any compensation to the Burmese for the losses which they suffered at the hands of Kingberring and other Mug refugees who had found asylum in the Company's territory. It is small wonder then that they should now retaliate

* Aitchison's Treaties, 1st, Vol. (1st. Edition of 1862) p. 202.

and insult the Company's Government in every manner possible. H. H. Wilson (*Ibid*, pp. 23 *et seq*) writes :—

Repeated instances of actual aggression had still more distinctly marked either their intention of provoking hostilities, or their indifference as to their occurrence. The chief objects of these acts of violence were the elephant hunters in the Company's employ, whom the Burmas seized, and carried off repeatedly, under the pretext that they were within the territories of the king of Ava ; a pretext that had never been urged throughout the long series of years, during which the Company's hunters had followed the chase in the jungles and hills of the Eastern frontier. In May 1821, the Burmas carried off from the party employed in the Ramoo hills, the Darogah, the Jemadar, and twenty-three of their men, on whom they inflicted personal severities, and then threw them into confinement at Mungdoo, * *

* *The same system of violence was adopted in another part of the Chittagong district, in order to maintain pretensions to territorial jurisdiction equally unfounded with those made upon the elephant grounds of Ramoo, in order to establish the right of the Burmas to the whole extent of the Naf river, * * The Burmas claimed the right of levying a toll upon all boats entering the mouth of the river, although upon the British side ; and on one occasion in January 1823, a boat laden with rice having entered the river on the West or British side of the Channel, was challenged by an armed Burman boat, which demanded duty. As the demand was unprecedented, the Mugs, who were British subjects, demurred payment, on which the Burmas fired upon them, killed the manjhee or steersman, and then retired. This outrage was followed by reports

of the assemblage of armed men on the Burman side of the river, for the purpose of destroying the villages on the British territory, and in order to provide against such a contingency, as well as to prevent the repetition of any aggression upon the boats trafficking on the Company's side of the river, the military guard at Tek Naf, or the mouth of the Naf, was strengthened from twenty to fifty men, of whom a few were posted on the adjoining island of Shahpuri. * *

This was resented by the Burmans, and they claimed Shahpuri as belonging to their kingdom. The British authorities did not give a very satisfactory reply, but made a proposal to depute commissioners on the part of either Government to meet, not immediately, but some months afterwards to determine all questions respecting the disputed territory on the borders.

The British authorities not settling the matter at once led the Burmes to occupy Shahpuri by force. This was no doubt an affront to the British which they could not overlook. Accordingly, two companies of a native regiment (20th Infantry) were forwarded from Calcutta. They landed on Shahpuri on the 21st November and did not meet with any resistance from the Burmese.

"A proclamation was distributed at the same time, stating that the only object of the detachment was the re-occupation of the island, and that the intercourse of the people on the frontier should suffer no interruption from their presence. The force left on the spot was two Companies of the 2nd battation 20th regiment native

infantry, and two field pieces, six-pounders, on the stockade at Shahpuri ; one company at Tek Naf ; and the *Planet*, armed vessel, and three gun-boats, each carrying twelve pounder carronade, were stationed in the Naf.”*

By the re-occupation of the island of Shahpuri, the British prestige was restored. The Burmese at that time were not prepared to go to war with the English. But the military demonstration of the latter no doubt showed them that the British meant war with them.

Lord Amherst, who was the governor-general of India at this period, was not an expert in military matters like his predecessor. It would seem that to emulate the conduct of the Marquess of Hastings, he was also bent upon war with Burma. He consulted the Commander-in-chief on the matter. General Sir Edward Paget arrived in India as Commander-in-chief in the winter of 1822. He had never served in this country before and was not well acquainted with the Company's officers and men. Being an autocrat, he did not like the manly spirit of the Company's officers. In his evidence before the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company, given on 8th May, 1839, he said:—

“It is perfectly impossible for me (called upon to give evidence here) to conceal from this committee that there

* *Wilson's Narrative of the Burmese War*, pp. 30-31.

is a great spirit of insubordination in the army, at least that I had the opportunity of more particularly seeing, which is the Bengal army. A sort of spirit of independence prevails amongst the officers, which is totally inconsistent with our ideas of military discipline."

He wanted the officers to be cringing, subservient tools in his hands. It was he who should be held responsible for the Barrackpore Mutiny which resulted in the deliberate massacre of several hundreds of innocent sepoys. With that egotism and self-sufficiency which characterised Sir Edward Paget, it does not appear that he asked the Company's officers to furnish him with their opinions and advice regarding the Burmese affair.

Of course, he was a military man, and so it was not to be expected that he would give any advice which would preserve peaceful relations with the Burmese. No, he was for war, which is the royal road to fortune, honor and glory for military men.

Unfortunately Lord Amherst and his council also listened to the counsels of the Commander-in-chief, and so arrangements were adopted for carrying on the war with the Burmese. Sir E. Paget suggested that the course of operations on the frontier should be defensive, that is, for the protection of the British provinces, and expulsion of the Burmese from the territories which they had wrested from the native princes of Assam,

while the offensive system should be an attack by sea on the Burmese coast.

According to the plan of operations recommended by the Commander-in-chief, a large force was despatched to the frontier. No formal declaration of war had as yet been made by the British Government. So the plausible excuse for the despatch of the large force to the frontier was to render assistance to the Raja of Kachar. It has been pointed out before that the treaty with the Raja of Kachar was not concluded till the 6th of March, 1824, while the despatch of troops was taking place towards the close of the year 1823.

A brush of the British force with the Burmese who had invaded Kachar was inevitable.

The Burman armies entered Kachar in different directions, and it was considered necessary to resist their progress, before they occupied positions which would give them the command of the Sylhet frontier. Without making any representations to, or remonstrance with the Burmese, the civil authority on the frontier of Assam advised the British officers to oppose the advance of the Burmese by force, and so hostilities ensued.

Before the declaration of war, and without sufficient *causæ belli*, for, as said above, the East India Company had not executed any treaty with the Raja of Kachar, the British took the offensive and were guilty of the breach of friendly relations

which till then existed between the Governments of Ava and India. Irritated by the conduct of the British, and smarting under the provocations which the Burmese Government had been receiving at their hands for a number of years, they perhaps did not show that diplomatic etiquette towards the representatives of the East India Company, which international laws enjoin on every state.

After the withdrawal of the British detachment from the island of Shahpuri in January 1824, the Bengal Government deputed Mr. Robertson and Captain Cheap to meet any persons whom the Burmese government might depute to define and settle the boundary. They had arrived at Tek Naf when the Raja of Arracan sent four persons to meet them. The Burmese envoys very reasonably urged as a preliminary condition of the Conference that the island in dispute should be allowed to be considered as neutral, and to be occupied by neither power. This reasonable demand of the Burmese was not attended to by the British authorities, and hence the Burmese envoys returned to their own country, without settling the disputed boundary.

The Burmese authorities seized Mr. Chew, the commander of the *Sophia*, a pilot vessel which had been sent after the withdrawal of the detachment from Shahpuri, to serve as a substitute for the troops removed from that island. Mr.

Chew, with some of the native seamen, was taken prisoner to Arakan, and as a condition for his release, the Burmese authorities asked for the chief Mug refugees to be delivered to them. He was kept at Arakan from the 20th January to 13th February, when he was sent back.

This arrest of a British officer formed the chief ground on the part of the English for the declaration of hostilities against the Burmese.

The British had been making preparations for the war since some time past, and now without demanding any explanation or reparation from the Burmese for their conduct in seizing Mr. Chew and native seamen, they declared war with Burma. The Governor-General in Council issued a long declaration, dated 24th February 1824, the text of which is inserted in full in Mill and Wilson's *History of India*, Vol. IX, pp. 397 *et seq.*

Regarding this war, Major Archer, in his *Tours in Upper India, and in parts of the Himalaya Mountains* (Vol. II, p. 298), wrote:—

"The Ava war, entered upon in all the hurry of fear, was of course not guided by judgment, either in the plan of operations or the most fitting time for commencing them. But I will not here repeat the absurdity which characterised the doings of the Indian Government, which with all the goodnature of fancied over-strength, gratuitously told the Burmese of the intended attack; and, in the extensive preparations of some months, gave the

enemy ample time to make the best defence in his power. If ever the bull was taken by the horns, it was on this occasion."

We agree with the above-named author in thinking that the war was unnecessary. He writes (*Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 301):—

"It may be deemed a bold assertion, that the war was wholly unnecessary, especially with respect to the circumstances of responsibility and importance which accompanied it from the commencement to the termination. In the first place, the Government was most profoundly ignorant of the country, its resources, and its means of offence and defence; and the only authority upon which it built the structure of its policy, was the narrative of 'Symes's Embassy to Ava,' and the reminiscences of an officer who had accompanied it. To the latter, implicit confidence was yielded, and vast influential authority delegated; but it was quickly perceived that the several points of information gathered in the previous visit to Ava, were not of the slightest use in the present state of affairs; and the utmost of the knowledge acquired sufficed only to take the fleet abreast of the town of Rangoon."

Captain Canning's report, which has already been referred to before, misled the Indian Government respecting the military strength and fighting capacity of the Burmese. In fact, that officer had urged the Government to go to war with Burma, and had represented that such a war would not be attended with any difficulties for the British.*

* When the war was finally decided upon, Captain Canning was consulted as to the best mode of conducting

The plan of operations sketched out by the Commander-in-chief was pursued and troops were despatched to the frontier by road and to Rangoon by sea. The high-caste Bengal sepoys, to whom crossing the sea meant excommunication, were not sent to Rangoon. But the Madras sepoy, not so scrupulous about caste, was made use of for this purpose.

Sir Thomas Munro was the Governor of Madras at this time, and he was asked to make all the

it. In a memorandum, dated Government House, March 4th, 1824, he advised the plan of advancing entirely by water. But some of the points discussed in his paper were not approved of by Sir Thomas Munro, to whom the paper was forwarded by Lord Amherst for perusal and opinion. In his letter to the Governor-General, dated Madras, 21st March 1824, Sir Thomas Munro wrote:—

“I should certainly place more dependence on the ultimate success of an attack by Munnipoor than by Rangoon, because, though it may require more time, yet regular troops possess greater advantages against irregulars in acting by land than by water; and the success of their operations is not left to depend on their finding a sufficient number of boats.”

Thus it will be noticed that the plan of operations recommended by Munro was diametrically opposed to that of the Commander-in-chief. Of course, Munro was a better and more trustworthy authority on all matters pertaining to India than Sir Edward Paget. Had Munro's advice been followed, much of the expense incurred on the war, would have been saved.

necessary arrangements to equip and dispatch troops to Rangoon. He himself admitted in a letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated Madras, 18th September, 1824 :—

"I was probably more surprised at hearing of the intended war than people at home will be; for I never had the least suspicion that we were to go to war with the king of Ava, till a letter reached this Presidency, in February last, asking us what number of troops we could furnish for foreign service. I thought that the local officers of Chittagong and Arracan might have carried on their petty aggressions on both frontiers for another year, and that they would probably have got tired and settled matters among themselves."*

The second sentence of the above extract clearly shows how unjustiable was the war which the Indian Government had declared against the Burmese.

Munro did what he had been ordered to do by the Supreme Government. However, he gave a piece of advice which the Governor-General would have done well to act upon. In his letter to Lord Amherst, dated Madras, 25th February, 1824, he wrote :—

"The distance between Calcutta and Madras making it nearly a month before an answer can be received to a letter, renders all sudden operations, in which the forces of both Presidencies are to co-operate, extremely liable

* Gleig's Life of Sir Thomas Munro, 2nd Vol. (1831), pp. 220-222.

to accidents, because there is no time for consultation or explanation ; and under such circumstances, no operations are so liable to failure as maritime expeditions. A service of this kind requires, more than any other, that every equipment should be ample, because there can seldom be any medium between complete success and failure : partial success is little better than an expensive failure.

* * *

"I must own, with the little information which I can be supposed to possess, I should think it better to avoid all inferior expeditions, to wait until we are fully prepared for the main one, and to undertake it with such a force as should leave no doubt of success. This would give time for the two Governments to communicate freely, and for the subordinate one to understand exactly what it was to do, and to make its arrangements accordingly : and it would be more likely, in the end, both to ensure success and to save expense. The occasional hostilities on the eastern frontier of Bengal might, perhaps, still be allowed to continue for some months without much serious inconvenience : and even if the Burmans brought a greater force to that quarter, it might divert their attention from the main object of the attack."*

But Lord Amherst turned a deaf ear to the sound and wholesome advice of Munro. His Lordship replied to Munro's letter on 10th March, 1824 :—

"You have stated many reasons, which I acknowledge to be powerful ones, why the expedition should be deferred till further communication can be held between

* Gleig's Life of Sir Thomas Munro, Vol. II (1831), p. 225.

this place and Madras. I think they are overbalanced, not only by the consideration of the proper period for ascending the Irrawaddy River, and the impossibility of moving from Rangoon to Ummerapoora by land, but also by the security which an early blow would afford to our eastern frontier, and by a reference to the unprepared state in which we may expect to find the enemy."

So Sir Thomas Munro had to obey the order of the Governor-General and arranged to send from Madras to Rangoon three regiments of Europeans and ten battalions of Native infantry. This was far in excess of what Lord Amherst had considered necessary for the occupation of Rangoon. In the course of the letter from which an extract has been given above, his lordship wrote :—

"We contemplate an attack on Rangoon as soon as it can be made ; and have no reason to doubt that four or five thousand men will be sufficient for its capture and occupation. Of these we may be able to furnish from hence nearly three thousand. We should not require, therefore, from Madras, above two thousand native troops, with European and native artillery ; and I should hope that these may be ready to sail from Madras by the 15th April,—say the whole reaches the rendezvous by the 1st of May. During the first week in that month they may be in possession of Rangoon."

Munro erred on the right side in sending a larger force than what Lord Amherst had asked for.

The Madras troops were placed under charge of Colonel McBean, who was granted the rank and allowances of a Brigadier-General.

The force by land had already been despatched to the frontier some months previously where the operations were proposed to be limited to the protection of the British provinces and the expulsion of the Burmese from Assam. It was not considered advisable to immediately invade Arakan.

General Sir Archibald Campbell, a brother of Lord Combermere, was selected to the chief command of the expedition with Captain Canning as political agent.

The place of rendezvous selected for the two divisions of troops from the presidencies of Bengal and Madras was Port Cornwallis. Here the Bengal division, which were embarked at Calcutta between the 12th and 17th of April 1824, arrived at the end of that month. The greater portion of the Madras division arrived on the 4th of May. Orders were given for the sailing of the fleet the following morning, which on the 10th instant anchored within the bar of the Rangoon river.

The capture of Rangoon was not attended with much difficulty, as the place was not fortified and the Burmese authorities were not prepared for the British fleet. H. H. Wilson writes :—

“At the river gate is a landing place, denominated the King’s Wharf, in which situation the principal battery was placed, and opposite to which the *Liffey* came to anchor about two P. M. After a short pause, a fire was opened on the fleet, but was very soon silenced by the guns of the frigate. In the meantime, three detachments were

landed from the transports of his Majesty's 38th regiment, under Major Evans, above the town, and his Majesty's 41st, under Colonel Mc Bean below it, whilst Major Sale, with the light infantry of the 13th, was directed to attack the river gate, and carry the main battery. These measures were successful. The Burmas fled from the advance of the troops, and in less than twenty minutes the town was in the undisputed possession of the British." * * *

"Upon taking possession of Rangoon, it was found to be entirely deserted. The news of the arrival of the fleet had scarcely reached the town, when the population began to depart, and to secrete themselves in the adjacent thickets." (*Loc. cit.* pp. 68-69)

It was not on physical force alone, that is powder and shot and the sword, that the British depended for their success against the Burmese. No, they leaned more on the Machiavelian doctrines, to achieve their end. In his letter dated from Calcutta, 2nd April. 1824, Lord Amherst wrote to Sir Thomas Munro :—

"The Siamese, inveterate enemies of the Burmese, would cause a most powerful diversion in the South. The aid to be derived from the Siamese, in the event of protracted hostilities, has entered deeply into our calculation. But I am not disposed, if we can possibly avoid it, to engage too largely in the intrigues and politics of the Indo-Chinese nations, or to enter into engagements which we are not prepared at all hazards to fulfill. * * * * I am not at all sure that the dismemberment of the Burmese empire, even if we had the means of effecting it, is an event to be desired. The balance is now tolerably equal

between them and the Siamese, and they help to keep each other in order. The only tribe to which we have yet held out hopes of independence is the Assamese. * * it is highly desirable on every account that they should no longer remain subject to the Burmese yoke."

What could not be effected by force of arms was to be accomplished by means of Machiavelian policy. The British had thought that the capture of Rangoon would make the King of Ava sue for peace ; and hence they had not made all those preparations which otherwise they would have done. Major Snodgrass writes :—

"The arrival of a British fleet at Rangoon seems to have been wholly unexpected by the Court of Ava ; the town was unprepared for its reception, and the civil and military authorities thrown into alarm and consternation * * it was, therefore, most desirable that no time should be lost in appearing before the town, which we sanguinely hoped would, by accepting of protection, at once place at our disposal the resources of the country in cattle, boats, drivers, and boatmen, with which we were wholly unprovided. In boats, especially, Rangoon was known to be well supplied ; and it was by many anticipated, that should the king of Ava, upon the capture of his chief commercial city, still refuse to make atonement for his wanton and unprovoked aggressions, that city would afford the means of pushing up the river a force sufficient to subdue the capital. and bring the war at once to a conclusion."*

* Narrative of the Burmese War, pp. 4 and 5. But Snodgrass is not a trustworthy historian. Thus, an officer writing on "*A few recollections of the Ava campaign in*

But the British met with disappointment. Machiavelian policy, for a time at least, met with no success. To quote the same author again:—

"It has already been observed that the army came unprovided with the necessary equipment for advancing either by land and water; indeed it was anticipated that the capture of Rangoon alone, * * would induce the King of Ava to make overtures for peace, * * or, at all events, that the country would afford sufficient water transport to enable a considerable corps to proceed up the Irawaddy towards the capital; * * nor were the reasons upon which these expectations of aid and assistance from the natives were founded without some weight. It was urged that they were not Burmese, but Peguers and a conquered people, living under the tyrannical sway of a Government with which they had for centuries, and often successfully, waged war; deprived of their court, and governed by despotic and mercenary chiefs, whom they obeyed from fear alone; represented* as discontented with their present situation, and ever longing for their former independence; and finally, that they would easily

1824-25-26," in the *Meerut Universal Magazine* (Vol. I. pp. 60 *et seq.*) says—

"The official Reporters were all personally interested in the War being continued; nor can the historians of that campaign be considered altogether impartial."

"Snodgrass (who left Calcutta with the expedition as Adjutant of the 38th) was *Post Master, Prize Agent, Military Secretary, Political Assistant* and *Son-in-law*, and merely published a *Puff* on the family performances, civil and military."

* Or, rather, misrepresented.

be induced to join the invading force, and to aid it, by every means in their power, in humbling the tyrant, under whose arbitrary rule they had so long suffered every species of degradation. But in these calculations, the well considered power and judicious policy of the Government towards its conquered provinces were overlooked, and the warlike and haughty character of the nation was so imperfectly known, that no correct judgment could be formed of our probable reception.”*

No, the Burmese, paying allegiance to Buddha, were not tyrants nor intolerant to votaries of other creeds, as they had been represented by Christians. Of the spirit of toleration in religious matters of the Burmese, the above-quoted author writes :—

“Rangoon contains an Armenian and Portuguese church ; a strong proof of liberality of sentiment in the Government, and of freedom from intolerance and religious prejudice in the people.” (*Ibid.*, p. 14).

So the appeal of the Christian British to the Buddhist inhabitants of Rangoon to throw off the yoke of their lawful sovereign and seek their protection was in vain. The Burmese were not cowards and altogether devoid of military tactics. They did exactly what the Muscovites did when their country was invaded by Napoleon. From the neighbourhood of Rangoon the Burmese authorities had carefully removed everything that

* Snodgrass's Narrative, pp. 17—18.

was likely to be of use to the British army. To quote the above-mentioned author:—

“Hid from our view on every side in the darkness of a deep, and, to regular bodies, impenetrable, forests, far beyond which the inhabitants and all the cattle of the Rangoon district had been driven, the Burmese chiefs carried on their operations, and matured their future schemes with vigilance, secrecy, and activity. Neither rumor nor intelligence of what was passing within his posts ever reached us. Beyond the invisible line which circumscribed our position, all was mystery or vague conjecture.”

Placed in these circumstances, it was difficult for the British to succeed. The Burmese were born soldiers and were given to guerilla warfare, of which the formation and defence of stockades formed the chief feature. These constructed in the most difficult and inaccessible recesses of the jungle, which covered the greater part of the face of their country, were the means by which they carried on nightly attacks on the British forces, which greatly annoyed and inconvenienced the latter.

While the British force was in such a critical position in Rangoon, the state of affairs in Assam and the Arakan frontier was no better. The British were acting on the Machiavelian policy in Assam. H. H. Wilson writes :—

“On entering Assam, a proclamation was addressed to the inhabitants, encouraging them with the prospect of being

released from the cruelty of their Burman invaders and assuring them of British protection. Several of the barbarous tribes in the eastern portion of Assam, as the Khamtis and Singphos, availed themselves of the unsettled state of affairs to harass the Burmas, but their operations were equally directed against the unfortunate natives of Assam, numbers of whom were carried off by them as slaves. The Assamese displayed the most favorable disposition towards the British, but their unwarlike character, scanty numbers, and reduced means, rendered their co-operation of no value.*

The King of Ava placed a large force under the famous commander, Maha Mengyee Bundoola, who had established his head-quarters at Arakan. This force, it is said, was composed of between ten and twelve thousand Burmese. In the beginning of May, a portion of this force, crossing the Naf, advanced to Rutnapullung, a place fourteen miles south of Ramoo.

On hearing of the advent of the Burmese force, the British also sent a detachment under the command of one Captain Noton to fight the Burmese. So not far from Ramoo an encounter with the Burmese took place, in which the British were defeated. The officer commanding the detachment was killed. The casualty list on the side of the British was a heavy one.

This defeat of the British at the hands of the Burmese produced a great panic in Calcutta. in

* Narrative of the Burmese War, p. 48.

fact throughout the British possessions in India. It was thought by many not impossible that the enemy might penetrate through the Sunderbunds to Calcutta. Major Archer in his work which has been already referred to before writes:—

“The Supreme Government was actually afraid of a Burmese invasion of Calcutta, by way of the Sunderbunds, and accordingly ordered an European regiment down the river for further protection.”*

This defeat of the British created a great sensation in India, as may be gathered from the paper which Sir Charles Metcalfe transmitted to the Governor-General, Lord Amherst, June 8, 1824, a few extracts from which are given below:—

“Our great success in India has induced the systematic habit of despising our enemies, and thence we are liable to disasters and reverses from which otherwise we might be preserved by the actual magnitude of our power and extent of our resources,

“Our Indian Empire is owing solely to our superiority in arms. It rests entirely on that foundation. It is undermined by every reverse, however trifling, and would not long withstand any serious indication of weakness.

“All India is at all times looking out for our downfall. The people everywhere would rejoice, * * at our destruction; and numbers are not wanting who would promote it by all means in their power. Our ruin, if it be ever commenced, will probably be rapid and sudden * * From the pinnacle to the abyss might be but one step.

* Loc. cit., p. 299.

"The fidelity of our native army, on which our existence depends, depends itself on our continued success. * * *

"The Burmans have commenced the war with us in a manner which perhaps was little expected. They have the advantage of first success, and we have the disadvantage of disaster, which is likely, in however small a degree it may have taken place, to be of worse consequence to us than it would be to any other power in the world, because unremitting success is almost necessary for our existence....

"It is evident that we have an insufficiency of troops within any moderate distance of the scene of invasion, and that the progress of the enemy has carried alarm to Dacca and even to Calcutta, where alarm has not been felt from an external enemy since the time of Surajah Doula and the Black Hole.

* * * *

"We are engaged in a contest with the Burmans on the whole length of the Eastern frontier of our Bengal possessions. Our enemies appear not to be deficient in either spirit or numbers ; and we must bring numbers as well as spirit to oppose them. * * * * there is real danger to our whole Empire in India from the slightest reverse at any point whatever, if it be not speedily and effectually repaired. The intelligence spreads like wild fire, and immediately excites the hopes and speculations of the millions whom we hold in subjugation * * * * Let us put forth our strength to prevent further misfortune, and crush the evil before it be fraught with more extensive injury and greater peril."

The British tried in right earnest to repair the disaster which befell them at Ramoo. A greater

number of troops, with more ammunition and other military stores, was despatched to the Frontier. But during the continuance of the rains, owing to the increased sickness of the men, the British force was compelled to retreat to Bhadarpur, where it remained inactive. The Burmese also were unable to move out of their entrenchment, to which they were confined by the rise of the rivers.

H. H. Wilson has censured the generalship of of Bundoola for not taking advantage of the victory of Ramoo and pushing on to Calcutta. He writes :—

“Neither was much to be apprehended from the generalship that suffered the victory of Ramoo to pass away without making the slightest demonstration of a purpose to improve a crisis of such splendid promise, and which restricted the fruits of a battle gained to the construction of a stockade.”

Here H. H. Wilson has suppressed a material fact which will account for Bundoola's not pursuing the British forces in their retreat from Ramoo. He (Bundoola) had been apprised of the capture of Rangoon by the British and so in hot haste he moved to that port town for its recovery. Major Archer writes :—

“Bundoolah, the Burmese Chieftain, was in Arracan with a large force, advancing upon the Company's territories, but, hearing of the capture of Rangoon, he

hastened to the scene of action, leaving orders for his army to follow with all speed.”*

The Burman empire was not so rich as the British Government of India. Unlike the latter, the King of Ava could not afford to spend money like water. Of course, the British Government of India was spending money wrung out of an alien people with which that Government had very little sympathy. Therefore there was small wonder that the Burmese Government could not send more officers and men to oppose the large hordes with whom the British had invaded their country. Under the circumstance, it is hardly fair to charge the Burmese Commander with bad generalship.†

* Loc. cit., p. 305.

† It would seem from all accounts available that Bundoola was anxious to pursue the fugitive British force to Bengal. In fact, that had been his cherished dream ever since he conquered Assam and made it part of the Burman Empire. Thornton (History of the British Empire in India, Vol. V, pages 95-96, footnote) writes:—

“Mr. John Laird, a native of Scotland, who resided several years in the Burmese dominions for commercial purposes, made the following statement to Mr. Cranford:—
“When I was in Ava, for the second time, in 1823, I was present at an evening levee of the king. The late Bundoola and several of his officers, who had just arrived from the conquest of Assam, were there. * * * Bundoola said, ‘I pursued the fugitives across the Brahma-

It has been said above that the British Government had to send more troops to the seats of war to oppose the Burmese who had been elated by their successes. It has been the policy of the British Government in India to treat the native troops as mercenaries. To them do not belong the honor and glory of war.

pooter into the British territory: but as the English are on terms of friendship with your Majesty, and you derive a large revenue from their trade to Rangoon, I retired. But if your Majesty desires to have Bengal, I will conquer it for you, and will only require for this purpose the *kulas*, or strangers, and not a single Burman.' So confident was the Bundoola of being able to perform what he suggested, that according to a statement of Major Snodgrass, he marched into Arracan, provided with golden fetters, in which the Governor-General of India was to be led captive to Ava."

The victory of Ramoo seemed to realise his long-cherished dream. But then as a faithful servant he had to obey the orders of his sovereign.

CHAPTER LXIII

The Barrackpore Massacre

Although it was the Native Indian army with whose help the British succeeded in building up their Empire in India, yet it is a fact that the sepoy has been for long ill-treated in many ways and never treated sufficiently well by his foreign masters. It is not necessary here to dilate on the many virtues possessed by the swarthy and heathen sepoy. These have been borne testimony to by all those who knew that person well. Almost all of the military witnesses examined before the Select Committee of the House of Commons held in 1832 to enquire into the affairs of India, spoke very highly of the Indian sepoy. Sir Jasper Nicolls, who rose to be the Commander-in-Chief in India, answered the question put to him as follows:—

“12. What are the habits of the native soldier, is he orderly and easily managed?—very much so; his habits are very simple, and he is very easily managed.

“13. How, as compared with European soldiers?—I think the command of an European regiment would be more difficult than the command of a brigade of **sepoys**; it would be much easier to control 5,000 **sepoys** than it would be 1,000 Europeans.”

Major General Sir Thomas Reynell, who had served in India from 1805 to 1828, gave, in his evidence, the following character to the sepoys :—

"They are subordinate: they are patient and they are certainly obedient to their orders. I consider them to be animated by a good spirit, and I have had a good opportunity of witnessing it in the late service before Bhurtpure. There I have seen them in the trenches, working at very laborious employments, and I believe, contrary to their own religious feelings. * * I consider them, generally speaking, an efficient army, the Bengal army."

He answered the question,

"271. Now as compared with the European soldier; I mean, as to order and being easily managed?—I think he is much more orderly than European soldiers in general from the mere circumstance of his not being so given to drink."

According to Major-General Sir Theophilus Pritzler, who had served with the Madras troops,

"There is no greater punishment that you can inflict upon a sepoy than to order him to be discharged."

It would seem that because the Indian sepoy was always a very docile animal, therefore, perhaps he used to be ill-treated. The historian Lecky, in one of his well-known works, has said :

"A people who are submissive, gentle, and loyal,

tall by reason of these very qualities under a despotic government."

It is not necessary here to multiply instances to show the ill-treatment the sepoy's have been subjected to. Suffice it to notice the grievances under which the sepoy's generally and those of Bengal specially were smarting at the time of the first Burmese War of 1824.

The Bengal troops were, as regards pay, worse off than their comrades of Bombay and Madras. The pay of the former was only five and a half rupees a month, while that of the latter seven rupees. Col. J. Munro, in his evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons held in 1832 to inquire into the affairs of the East India Company, answered the question,

"1043. Is that difference a matter of complaint or discontent?— "I have understood that the Bengal sepoy's on some occasions have stated as a grievance, the superior pay received at all times by the Bombay and Madras sepoy's."

Even in 1832, the pay of the sepoy compared with the wages of labour and price of subsistence was not very high. Sir Jasper Nicolls, in his evidence before the Committee referred to, answered the question,

"17. How is that (the pay of the sepoy) compared with the wages of labour and the price of subsistence? —The lowest servant of any officer gets four rupees, some

as high as twenty, so that in fact it is very low compared with servants ;" * * *

The same officer in answering the question to specify the particular advantages of Madras and Bombay over those of Bengal, stated :—

"Under the Madras Presidency, upon every removal of a corps, they receive hutting money, eight rupees to a native officer, two to a private sepoy, which allowances are unknown in Bengal. The Madras sepoy is never more than 15 days in arrear, and if he is ordered to move after the 24th of any month, he is paid to the end of it; the Bengal sepoy a month and a half in arrear. The Madras sepoy, when grain exceeds a given sum, receives the difference for himself and the family from the Government. Native officers are very handsomely rewarded for meritorious actions, by extra pensions (for they are all entitled to pensions), grants of land, horses occasionally for cavalry service, palanquins and an allowance for their carriage of 70 rupees a month, which is a great advantage and an honour; which allowances are unknown, with few exceptions, in Bengal. There are 70 recruit and pension boys upon each regiment: 30 recruit boys and 40 pension boys, children of soldiers, borne upon the strength of each corps at Madras; this is unknown in Bengal. * * * *

"There is a native adjutant to each battalion at Madras, which is certainly a benefit; promotion is very much quicker, and they are sent at an earlier period of life to the invalid corps or pension list, which though not a personal is a general advantage to that army. Bombay has also the same establishment of recruit and pension boys; the sepoys receive their full pay on furlough monthly, wherever they are, which the Bengal sepoys

do not. They receive a higher rate of pension; they receive for their clothing, I think; three articles in two years, whereas the Bengal sepoy receives only two articles in two years. The Bombay sepoy, when he marches under command, receives nine and a half rupees a month; the Bengal sepoy eight and a half. The Bombay sepoy when he marches receives his *batta* three days before he sets out under command, and the Bengal sepoy on the day he sets out. *They are apparent trifles, but they are very important to a sepoy.* No deductions are made from the Bombay sepoy, who has had leave of absence, when he returns to his corps; from the Bengal sepoy there are. The Bombay sepoy receives presents on Christmas day, New Year's day and the King's birth-day, the Bengal sepoy does not. The Bombay sepoy, in taking up a new cantonment receives two rupees; the non-commissioned officer four, the jemmadar 12, the subadar 24; the Bengal officer nothing. The Bombay sepoy, on changing quarters, receives half the above allowance; the Bengal sepoy nothing. From the Bombay sepoy no deduction is made when he is in the hospital; from the Bengal sepoy one anna per day. The Bombay sepoy receives a coat every year, pantaloons every third year; the Bengal sepoy receives a coat and pair of pantaloons alternately. Thus the Bombay sepoy receives three coats and a pair of pantaloons in three years, and the Bengal sepoy two coats and a pair of pantaloons, or a pair of pantaloons and a coat. The Bombay sepoy receives two yards of nankeen, a pair of sandals, and cloth for a turban every year, which is unknown in Bengal. The knapsacks for the Bombay sepoys are found by the Government, not so with the Bengal."

So then it is clear that the Bengal sepoys had legitimate grievances against the Indian Govern-

ment. But the sepoy as a class were not so fairly treated as the European troops then serving in India. The native sepoy did not receive any bounty on enlistment as did the British recruit. Then again, while the European soldier was provided with barracks in the cantonment, the native sepoy had to shift for himself, and to make his own hut.

Captain Balamain in his letter dated 31st March, 1832, to Mr. Villiers, published in the appendix to the Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 16th August, 1832, wrote;—

“The European soldier is very well provided for in every respect and his situation, on the whole, is probably more comfortable than that of the private in any other country. The men ought only to be enlisted for a term of years.”

But he could not give such a rosy account of the situation of the native sepoy, regarding whom he wrote:—

“The native soldiery in the Company’s service is composed of men of a great variety of country, caste and disposition;* * They are easily managed by gentle treatment, but quite unnerved by harshness.* * They are very sensible of disgrace or injury, particularly the Mahomedans.* * The fear of being hastily punished by some young officer, or of being flogged for some purely military offence, prevents many men from entering the

service ; and it is remarked that of late years few native officers place their sons in the army. There is, I fear, no great attachment to the service. The causes of this are numerous. The prominent one, almost an unavoidable one, is the depression of the whole native soldiery. In an army of between 200,000 and 300,000 men, no native can rise above the rank of subadar-major, about equal to troop serjeant-major. There are many men of talent, more of spirit and ambition among them and these can never be satisfied with such a state of things ; they have not only their own feelings to contend with, but they are continually taunted and excited by their countrymen not in the service. Could any safe opening, however small, be made for the advancement to higher office of some of the natives, it would have a most beneficial effect. Among the lesser causes of discontent are the frequent changes in dress and drill ; the great strictness in little points of etiquette ; the curtailment of liberty when off duty ; the irregularity of relief of corps ; the insults of the European soldiery ; the being most frequently placed under the command of officers not acquainted with their manners and customs, and often regardless of them.*** The insults of the European soldiery have increased from the more frequent reliefs of His Majesty's regiments. It originates in the ignorance of, and contempt for, what the men call 'black fellows' and is chiefly felt by them on their first arrival. Thirty years ago, there was no such thing as the hanging of European soldiers for shooting natives, which is now so common : nor is there such a sight now to be seen as European and native soldiers walking arm in arm, and frequenting each other's barracks and tents, as used then to be the case."

Other eminent officers also gave evidence to the same effect. Thus, to quote Major-General Sir H.

Worsley on the subject ; in his letter dated 30th March, 1832, to Mr. Villiers, he wrote :—

“For the purposes of service or war I should deem it very desirable to have a larger proportion of troops armed and organized as light infantry. Nor can I omit the opportunity for observing, that I have always considered the musket in general use for the infantry as cruelly heavy, burthensome and unwieldy for that country, when it is recollected that the native soldier’s inferior stamina is moreover loaded with a pouch calculated to carry 60 rounds of balled cartridges (40 would be abundant for every occasion), a heavy laden knapsack containing all his necessaries, often including cooking utensils; * * *.

“With regard to the pay and allowances of the Native soldiers, it is at this day the very same in amounts as when it was first fixed, which was in so early a period of our establishment in that country, that in a code of Pay Regulations, published by the Military Auditor-general in 1810, it is stated, that the same rates as therein stated of pay and *batta* have been always passed to the native troops but that no record of the authority establishing them in the first instance is anywhere to be found.”

In the footnote to the above, he adds :—

“Nor do the Native troops ever receive any bounty on enlistment, whilst on every relief or change of situation they have to provide quarters at their own expense.”

Then Sir H. Worsley proceeds :—

“It may be safely assumed that since the early period of time in question, all necessaries of food and raiment have risen from 50 to 100 per cent. 2ndly, that the country then occupied was bounded by the Currumnassah

River, progressively extended to the Vizier's dominions, and now bounded by the river Sutledge and the deserts of Bikāneer; and that in like manner have the labours and duties and the wear and tear consequent on distant marches, in peace as well as in war, proportionately increased, with expense and inconvenience, enhanced in many cases where water carriage cannot be employed for the conveyance of the baggage, families, etc., of the troops.

* * * *

"It will be no disparagement of any other troops to say, that hitherto the native army of India has never been surpassed for fidelity to the Government, and attachment to their officers; nor 'yielded to those of any other nation in point of discipline and effective valour.' But it is, I fear, too true, that there is, in some respect, a falling off from its former excellence, as regards the inclination to enter the service on the part of the same respectable classes that formerly sought it with avidity; nor does the same spirit of contentment and satisfaction seem to prevail. They seem to have lost much of their characteristic purity and simplicity of manners, by which their moral and military virtues were formerly enhanced. They are, nevertheless, the most orderly, respectful and obedient soldiers in the world; and I fervently trust and hope they will not fail to continue so to the end of time, provided their habits and prejudices are duly attended to; by which their attachment and fidelity has hitherto been secured, and a lesson taught to after ages, 'that their lives may be commanded through the medium of their affections'."

"The European troops in India always had a good time of it. They were pampered and they almost did next to nothing. Thus Lieutenant-

Colonel Baker wrote in his letter dated 29th February, 1832, to Mr. Villiers:—

“That in Bengal, except in time of war or on actual service, or for the political purpose of overawing the native army, they (the European troops) are entirely useless to the Government for the ordinary duties of the country. They perform no duties that can be possibly avoided, or which involve any exposure to the climate. The Governor-General’s and the Commander-in-Chief’s guards are solely furnished by the native regiments. Even in Fort William but half the main guard is supplied by His Majesty’s regiments in garrison there, to furnish the *covered sentries*, *i. e.*, in the shade of some building, veranda or gateway. Even the orderly to carry the adjutants’ orderly-book is a native soldier from Barrackpore. On a march in Bengal, a regiment of His Majesty’s dragoons or infantry must have a detachment of native infantry (generally a company under an English officer) to perform most of their duties for them in camp.”

The native troops had many grievances and were labouring under many disadvantages. But no one ever bestowed a thought to redress the former or remove the latter. It would be no exaggeration to say that year after year their grievances and disabilities increased rather than in any way diminished. During the Burmese War, as more troops were needed for the front, one of the native infantry regiments stationed at Barrackpore, namely, the 47th, was ordered for the service. Of course, the sepoys had to obey the orders. But it was the bounden duty of the authorities to see

whether it was possible for the sepoys to obey those orders. They should have attended to the comforts of the sepoys, towards whom cold and unsympathetic was their attitude. But they did nothing of the sort. The native soldiers had to pay for their transport whenever they were ordered to move from one place to another.*

* Thornton's *History of British*, vol v, page 105. He writes:—

"The European does not carry even his knapsack. The sepoy is not excused from this burden, but in addition to ordinary necessities, he must find means of conveyance for a set of utensils for cooking, with which each man is provided and these added to his clothing, appointments and ammunition, would constitute a load which the comparatively slender frames of the native troops would be altogether unable to bear through a lengthened march, more especially if it were to be performed, as most frequently happens, under unfavourable circumstances. Carriage-cattle are, for this reason, of prime necessity for the movement of an army; but it is to be observed that *the expense of these animals, and their drivers, so far as employed for the use of the sepoys, had been accustomed to be defrauded by the sepoys themselves.*"

That the sepoy's knapsack was a curse even in the year of grace 1858, will be evident from what Sir Mark Cubbon, K. C. B., Commissioner for the Government of the territories of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore, wrote in his letter dated Bangalore, July 24, 1858, to Colonel Durand. He wrote:—

"The present musket is good enough, though it would

But when the native infantry regiment was ordered from Barrackpore to proceed to the front, it was impossible for it to secure any transport of any sort. The East India Company's historiographer, Mr. Thornton, is obliged to write:—

“In the instance under notice, however, no bullocks could be provided none could be hired, and they could only be purchased at an extravagant price. An application for assistance from the commissariat department was

be better if it were somewhat lighter. But the sepoy does not complain of the weight of his present musket, his great grievance is his present knapsack; relieve him of that and he will consider it as great a boon conferred upon him, as if the Government had given him a considerable increase of pay. When the knapsack was first introduced into the Madras army, it was a small and convenient pack: the present knapsack or its like was introduced in 1817, and it is the curse of the native army. More men have been invalided and pensioned from the chest-foundering action of the knapsack than ever would have been from the ordinary risks of the service. The knapsack is looked upon as the bore of of the service, and were it to be removed altogether, it is certain that the sepoys of the whole army would greet the measure as a great boon, and the service would instantly become much more popular than it has recently been and plenty of recruits would be found; why should not this be done at once?”—P. 106 of *Papers connected with the Re-organization of the Army in India*, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1859.

made, but was answered by an intimation that the men must provide the required accomodation for themselves."

Of course, this was impossible; the Commanding Officer of the regiment, Colonel Cartwright, spent money from his private funds for the purchase of transport animals. At that moment, the Government also advanced money for the same purpose. But then it was too late. The disease had passed the stage of the application of any correct remedy.

It was given out that the regiment would be transported by sea from Calcutta to Rangoon. The men in the regiment—all high-caste Hindus—had not enlisted for service in countries to which they could not march. It does not appear that any steps were taken to remove this impression (assuming it to have been a false one) from the minds of the sepoys. In the petition which they presented to the military authorities, to which reference will be made presently, they stated this to be the ground of their complaint and grievance.

The regiment was ordered to parade on the 30th October, 1824, in marching order. The men appeared without their knapsacks. The explanation which they offered was that their knapsacks were old and worn-out ones, not fit to be used. They stated their grievances, which were not unreasonable. They said they would not proceed to Rangoon or anywhere by sea, as that was not in the

bond which they had executed; and if they were to be sent to the front, they should be granted extra allowances or double *bat*, as they called it, which claim they based on the grounds first, that increased pay had been given to bullock-drivers and persons engaged in similar services; secondly, that according to report, everything was very dear in the country to which they were ordered to proceed.

No measures were adopted to conciliate them or to remove their causes of discontent. But the parade was dismissed and the commanding officer sought the advice of the general officer commanding at Barrackpore, who proceeded to Calcutta to consult the then Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Edward Paget.

As the result of the deliberations of these higher authorities, two British infantry regiments, *viz.*, His Majesty's 1st Royals and 47th, a corps of artillery, and a troop of the Governor-General's body-guard were brought from Calcutta to Barrackpore, and the disaffected regiment was ordered to parade on the 1st November, when the men found themselves surrounded by the British troops.

They had forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief a memorial stating their grievances. This document was written in the vernacular and was translated, it seems not quite correctly, by the Persian interpreter. In it they wrote :—

"The case is this:—The soubahdar major and havildar major told the sepoys, &c., they were going to Rangoon, and would be embarked on board ship, and he told all the sepoys that when the Company went to war they ought not to shrink. After this the soubahdar major and havildar major sent for four men from each company, and said, 'those who wear the *takee khoo* ought not to cast it off. This also they ought not to do.' The sepoys replied that they never could put their feet on board ship, and that no person would forfeit his caste. For this reason all the sepoys swore by the Ganges water and *toolsce*, that they never would put their feet in a ship; and every gentleman knows that when a Hindoo takes Ganges water and *toolsce* in his hand, he will sacrifice his life. In this way the regiment, &c., pledged themselves. This which is written is our representation. And further, the soubahdar and havildar before mentioned went to the commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, and stated that the regiment was ready to march; that all the sepoys had agreed (to march), whereas the sepoys knew nothing of this circumstance. Now, you are master of our lives; what you order we will do; but we will not go on board ship, nor will we march for that purpose. Formerly our name was good, but it has now become bad; our wish is, therefore, that our names be effaced, and that every man may return to his home."

It does not seem that this representation of the sepoys, couched in respectful language, was taken into serious consideration by the Commander-in-Chief or his staff. Had kindness and a conciliatory spirit been shown to them and they had also been assured that they would not be required to

embark on board ship for Rangoon, in all probability they would have behaved as all good soldiers ought to do. But to treat the sepoys kindly was not the policy of the European military officers. By the order of the Commander-in-Chief, the sepoys were ruthlessly massacred on the morning of the 1st November. Kaye writes:—

"A hard, strict disciplinarian, with no knowledge of the native army, and a bitter prejudice against it, Sir Edward Paget was a man of the very metal to tread down insurrection with an iron heel, regardless both of causes and of consequences. * * * Some attempt was made at explanation—some attempt at conciliation. But it was feeble and ineffectual; perhaps not understood. They were told, then, that they must consent to march, or to ground their arms. Still not seeing the danger, for they were not told that the artillery guns were loaded with grape, and the gunners ready to fire*, they refused to obey the word; and so the signal for slaughter was given. The guns opened upon them. The mutineers were soon in panic flight. Throwing away their arms and accoutrements, they made for the river. Some were shot down; some were drowned. There was no attempt at battle. None had been contemplated. The muskets with which the ground was strewn were found to be unloaded."†

*"It is doubtful, indeed, whether they knew that the guns were in the rear of the European regiments."—Kaye.

† Kaye's *History of the Sepoy War*, Vol. I (1870), pp. 268-69.

That this bloodshed, indulged in by the Commander-in-Chief, could have been prevented, will be evident from what Kaye says on this subject:—

“A few sentences of well-chosen, well-delivered Hindoostance, on that fatal November morning, might have brought the sepoys back to reason and to loyalty. But they had the benefit of neither wise counsel from within nor kindly exhortation from without. Deprived, by the reconstruction of the Army, of the officers whom they had long known and trusted, they were more than ever in need of external to bring them back to a right state of feeling. They wanted a General of Division, such as Malcolm or Ochterlony, to re-awaken their soldierly instincts—their pride in their colours, their loyalty to their salt. But instead of such judicious treatment as would have shown them their own folly, as in a glass, the martinets of the Horse Guards, stern in their unsympathising ignorance, their ruthless prejudices, had, in our own territories, at the very seat of Government, in the presence of no pressing danger, no other lessons to teach, no other remedies to apply, than those which were to be administered at the bayonet’s point and the cannon’s mouth.”*

The demoralising effects of this massacre have been described by the same authority as follows:—

“But this display of vigour, though it checked mutiny for the time, tended only to sow broadcast, the seeds of future insubordinations. It created a bad moral effect throughout the whole of the Bengal army. From bazaar to bazaar the news of the massacre ran with a speed

* *Ibid*, pp. 270-271.

almost telegraphic. The regiments, which had already marched to the frontier, were discussing the evil tidings with mingled dismay and disgust before the intelligence, sent by special express, had reached the ears of the British Chiefs. 'They are your own men, whom you have been destroying,' said an old native officer; and he could not trust himself to say more."

The brutal Commander-in-Chief was not content with mowing down the sepoys by artillery fire. He court-martialed the survivors, when many were hanged. The regiment was afterwards struck out of the Army List.

Thus ended the disgraceful affair of the Barrackpore massacre. Had justice been done, it was the Commander-in-Chief and members of his staff who deserved to be hanged or blown from the mouths of cannon rather than the sepoys. But in this nether world of ours, justice is not always to be had, but might is right.

This wanton massacre of the Sepoys forms a dark episode in the history of the Burmese War. There have been many English writers who have not scrupled to add insult to injury by blackening the character of the sepoys. According to them the refusal of the sepoys to proceed to the front proceeded from fear, cowardice and other similar causes. Thus Metcalfe, who ought to have known better, wrote:—

"Now what does this mutiny proceed from? Either

* *Ibid.*, p. 269.

from fear of our enemy, or from disaffection to our Government . . . They (the sepoys) detest the eastern part of Bengal more than the western; and the country beyond our frontier they believe to be inhabited by devils and cannibals; the Burmans they abhor and dread as enchanters against whom the works of mere men cannot prevail. What does all this amount to in brief but this—that we can not rely on our Native Army? Whether it be fear of the enemy or disaffection toward us, they fail us in the hour of need. What are we to think of this, and what are our prospects under such circumstances? It is an awful thing to mow down our own troops with our own artillery, especially those troops on whose fidelity the existence of our empire depends.”*

But Mr. Herbert Spencer, when referring to the Barrackpore massacre, wrote :—

“Down to our own day continues the cunning despotism which uses native soldiers to maintain and extend native subjection—a despotism under which, not many years since, a regiment of sepoys was deliberately massacred, for refusing to march without proper clothing.”

* *Kaye's Selections from the papers of Lord Melcalfe*, p. 153.

CHAPTER LXIV

The Termination of the Burmese War

The war was very unpopular both in England and India. The Government was straining every nerve to come out of the war with as much glory and honour as possible. Money was spent on it like water. But failure on all directions stared Government in the face. Success was not to be obtained by fighting alone. So recourse was had to Machiavellian principles. H. H. Wilson writes :—

“Reports having reached Sir A. Campbell, that much dissatisfaction had been excited in the district of Dalla, by the orders of the court for a general conscription, a force of four hundred men was embarked under Lieutenant Colonel Kelly and despatched on the 8th of August, to take advantage of any opportunity that might offer of giving support to the discontented.”

Comments on the above are not needed. It was by acting on Machiavellian principles that the English succeeded in dismembering some of the districts of the Burman Empire. The same author, who has been quoted above, writes :—

“In the impossibility that existed of engaging in any active operations in the direction of Ava, it was judged advisable to employ part of the force in reducing some of the maritime provinces of the Burman kingdom. The district of Tenasserim, comprising the divisions of Tavoy

and Mergui, was that selected for attack, * * (A force) sailed from Rangoon on the 20th August and reached the mouth of the river leading to Tavoy, on the 1st September ; * * A conspiracy among the garrison facilitated the capture of the place, the second in command making the Maiwoon and his family prisoners, delivered them to the British officer, and the town was occupied without opposition."

Of course, even a child can understand that the conspiracy was incited by the British. The above-quoted author does not state the price that was paid to the second-in-command for this foul act of treachery.

There is no need of narrating in detail the skirmishes and battles fought between the English and the Burmese in which, more often than not, the latter were beaten, not because they lacked in courage or even military strategy but because they were no match for their antagonists in the exercise of the Machievellian art, which the English had carried to perfection. To add to the misfortunes of the Burmese, their able general Maha Bundoola, who had come from the Arakan frontier, on hearing of the capture of Rangoon, was killed on the 1st of April 1825, by the bursting of a shell while fighting the English from his fortified place of Doonabew. That he was a general of no mean order even his enemies are forced to admit. Major Snodgrass says of him :—

"The management of a Burmese army for so long a

period contending against every disadvantage to which a general could be subjected, evinced no small degree of talent, while the position and defences at Donoobew, as a field work, would have done credit to the most scientific Engineer ; * * . During the days of his prosperity, Bandoola seldom exposed his person ; in the battles of Rangoon and Kokeen, he was never under fire ; but he did not hesitate, when circumstances required it, to allow himself to be hemmed in at Donoobew, where he boldly declared he would conquer or die, and till he actually fell, set his men the first example of the courage he required in all.” *

The English were desirous of concluding peace, because the war was unpopular, and they had to pay a very heavy penalty in the loss that occurred to their force by the sickness and death of the men composing it. The Burmese were equally desirous of peace, because the war was not of their own seeking and they had already suffered very heavily. The English by bribery and corruption and holding out other temptations had succeeded in raising traitors in the Burmese camp. They conspired with the Siamese and instigated them to create disturbances in the provinces contiguous to their borders. H. H. Wilson writes :—

“Although they (the Siamese) had taken no part in the war, they had continued their military demonstrations. In December (1824), a letter was received by Captain Fenwick, at Martaban, from the Ronna Ron, announcing

* *Narrative of the Burmese War*, pp. 176—177.

that he was on his march towards the Pegu frontier, with a Siamese army, and had moved to Kumboori on his way. It was, accordingly, arranged by the Commissioners, that Captain Williamson should be attached to the Siamese and a letter was addressed to the ministers of Siam, in encouragement of the disposition thus manifested.*

Reduced to such straits, it is no wonder that the Burmese were anxious to conclude peace. But they did not make the first move for it. It was the English who did it. To quote the above-mentioned author:—

"Although prepared for the renewal of hostilities, the English General, being sensible that it was not the wish of the Government of India to urge them to extremities, availed himself of an opportunity that occurred at this period (after the death of Bundoola), to afford an opening to a negotiation for peace. Amongst the individuals of all ranks, who had now flocked to Prome, was a confidential servant of the prince of Tharawadi, who made no secret of his relation to the prince, nor of the distress which the latter suffered from the occupation of his government by the English. A private letter was, accordingly, addressed to the prince, through this channel, by Sir A. Campbell, stating the disposition of the British Government to terminate the war, whenever the Court of Ava should be inclined to offer reparation for the injuries which had provoked it, and to indemnify the British Government for the expense. This attempt, however, was unavailing, and no answer was received."†

* *Ibid.* p. 230.

† *Ibid.* p. 230.

The English had instigated insurrections and created disorder in the Burmese Empire and so they thought they would succeed in forcing the Burmese monarch to accept the terms of peace dictated by them. H. H. Wilson writes:—

“Various reports were current at that time, which rendered it probable that the overture would be acceptable. Insurrections had taken place, it was asserted, in different parts of the Burman dominions, and a rumour of the deposition of the King seems to have found extensive currency. The reports turned out to be incorrect; but there was no doubt that the war was highly unpopular, and that the Lotoo, or Great Council of the State, was much divided.”*

The principal conditions of peace proposed by the British were so humiliating that they were rejected by the Burmese. So once more hostilities were resumed; but the Burmese, with their slender resources, were unable to carry on the war successfully with the English. They were desirous of peace and so were the English. The English had in their train one Burman priest, designated as the Raj-Gooroo. He was allowed to proceed to Ava, furnished with a private note from the British General, expressive of the readiness of the English to conclude peace with the Burmese King. The priest succeeded in inducing the Burmese Court to make overtures for peace. Hostilities

* *Ibid* p. 199.

were suspended, and deputies from both parties met in conference on the afternoon of the 30th December 1825. At this meeting, terms were stated and their discussion postponed till the next day. A third meeting took place on the 2nd January 1826. A treaty was drawn up the English copy of which was signed on the 2nd and the Burmese copy on the 3rd January, and an armistice was agreed upon till the 18th of January. But the treaty was not approved of by the Burmese King and so hostilities were again resumed. The British force was on full march towards the capital of Ava, which also scored some victories on the route. The King and his ministers felt that they were in the power of the British; meanwhile they were also informed of the fall of Bhurtpore. It was these considerations which led the Burmese Court now to sue for peace. The treaty of peace was concluded at Yandaboo, a place within four days' march of Ava.

Thus ended a war which benefited the Governor-General more than anybody else. H. H. Wilson writes that the war.

"inflicted very severe penalties on both the belligerent parties : on the British, by a heavy pecuniary expenditure and awful loss of life : and on the Burman Empire, by an equal sacrifice of men and money, and by the perpetual separation of some of its most highly valued dependencies. The expense of the military operations had greatly exceeded all anticipation, and had been,

in some respects, unnecessarily wasteful.* * A large portion of the expenditure, however, arose out of misinformation with regard to the resources of the Burman kingdom, which, instead of being adequate to the support of the troops, proved to be wholly deficient ;" * *

Major Archer's remarks are so pertinent that they may be quoted here *in extenso* as a fitting conclusion to this chapter on the Burmese War.

"At this moment the Company is deeply in debt, consequent upon the enormous, if not profuse, expenditure in as foolish and useless a war as was ever waged between a powerful and civilised state and a barbarous and really contemptible people. This grew out of sending a person to rule the destinies of India in every point deficient in the necessary qualifications : one who possessed but little experience in the arts of government, particularly in one so foreign to that of his native country....

"The Ava War, entered upon in all the hurry of fear, was of course not guided by judgment, either in the plan of operations or the most fitting time for commencing them. . . . The history of this war is divested of all honourable characteristics. . . . Death reaped a plentiful harvest at Rangoon and in Arracan: those to whom he did not deal the finishing stroke continue to bear the remains of a disease which baffles all attempts of skill to overcome. . . .

"Had the Burmese entered over our frontier, we should have met them on vantage ground, and have given them a hearty good drubbing. . . ."

(*Tours in Upper India and in parts of the Himalaya Mountains*, Vol. II. pp. 296—304.)

* *Ibid.*, p. 261.

CHAPTER LXV

The Reduction of Bharatpore

The reduction of Bharatpore by Lord Combermere during the administration of Lord Amherst did not lead to any extension of the territory of British India, but it enhanced the prestige of the British Indian Government. Lord Lake had failed to reduce it. Metcalfe, in his paper on the bombardment of fortified places, transmitted to Lord Moira in November, 1814, wrote:—

“At Bharatpore, four assaults and the greatest exertions of the united armies of Bengal and Bombay were ineffectual against a straggling and extensive walled town, situated on a plain, with a dry ditch, which the activity of the enemy converted into a wet one before the breach, and defended by men whom we used to call a rabble.

“Our failure on that occupation may be attributed partly to the difficulties which opposed the attack, and partly to the firmness and activity of the defence, and partly to the presence of a large enemy’s army under the walls which embarrassed our operations, and partly to the want of confidence on the part of our troops after the first check.”

Then he went on to mention the causes of failure in detail.

“The commencement of our systematic failures may

be dated from the unfortunate siege¹ of Bharatpore, where a great portion of our military fame was buried.

* * * *

"The real cause of our repeated failure seems to be, that our opponents now are better able to defend themselves against us than our opponents were formerly; consequently that we have not the same superiority on these occasions that we formerly possessed, nor have our troops the same confidence.

"The sight of a white face or a red coat is not sufficient now, on all occasions, as it once was, to make our adversaries flee in dismay, and abandon defences in which they have well-grounded confidence.

"Either the gradual and imperceptible circulation of knowledge has given them a better mode of defence and greater resources; or the charm which ensured us success is dissolved; or from some other change of circumstances we are less invincible than we were; for certain it is, that there have been occasions on which the backwardness of our troops has been complained of and whatever may have been the immediate cause of their defeat, they have repeatedly turned their backs on the walls of foes who, in theory, would be considered contemptible, and who to this day are compared by some writers in England to a flock of sheep.

"This is a subject which can not be taken too much into deep consideration. On our military superiority our power entirely depends. That superiority is lessened by every defeat.

* * * *

"Often has the fate of India depended on a single army; often again may the fate of a great part of India depend on a single army; and if ever, by any combination of unfortunate accidents, such scenes should be

exhibited in an army in the field, having the fate of our empire in great measure attached to it, as have occurred more than once in storming parties, and even in considerable detachments, our power might receive a blow from which its recovery might be questionable."

The importance of the above extracts from Matcalfe's paper will be understood when we come to describe the part played by him in the Bharatpore affairs of 1825.

At the request of Lord Amherst, in the autumn of 1825, when Metcalfe was at the Presidency, on his way to Delhi, he drew up the paper on the general question of interference in the concerns of other states, especially Bharatpore and Ulwar. "The policy which he recommended," writes Kaye, "was adopted by the Supreme Government; and the capture of Bhurtpore and the submission of Ulwar were the results."

He commenced his paper by saying:—

"It is presumed to be universally acknowledged as a general principle, that we ought not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states; and the same is enjoined by the repeated orders of the Court of Directors.

"But we are continually compelled to deviate from this rule, which is found untenable in practice; and the deviation is generally sanctioned, and sometimes directed by the same authority.

* * * *

"With respect, therefore, to all states over which our supremacy extends, our duty requires that we should support the legitimate succession of the prince, while

policy seems to dictate that we should, as much as possible, abstain from any further interference in their affairs.

* * * *

"Supposing the principles above stated to be correct, our duty with regard to the succession at Bharatpore may be easily defined.

"We are bound, not by any positive engagements to the Bharatpore State, nor by any claim on her part, but by our duty as supreme guardians of general tranquility, law, and right, to maintain the legal succession of Rajah Bulwant Singh to the Raj of Bharatpore: and we cannot acknowledge any other pretender.

* * * *

"A display and vigorous exercise of our power, if rendered necessary, would be likely to bring back men's minds in that quarter to a proper tone: and the capture of Bharatpore, if effected in a glorious manner, would do us more honour throughout India, by the removal of the hitherto unfaded impressions caused by our former failure, than any other event that can be conceived." *

Although the English had no business to interfere in the affairs of Bharatpur, yet, from interested motives, they did so. Intrigues were set on foot to gain their end and wipe out the disgrace of two former defeats. So when in 1825, the reigning prince died, the succession was disputed by two cousins. The opportunity was seized by the British Indian Government to interfere in

* *Kaye's Selections from the papers of Lord Metcalfe*, pp. 122-131

the internal affairs of the state and so they went to war with it. The then Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, went in person to conduct the war. An army of 25,000 men with a large artillery invested the place on December 10, 1825 and it was not till the 18th January 1826, that the fortress was reduced.*

It is said that there was a legend current in

* A very good account of the storming of Bharatpore fort on the 18th January 1826 is given in *Memoirs of Colonel Skinner* (Vol. II, pp. 174 *et seq.*) In a footnote on p. 175, it is mentioned that it was on the suggestion of Colonel Skinner that the fort was mined.

"When the breach was first reported practicable by the engineer officer, Lord Combermere asked Skinner, who was by, his opinion on the subject; to which he only replied that he was unworthy to touch his excellency's shoe, much more so to offer him advice. But his lordship, desirous of learning his opinion, repeated the question, and urged a reply. On which Skinner said that the breach was impracticable, and that, if attempted, the men would sink up to their armpits in the rubbish, and there would be a repetition of the former failures. Colonel—, then a subaltern in the engineers, said he differed, but would ascertain the fact, and gallantly rushed forward, crossed the ditch, and found that it was as Skinner had stated. He returned untouched by the fire, patted Skinner on the back, and said, "Old boy, you are right and I am wrong." Skinner then said they must just do as the Mahrattas used to do on similar occasions, and trust to mining. They did mine, and the event proved the soundness of his opinion."

that state that the gods had built the fortress and it would be captured only when an "alligator" came across the sea to besiege it. The name of the commander of the besieging army sounded something like "Kumbhir", which in some of the Indian vernaculars means an alligator. This worked upon the minds of the defenders of the fortress. they became depressed, lost heart and so the place fell.

But it is not improbable that some of the beleagured army were bribed. This is to be inferred from the following:—

"From the moment that Lord Combermere arrived in the camp before Bharatpoor, or rather which surrounded that place, he was constantly in motion; visiting every part of a most extensive encampment, and superintending every operation from the commencement to its final close. Not content with this, on the day of the assault, he actually headed one of the storming parties himself, and had an officer killed on each side of him on the breach. Such conduct in a commander, on ordinary occasions, would be deservedly censured as unnecessary and foolhardy exposure. Here, the character of our army, and safety of our East Indian possessions, perhaps even our very existence, depended on the success of the moment; and the presence of the Commander-in-Chief almost supplied the absence of two or three thousand Europeans. From the time of Lord Lake's failure against this place, it had never ceased to be thrown in our teeth by the Natives, in every part of the East; and many a man, in conversing about our successes, has silenced me in a moment, by saying. "All this

may be very true, but can you take Bharatpoor ?" Even after it was taken, no Native would believe it was captured by storm ; and to the last hour of my residence in India, they persisted in asserting that it was bought, not conquered." Welsh's *Military Reminiscences*, Vol. II. pp. 240—241.

After the capture of Bharatpur, the atrocities, barbarities and cruelties perpetrated by British officers and men on the hapless and helpless people of that town may be inferred from the following recorded by two officers in their works on travels in Northern India.

Major Archer writes under date of 29th January, 1828 :

"After dinner, some acting gentry, or rather buffoons, made their appearance, and caused us to laugh by their most ludicrous representation of the capture of Bharatpore, and our plundering it, with vivacity, as even to cut the hair off the heads of the people." (*Tours in Upper India*, p. 101).

Captain Mundy, in his pen and pencil sketches of India tells the amusing story of a native pantomime in which the *dramatis personae* were an English prize-agent and a Bharatpore peasant.

"The former wore an immense cock-hat and sword, the latter was stark naked with the exception of a scanty waist-cloth. The prize-agent stops him and demands his jewels and money. The half-starved wretch protests his poverty, and appeals to his own miserable appearance as the proof. The Englishman, upon this, makes him a furious speech, well garnished with G-d-d-mns, seizes on

the trembling Bharatporean, and determined not to leave him without having extracted something from him, takes out a pair of scissors, cuts off his long shaggy hair close to his skull, crams it into his pockets, and exit swearing."

The above needs no comments.

To meet the expenses of the Burmese war and the Bharatpur campaign, Lord Amherst made the Indian princes, whether reigning or pensioners, advance him money to prosecute his ambitious military designs.

So writes Mr. John Malcolm Ludlow in his *British India*, Vol. II, p. 65.

"The time for openly plundering native princes was gone with Warren Hastings. One observes, however, at this time, the extreme prevalence of the practice of obtaining loans from them. At the end of 1825, the king of Oude lends £1,000,000 sterling; £500,000 for two years the next year. The Baiza Bacc, after Sindhia's decease, lent £800,000. In the general loans which were contracted, we find smaller chiefs contributing their quota, The Raja of Nagpur £50,000, the Raja of Benares £20,000; even the unfortunate Bajee Rao, the ex-Peshwa, refunding a very considerable sum for the purpose out of the savings from his pension."

CHAPTER LXVI

Lord Amherst's Visit to Delhi

The Burmese war had made Lord Amherst very unpopular with the authorities in England. To retrieve his popularity, he declared war against Bharatpur. But not content with the successful termination of that war, he made another bid for popularity by unnecessarily humiliating the position of the Moghul Emperor of Delhi. With this object in view, he proceeded to Delhi, arriving at that Imperial Capital on the 15th of February, 1827. He had an interview with His Majesty on the 17th. The latter was seated on

"the *Takht-i-Taoos*, or Peacock Throne, and the Governor-General took his seat in a State Chair in front of it on the right, and sat at right angles to His Majesty, the Resident and other officers present as well as the chief personages of the Court, all standing." P. 338 of Punjab Government Records, Delhi Residency and Agency, 1807-1857, (Vol. I.)

Lord Amherst's conduct was considered so derogatory to His Majesty that he despatched Raja Ram Mohan Roy to England. It is true that His Majesty consented to an interview to the

Governor-General, for as he explained to the Resident that

"he had been influenced by an apprehension of consequences, similar to those which had resulted from the objection which His Majesty had urged to a meeting with the Marquis of Hastings on the footing then proposed, attributing, as he expressly stated, to this cause the subsequent assumption by the Nawab Vizier of the title of King; that, in the hope of obviating these consequences, he had reluctantly acquiesced in the ceremonial established by Lord Amherst, but that, instead of reaping from that concession the benefit which he expected, advantage was afterwards taken of it to introduce an alteration of the *ulkab*, ..." (*Ibid*, p. 359),

A year afterwards, the then Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, visited the Emperor, on the 3rd February, 1828. Major Archer, who was his A. D. C., has recorded in his *Tours in Upper India* (p. 110) a description of that visit. The Commander-in-Chief and his staff paid homage to the Emperor and presented the usual *nuzzar*, regarding which wrote Major Archer that

"It is known that by such means he is necessitated to eke out the scanty pittance allowed to him and his numerous family, servants, and dependants residing, in the fort. How are the mighty fallen!"

In a *shooqua* from His Majesty to the address of the Resident, received on the 26th November, 1831, His Majesty said :—

"I had invariably looked for relief from the Government in every case through the medium of the Resident

in attendance at my Court and that I had always continued to make him the channel of communicating my grievances to the Government, but that no one had ever exerted himself, in any instance, in my cause. Providence at length favoured me with a visit from Lord Amherst, which I hailed with feelings of the fullest confidence and delight at the prospect which it afforded of securing to me the fulfilment of the pledges that had been given me and the realization of all my desires. I accordingly did everything in my power to please His Lordship, and showed him every kindness that I could possibly manifest, explaining at the same time the engagements of the British Government towards me and making a full disclosure of my wishes to him. His Lordship, however, evinced as little disposition as others to redeem those engagements or execute the provisions contained in the regulations of Government, and, not confining himself to this, he had recourse to the novel procedure of setting aside the ceremonials and forms of address (*adab wu alkab*) observed by his predecessors, thus lowering me even in respect of the style of correspondence adopted towards me,—a thing that I could have least expected." (*Ibid*, p. 347).

The degradation of the Delhi Emperor did not produce any stir among the people of India. In a letter, dated the 20th of August, 1800, Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote to Major (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro :—

"As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country, I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with—if indifference constitutes that character."

Peter Auber, in his *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India* (Vol. II, p. 606), writes that Lord Amherst

"terminated the implied vassalage previously rendered, or was supposed to exist towards the royal family, by the British Government. The event created, very naturally, a strong sensation at the time, as it was the first instance of our openly and decidedly asserting the independence of the British power: it was generally stated that the crown of Hindustan had been transferred to the British nation.

"The event is said to have been viewed with deep melancholy by the royal family and their dependants. They felt, whatever privations they might have suffered from the Mahrattas, their title to the sovereignty of India had been invariably acknowledged. They were now, for the first time, divested of it."

There was at that time in India no awakening of the national consciousness, no sentiment of patriotism, as that term is understood in the modern Christian countries of the West. This made the rise of the Christian power possible in India. But after a century and more of the Christian British rule in India the awakening of the national consciousness of the people of India has taken place, as is evident from the result following the so-called abdication of the throne by the ruler of the Nabha state in the Panjab.

After the degradation of the Moghul Emperor, Lord Amherst continued his journey northward

to the Himalayas and spent the summer at Simla, where he received a friendly mission from Ranjit Singh and also the intelligence of the rupture between Russia and Persia. After quitting Simla in the end of June, he returned to Calcutta, where he stayed till the close of March, 1828, when, placing the provisional government in the hands of Mr. W. B. Bayley, he embarked for his native country.

CHAPTER LXVII

Lord William Bentinck's Administration (1828—1835)

Lord William Bentinck had served as Governor of Madras but was recalled after the outbreak of the Mutiny at Vellore. The disgrace was rankling in his breast, and so he applied for the post of Governor-General of India after the retirement of Lord Amherst. The course which he adopted was an unusual one. But it has been justified on the ground that

"He wished that the country which had been the scene of his undeserved humiliation, should also be the scene of his administrative triumphs. These considerations must be taken into full account, if we would form an accurate estimate of the motives which induced Lord William Bentinck to appear as a candidate for the office."^{*}

Sir William Kaye, from whose article in the *Calcutta Review* the above extract has been made, mentions the special qualifications which Bentinck possessed for the Indian administration. He writes :

"When formerly Governor of Madras, he had devoted his active mind with great ardour to the study of Indian

* *Calcutta Review*, Vol. I, p. 341

politics. He had made himself master of every subject connected with the internal economy and working of the Government. He had sketched out many plans for the improvement of the administration. In his eagerness to carry those views into effect, and to prevent their being subverted by superior authority, he had, in one instance, adopted the extraordinary step of quitting his own presidency and proceeding to Calcutta.”*

But no Indian having any sense of self-respect and not altogether wanting in patriotism, can praise Lord Bentinck for all the trouble he took for making himself master of every subject connected with the working of the government, during the period of his governorship of Madras. True it is, that he perceived the benefits which Muhammadan rule had conferred on the natives of this country and which the Anglo-Indian Government of that day from the very nature of its constitution was precluded from doing. He wrote :

“In many respects the Mahomedans surpassed our rule ; they settled in the countries which they conquered ; they intermixed and intermarried with the natives ; they admitted them to all privileges ; the interests and sympathies of the conquerors and the conquered became identified. Our policy, on the contrary, has been the reverse of this, —cold, selfish and unfeeling.”

It was easy for him to diagnose the disease and mention its symptoms. He knew the remedy also—the remedy which was calculated to cure the

* *Ibid*, p. 340.

disease. But he did not propose to apply the remedy. It was during his governorship of Madras that one of the members of his council there, by the name of Mr. William Thackeray, penned a minute from which the following extracts are made :

"It is very proper that in England, a good share of the produce of the earth should be appropriated to support certain families in affluence, to produce senators, sages, and heroes for the service and defence of the state,..... The leisure, independence, and high ideas, which the enjoyment of this rent affords, has enabled them to raise Britain to the pinnacle of glory. Long may they enjoy it;—but in India, that haughty spirit, independence, and deep thought, which the possession of great wealth sometimes gives ought to be suppressed. They are directly adverse to our power and interest..... We do not want generals, statesmen, and legislators; we want industrious husbandmen."

Referring to the above, Mr. William Digby truly observes :—

"Mr. Thackeray was without excuse. Lord William Bentinck, who of set purpose selected Mr. Thackeray as his mouthpiece, they holding ideas in common, is even more without excuse." (*Prosperous British India*, p. 41).

If we remember the above facts, we shall be able to understand Bentinck's policy when he held the office of Governor-General of India. Of course, he was not popular with the Anglo-Indian community of his day, because he disturbed the allowances

of the civil and military officers. He was denounced by his Christian countrymen, because he touched their pockets. It is on this account that the memory of Lord William Bentinck is held in execration in the annals of Anglo-India. Even the paid historiographer of the East India Company, Mr. Thornton, had no good words to say of Lord William Bentinck. The reader is referred to his History of British India for the estimate he formed of his lordship.* So fair-minded a writer as the Honorable Mr. Frederick Shore wrote of Lord Bentinck :

* "It remains only to state that he (Lord Bentinck) quitted India in May, 1835, having held the office of Governor-General somewhat longer than the ordinary period ; but having done less for the interest of India and for his own reputation than any who had occupied his place since the commencement of the nineteenth century, with the single exception of Sir George Barlow. His besetting weakness was vanity—the idol of his worship was popularity, and he sought to win its behests by an unrestrained sacrifice to what is called the 'Spirit of the Age.' Economy was in fashion, and therefore Lord William Bentinck was an economist. It was a period when showy and noisy pretension was permitted in many instances to carry off the rewards and honors which were due only to deep and solid attainments, and Lord William Bentinck challenged praise for a system designed to work in accordance with the popular feeling—professing to foster merit, but, in truth, calculated to foster only undue influence..... For all these acts, charity itself can assign no motive but a weak and inordinate appetite for temporary admiration." Vol. V, pp. 235-36,

"But what has been the general result of Lord William's government? What has become of his determination to do his best for the interests of the people over whom he has been placed? Professions in abundance we have had; it has been a government of professions, which has begun and ended in words. It may have been his intention to have fulfilled them; but he forgot to add the qualifying proviso, that his good intentions were never to interfere with the main principle of the British Indian Government, profit to themselves and their masters at the expense of the people of India. * * The abominable system of purveyance and forced labour is still in full force. The commerce and manufactures of the country are daily deteriorated by the vexatious system of internal duties which is still preserved—.....the people are neither happier nor richer than they were before—indeed, their impoverishment has been progressive—for while the evils enumerated have continued in full force, the revenue screw has scarcely been relaxed half a thread of the many hundreds of which it is composed;.....while the natives, the East Indians, and the English settlers, are found equally murmuring at the little which has been practically done to improve their condition." (*Notes on Indian Affairs*, Vol. II, pp. 223-224).

But because he was unpopular with his own countrymen, it does not necessarily follow that he wanted to injure them. No, he was their true friend and well-wisher. Every political and administrative measure that he carried out in India was for their benefit and calculated to do harm to the natives of the soil.

By Indian historians in general, Lord William Bentinck is considered to have been a peace-loving Governor-General. It is true that he did not involve India in costly wars like those of which his predecessors like Wellesley, Marquis of Hastings and Lord Amherst had been guilty. But then the finances of the country were in such a precarious condition when he was appointed to the high post of Governor-General that he could not indulge in the luxury of any costly war. He had to carry out retrenchments and so he was obliged to touch the pockets of his own co-religionists and compatriots, for which he was so unpopular with them.

However, there was one war during his regime by which a large province was made to lose its independence. Coorg was coveted by Anglo-Indians, because it appeared to them almost a paradise on earth. Says Mr. L. Bowring, who was for some years Chief Commissioner of Mysore and Coorg, in his "Eastern Experiences" (pp. 223, 238):—

"Few parts of India are more picturesque than the little hill province of Coorg, and nowhere can be found a more gallant and loyal race than its inhabitants..... In former days, when to a native mind, the merit of a territory was its inaccessibility, few States enjoyed such an immunity from invasion as Coorg, the only approaches to it being through dense tangled woods, or up the face of steep mountains, clothed with forest trees, and cut up by stony water-courses."

It was to lift the *purdah* of and annex this

beautiful land, that Lord William Bentinck made a war on its sovereign. The princes of Coorg were always friendly to the English. When the latter went to war with Tippoo, the help which they received from the then reigning prince of Coorg, made them conclude a treaty with Coorg in 1790 with the following stipulations :—

"1. While the sun and moon endure, the faith of the contracting parties shall be kept inviolate.

2. Tippoo and his allies are to be treated as common enemies. The Rajah will do all in his power to assist the English to injure Tippoo.

3. The Rajah will furnish, for fair payment, all the supplies his country affords, and have no connection with other 'topiwallahs.'

4. The Company guarantee the independence of Coorg, and the maintenance of the Rajah's interests in the case of a peace with Tippoo.

5. An asylum and every hospitality is offered to the Rajah and his family at Tellichery until the establishment of peace.

God, Sun, Moon and Earth be witnesses!"—*The Calcutta Review*, September 1856, p. 188.

But as usual with the East India Company, their dealings with Coorg were not fair. It would seem that Bentinck was bent upon annexing Coorg because he knew its value to the colonisers of his race and creed when he was Governor of Madras. No trouble would have occurred, had the Coorg question been properly dealt with. The claims of the last Rajah of Coorg were not well founded.

Revd. Dr. Mœgling, in his history of Coorg, published in the *Calcutta Review* for September, 1856 (p. 196), wrote:—

“The present ex-Rajah succeeded. He was acknowledged by the British Government without any difficulty, it appears. Devammaji's claims, and the promises of the Supreme Government given to her father were overlooked. The resolution of the Marquis of Hastings, that the Coorg question should be investigated when Virarajendra's daughter would reach majority, seems to have been forgotten.”

The Raja was represented (mis-represented) to be an incarnation of the Devil, and it was said that he delighted in murdering in cold blood his relatives and subjects. Affairs reached the climax when the Raja's sister Devammaji and her husband fearing assassination at the hands of the Raja sought protection of the Resident of Mysore. It does not seem unreasonable that she fled to the Company's territory, in order to draw the attention of the Company to her claims to the sovereignty of Coorg. It may be that she might have concocted all the stories of the cruelties of her brother in order to gain her own end. But the Resident and the Company not only took her and her husband under their protection, but they wanted to coerce the Raja. The Raja as an independent sovereign resented this interference. He was irritated beyond measure and it is alleged that he indulged in mad schemes. If he did so, his

conduct was not unjustifiable. Perhaps, the authorities were seeking for a pretext to annihilate the sovereignty of Coorg and so provoked the Raja to take those measures which were necessary to maintain his dignity and safety.

This was just what the authorities were longing for. War was declared against the Raja. An expedition under British officers was sent to his territory. The Raja never meant war and so it was not difficult for the British force to occupy his country. Even the Revd. Dr. Moegling is forced to say that

"the Rajah, incited partly by the hope.....that a reconciliation was yet possible, partly by the fear, that he might lose all, if matters went to extremities, sent orders prohibiting the Coorgs from encountering the troops of the Company. To this vacillation of the Rajah, the several divisions of the British expedition, then marching into Coorg, were more indebted for their success and even safety, than to the skill and talents of their commanders." (*Ibid*, p. 199)

The Raja submitted. He was dethroned and sent a captive to Benares. Had Bentinck been an honest man, here an opportunity presented itself to investigate the claims of the princess to the throne of Coorg. He did nothing of the sort, but on the contrary annexed the province on the ostensible plea that the people of Coorg unanimously desired to be placed under the protection

of the East India Company! We know the significance of this diplomatic declaration.*

The following Proclamation was issued to annihilate the national existence of Coorg :

"Whereas it is the unanimous wish of the inhabitants of Coorg to be taken under the protection of the British Government, His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-General has been pleased to resolve, that the territory heretofore governed by Virarajendra Vodeyar shall be transferred to the Honorable Company. The inhabitants are hereby assured that they shall not again be subjected to native rule, that their civil and religious

* Thornton as an apologist for the annexation of Coorg writes :—

"The annexation of the conquered territory to the British dominions is not, on the first view, so clearly justifiable, but a very few words of explanation will shew that, in this instance also, the right course was taken. The Rajah was childless [this is not true, as one of the Raja's daughters was married to an English gentleman] and he had taken effectual measures to cut off all pretensions to the succession not derived from himself, The vacant throne was without a claimant, and the power which had occupied the country was called upon to provide in some manner for the administration of the government. A stranger might have been placed on the musnud; but there was no reason for the exercise of such self-denial on the part of the British Government, more especially as the people manifested a strong desire to become British subjects. The existence of such a desire removed every pretension for hesitation, * * "

(Vol. V, pp. 214-215.)

usages will be respected, and that the greatest desire will invariably be shown by the British Government to augment their security, comfort and happiness."

Mr. Bowring writes :—

"the province being one of the very few British possessions in India which has become such not by conquest, but by the free consent of the population. Perhaps owing to this fact, the government to which they announced their adhesion in 1834, has, not without good reason, shown them constant indulgence, and an exceptional deference towards their feelings and prejudices. For instance, the slaughter of cattle in Coorg is and likely to remain, forbidden, so long as the people deprecate it, nor would it be prudent or just to ignore their feelings on the subject, in the face of a distinct promise given to them by Colonel Fraser at the time of annexation." *Loc. Cit.* p. 247.

It is admitted that Coorg is not a conquered province. Its inhabitants are not then bondsmen of England. But do they enjoy all the rights and privileges of free citizens ?

It was solemnly proclaimed that the civil usages of the inhabitants of Coorg would be respected. But this solemn proclamation was violated by the English when cash payment was demanded for land assessment. The Revd. Dr. Mœgling writes :

"Under the Rajas, the assessment had been paid in kind. The Collector of Mangalore, now demanded cash payment : this was considered a grievance, as the farmers were laid under tribute by the money changers."

There was an insurrection which was put down with a high hand.

This was how the civil usages of the inhabitants of Coorg were respected!

Lord Bentinck should be held responsible for the ill-treatment that the Ex-Raja received at the hands of the E.I. Company and to obtain redress for which he went personally to England. The wrongs of the Raja need not be dilated on here.

Coorg was annexed because it was considered fit for colonisation by English settlers. The number of Englishmen who have settled in Coorg as coffee-planters is a very large one, as may be judged from the fact of its being the largest coffee producing province in India. According to the Agricultural Statistics for 1904-5, Coorg has an area of 48,142 acres of land under coffee cultivation. Mr. Bowring wrote:

"If the progress of enlightenment among the Coorgs has been slower than could be desired, their material progress has been remarkable. This is mainly owing to the extensive operations of the coffee-planters, who ** began to colonise the country, the splendid forests in which promised a rich reward to the enterprising settler.

"From the time when Europeans began to settle in the district to plant coffee, the forests, with which the country was covered, began to acquire a new value. But, at first any applicant received permission to commence operations in woods not claimed by private individuals,

or regarded as sacred forests. Very little trouble was taken about securing proper grants, permission to cultivate coffee on payment of the Government excise being deemed sufficient." (Loc. Cit. p. 260)

The annexation of Coorg was immensely beneficial to every British officer who served in the expedition to that principality. By the distribution of the Coorg prize money, Sir P. Lindsay received one-sixteenth of the whole amount, and the other officers shared as follows :—

Colonels	Rs. 25,000	each
Lieut.-Colonels	" 15,000	"
Majors	" 10,000	"
Captains	" 5,000	"
Sub-alterns	" 2,500	"

(Asiatic Journal, May 1836, p. 33).

After this need one wonder why the inhabitants of Coorg *unanimously* desired to place themselves under the protection of the English!*

*The deposed Raja of Coorg went (in 1852) to England to represent his case to the authorities there, and to obtain redress, if possible, for the wrongs inflicted on him. He took with him his only daughter, who was converted to Christianity and married to an English gentleman there. It is needless to say that no heed was paid to his representations. That laird of the Pen, Lord Dalhousie, insulted him. The Raja's case was put before the British public in a pamphlet published in 1857 by John Bumpus, 158, Oxford Street, London, and written by an officer formerly in the service of His Highness Veer Rajunder Waddeer, Rajah of Coorg.

Bentinck annexed Kachar under the doctrine of lapse—a doctrine which became so notorious during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie. The ruler of Kachar, Govinda Chandra by name, was assassinated in 1830 and had no male heir and so the “benevolent” Bentinck did not scruple to annex it.

Shortly before his departure from India, Bentinck confiscated part of the possessions of the Raja of Jynteah on the ground of infraction of treaty !

It is true that excepting Coorg and Kachar no other province of India was annexed to the British dominion by Lord Bentinck.

He had his eye on Mysore also. He did not, however, annex it, because he could not do so without offering the Nizam of Hyderabad at least half of it. So he deprived the Maharaja of all power, placing the administration in the hands of British officers.

Lord William Bentinck had no right to deal with the Maharaja of Mysore in the manner in which he did so. The letter, dated September 7th, 1831, he wrote to that unfortunate prince, depriving him of all power to manage the affairs of his principality, did not allow him to answer the allegations contained in it or afford him an opportunity to exculpate his conduct.

Major Evans Bell, in his work on *The Mysore*

Reversion, has thoroughly exposed^d the falsehoods with which that letter abounds. He writes :—

“The summary substitution of direct British management was a somewhat harsh remedy for any administrative abuses, when the Treaty gave us the power of dictating and enforcing the acceptance of such ‘ordinances’ as might have removed all cause of offence..... according to the strict letter of the Treaty (article IV), when it should be thought necessary to have recourse to this extreme measure, we had no right to attack the whole of Mysore, but only ‘such part or parts’ as should be required to render the funds of the State ‘efficient and available either in time of peace or war.’...

“The first attachment of the country by Lord William Bentinck was not justified either absolutely by the terms of the treaty or morally by any special urgency of outraged humanity, or of danger to the tranquility of our own adjacent provinces. ... The fact is that the subsidy had been always paid with the utmost punctuality, and that not a single instalment was due at the date of the ‘Governor-General’s letter’.

“Thus the grounds alleged for the original attachment of the country are not only unsustainable by the terms of the Treaty, but are found to be even more opposed to truth than Lord William Bentinck was ever made aware.” (Pp. 21-24).

Bentinck should have shown some consideration for the case of the Raja and asked him for an explanation before depriving him of power in his principality. He should not have acted on the advice of the then Governor of Madras, who was one Mr. Stephen Lushington, whose early career

was not unknown to the Governor-General. For it was during his Governorship of Madras in 1804 that young Stephen Lushington, who had come out as a writer to Madras in 1791, had to leave it under a cloud for embezzlement of public revenue. (See Major Evans Bell's *Memoirs of General John Briggs*, pp. 151 *et seq.*)

His interference in the Jeypore affairs, upsetting the arrangements of his predecessors, led to the belief that he contemplated the annexation of that State of Rajputana. It is stated in the *Political History of Jeypore* (p. 29), published in 1868 as one of the Selections from the Records of the Government of India, foreign department No. LXV, that

"the appointment of Jootha Ram as minister..... was ascribed to a desire on the part of the British Government to annex the country, on account of the certain ensuing anarchy."

The tribute of the Raja of Jodhpore had fallen into arrear. An army had been assembled to overawe that prince, who was also threatened with dethronement. The district of Sambhar and a share of the Sambhar salt lake were taken possession of as a security.

Lord William Bentinck also detained as security the Jeypore share of the Sambhar salt lake and district. Referring to this, Ludlow writes, that this

"gave great offence to both prince and people. A jealousy of the English sprang up, and a few months after Lord William Bentinck's departure (4th June, 1835), an attack was made on the Resident Major Alves, and his assistant, Mr. Blake, was killed." (Vol. II, p. 95).

The policy which his Lordship pursued in the Political or Foreign Department was such as paved the way to the annexation of the States of several independent or feudatory princes of Hindustan and bringing them under the direct administration of the East India Company. The manner in which he treated those princes was not calculated to make the relations between them and the English pleasant.

Take the case of Oude. Lord Bentinck meddled unnecessarily with the internal politics of this Kingdom. His visit to Oude in 1831 did not forebode good for that Kingdom. In his report of 11th July, 1831, he wrote:—

"I thought it right to declare to his Majesty beforehand, that the opinion I should offer to the home authorities would be, that unless a decided reform in the administration should take place, there would be no remedy left except in the direct assumption of the management of the Oude territories by the British Government."

It is a well-known fact that this minute of Lord Bentinck strengthened the hands of Lord Dalhousie, and the Directors of the East India Company, who were bent upon annexing Oude.

The King of Oude was alarmed by the hostile attitude which Bentinck assumed towards him. He intended the dispatch of an embassy to England to represent his case to the authorities. But how this was frustrated by Bentinck is not so well known as it ought to be. A correspondent under the pseudonym of "Veritas" wrote to the *Indian Examiner and Universal Review* for April 1847 :

"Some ten or twelve years ago, it was generally believed, and publicly spoken of in the Calcutta Journals, that the East India Company would depose the then reigning sovereign of Oudh, take his rich country and treasury, in which he had enormous wealth, to themselves, and pension the king, as they had many other native princes of India whose possessions they coveted. The king, greatly alarmed at the prospect of losing his kingdom, and becoming a pensioner of the East India Company, resolved on sending an embassy to England, in order to create a sympathy in the British people, and avert, if possible, the wrongs likely to be done him.

"Having come to this resolution, his Majesty selected for the embassy Colonel du Bois, an intelligent, talented gentleman, who then held a post of honor in the king's service. A native gentleman, from the Court of Oudh, was also to accompany Colonel du Bois as joint representative of his Majesty. while these matters were progressing, the supreme Government of India became alarmed at the probable results of the mission, determined at once to frustrate the king's intentions, and to ruin the embassy immediately. A plot was accordingly laid for this purpose, in which a lady, took an active part, and deprived it of all its power. Charges of cons-

piracy against the East India Company's Government were brought forward against Colonel du Bois, as the embassy was on the eve of departure for England ... Everything was carried on in secret against him, and before the matter was brought to a conclusion the ship sailed, and the embassy proceeded in opposition to the Government, ... The Government arbitrarily compelled the King of Oudh to dismiss his faithful servant, Colonel du Bois, on these absurd charges, brought forward for the express purpose of frustrating the King's intentions, ... Colonel du Bois, though aware, previous to quitting India, that he was charged with conspiracy against the East India Company, yet conscious of his own innocence, never supposed that he would be injured by it. What, then, must have been his horror and astonishment, on receiving his dismissal, which had been wrung from the King, his master, by the supreme Government of Bengal, and sent after him, in breathless haste, and without a moment's delay. ... On Colonel du Bois being dismissed from the embassy, they had nothing to fear from the native gentleman, who was left in a helpless condition, friendless, and in a strange country, where he knew not a word of the language, consequently not in a position to gain many in his favour; and after suffering great anxiety of mind he ... became depressed in spirits, ill in health, and ultimately died at Poonah, on his way back to his sovereign, at Lucknow. ... Colonel du Bois, finding he could obtain no redress from the East India Company, eventually sent his wife Madame du Bois to Calcutta, to seek an interview with Lord William Bentinck, and to implore him to redress his grievances; but the Governor-General was inexorable, for he had himself concocted the plot, for the benefit of his masters. ... After this piece of injustice from the East

India Company, Colonel du Bois retired to France, and would have held a post of high honour in his native land; but Lord William Bentick had returned from India, and was then in France, and in addition to the signal service he had done him with the King of Oudh, now prevented the King of the French from conferring this post of honour on him, by representing that Colonel du Bois had entered into a conspiracy against the East India Company's Government, though he knew at the same time that it was one of the foulest plots ever concocted to ruin the character of an honourable man, and to prevent the course of justice....." *The Indian Examiner and Universal Review*, April, 1847, pp. 178-187.

In this connection must also be mentioned the attitude of Lord Bentinck to the embassy of the King of Delhi to England. The celebrated Hindu reformer, Ram Mohun Roy, was selected by the King to represent his grievances to the authorities in England. As Ram Mohun Roy was his ambassador, the title of Raja was conferred on him to exalt his dignity. Lord Bentinck was much enraged at the proceedings of the King. To mark his displeasure with the conduct of His Majesty—whose vassal the East India Company, of which he was the representative, was, he did not see the King when he passed by Delhi.* This act of

* Raja Ram Mohun Roy was the bearer of a letter from His Majesty, the King of Delhi, to the King of England, in which it was stated:—

"Even in the communication above stated insult, in point of form, was added to injustice. All the Governor-

positive discourtesy, if not⁴ disloyalty, of Lord Bentinck must have rankled in the breast of the King and of his relatives and loyal subjects and was probably one of the contributing causes of the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Generals who have preceded Lord Amherst in the Government of the British territories in India have thought it no degradation to themselves to address me or my august Father in the style that custom has accorded to Royalty. Lord Amherst, however, thought proper to reduce me, in the form of communication, to the footing of an equal, and thereby to rob me even of the cheap gratification of the usual ceremonials of address, so as to humble me, as far as possible, in the eyes of all ranks of people."

The King's deputation of Raja Ram Mohun Roy to England greatly enraged the Governor-General, who directed his Secretary, Mr. H. T. Prinsep, to write to Mr. W. B. Martin, Resident at Delhi, on 20th November, 1831 to

"call upon His Majesty for a distinct declaration whether Ram Mohun Roy is authorized to act as His Majesty's agent to present the letter from His Majesty from which the above passage is cited, and to advocate the appeal prosecuted therein against the forms of intercourse established."

The King did not see his way to disavow Raja Ram Mohun Roy and so the Resident was directed to inform His Majesty that

"Under the distinct avowal made by the King that Ram Mohun Roy is now his agent in England for prosecuting an appeal, among other points, against the

Perhaps the fact is not so well known as it deserves to be that Lord Bentinck was the author of a plot which had for its object the extinction of the Maratha Principality of Gwalior. Writes Mr. John Hope, a former Superintending Surgeon of Scindia's Contingent, and Surgeon to the Court of Gwalior, in his brochure "The House of Scindia, a Sketch," published in 1863 by Messrs Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green :—

"But if these dangers surrounded him [Maharaja Janko Scindea] in his capital, he was threatened with no less danger from the Council of Calcutta. Secret deliberations were there being held, with a view to discover what profit could be made out of the troubles of this weak but most faithful young prince, A demi-official letter was written to the Resident by the Chief Secretary of the Foreign Department, desiring him to learn, at a private interview, by way of a feeler, if the Maharajah, encircled as he was by serious troubles—

footing on which the forms of intercourse and of correspondence between His Majesty and the Governor-General were placed by His Lordship's predecessor, the Earl Amherst, it seems to His Lordship to be impossible that any intercourse on that footing can be renewed, which His Majesty has in his letter to the King of England characterized as degrading and insulting."

For all particulars, see *Records of the Delhi Residency and Agency*, (Lahore 1911,) Chapter XI, Failure of Negotiations for a meeting between the Governor-General (Lord William Bentinck) and His Majesty the King of Delhi in 1831.

troubles mainly caused by our government—would like to resign; assigning over the country to the British Government, and receiving a handsome pension, which would be paid out of his own revenues. There can be very little doubt that this demi-official document was of the genus *mystic*, and that no copy of it can now be found among the archives pertaining to India. Mr. Cavendish, than whom no Englishman ever attained a greater ascendancy over the minds of the natives with whom he had concern, declined to make such a suggestion, and his answer threw a damp upon the hopes of the annexationists, The Government officials were of course extremely angry. The press, almost entirely supported by the civil and military services which are immensely benefited by annexation, was very abusive. Presently another demi-official letter arrived; this time from the Deputy Secretary of the Foreign Department—a '*mystic*' one we may be quite sure—strongly expostulating with Mr. Cavendish upon his proceedings, and concluding with this significant remark; 'You have thus allowed a favourable chance to escape of connecting the Agra to the Bombay Presidency.' Of course the Resident's doom was fixed, though not just then declared. A few months afterwards, the Governor-General gratified his feelings of resentment by removing Mr. Cavendish to another native court.

"Lest it should be thought by any one that in this little sketch of his (Lord William Bentinck's) foreign policy, we have given even the slightest touch of colouring, we will relate, by way of illustration, an amusing anecdote, which is known to three or four persons now living, and which sufficiently confirms our statement that, in respect of the rights of native states, his lordship entirely overlooked the tenth commandment. It happened

that Major Sutherland was selected to fill the office vacated by Mr. Cavendish.... He therefore waited on the Governor-General in Calcutta, to learn what the policy was to be at Gwalior; was it to be intervention or non-intervention? Lord Bentinck, whose disposition, like that of Lord Palmerston, loved a joke, quickly replied: 'Look here, Major,' and his lordship threw back his head, opened wide his mouth, and placed his thumb and finger together like a boy about to swallow a sugar-plum. Then turning to the astonished Major he said: 'If the Gwalior State *will* fall down your throat, you are not to shut your mouth, as Mr. Cavendish did, but swallow it; that is *my* policy.... To 'the traditionary old Indians,' the objects of so much scorn in these days, this doctrine smacks of petty larceny. Imagine a magistrate of Bow Street to say to some smart-looking man, with a cloak hanging on his arm for a purpose, 'Don't prowl about the theatres at night, picking pockets, for that is larceny; but if you see a person drop his purse, keep it; a traditionary old beak would call this petty larceny, but I tell you it is all right!' In a moral point of view, we think the two cases exactly parallel."

It seems that Lord Bentinck was also scheming to absorb and annex other principalities of Central India. In 1835, there was a disputed succession to the throne of Jhansi. There were four claimants. Lord Bentinck's decision is described by the Secretary to Government as follows:—

"On this occasion the lawful heir by blood, descended of the body of Sheo Ram Bhow, was recognised as successor to the Raj, to the disallowance of a boy alleged to have been adopted, or nominated as successor by the

late Rajah the day before his death, who if adopted would have been unquestionably the heir to any property of his adoptive father to the exclusion of the uncle, and this was done without enquiry into the fact of adoption or nomination as though it was an immaterial circumstance.”*

Lord Bentinck had no right to interfere in the affairs of this principality by upsetting the adoption of the successor to the throne made by its late ruler. His object seems to have been to create confusion and distractions in that state and then to annex it on the ostensible plea that it could not manage its own affairs! In recognising Raghunath Rao, the deceased Raja's uncle, it was said :

“ It being presumed that he is able to establish his authority, and that his succession will be acknowledged by disinterested parties at Jhansi ”†

This action of Bentinck in upsetting and not recognising the adoption of the successor to the throne of Jhansi made by its late Raja served as a precedent to Lord Dalhousie in annexing that state in 1853.

Again, in 1834, Lord Bentinck declined to interfere in favor of Mulhar Rao Holkar's adopted son at Indore. He instructed the British Resident at Indore not to be present at the installation,

* Jhansi Blue book, p. 18.

† Jhansi Blue Book, n. 17.

or to confer the *khiṣut* of honor upon the young Rajah. The Secretary to Government wrote to the Resident at Indore:—

"There would appear to be three individuals whos^e pretensions to the sovereignty might be alleged with some colour of right, ... His Lordship in Council is not prepared to pronounce upon the relative superiority of these claims. The decision may fairly be left to the voice of the country, and our duty will be to maintain whatever arrangement may appear to be unequivocally consonant to the general wish."

Regarding this action of Lord Bentinck, Sir George Clerk, the then Governor of Bombay, said that,

"the inconsistency, caprice, and mutability of our opinions regarding all great principles, is the bane of our supremacy in India."

The Afghanistan imbroglio and disasters of 1839-1842, the subsequent unjustifiable wars in Sind and Punjab and also the annexation of those two provinces, were in no small measure due to the part which Lord Bentinck played in the scheme which was euphemistically called the navigation of the Indus*. The real author of this

* It was Moorcroft who first suggested the navigation of the Indus. Captain Cunningham, in his *History of the Sikhs* (first edition, p. 205), writes:—

"The traveller Moorcroft had been impressed with the use which might be made of the Indus as a channel of

scheme was Sir John Malcolm. Its genesis was the "Memoranda on the North-Western Frontier of British India, and on the importance of the River Indus, as connected with its defence, drawn up by desire of Sir John Malcolm." This document was considered by the authorities of the East India Company, as well as by Lord Bentinck. Some extracts from this State document, which was pregnant with such momentous consequences, are given below :

"Should ever an enemy appear on our N.-W. Frontier, the possession of Sindé will become a point of the utmost importance to British interests in India, as *commanding the navigation of the Indus* : a position, in case

British commerce, and the scheme of navigating that river and its tributaries was eagerly adopted by the Indian Government, and by the advocates of material utilitarianism. One object of sending King William's presents for Runjeet Singh by water, was to ascertain, as if undesignedly, the trading value of the classical stream, and the result of Lieutenant Burnes' observations convinced Lord William Bentinck of its superiority over the Ganges. There seemed also, in his Lordship's opinion, good reason to believe that the Great Western Valley had at one time been as populous as that of the East, and it was thought that the judicious exercise of the paramount influence of the British Government, might remove those political obstacles which had banished commerce from the rivers of Alexander. It was therefore resolved, in the current language of the day, to open the Indus to the navigation of the world."

of such an event occurring, of vital consequence to the defence of the country. A perfectly unrestricted communication on this river, can never be expected to be conceded us by the Court of Hydrabad....The possession of Hydrabad may consequently become the object of the British Government—that effected, it is presumed, that very efficient measures might be taken to secure the free passage of the Indus. The execution would not appear to present any serious difficulties—the routes upon Hydrabad (as will be shewn) are very practicable; the fortifications of that Capital are insignificant; “The Seik” is the only foreign adjacent power—from the organization of his Government, the disposibility of his force, and his political discrimination, whose jealousy of our encroachment we need fear or propitiate; and the disjointed texture of the Scindian Force and Government, while it prevented union in those who opposed us, would afford us ample means of coercing any refractory chiefs, and of converting many into grateful allies, by substituting a liberal and beneficent rule, for the grinding tyranny of the Ameers.”

Of course, the annexation of Sind was plainly hinted at in the above document.

Lord Bentinck played the part of Machiavelli in the Navigation of the Indus Affair. Sir Charles Metcalfe as a member of the Council of Lord Bentinck raised his voice of protest against this measure.

In a minute dated October 1830, Metcalfe condemned the contemplated Survey of the Indus. He wrote :

“The scheme of surveying the Indus, under the pre-

tence of sending a present to Rajah Runjeet Singh, seems to me highly objectionable.

"It is a trick, in my opinion, unworthy of our Government, which cannot fail when detected, as most probably it will be, to excite the jealousy and indignation of the powers on whom we play it.

"It is just such a trick as we are often falsely suspected and accused of by the native powers of India, and this confirmation of their suspicions, generally unjust, will do us more injury by furnishing the ground of merited reproach, than any advantage to be gained by the measure can compensate...

"It must be remembered that the survey of the Indus or any part of the Sind country may give us the power to injure that State, may even assist us in conquering it, and in the course of events is as likely to be turned to use for that purpose as for any other. The rulers of Sind, therefore, have the same right to be jealous of our surveys of their river and their territories that any power of Europe has to protect its fortresses from the inspection of foreign engineers.

"It is stated in a late despatch from the Secret Committee that we must not permit the rulers of Sind to obstruct our measures; in other words, that we are to go to war with them to compell submission to our wishes. With deference I should remark that such an assumption does not seem to be warranted by the law of nations...,... But the assumption is an exemplification of what I have often observed in our conduct towards the Native States, and what appears to me the greatest blot in the character of our Indian policy, although I am not aware that it has attracted any general notice in England. However much we may profess moderation and

non-interference when we have no particular interest of our own concerned, the moment we discover any object of pursuit we become impatient and over-bearing, insist on what we require, and cannot brook denial or hesitation. We disregard the rights of others, and think only of our own convenience. Submission or war is the alternative which the other party has to choose.

"Thus at the present time, because we have taken alarm at the supposed designs of Russia, it would seem that we are to compel intermediate States to enter into our views or submit to our projects, although they cannot comprehend them, and instead of entertaining any apprehension of Russian designs, are more apprehensive of our own, our character for encroachment being worse than that of the Russians, because the States concerned have a more proximate sense of it from the result which they see in actual operation among the realms of India . . .

"Among other uncertainties of this great question, is that of what our own conduct ought to be when the expected crisis shall arise. Whether we should meet the enemy half-way and fight the battle in foreign countries—whether we should defend the passage of the Indus and make our stand there, or await the foe on our own frontier, and force on him all the labor, and loss, and risk of coming the whole distance before we attack him—must depend so much on the disposition of intermediate countries, and other circumstances of the time that it seems utterly vain to determine even our own course at this remote distance from the event . . .

"If, therefore, I were asked what is best to be done with a view to a Russian invasion, I should say that it is best to do nothing until time shall show us what we ought to do, because there is nothing that we can

do in our present blind state that would be of any certain benefit on the approach of that event....

"The only thing certain is, that we ought not to want only to offend intermediate States by acts calculated to arouse hostile feelings against us, but ought rather to cultivate a friendly disposition....

"No rulers have ever shown their jealousy of us more decidedly than the Ameers of Sind, which feeling we are about to stimulate afresh by an act which will justify its past existence, and perpetuate its continuance.

"If the information wanted is indispensable, and cannot be obtained by fair and open means, it ought, I conceive, to be sought by the usual mode of sending unacknowledged emissaries, and not by a deceitful application for a passage under the fictitious presence of one purpose when the real object is another, which we know would not be sanctioned."*

In a minute dated June 2, 1833, Metcalfe wrote:—

"It does not appear to me that the establishment of a British agent at Caubul is requisite or desirable in any point of view.

"The professed object of the proposal is the improvement of commerce. I believe that commerce will take care of itself best without our direct interference in the form of a Commercial Agency; and, if we sought to remove existing obstacles, our efforts would be more needed elsewhere than at Caubul, where the trade with India already receives every possible encouragement.

"A commercial agent would unavoidably become,

* *Kaye's Selections from the Writings of Lord Metcalfe*, pp. 211—217.

from the time of his creation, a political agent. To the extension of our political relations beyond the Indus there appears to me to be great objections. From such a course I should expect the probable occurrence of embarrassments and wars, expensive and unprofitable at the least, without any equivalent benefit, if not ruinous and destructive.

"The appointment of an agent at Caubul would of itself almost amount to an interference in the political affairs of Afghanistan.....

"As a commercial measure, I consider the one proposed to be unnecessary; as a political one, undesirable; and and therefore, on the whole objectionable."*

Kaye writes that

"The survey of the Indus and the Commercial Agency at Caubul were the *prolegomena*, so to speak, of the great epic of the Afghan War; and Metcalfe, in his correspondence both with Lord William Bentinck and Lord Auckland, argued and protested, with equal sagacity and earnestness, against measures which could hardly fail to entangle us in such a manner with the Trans-Indian States as eventually to evolve a great and calamitous war. He left India at a most unfortunate conjuncture. His services were never so much needed as at the time of his departure."†

Metcalfe wrote :

"We could not long exist in a state of adequate pre-

* P. 218, Kaye's *Selections from the writings of Lord Metcalfe*.

† *Ibid*, p. 219.

paration, as we should be utterly ruined by the expense.”*

The navigation of the Indus was ostensibly undertaken for the purpose of presenting a coach and horses to Maharaja Runjeet Singh. Writes Prinsep :

“It was resolved to make the transmission of this present, a means of obtaining information in regard to the Indus, and the facilities, or the contrary, it might offer to navigation....The dray horses were accordingly sent out to Bombay, and the Supreme Government instructed Sir John Malcolm, the Governor of that presidency, to take measures to have them forwarded under charge of an intelligent and prudent officer, in boats up the Indus. Some demur was anticipated on the part of the rulers of Sindh to allowing them passage through the Delta and lower part of the river; but it was assumed that the governing Mirs, situated as they were relatively to Runjeet Singh on the one hand, and the British Government on the other, would not readily incur the risk of offending both powers, by refusing a passage altogether, if it were insisted upon,” (Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab and Political Life of Maharaja Runjeet Singh, Chapter X.)

But Lord Bentinck had his designs on the provinces of the Punjab and Sind and so he paid no heed to the warning voice of Metcalfe.†

* *Ibid*, p. 199.

† “The main and great aim of Government, is declared to be to open the Indus. Was the Indus ever closed or, farther closed than by its dangerous entrances and shallow

It was because he had his eye on Sind, that he stood in the way of Maharaja Runjeet Singh's attempt in adding that province to his dominions. The treaty which was concluded with Runjeet

depth of water? Another object was to open the countries on and beyond the Indus to commerce. Were they also ever closed? No such thing: they carried on an active, and increasing trade with India and afforded markets for immense quantities of British manufactured goods. The Governments of India and of England, as well as the public at large, were never amused and deceived by a greater fallacy than that of opening the Indus, as regarded commercial objects. The results of the policy concealed under this pretext have been the introduction of troops into the countries on and beyond the river, and of some half a dozen steamers on the stream itself, employed for warlike objects, not for those of trade. There is, besides, great absurdity in commercial treaties with the states of Central Asia, simply because there is no occasion for them. From ancient and prescribed usage, moderate and fixed duties are levied; trade is perfectly free; no goods are prohibited; and the more extensive the commerce carried on the greater advantage to the State. Where, then, the benefit of commercial treaties?" *Manson's Travels*, Vol. III, p. 432.

How Bentinck threatened the Amirs of Sind with the loss of their independence if they would not allow the navigation of the Indus by the British ships, has been thus related by M. Victor Jacquemont in one of his letters, dated December 15th, 1831, to one M. Prosper Marimee of Paris:—

"The Ameers of Sind.....have been independent ever

Singh by the Government of India in 1809 expressly stipulated that that sovereign was not to be hampered in his operations on any country beyond the Sutlej. So Lord Bentinck violated the Treaty when he forbade Runjeet Singh from acquiring Sind.*

The meeting at Roopur, in the latter end of 1831, of Bentinck with Runjeet Singh, was a covert attempt to spy out the military strength of Runjeet Singh.

since the dissolution of the Afghan Empire. For these twenty years past, Runjeet Singh has been coveting their country, and would long ago have seized it, had he not dreaded the displeasure of the British. The Ameers have just been informed that if they do not afford every facility and protection to the commercial and military navigation of the British on the Indus, they will be left to Runjeet Singh's tender mercy. They have hastened to reply that they are the submissive slaves of the old lady of London, and that it will be their pleasure as well as duty to establish dockyards on the banks of their river for the British steam-vessels." (P. 221, Vol. II of M. Jacquemont's *Letters from India*).

* Captain Cunningham, in the seventh chapter of his *History of the Sikhs*, has dwelt at great length on this subject. One of the causes which provoked the Sikh War was the fact that the English to possess Sind themselves had, during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Bentinck, made use of every stratagem, artifice and excuse to prevent Runjeet Singh from acquiring, or extending his power over, Sind.

Regarding this meeting, the celebrated French traveller, Victor Jacquemont, in one of his letters to his brother, wrote :—

"It is not merely a magnificent embassy that the British Government now talk of sending to Runjeet Sing; the Governor-General desires to have a personal interview with the Maharaja. My friend Wade is returned to Lahore, to negotiate the etiquette at the meeting of the two stars of the East. They are counting steps and half steps and regulating beforehand the insignificant sentences which they are to exchange, &c. This is a very grave affair; and I do not think Wade will manage it well. The high contracting parties, as they say, have irreconcilable or incompatible pretensions, which form the subject of parley at the present time. What Lord William wants with Runjeet Sing, I am unable to guess,—to frighten him, perhaps and show him how easy it would be to annihilate him. The Colonel of one of the two regiments of English cavalry in the Calcutta Presidency writes to me from Simla that he has been appointed to command, not the escort, but the army, which is to accompany the Governor-General to his interview with Runjeet, if it take place; or the embassy to Lahore, in the reverse case."

(Jacquemont's *Letters from India*, London, 1834, Vol. II, p. 111).

According to Mr. John Malcolm Ludlow (*British India*, Vol. II, p. 97):—

"At this interview was decided the question of the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by Shah Sooja, a British pensioner at Loodiana, who, in January 1833, with a few hundred followers, set out for the invasion of Afghanistan,

as it appeared by a treaty concluded two months later, with the countenance of Ranjit Sing. His followers soon swelled to 30,000; he defeated the Ameers of Scinde, and moved on towards Candahar, but was in turn defeated by Dost Mahommed, and had eventually to return a fugitive to Loodiana (1834). It is only in connexion with subsequent events that the expedition has some importance."

Runjeet Singh threw all precautions away and did not hesitate to meet Lord Bentinck at Roopur. On a previous occasion, when he had sent presents to Lord Amherst at Simla, the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, who passed the warm season at Simla in 1828, desired to procure an invitation in person to Lahore, but then Runjeet Singh evaded compliance with this wish.* But the Sikh sovereign, addicted to hard drink and debauchery, was losing his strong common sense, for which he was noted, and being easily seduced by the present received from Bentinck, unhesitatingly acceded to the latter's wish and met him with all the pageantry of the East at Roopur.†

It is said that Bentinck was not very favourably impressed with that Sikh sovereign and hence the contemptuous manner with which he treated

* Prinsep's *Runjeet Singh*, 9th Chapter.

† There is a very good account of the meeting at Roopur in *Memoirs of Colonel Skinner* (Vol. II, pp. 206 *et. seq.*)

him, and the conspiracy was laid during Bentinck's regime to subvert the Sikh Raj. Of this conspiracy, we read in the evidence of Captain Macan before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the affairs of the East India Company on 22nd, March, 1832:—

"1446. An idea has been broached that great additional security would result to our Eastern empire from the extension of our frontier to the Indus; is that a subject you have considered?—Yes, I have frequently considered it.

"1447. What is the result of your opinion?—I have heard many military men say that the Indus was our natural boundary in India; but it has been proved by late and former wars, that a river like the Indus is little or no obstruction to a well-organised invading army, and if we are to have a defensible boundary on that side, we should do more than stop at the Indus, we should push our posts into the hills, fastnesses and passes which are beyond that river; but I hold that the conquest of the Punjab (which is the country between the Indus and the Sutlej, upon which latter river our frontier posts are now stationed) would be highly impolitic and unjust. We already possess more territory than we seem capable of governing well. The chief of that state has been on amicable terms with us since the treaty made with him in 1808, the cause of that treaty was an attempt on his part to conquer the Seik Chiefs east of the Sutlej, and the purport of it (which has been faithfully observed by both parties since that period) was that he should not interfere east of that river, nor we to the west of it. The consequence has been, that he has gradually extended his conquests

over the whole of Cashmere, Mooltan, and latterly Peshawar; his territory is extensive, populous and fertile, his army numerous and efficient, perhaps the best native army in India, with the exception of the British. Again, it would be impolitic to extend our frontier in that quarter, as it would bring us in direct collision with the Afghans, one of the bravest, most bigoted, and fanatical of all the Mahomedan tribes. Now, it is well known that the Seiks are neither Mahomedans nor Hindoos, but admit converts of both, though their religion has infinitely more of the Hindoo in it than the Mahomedan; they are therefore a powerful barrier between us and those fanatical tribes, with whom if we were to come in collision, it would unquestionably have a dangerous influence on the religious prejudices of our Mahomedan subjects and troops."

Of this conspiracy we read in Baron Hugel's Travels (p. 334):—

"Several articles had appeared of late in the newspapers of Hindustan and of Calcutta, which went to show that the English must of necessity soon march to the Indus, and make that river the Western boundary of British India, and I fancied that Runjeet Singh had thought a good deal of these articles."

Lord Bentinck did nothing to allay the alarm into which Runjeet Singh was thrown by all these writings in the Calcutta papers, which were of course all inspired by the Governor-General or his subordinates in office. It was the policy of the Company of which Bentinck was the represen-

tative not to make any alliance with Runjeet Singh, for Baron Hugel wrote :—

“A treaty offensive and defensive with the British Government, having a guarantee for the integrity of his possessions, was the only thing that could ensure the dominion of Ranjit Singh. But this would have prevented England from taking immediate advantage of any sudden occurrence which might fall out.” (P. 409.)

Such was the foreign policy then of Lord Bentinck. He annexed Coorg and Kachar ; he interfered needlessly with the affairs of the kingdom of Oudh and his Minute on Oudh was made use of by those who favored the extinction of that kingdom. He unnecessarily humiliated and insulted the king of Delhi. He tried his best to exterminate the independent existence of the Maratha State of Gwalior. He approved of and countenanced, for he made no protest against, the navigation of the Indus, which laid the foundation of all the troubles in Afghanistan, Punjab and Sind.

In the face of the above-mentioned facts, it is nothing less than travesty of truth to say that Lord Bentinck was a peace-loving, honest and straightforward man in his dealings with the native powers of Hindoostan.

In addition to his post of Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck was also Commander-in-Chief in India. The *Meerut Universal Magazine*

for 1835, in reviewing his career in the latter capacity, wrote as follows :—

“A more unfit person for a Commander-in-Chief than Lord William Bentinck it would have been difficult for any Ministry to pitch upon, nor does it reflect credit upon the Court of Directors, the Board of Control, or his Majesty’s Government, that for the sake of effecting a saving of some six or seven thousand pounds a year, the welfare and discipline of an Army....should have been risked, or their interests sacrificed.....

“The first acts of Lord William Bentinck on assuming the command of the Army were taken with a view to reflect disgrace on the rule of his predecessor, and in pursuance of this system all descriptions of complaints were not only received but fostered at headquarters, squabbles long set at rest were carefully raked from their ashes—nourished into representation, enquiries and courts martial, and the curious observer will find, that a large majority of the causes submitted to the decision of the military tribunals, were manufactured out of disputes that occurred in the time of Sir Edward Barnes.....His Lordship loved to live in an atmosphere of complaints, and so long as he received a due quantity, considered that the Army must be progressing to a state of improvement,.....

“With a man so singularly lauded for benevolence and humanity as Lord William Bentinck was, it is extraordinary how many acts we find that would lead the *casual observer* to a belief, that his Lordship was swayed by a selfish disregard of every one but himself or his immediate parasites.....

“Lord William is very fond of Rupees—Lord William loved the Rupees,”

In the administration of domestic affairs Lord Bentinck did little to promote the interests of the natives of India. Indeed some of his measures were best calculated to make the natives miserable and keep them in subjection. Before his time, the executive and judicial functions were not combined in the same individual. But he combined them. That this measure has been a great curse to the people of Hindustan is evident from the fact that the Indian National Congress from its very birth has been praying for the separation of judicial and executive functions—a request which that astute Irish Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, pronounced to be “a counsel of perfection.”

The meeting at Roopur made Runjeet Singh disgusted with the English Government. Jacquemont wrote to his friend, M. Victor De Tracy of Paris, from Delhi, on January 11th, 1832 :—

“There is a coolness between Runjeet Sing and us—I mean the Government. The British wish to occupy the Lower Indus, and push their trade in that direction. They will unquestionably be obliged to establish military posts on the banks, in order to protect it. Hence the ill temper of Runjeet, who cannot resist and is forced to suffer what he cannot prevent.”

“That which he allowed me last year out of compliment to the Governor-General, he would no doubt refuse me now.” (*Ibid*, p. 255).

Lord William Bentinck resumed rent-free lands.

Wrote the *Meerut Universal Magazine* (Vol. I, p. 12):—

“By an old regulation of Government, no person holding *lakhiraj* or rent-free lands, could be deprived of them, until a proper judicial investigation had been instituted on his claim, and a *final* decree past by the Supreme Court. Soon after Lord William Bentinck’s arrival in India, this regulation was repealed, and the Collector was authorised to dispossess the holder of such tax-free lands, by his own authority, without reference to any judicial inquiry, if the Collector should be of opinion after such inquiry as might *satisfy* himself, that the title of the proprietor was invalid. It is therein enacted (Sec. I. Art. I) that ‘such decision of the Collector shall have the force and effect of a decree,’ also that ‘it shall not be necessary for him to transmit his proceedings to the Board of Revenue,’ but that ‘the party dispossessed might appeal, and by Art. 3 whether an appeal be filed or not, ‘that it shall and may be lawful,’ for the Collector immediately to carry into effect his decision by attaching and assessing the lands.’.....

“Only imagine, an English Collector of taxes, summoning the head of the Portland family to produce his title to the estates he now holds, and ‘satisfying himself that the title is invalid’, proceeds ‘immediately to carry into effect *his* decision, by attaching and assessing the lands.’ Yet such an act has Lord William Bentinck perpetrated on the natives of India, on a people he declares to be oppressed and degraded, showing throughout, a cunning and hypocrisy, at which his countrymen must blush. The regulation was public, the suspension of the regulation was public; but the last orders for carrying the original regulation into effect *secret*. Thus,

by a measure more arbitrary than any that can be found in the History of the darkest ages of our own country, have families, that were in comparative affluence, been hurled into the depths of poverty, hundreds and thousands, who considered themselves beyond the reach of adversity, cast upon the world to seek their bread.

"This is what Lord William Bentinck has done for India."

Bentinck did not want the existence of an Indian aristocracy. Therefore he favoured the resumption of estates whose owners died without male issue. It was with reference to this that Sir John Malcolm, on the eve of his retirement from the office of Governor of Bombay, wrote in his farewell Minute of 30th November, 1830 :—

"I have endeavoured through life (and shall as long as I am employed) to mitigate what I deem the evil effects produced by a cold and inflexible policy, which, substituting in all cases attention to principles for consideration of persons, runs counter to the feelings and usages of natives. I know the change must take place ; but I desire it should be gradual, and I cannot convince myself that either our financial or political interest will be promoted by the adoption of measures that consign to early extinction the family of the jagheerdar of Vinchoor, or that of a man of rank and character like Balla Sahib Rastia, or Rajah Bahadoor, and several others belonging to that class, *whose estates it is the opinion of the Right honourable the Governor-General in Council should be resumed* I think it is to be regretted these chiefs were ever placed in possession of estates not intended to be conferred on their heirs, according to the laws and

usages of their tribes ; or when this was done, that it was not specifically stated in their grants that no collateral succession or adoption would in any case be admitted, and a resolution taken never to deviate from the rule laid down.”*

His great aim in the administration of India was to anglicise and denationalise the natives of India. He did not conceal it ; because he came to believe that the anglicisation of India would be of material advantage to England. With this object, among others, in view, he tried his best to introduce English as the court language in India. (*Vide* passages quoted from blue books in *The Modern Review* for February, 1910, pp. 177-179.)

Knowing the views and opinions of Bentinck, Macaulay also did not hesitate to side with the Anglicists and wrote that minute which made English the medium of instruction in India. That minute considerably retarded the growth of the vernaculars of India.

In my *History of Education in India under the rule of the East India Company* (pp. 83 *et seq*), I have stated that Lord William Bentinck of set purpose selected Macaulay to decide the very important controversy between the occidentalists and orientalists. That brilliant English essayist's

* Vol. VI—Political or Foreign Minutes of Evidence before the Parliamentary Committee of 1832. (The italics are ours).

Minute on Education is a counterpart of Mr. William Thackeray's Minute, from which an extract has already been given before. Both the minutes were penned with the object of "suppressing deep thought" amongst Indians and were most probably inspired by Lord William Bentinck.

In the chapter on the Mutiny at Vellore extracts have been given from the Revd. Mr. Sydney Smith's article in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1807 to show the encouragement afforded by Bentinck to Christian Missionaries to convert the heathens of India. The introduction of English education in this country was conceived with the same object in view. Macaulay looked upon it as a step that would lead to the conversion of Indians to Christianity. Thus in 1836, Macaulay wrote to his father :

"It is my firm belief that if our plans of education are followed up there will not be a single idolator among the respectable classes in Bengal thirty years hence."

Commenting on the above, the *Indian Daily News* for March 30, 1909 wrote :—

"Lord Macaulay's triumph...was really the triumph of a deliberate intention to undermine the religious and social life of India.....how behind his splendid phrases, there lay quite a different view."

Bentinck was thwarted from accomplishing his purpose in Madras by the outbreak at Vellore and his subsequent recall. As Governor-General, he

tried to carry into execution his long-cherished intention and so appointed Macaulay, the youngest of his councillors and without any personal experience of Indian life, to preside over the committee of Anglicists and orientalists.

Lord Bentinck did all that lay in his power to give impetus to the settlement and colonization in India of his co-religionists and compatriots. The free resort of his countrymen to India would lead, he thought, to the Anglicisation of the natives, which would be advantageous to England.

He is considered to be a great philanthropist, because he passed that act which prevented the immolation of widows known as *Suttee*. Of course, it was the right thing to do. But the ground had been paved as it were for him by the writings of Raja Ram Mohun Roy. If the credit is mainly due to anybody for the abolition of *Suttee*, it is to Ram Mohun Ray.* Bentinck was obliged to him, for it was not Bentinck but Ram Mohun Roy who was the object of obloquy and the target for ridicule and attack of the Hindus; for they knew

* Lieutenant A. White, a contemporary of Ram Mohun Roy, writes in his "Considerations on the State of British India," pp. 60-61 :

"This enlightened Hindoo Ram Mohun has rendered a signal service to his countrymen in exposing the cruelty and injustice of the practice which condemns a widow to sacrifice herself on the funeral pile of her husband ;"

that without the powerful aid of Ram Mohun, Bentinck would not and could not have ventured to enact the abolition of Suttee. But such was the sense of gratitude possessed by Bentinck that he put obstacles in the way of Ram Mohun Roy's proceeding to England as ambassador of the King of Delhi and did not recognise the title of Raja which the Moghul King had honoured him with.

It is said that Bentinck was a friend of the natives, because he recognised their claims to more extensive employment in the service of the State and for the posts of Deputy Collectors created during his regime. It was not from any philanthropic considerations that the natives were more widely employed. It was financial necessity which obliged the authorities to resort to native agency ; —the same necessity which led to the curtailment of the *batta* of the civil and military officers and which made Bentinck so unpopular with his countrymen in India.

By right, all the appointments in the public services of India belong to the natives, because they are the children of the soil and also the taxpayers. Even if Bentinck employed them more extensively, we do not see any reason why he should be thanked or considered a philanthropist for merely meting out a little justice to them.*

* Prof. H. H. Wilson, in his continuation of Mill's

It should be remembered that Bentinck was no advocate of high education in India. This will be gathered from the following from the Minute of Sir Charles Metcalfe, dated the 16th May, 1835 :—

“His Lordship (Bentinck), however, sees further danger in the spread of knowledge and the operations of the Press. I do not, for my own part, anticipate danger as a certain consequence from these causes.”

Regarding the credit given to Lord Bentinck for the liberty of the press, the *Mecrut Universal Magazine* (Vol. 1, 112) wrote :

“There are men, perhaps, who may tell us that the Indian community should be thankful for the mis-called liberty allowed during the rule of Lord William Bentinck. If any such can be found, shame on them.

History of British India in a footnote in Book III, Chapter VI, writes :

“Regulation V., 1831. The credit of this enactment has sometimes been given exclusively to Lord W. Bentinck ; but this is an injustice. That his Lordship unreservedly admitted the principle, and zealously carried into practice the employment of respectable natives in the administration of public affairs, is undoubtedly true ; but the justice and necessity of the measure had been fully recognised, both in India and England, long before Lord W. Bentinck’s appointment ; and the provisions of the Regulation here cited were based, as mentioned in the Regulation, upon the suggestions and orders of the Court of Directors, prior to the arrival in India of the actual Governor-General.”

for spaniel like, they would lick the hand that chastised. Lord William Bentinck dared not to attack the press!

• "Had he raised his finger against the Indian Press, he would have been hooted by his constituents on his return to England! His expectations from the party with which he is allied, (together with his political reputation, small as it is,) were greater than those of a pension from the East India Company!!! For these reasons he dared not; had he not dreaded an exposure in England, his Lordship would not have hesitated for an instant in the course to be pursued. But times were changed since his Lordship governed the Madras Presidency, and let the reader contrast the conduct of Lord William Bentinck, in refusing permission to Sir William Gwillim to publish his address to a jury, an address written by a Judge, an address spoken by that Judge when presiding on the judgment seat of the highest tribunal, with the same Lord William's false pretensions to popular esteem, held forth while in Bengal.

"It is necessary in my opinion, for the public safety, that the press in India should be kept *under the most rigid control*. It matters not from what pen the dangerous matter may issue, the higher the authority the greater the mischief.' (Lord William Bentinck at Madras.)

"This is the language of the man, who 'knew no subject which the press might not freely discuss,' this is the man who for seven years induced the Indian European community to believe that they were enjoying freedom of discussion; the man who duped them with the shadow for the substance; yet the man, who in the words of Sir James Mackintosh, well knew 'that to inform the public of the conduct of those who administer public affairs, requires courage and *conscious security*. If it is not done boldly, it cannot be done effectually;

and it is not from writers trembling under the up-lifted scourge, that we are to hope for a proper discharge of the duty.' "

The Governor-General's view regarding the acceleration of communications between England and India was that by this "the natives of India in person would be enabled to bring their complaints and grievances before the authorities and the country,".... and by which "disinterested travellers would have it in their power to report to their country at home the nature and circumstances of this distant portion of the Empire." The result, he trusted, would be "to rouse the shameful apathy and indifference of Great Britain to the concerns of India." (Ludlow's *British India*, Vol. II, pp. 98-99).

But there is a difference between what Bentinck professed and what he practised. Had he been sincere in the view expressed above he would have treated Ram Mohun Roy's mission to England on behalf of the Mogul Emperor of Delhi, or, that of the King of Oude, quite differently from what he did.

That Bentinck's seven years' rule from 1828-1835 was on the whole beneficial to the natives of the country is a myth. His foreign policy was aggressive and his domestic policy was destructive of the best interests of the children of the soil.

